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A B S T R A C T
An attempt has been made in this thesis to study 
the various problems arising out of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion;their consequences and effects on the economy of 
the State and to suggest ways and means to discourage it
The first Chapter outlines the background in which 
tax crimes are committed in India today*
The second Chapter is devoted to a brief description 
of the origin of direct taxes in India and discusses the 
working of the Income Tax machinery.
A brief examination of the various practices 
adopted by ingeneous taxpayers to defeat the provisions 
of law in order to escape taxes has been made in Chapter 
three. The study of tax avoidance devices adopted by the 
Hindu undivided family is given particular attention.
A detailed analysis of the judicial attitude to 
tax avoidance in India and Britain has been made in 
Chapter four.
In the fifth Chapter an appraisal of the nature 
and extent of tax evasion has been made. The defects in 
legislation and administration have also been pointed out.
In the sixth and seventh Chapters legislative
provisions relating to penalties and prosecutions for 
tax avoidance and tax evasion have been discussed. The 
provisions relating to the application of the common law 
doctrine of mens rea in administrative and criminal 
sanction have been discussed and compared with the 
situation in other countries.
A judicial review of the provisions relating to 
the nature of penalty proceedings, burden of proof and 
the constitutionality of fiscal legislation has been 
made in Chapter eight.
This is followed by concluding remarks in Chapter
nine.
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C H A P T E R  I
INTRODUCTION
Taxation, besides being a major source of revenue,
is one of the most important weapons by which the State can
mitigate two objectionable aspects of an unrestricted right
to private property, firstly, the inequalities of wealth,
and secondly, the power to use property for private profits,
without regard to the community’s interest • In other words,
taxation is an instrument for implementing an egalitarian^
economic and social policy, redistributing income on a
2
socially desirable pattern .
In India revenue from taxes constitutes 13 per cent
*5
of national revenue and a substantial part of this comes 
from direct taxes^. This must be increased in the coming
1. ’Law in a Changing Society1, Friedmann (1959) P-85
2. K.C. Pant, Minister for Revenue and Expenditure,
Government of India, 2nd All India Conference of Tax 
Executives, (1967) p.3.
3. B.R. Bhagat, Minister for Revenue and Expenditure, 
Government of India, 1st All India Conference of Tax 
Executives, (1966), p.1.
4. A little less ,than fifty per cent of total tax revenue,
i.e., approximately 6 per cent of the total revenue of the 
Government of India comes from Direct Taxes, and about 96 
per cent of which represents Income tax. See’Report on 
Tax Administration in India’. Foreign Tax Assistance, 
U.S.A.I.D, India (1964)* p.5. The percentage contributions 
from tax in relation to national income in other countries 
are as mentioned: Sweden 41.0 per cent, France 38.6 per
cent, Austria 36.4 per cent, West Germany 34.9 per cent, 
U.K. 31.5 per cent, Italy 29.1 per cent, Canada 28.2 per 
cent, New Zealand 26.8 per cent, and Japan 19.3 per cent. 
See ’Fiscal Figures’. David B. Perry (1969) 17 Cah. T.J. 
207 at p. 208.
2years, if the country is to achieve social and economic
prosperity, A sound taxation policy and the whole-hearted
co-operation of the taxpayer are essential. In other words,
taxes should be just, equitable and directed towards the wider
interests of every section of the community and the taxpayer
should pay the tax due by him to the State without reluctance.
Taxes should not be regarded as a. confiscation of one!s private
property but as a fair contribution to the financial needs of
the State. As Justice Holmes said, 11 taxes are what we pay for
civilized society.” He further stated, "I like to pay taxes.
15
7/ith them I buy civilization. 11 And Sir Leo Money once told 
the Royal Commission of Income Tax that taxes were the best 
expenditure he ever made and he got more satisfaction from 
them than any other expenditure incurred by him,^
However, there are persons who do not appreciate the 
importance of agricultural, industrial and commercial 
advancement, which can only be achieved by capital 
expenditure, financed by taxes. They do not realize that the 
goals of political freedom and a socialistic pattern of 
society, called for in our Constitution, requires every 
citizen to discharge his public obligation, in particular to 
pay his taxes, so that the welfare state can be established. 
But many people adopt unfair means to avoid and evade the
5. fIhe Lav/ and Practice of Income Tax* , J.B. Kanga and H.A. 
Palkhivala, 6th ed. (1969) Vol. I, b xix.
6 . Ibid.
payment of taxes legally imposed by the State, thereby
hindering the social and economic progress of the country.
Such activities violate the Directive principles in the
Indian Constitution. They include all possible methods
employed to escape the impact of taxes lawfully imposed by
legislation, by delay in payment of taxes, by tax avoidance
and by tax evasion.
When fiscal legislation is before the legislature ,
the taxpayer, particularly the business magnates in the
country, try to influence the legislature by lobbying and
by propaganda, to secure their statutory immunity and
concessions in;their own interests to the prejudice of the
general public. Some of the legislative reliefs asked for
are the reduction of taxes, the liberalization of exemptions,
the grant of credits, depletion and depreciation allowances
7and the creating of hitherto unrecognized allowances'.
The practice of delay in payment of taxes has 
become a lucrative source of income, especially for 
taxpayers in the upper income group, such as businessmen, 
manufacturers and industrialists. They earn huge profits 
by investing unpaid taxes either in their own businesses 
or at high rates of interest. At the same time they petition 
Government to grant partial or total exemption from taxes, 
accumulated in millions, on the pretext of their inability 
to pay such huge sums.^
7. 1 Tax Fraud and Evasion1, H.G.Balter, 3rd ed. (1963) p.2.
8 . Government of India exempted Ram Ratan Gupta, an 
industrialist of Kanpur, from the payment of taxes amounting tc 
several lakhs. Hindustan Times, May 10, 1966.
4Tax avoidance indicates a defect in the law. It is 
a device by v/hich a person, acting within the framework of 
the law, arranges his affairs in such a manner that he has 
either reduced his taxable income or has no income on which 
tax is payable. For instance, the act of representing one’s 
mother as a partner in one’s business in order to minimize 
one’s income and to reduce tax liability by taking advantage 
of a provision of law meant to apply to a genuine partnership,
Q
is an act of avoidance of tax •
Tax evasion denotes defrauding the revenue by such
illegal acts as concealment of income, or furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income, or making a false return,
or malcing false claims to allowances, in order to defeat
the provisions of the law. For instance, if a man with a
Swiss watch in his pocket says, to the Customs authorities
at the Bombay Airport, ”1 have nothing to declare,” he is
evading customs duty, which he is bound by law to pay on
taking the watch within the territory of India*
Tax avoidance and tax evasion have only a shade of 
10difference . The standard dictionaries of the English
11language treat the word ’evasion' and ’avoidance’ as synonyms «
9* Be Central Talkies Circuit, Matunga, A.I.R. 1941 Bom.205.
10. ’Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance1. Montgomery B. Angell,
(<938) 38 Col. L.J. 81.
11. Webster’s International Dictionary of English Language (1930} 
p. 106; Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary (1968). p.71.
5However, a distinction is drawn between them by the law,
which regards the former as illegal and the latter as legal.
And the Courts of law in most cases have upheld the right of
the citizen and the resident to so arrange his affairs that
he pays the minimum qmount of taxes, by making use of
loopholes in the law. Tax avoidance, therefore, has acquired
a constitutional sanctity in most countries, including India.
Whatever may be the legal position, all these
activities result in a colossal loss of revenue to the State
in these times of grave economic emergency. They are for all
purposes amongst the most important form of economic crimes
12or white collar crimes and are as reprehensible as any other 
crime under the law of the land. But persons involved in 
tax-evading activities, recognized as criminals, are neither 
treated as ordinary criminals nor punished adequately; they 
are accepted by society as respectable and good citizens. 
This may be due to some defect in the law, or in the 
procedure, or in the enforcement machinery, or to the lenient 
attitude of the State, but it is also due to a regrettable 
social attitude of perversity or indifference, which imputes 
no shame to such activities and the bias of the judicial 
tribunals towards offenders from the well-to-do sections of 
the community.
1 2. 1 Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction*. Hermann 
Mannheim (1946), p . 1 4 5 ; Report of the Committee on
Prevention of Corruption. 1964, Government 0f India,
p. 271.
6It is distressing to note that hardly any prosecution
worth the name has been instituted in India during the last
two and a half decades for illegal evasion of taxes.
This lenient attitude towards violators of the
revenue laws leads to a number of undesirable consequences.
People lose faith in the law and the democratic institutions
of the country; they think there is one law for the poor and
another for the rich. Peelings of frustration will increase
when the honest, law abiding citizen is asked to assume the
heavy burden cast on him by dishonest tax evaders, and this
will ultimately lead to increase in crime.
ho doubt tax avoidance and tax evasion are as old as
taxes themselves and are prevalent in almost all countries of 
13the world . But they have multiplied enormously during the
13* 1Report of the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry
Committee 1938-39"« Government of India, para. 7«2, p. 1 4 6; 
Messrs. Masukhlal v. C.I.T., Bombay, A.I.R. 1969 B.C. 1083, 
1092* See "Report of the U.K. Royal Commission on Income 
Tax. 1920, para 625> p* 135; "Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance: The Problems in the United Kingdom1, C1954) 2, 
Can. T.J. 377, 376; supra note 10, p. 80; "German Tax 
Avoidance: Looking at Loopholes11, Economist1 Vol. 211, 
(1964 June 27); "Taxationin Australia, Agenda for Reform1, 
\1964)f P« 128; "Canadian Report of the Royal Commission 
on Taxation*, Vol. Ill 11966) p.103 and Appendix A, pp. 
5 3 7 5 5 7 8. "Legislative Measures to Right Tax Frauds in 
Norway", Kristian Straneby, U953JT 1 * Bulletin for 
International Documentation, p.257; "The Struggle Against 
Tax Evasion; The Situation in Denmark," Hofrt-Lorenzen, 
1953t 7 5 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 
p.8 . "Report of the Director of State Revenue: State of 
Israel (March 3, 1965) > P* 1; "Economic Crimes in the*
Soviet Union, (1964) 5 5 Journal of the International 
Commission of Jurists, p.1; "Obstacle to a Revenue
Administration in the Phillipines", Roman A. Cruz (1 9 6 9) 10 
The Tax Monthly, p.13, (Ph.il!ipines).
last two and a half decadds in India since the achievement 
of political independence and have become a menace to 
society. As pointed out by the Committee on Prevention of 
Corruption:
"The advance of technological and scientific development 
is contributing to the emergence of ’’mass society", with 
a large rank and file and a small controlling elite, 
encouraging the growth of monopolies, the rise of a 
managerial class and intricate institutional mechanisms. 
Strict adherence to a high standard of ethical behaviour 
is necessary for the even and honest functioning of the 
new social, political and economic processes. The 
inability of all sections of Society to appreciate in 
full this need results in the emergence and growth of 
white-collar and economic crimes, renders enforcement 
of the laws, themselves not sufficiently deterrent, 
more difficult’ .... Tax evasion and avoidance... 
evasion of economic lav/s, bribery and corruptioh, 
election offences and malpractices are some of the 
examples of white-collar crimes."^
These anti-social activities are by no standard less 
heinous crimes than those committed against the State under 
the Indian Penal Code.
The Government of India appears lately to be much 
concerned with these problems* With the result that it has 
referred the simplification and rationalization of tax laws 
and the search for ways and means to check tax avoidance 
and tax-evasion, prevalent on such an alarming scale in the 
country, to various committees and commissions. However, not 
much success has been achieved as yet.
A modest attempt,therefore, has been made in this 
thesis to study these problems in a wide socio-legal field 
in the hope of suggesting how the problem of tax crimes in
14. (1964) para 2,13, p.11.
India can be handled in a more co-ordinated, well arranged 
and scientific way and how the maximum amount of taxes can be 
effectively realized by the State, so that it can meet its 
commitments for the establishment of a welfare state.
The study of the subject is urgent, as India is 
facing enormous economic problems and its five year plans 
for the development and progress of the country have not 
produced the expected results. Moreover, there is no 
published work on the subject, in which the problems relating 
to tax avoidance and tax evasion have been examined in the 
light of judicial pronouncements.
The problem of tax crimes requires a comprehensive 
study of law, sociology, economics, psychology, politics and 
anthropology. This obviously is beyond the scope of the 
present study, which is mainly confined to the legal aspect 
of the problem, leaving the rest to be explored by others.
Of course, the problems relating to equitable taxation, the 
importance of human relations and education of taxpayers 
are often emphasized.
As the title of the thesis indicates, the study has 
been limited to "Crimes relating to Income Tax" only. This 
has been done to avoid confusion and to enable a more 
thorough examination of the provisions relating to tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.
9A critical examination of the problem arising out of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion has been made. The various 
measures adopted by the Government, both administrative 
and legal, have been set out and their efficacy ha& been 
examined. The Courts1 attitude to tax crimes, particularly 
in relation to tax avoidance in India and Britain, will be 
of interest to academic lawyers.
Though this thesis does not pretend to be a 
comparative study, a detailed review of similar provisions 
of law relating to tax avoidance and tax evasion in some 
of the major Commonwealth countries, namely, Britain, 
Australia, Canada, hew Zealand, on the one hand and the 
United States of America on the other, ha© been made. The 
Courts1 attitude in these countries in interpreting the 
statutory provisions relating to tax avoidance and tax 
evasion has also been examined.
At the close of the study, suggestions have been 
made for strengthening the administrative machinery, amending 
the law, educating the people in order to inculcate a sense 
of duty to pay their taxes, and for strictly enforcing 
penal provisions, in order to deter people from indulging 
in such anti-social crime; it is urged that the judiciary 
should change its traditional attitude, when interpreting 
the provisions of taxation legislation and give a liberal 
construction of such provisions, so that the intentions of 
the legislation may not be frustrated.
10
C H A P T E E II
HEVENUE COLLECTION
Taxation
It is a well recognized fact since time
immemorial that the State needs money to finance its
activities , to maintain its internal and external
security and to run the administration for the well-being
2
of its people* Taxation is one of the major devices used
1. A Plea for Tax on Casual Income« B.N. Varma, Tax 
Consultant Conference Souvenir, (Jaipur) 1964 at p*13.
2. Prof. Wills: Constitutional Law of the United States: 
"The three great legislative powers usually exercised 
by the government are the power of taxation, the 
police power, and the power of eminent domain. The 
power of taxation may be defined as the legal capacity 
of government to impose charges upon persons or their 
property to raise revenue for governmental purposes. 
The levying of taxes is a legislative function; the 
determination of the amount of each individual's tax 
is an aaministrative function; but whether either 
function has been properly exercised is a judicial 
function”. Quoted from The A.I.E. Commentaries; The 
Constitution of India:Chitaley, V#V# and Appu Eao, S., 
Vol.Ill, Eirst Edition, (1956), Article 265* Note 2* 
-Law in a Changing Society*by W* Eriedmann, (1959)* 
London, Stevens and Sons, Ltd. at p* 85*
11
3
by the Government*^ to extract money or other valuable
A
things from people by securing the enactment of
legislation for this purpose. Taxes are compulsory
contributions to public funds, regardless of the presence
or absence of a specific quid pro quo between the tax-
15
payer and the public authority . The essence of taxation 
is compulsion, i.e., it is imposed under statutory powers 
without the taxpayers1 consent. Thus, a man cannot claim 
exemption from a tax to support educational institutions 
on the ground that he has no children to educate. Nor can 
a man claim or ask for adjustment of taxes to the amount 
of the services rendered to, or to the benefits enjoyed by
3* *A Quarter Century of Direct Taxes in India 1959-64, 1 
Pophale, G.I.: Economic Research and Training
Foundation, Bombay, p.24; S. Narayanappa & Brothers v. 
I.T.O. A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 40,42. Report of the Indian 
Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924-25), Vol .1 at p . 6 
enumerates some of the sources of revenue. They are -
1. State domain and tributes; 2. Fines and Penalties;
3* Business 'undertakings; 4* Fees and 5* Taxes. Tax 
Revenue constitutes 13 per cent of the national income
of India, Bhagat, B.R., Minister of State in the Ministry 
of Finance, Government of India, Inaugural address report: 
First Tax Executives* Conference: Federation of India 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi (1 9 6 6), at p.
4* The Government of Communist China imposes taxes on 
peasants assessed in units of grains produced, and it 
requires payment in grains itself. Internationai 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Vol.15 (1968) at p.521
5. 1 The Burden of British taxation*, Findley, G., Shirr as 
and kostal, L. The iTational Institute of Economic and 
Social Studies II Cambridge University Press, 1942. p.1, 
See *Nigerian*s Tax Efforts*by A.O. Phillips (1970), 
British Tax Review, p. 180.
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him. A poor man who pays the least may receive the largest 
benefit from public services as compared with a rich man, 
who contributes heavily in taxes, because the object of 
the government in a welfare State is to extend all 
benefits to every one equally, irrespective of caste, 
creed, colour and position in society. With this end in 
view, the burden is heavier upon those who are best able 
to bear it. In other words, as observed by the Supreme 
Court of India in Commissioner H.R.E. v. L.T. Swaroiar:
11 A lax ... is a compulsory exaction of money 
by public authority for public purposes 
enforceable by law and is^not payment 
'for services rendered1.n
Similarly, Cooley says in his book on 'Constitutional
Law' that:
"The word 'taxes' in its most enlarged sense, 
embraces all the regular impositions made by the 
Government upon the person, property, privileges, 
occupations and enjoyments of the people for the 
purpose of raising public revenue."*
6 . A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 at p.295 (para.43). Economists 
in general have agreed that the two of the most 
important characteristics of a tax are: 1. that it is 
a compulsory payment made to the state, and 2 . that 
there is no immediate quantitative relation between 
the tax paid by the individual and the service 
rendered by him to the State: See Report of the
Indian Taxation Enquiry Cnmynitteg (1924-25)* Vol.I, 
p.7 , for definition of tax.
7. Cooley's Constitutional Law (4th ed.), at p.6 1.
Quoted from Narayanappa and Brothers v. I.I.O.
A.I.R*(1960) Mysore 40 at p.42; See Corpus Juris 
Secundum Vol.83 (1953)* 944.
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Thus, the power of taxation is an attribute of 
sovereignity and is essential to the very existence of 
the State*
The power of taxation can only be exercised by
the State through legislation, and it is this great
constitutional principle that is embodied in Article 265
of the Constitution of India. Article 265 states that:
!fRo tax shall be levied or collected 
except by authority of law . 1,8
This means that not only the levy but even the
9collection of a tax must be under an authority of
8 . In England this principle was established as long ago 
as 1215 in Magna Carta and finally affirmed by the 
Bill of Rights (1869) in the following words:
"levying money for the use of the Crown by pretence
of prerogative without grant of Parliament is illegal "j 
In the United States of America, Article 1 , section 8 
(i) of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that; 
"The Congress shall have the power to levy and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises..•"
9. The Constitution of India has laid down the procedure 
for such purposes in Articles 110,117*123*199*207 and 
2 1 3* which must be strictly complied with in order to 
validate the levy or collection of the tax: Zila 
Parishad Moradabad v. K.S. Mills. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 
p.96 at p. 100) M. Mohammad Ishawk v. C.I.T., Belhi, 
A.jmer-Merwara A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 296 at p.297 (para 7). 
The Court held that if an Income-tax Officer recovers 
tax except in accordance with the procedure established 
by law, it would amount to taking property in 
contravention of the provisions of Article 31 of the 
Constitution. The Constitution of India in Item 82 of 
List I of the 7th Schedule has provided for the imposition 
of Income-tax. The provision is wide enough to include 
not only legislations for levying of tax but also as 
authorizing an enactment which prevents the tax imposed 
from being evaded. See Baldeo Singh v. C.I.T., Delhi 
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 742; Bala.ii v.Iffg* Special 
Investigation Circle A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 123.
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10law . Thus a tax can only be imposed by a law, which is
valid according to the relevant provisions of the 
11
constitution , viz*, (i) the law must be within the
legislative competence of the legislature, being covered
by an item in tne legislative list assigned to it by the 
12constitution ; (ii) the law must be validly enacted, i*e., 
by the proper body which has the legislative authority to 
legislate on the matter, and in the manner required by law 
to give its acts the force of law '; (iii) the law must 
not violate Article 13^  of the constitution or any other 
constitutional limitations* In other words, the law
10. fLaw* in this Article refers to statute law or law 
made by the legislature. A customary imposition is 
no longer valid. State of Kerala v* Joseph* A.I.R.
1958 S.O. 296.
1 1. See Commentary on the Constitution of India, D*D*
Basu, 5th ed.Yol.4 , pp . 238 to 260.
1 2. The Constitution of India, Schedule VII, provides 
three lists enumerating matters on which the central 
and state legislatures can make laws. They are as
follows: List I: Union List: Entries 82-92A: Parliament 
dah.make laws on mattemrelhtlhg to taxes mentioned in 
the said entries. List II: State List: State legislatures 
can make laws relating to taxes mentioned in entries 45 
to 63• List III: Concurrent List: Both the Parliament 
and the State legislatures can make laws. Entries 35 
and 44 deal with taxes.
13« Bharat Kala Bhandar v. Lhamangaon Municipality* A.I.R. 
1966 S.C. 249 (262).
14. Bala.ii v. I.T.O.* A.I.R 1962 S.C. 123 (128). Khandige 
Sham Bhat v. Agricultural I. T. Officer. A.I.R. 1963 
S.C. 591*594; Purshotam Gound.ii tealai v. B'.M. Lesai 
Add. Collector, Bombay, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20; Thangal 
Kunju Musaliar v. Venkatachalam.A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246.
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should not be such as to infringe any of the fundamental
rights guaranteed to the people under part III of the
constitution, such as that in Article 141^* Article 19 (1)
(a)1 ,^ Article 19 (1) (f)1^, and Article 19 (1) (g)18*
Article 2 01^, Article 2120, Article 289 or Article 303.
However, the constitution does not prohibit the retrospective
21imposition of a tax.
The principal of *No taxation save by authority 
of law* is so well guarded by the courts that they would 
not infer the grant of a power to tax from any legislation 
in the absence of a clear expression. The courts have never 
hesitated to strike down a taxing act, if the taxing power 
is colourably exercised by the State for the enforcement
15. Kunnathat Mopil Hair v. State of Kerala. A.I.R# 1961
S.C. 352.
16. Express Newspapers v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1958 S.C.
578,614..
17. Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P.. A.I.R. 1962
s.C. 1563, 7-1570-72; •
18. Supra note 15.
19* Maqhool Hussein v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 325* 
R. Prasad Mohanlal v. I.T.A. Tribunal, A.I.R. 1970 
620,624*625, IP.B.) N.A. Malbury and Brothers v. C.I.T. 
Bombay, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1807.
20. Purskottam Govind.ii Halai v. B.M. Desai Add Collector 
of Bombay, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20; Collector of Malabar 
v. E. Ebrahim  ^A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 6 8 8.
21. World Tax Series: Taxation in India : Harvard Law
School (I9b0) p.44 para 1/4*1*
of a forbidden power. On this point the courts in both
22 23India ana the Unitea Kingdom  ^have taken a similar
stana and have declared taxing laws ultra vires, if not
enacted strictly according to law. However, the power of
taxation belongs exclusively to the legislature, and the
courts can interfere only if the taxing power overrides
the constitutional provisions.
Taxes,besides being a means of raising revenue to 
finance governmental expenditure, are a major instrument 
for implementing the economic and social policy of the 
State. Broadly speaking taxes are an instrument in 
regulating consumer purchasing power in relation to goods 
and services, by providing incentives for production, 
investment and saving, and influencing the balance of 
payments and the structure of economy, as well as
22. Yasin v. Town Area Committee, (1952) S.C.R. 572. The 
Town Area Committee framed two bye-laws (1 and 4b) to 
charge fees from persons, who sold or purchased 
vegetables or fruits within the local area. The bye- 
laws were framed under sections 295 and 298 of the 
U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which empowered the 
Town Area Committee to make bye-laws to charge fees 
for the use and occupation of any property vested in 
or entrusted to the management of the Town Area 
Committee * Bye-laws 4 (b; provided that any person can 
sell wholesale at any place in the town area, provided 
he paid the prescribed fee.
The court held that the bye-laws were ultra vires, for 
the Act did not empower the committee to charge any fees, 
otherwise than for the use or occupation of any property
vested in or entrusted to the committee. But the bye- 
laws in effect forbid a person from using any land or 
place within the limits of the committee, without 
payment of the prescribed fee.; Lokmanya Mills v Barsi 
Borough Municipality, A.I.R.1961 S.C. 1558, 1560-61.
25. Attorney General v . Wilts United Dairies (1922) 127 
L.T. 822.
17
contributing directly to the long term growth2^. As a 
result of taxation a balance is created in the spending 
potential of the private and public sector. Wealth is in 
a way redistributed when persons are asked to contribute 
to the exchequer in the form of taxes in a fixed proportion, 
determined by law, according to their capacity.2  ^ Thus, 
taxes are increased in time of war and emergency to subdue 
inflation ana reduced in time of depression to stimulate 
production. It may not be out of place to quote a passage 
from Encyclopedia Britannica, which summarizes the objectives 
of the law of taxation in a very simple and clear language
24♦ “Social Effects of Fiscal Legislation with Special 
reference to Devaluation" by Debi Prasad Pal. J.i. 
L.I., (West Bengal State Unit), Vol. 3* P* 163;
'The British System of Taxation1, Central Office 
of Information Reference Pamphlet 10. H.M.S.O.,
London, (1969), at p.4; fTax Reform Proposals in New 
Zealand, (1968) 16 Canadian Tax Journal p.146.
25* 1 Tax and Social Benefits* The Accountant, March 12,
1976, at p. 361 (Vol. 762 No. 4969); see 1Incidence 
of Taxes and Social Service Benefits in 1Q6 8: 
Economic Trends1: Study.from the Central Statistical 
Office Treasury Publication (quoted in Accountant 
at p .361 stated above); 'The Use of Tax System to 
Achieve Economic and Social Objectives1 (1967)
15 Canadian Tax Journal, pp. 112 to 130.
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in tiie following words:
11 The pervading objective of taxation, 
in concert with other government 
policies, is to promote the general 
welfare. Taxes contribute to this 
end by providing the financial 
foundation for the substantive function 
of the government and at the same time 
serving as an engine of social and 
economic betterment, which nations can 
call upon to reduce excessive 
inequalities of wealth, to check 
inflation and war profiteering, and 
to promote economic stability."26
The word “tax** in Article 26b of the constitution
has been used in a wide and comprehensive sense to include
27any 'impost1, - general, special, or local . As the
28Supreme Court of India in Muhammadbhai v. State of Gu.iarat 
has said, 'tax' includes not only 'taxes' but also 'fees', 
'duties', 'cesses' etc. However, schedule VII of the 
constitution has used 'tax' in the entries in the 
legislative list in a restricted sense, distinguishing it
26.  'Encyclopedia Britannica'(19 6 7 ). Vol. 21, at p.725;  
see Taxation and Foreign Investment: A Study of 
Taxation Itaws in ^ d i a  in Relation to Foreign 
Investment*, National Council of Applied Economics 
Research, New Delhi (1957)> P*2; 'Inaugural Address' 
by K.C. Pant, 3rd All India Conference of Tax 
Executives' ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  pp. 8 , 9 ;  'Report of the Working 
Group on Central Direct Taxes': Administrative 
Reforms Commission, (1968) at p.137 (para 7 * 8 ) .
27* Constitution of India, Article 366 (28 )  provides that 
"Taxation" includes the imposition of any tax or 
impost, whether general or local or special, and "tax" 
shall be construed accordingly". This is the 
reproduction of Item 17 of section 311 (2 )  of the 
Government of India Act, 1935*
28. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1517 at p. 1530.
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from ffeesf, 'duty1 and 'cess*.
A 'fee' is a payment levied by an appropriate 
authority in respect of some privilege or special services
performed by such authority for the benefit of the
29individual.  ^ For example, if a local authority, say the 
Borough of Islington, makes it obligatory on the part of 
those, who want to use a vehicle in its jurisdiction, to 
take out a licence for the purpose and pay a certain amount 
for it. The amount is termed a 'fee1 (licence fee) and 
not a 'tax', because the taking of a licence is not 
obligatory, unless, of course, one uses the vehicle within 
its jurisdiction.
The licence holder would derive special benefit ;by 
virtue of holding the licence, i.e., he can use the vehicle 
within the local limits of the borough, which others not 
having a licence could not do. Thus, there is always an 
element of quid pro quo between the authority charging the 
fee and the person paying the fee, which is lacking in case 
of a tax. Further, a fee is a voluntary payment . 
and the payment is usually related to the special benefit 
available to the payer of the fee, unlike a tax, which is 
a compulsory exaction of money, with no particular 
advantage to the tax payer. However, a tax is generally 
levied, taking into consideration the payer's capacity to
29. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowment v. L.T. 
Swamiar ^ A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 2b2 at p. 295 (para^H)
2 0
pay, whereas in imposing a fee, as a rule no account is
taken of the abilities of the different assessees.
The distinction between a 'tax' and a •fee* is of
special significance under the constitution in determining
the legislative competence of the legislature imposing the
’tax’ or ’fee1. As the power to levy various kinds of
impositions has been distributed by the various entries in
the legislative lists, the validity of the impositions
made by a particular legislature has to be judged with
reference to those entries; for instance, some of the
entries in the legislative lists refer to 1 taxes1 while
30. A fixed rate of fee is levied for everyone
irrespective of the payer’s capacity, for instance, 
court fee, licence fee, tuiton fee etc., are charged 
equally from everyone.
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51some others to1fees1 • Accordingly, the courts have to
enquire into the real nature of the impost in order to judge
32the legality of the legislation in question •
31. See Entries (in lists I,II, and III) of Schedule VII for 
’fees1 and ’taxes1. See supra note 12. For entries 
relating to taxes and for fees see list I entry 9 6 , list 
2, Entry 66 and list 3* Entry 47*
32. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments v. 
lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, (1954) S.C.R. 1005 (S.O. )*A.I.R. 
1954 S.O. 282. ' ' The Supreme Court held that the
levy of an annual fee on all religious institutions, 
fixing the maximum rate at 5 per cent of the income 
derived by them, was not a ’fee1 but a ’tax’, because 
the legislation was not covered by entry 47 of the list 
III. The Madras State legislature had imposed a sum 
of fee under section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious 
and Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1951)* The Supreme 
Court held that, although the impugned section spoke 
definitely of the contribution being levied in respect 
of the services rendered by the government, there was 
total absence of any correlation between the expenses 
incurred by the government to the amount raised by 
contribution. Their lordships observed that: ”...The 
material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the 
present case is that the money raised by levy of the 
contribution is not ear-marked or specified for 
defraying the expenses that the Government has to incur 
in performing the services* All the collections go to 
the Consolidated Fund of the State and all the expenses 
have to be met not out of these collections but out of 
the general revenues by a proper method of appropriation, 
as is done in the case of other Government expenses.
That in itself might not be conclusive, but, in this 
case there is a total absence of any cc-relation 
between the expenses incurred by the Government and 
the amount of money raised by contribution under the 
provision of Sec. 76 and in these circumstances the 
theory of return or counter-payment or quid pro quo 
cannot have any possible application to this case. 11 
(p. 2 9 6, para. 49).
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A 'duty* is a tax levied on goods or commodities. 
In other words, ’duties* are not direct taxes'^. As said
t
by L.L. Basu in his Commentaries on the Constitution of
34* 35 36India 9 duties may be classified as excise , customs ,
37 38tolls or transit duties according to their nature.
A *cess* is a tax levied for a specific purpose
often with a prefixed word defining the object^ . For
instance, the tax levied on cotton produced in India for
33 • Infra p. 24 for the definition of direct taxes.
34« Volume 4 (5th edition) 1968 at p.255*
35* It is a duty levied upon a manufacturer or producer, 
in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. 
Thus, it is a tax upon goods and not upon sales or 
the proceeds of sales of goods: Governor General v. 
Province of Madras. A.I.R. 1945 FC 98,.. Central 
Government can levy excise duty under entry 84 List I 
on Ka.) tobacco; and (b) medicinal and toilet 
preparations containing alcholic or opium, hemp or other 
narcotic drugs and narcotics.
State Governments can levy excise duty under entry 51» 
List II on (a) alcoholic liquor for human consumption 
and (b) on hemp and other drugs and narcotics.
3 6. "Customs duty is a auty on the importation or
exportation whether by land or sea1’. Commonwealth Oil
Refineries. Ltd.v. S. Australia. (1926) 38 C.L.R. 408* 
List I Entry 83 empowers the Federal Government to levy 
custom auties upon commodities exported out of India and
imported into India from other countries.
37. Halsbury’s Laws of England. 3rd edition, Vol.25 para 767 
at ppo94-595. Toil has been defined as “... A sum 
payable by the buyer upon Bhles of♦..articles in a market 
or fair.**
List II entry 59 authorizes the State legislatures to 
levy a toll tax for the use of a market, or a bridge,
or the temporary use of a land. Sita Ram v. Janapada
Sabha. A.I.R. 1 9 5 2, Ragpur 401.
3 8 . It is a tax imposed on the transaction of goods from
one place to another.
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'the creation of a fund to be used for the improvement 
and development of the growing, marketing and manufacturing 
of cotton in India' is termed a cotton cess^.
'Taxes' are to be distinguished from'prices' 
imposed by the government for goods and services rendered 
as a condition for obtaining it. The 'price' is 
proportionate to the amount of services and goods rendered. 
For example, if the government supplies water or electricity 
to the public, the price is based on the cost of production 
and the amount used by the consumer^. This is the 'price' 
not a 'tax'•
Taxes may be classified for various purposes in 
different ways. For example, direct and indirect^” ; local
A'Z
and national; proportional, regressive and progressive ; 
taxes in rem and in personam^ ; personal or business;
40. Indian Ootton Cess Act, 1923; Agricultural Produce Cess 
Act, 1940; Lac Cess Act, 1930 imposes a cess on lac 
produced in or exported from India.
41. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences: Vol. 13 
at p.521. Macmillan and Free Press.
42. See King v. Caledonian Collieries Ltd.. A.I.R. 1928 P*C. 
282. Sales tax is one of the indirect taxes. Income- 
tax is the typical example of direct tax.
4 3. The distinction depends upon the ratio of tax liability 
to net income. The tax is termed progressive, if the. 
rate of tax rises with the rise in income; proportional, 
if the ratio is constant; regressive, if tax declines
as income rises: Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 21 (1967) 
at p.7 2 4.
44. Ibid p. 724.
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45specific and ad valorem etc. Since it is proposed to 
discuss crimes relating to income tax, which, is one of 
the most important direct taxes, the distinction between 
direct and indirect taxation needs explanation. The 
distinction between the two is mainly administrative.
Direct taxes are those which are intended by the legislature 
to be paid directly by the tax payer to the proper 
authorities, whereas indirect taxes are intended to be 
realised from the tax payer indirectly through non-official 
intermediaries along with the price or otherwise. In other 
words:
"A direct tax is one,which is demanded from 
the very person who it is intended or desired 
should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which 
are demanded from one person in the expectation 
and intention that he shall indemnify himself 
at the expense of another."
Thus, Income tax, Corporation tax, Surtax, and Profit
45. Ibid p.725. A tax or duty is specific, when it is 
based on some physical measurement or quality, e.g., 
so much per pound, per yard or per gallon. It is ad 
valorem when it is based on value and levied as a 
percentage of that value, for instance, 1 .5 per cent 
of property value.
46. Mill: Principle of Political Economy, p.823. Quoted 
from Justice in Taxation in India1. Lakdawala, Popular 
Book Depot, Bombay, at p. 23
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tax are classified as direct taxes^, because tax is paid 
directly to the taxing authority by tax payers; whereas 
Sales tax, Purchase tax Excise tod Customs are termed 
indirect taxes, since such taxes are realized and collected 
by tax authorities from the manufacturers or sellers of 
the product, though paid by the customers on what they 
purchase.
Direct Taxes in India
The history of Direct taxes in India is a
fascinating subject. Direct taxes are not a novelty in
4-8India introduced by the British/ , as is too eommonly 
supposed. Dor is this the outcome of the 19th and 2,0th 
century civilization as in other countries of the world^.
47. Some of the other direct taxes are; The Wealth Tax Act,
27 of 1957; The Estate Duty Act (34 of 1953); The Gift 
Tax Act (18 of 1958}. The Expenditure Tax Act, (29 of
1957)9 repealed from 1966-67; The Excess Profit Tax 
(15 of 1940). See Report of the Working Group on the 
Central Direct Taxes Administration: Administrative 
Reforms Commission (1968), p . 3 •
48. Report of the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry 
Committee (1958-59). Government of India, p.1.
* A Quarter Century of Direct Taxes in India (1939-64), 
jPaphlV," G.L.: Published by Economi'c Research and 
Training Foundation, Bombay, p.2; see J.P. Niyogi.1 The 
Evolution of the Indian Tax System1: Studies in Economics 
and Political Science No. 12 (L.S.E. (1929)* P«4; 'The 
Liabilities of Deities to pay taxes, J. Duncan M. Derrett 
(1 9 6 9) Bombay Law Journal 38 at p.39. See 'A History of 
Indian Taxation1, P. Banerjea (1930), (Macmillan & Co., 
London) pp.77-160.
49. Income Tax was introduced in U.K. in 1799 and finally 
became a permanent feature in 1842; in U.S.A. 1915; in 
Austria 1849; in Italy 1864; in Australia, Hew Zealand 
and Japan 1880fs; in Germany and Netherlands 1890*3; and 
in the rest of the countries of the world in the 20th 
century: International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
Vol. 15 (1968) "at p. 529. — -----------------
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Direct taxes were ancient and well known and recognized
50institutions in India since time immemorial . For instance,
as noted by Professor S.S. Khera, Agricultural taxes were
an extremely sensitive area of the economic and social
51policy ... in India* in the early days. Persons were
52asked to pay taxes to meet the expenses of the State and 
no unequal treatment between the cultivators and traders, 
poor and rich could subsist under the system^.
However, the system of direct taxation by a modem 
income tax in its present form was first introduced in
5 A
India by the then British Government in the year 1860 ♦
It was probably introduced to meet the financial difficulties
55consequent on the mutiny of 1857 • This in fact
50. fIhe Law of Income Tax in India1: Sundaram, V*S. IYth 
edition, Butterworth & Co. (India) Ltd., p.7. Report of 
the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee (1958- 
59), Government of India, p.1.
5tl. District Administration in India. 1964. p. 171. (Asia 
Publishing House, London).
52. Surra n.50. p.t. The Statens share of income from the 
land was fixed in between 1/I2th and l/6th depending on 
the quality of the soil and the amount of labour 
expended on cultivation.
55* Supra note 50, pp. 1-7. Some of the sources of
revenue were like sita (profits from crown lands), bhaga, 
(portion of profit payable to Government), bali, 
(religious taxes), kara (taxes paid in money), Vartani, 
(road cess etc.), Mula (capital), Vya.ii, (premia),
Atvava (fixed fines) etc.
54. Report of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee, (1924- 
25), Vol.1 , p.189.
55. Ibid. p.189
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adumbrated the introduction of progressive direct taxation
in India; it may be reckoned as the most important change
in the modern times in the Indian taxation system.
The Income Tax Act 32 of 1860 was based on the
56English system of taxation"^ which was unsuited to the
then Indian conditions, beside being complicated and 
57unworkable , with the result that a number of legislative
changes were made in the Act on one pretext or another, so
that, within a short span of 26 years 1860-1886, 23 Acts
58dealing with taxes on income were passed • In this period
5 6 . In the United Kingdom the tax on income was first 
introduced by Pitt in 1799 as a temporary measure to 
finance the Napoleonic War. The Act was repealed in 
1802 after the end of the war. However, the tax was 
reintroduced in 1803 by Addington and continued up to 
1816 after the Battle of Waterloo. Thus, from 1816 to 
1842 there was no income tax in Britain. In 1842 the 
tax was revived by Lord Peel in order to reduce import 
duties on various articles and has been imposed ever 
since, with modifications from time to time. The Act 
of 1842 was modified, firstly, by Gladstonefs Act of 
1 8 5 8> which remained the basic law of income tax until 
1 9 1 8. In 1918, 1952 and 1970, the first second and 
third Consolidation Acts were passed, which made major 
changes in law. The present law of Income tax is the
Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1970 c 10): British
Tax Encyclopedia; Wheatcroft, G.S.A., Vol.I, 12th ed. 
para 1-011 at p. 1007#
57. Supra note 54 at p.189.
5 8. Supra note 48 at pp. 1-2 .
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the legislation was in a rudimentary form passing through 
an experimental stage and it was only in 1886 that income 
tax became a permanent feature of the Indian system of 
taxation. The Income Tax 2 of 1886 remained in force for 
thirty-two years, i.e. up to 1 9 1 8. Of course, the let was 
amended from time to time, to suit changes in society and
RQ
to fulfil the economic needs of the Government •
Some of the important features of the tax were that
agricultural income as well as charities were exempt from
60taxes. The tax was levied on a flat rate basis • The 
administration was done by the land Revenue Officers, 
except in big cities like Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. In 
general, there was no obligation to file a return, except
59* Supra note 48 at p. 5-6. The rate of tax was 2 per 
cent on*salaries' and 'on interest on securities' 
between Rs. 500 and Rs. 2,000. In 1903 the taxable 
minimum was raised to Rs. 1,000 per annum. The 
financial stress of the First World War made it 
essential to make the tax more productive. 
Accordingly, in 1916 a sort of 'step' basis of 
tax was introduced in place of 'flat' rate basis. 
Thus, the gradation was made steeper and the rates 
increased substantially. It was made obligatory on 
the part of assessees having income over Rs. 2,000 
to make a return and penalties were provided for 
failure to file a return or for making a false 
return. In 19179 a Super Tax Act was passed. The 
tax was,levied on a slab basis on income over Rs.
50,000. The same rates were levied on Companies 
and individuals, as well as on the Hindu Undivided 
families.
60. Supra note 50 at p.10.
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for companies. The Act 2 of 1886 is one of the most 
important pieces of legislation in the history of Indian 
taxation, not only because it made a departure from the 
past, in as much as it gave a uniform pattern to the law 
of income tax and brought about stability in the law, 
but also because it contained the germ of the general 
structure of subsequent legislation, including the present 
Income Tax Act of 1961.
In 1918, a new income tax Act, 7 of 1918, was 
passed repealing the previous Act. However, this Act 
only survived for the brief period of four years, and in
61the year 1922 a new Income Tax Act , 11 of 1922 was passed ,
which came into force with effect from April 1, 1922. At
this time income tax was a central subject. Two important
features of the Act of 1922 were that the rate of taxation
was left to be decided every year by the Finance Act,
and secondly, that it was the first step in the
disengagement of the provincial governments from
62administering central subjects • The Act of 1922 
continued in force up to 1 9 6 1, though it was amended
61. Supra note 50 at p.12. The Government of India 
appointed an All India Committee in 1921 and the 
recommendation of this Committee formed the basis 
of the Act of 1922.
62. Ibid at p.14.
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considerably from time to time, notably by an Act of 1939^ 
It is interesting to note that the Government of 
India has been concerned since the inception of tax 
legislation in the country to make the law simple, easy, 
free from technicalities in assessment and collection of 
taxes, and comprehensible by the common man. With this 
object in view, the Government has appointed numerous 
committees and commissions from time to time to examine the 
structure and functioning of central, state and local 
taxation, as related to the economic and social objectives 
of the country and to make recommendations for modifications 
of the tax system and for the addition of new methods of 
taxation. Among the more important reports on the subject 
after the close of the Second World War, which were 
responsible for the change in the law of income tax in 
India from time to time and which led to the enactment of 
the Income lax Act of 1961, are the following:-
63* The Government of India appointed a committee of three 
known as ’Experts Committee1 in October, 1935* *to make 
an investigation of the Indian Income Tax system in 
all its aspects and report on both the incidence of 
the tax and efficiency of its administration1 • The 
Committee gave its report on 24 Dec. 1936. In the 
light of its recommendations, the Act of 1922 was 
thoroughly amended in 1939 by the Indian Income Tax 
(Amendment) Act 7 of 1939*
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The first report is that of the Investigation 
Commission, 1947* A Commission was constituted under 
Section 3 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation 
Commission) Act, 30 of 1947 , which gave its report on
December 29, 1948. As a result of its recommendations, 
the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 15 of 1953 was 
passed with retrospective effect from April 1 , 1952. In 
addition to this, other amendments were made in the Act 
11 of 192265.
The second report is that of the Taxation Enquiry
64• Report of the Income Tax Investigation Commision.
(1 9 4 9) / at p*"5. !lhe Commission was called upon ti) to 
investigate and report to the Central Government on 
all matter relating to taxation of income, with 
particular reference to the extent to which the 
existing law relating to and procedure for assessment 
and collection of such taxation is adequate to prevent 
the evasion thereof* (ii) to investigate any case or 
points in a case referred to it by the Central 
Government under Section 5 of the Act. See infra pp. 
491 to'504 for cases.
65* Ibid p.26. sections 34 and 46 of the I.T. Act, 1922
were amended and a new sec. 33B was added by the Income 
Tax and the Business Profit Tax Act, 1948, with 
effect from April 1, 1948.
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Commission, 1953 heaaed by Dr. John Mathai, an ex-Finance 
Minister of the Government of India, which submitted its 
recommendations to the Government in 1954. Effect to its 
recommendations was given from time to time, beginning 
with the Finance Act of 1955*
The third report is of the Indian Tax Reform 
Commission, 1956 by Professor Kalaor^. Professor Kaldor 
made an investigation of the Indian Taz system in the light 
of the revenue requirements of the Second Five Year Plan.
He studied the Indian taz system thoroughly and gave a 
number of useful suggestions, which were accepted by the
6 6 . Vol.I, p.144 para 2 of the report speaks of the terms 
of reference in the following words:
“The terms of reference require us to ezamine the taz 
system in relation to four main aspects; (a) the 
incidence of the tax system and its suitability for 
reducing inequalities of income and wealth, viz. the 
distribution of the burden of taxation and its 
redistributive effects and possibilities; (b) the 
suitability of the taz system with reference to 
the development programme of the country and the 
resources required for it, including fresh avenues of 
taxation; (c) the effects of taxation of income of . 
its structure and level-on capital formation and 
maintenance and development of productive enterprise 
and (d) the use of taxation in ' dealing with inflationary 
and deflationary situations. 11
67. Supra note 3 at p.27. Mr Kaldor, an eminent British 
economist, was invited by the Indian Statistical 
Institute in January 1956 to study Indian Taxation 
and to suggest changes therein.
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Government* The report is an outstanding and remarkable 
achievement, especially considering the short time within 
which it was accomplished (between January and March,
1956.) As a result of his recommendations income tax on 
'capital gains' was revived, three new Acts, vi , the 
Wealth Tax Act, 27 of 1957, the Expenditure Tax Act, 29.of 1957 
(repealed from 1966-67) and the Gift Tax Act,18 of 1958 were 
enacted*
Hot regarding this as enough the Government
decided to revise the whole income tax law* Accordingly,
the Law Commission of India was called upon *to revise the
Income Tax Act, so as to make its provisions more
intelligible, without affecting its basic tax structure.M
The Commission gave its report to the Government in
68September, 1958 • Its recommendations were implemented
by the enactment of the Income Tax Act of 1961*
The fifth report is that of the Direct Taxes -
69Administration Enquiry Committee, 1958 , commonly known
as the 'Tyagi Committee1, its chairman being Mr. Mahavir 
Tyagi. The Committee submitted its report on November 3o,
1959• The Committee made a comprehensive study of the law
68. Supra note 5 at p.27.
69* The Committe was asked to advise the Government Hon 
the administration, organization and procedures 
necessary for implementing the integrated scheme of 
direct taxation with due regard f|to the need for 
eliminating tax evasion and avoiding inconvenience to 
the assessees.”
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of income tax, its wording and pointed out a number of 
defects in the then existing law and maae many suggestions 
to improve it.
In the light of suggestions and recommendations 
made by these Committees, a Bill to consolidate ana amend 
the law relating to Income tax and Super tax was introduced 
in Parliament in the year 1961. The Bill was thoroughly 
discussed by Parliament and approved in the same year, and 
it received assent of the President of India on September 
9, 1961. Thus, tne Income Tax Act, 1 9 6 1, came into operation 
with effect from April 1 , 1962, repealing the Act of 1$22.
The Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, is a comprehensive piece 
of legislation. There are in all twenty-three chapters, 
incorporating two hundred and ninety-eight sections and 
six schedules,
It may be noted that in the decade since the 
enactment of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Act has been 
amended several times, beginning on the day following that 
on which it came into operation, i.e., on April 2, 1962. 
within the short span of eight years, from April, 1962 to
January 1969, as many as 400 amendments were made to the 
70Act. As a result the provisions of the Act have undergone
70. Administrative Reform Commission:Report on Central 
Direct Taxes Administration (1969). p.1; L.IJ. Birla. 
Welcome speech, 2nd All India Conference of Tax 
Executives (1967), Pederation of Indian Chamber of 
Commerce (New Delhi), p.1.
more than 250 insertions, 2^0 substitutions ana 100
71omissions ; * This clearly shows confusion in the minds
of the Indian legislatures regarding the policy behind 
tax legislation. There is no stability in the law and 
the tax provisions are neither clear nor understandable.
The Law Commission has rightly observed in its report that?
"The amendments to the Income-tax Act 
have been so short-sighted and so short­
lived as to rob the law of that modicum 
of stability, which is essential to its 
healthy growth. Before the provisions 
of the Act can be sufficiently clarified 
by the judicial process, new provisions 
are substituted in their place.... Stability 
is most essential to the proper 
administration of a taxing statute, and 
if the tax structure of this country is 
to be put on a sound footing, it is 
essential that a halt should be called to 
the making of ill-digested amendments in 
a frenzy of hurry, which has characterized 
the history of income tax law of the last 
few y e a r s . n72
The amendments to the tax laws, especially Income-
tax, which affect a considerable section of the community
should not be included in the annual financial Bills, which
must be passed in a hurry before a prescribed date. The
amendments should be made only after providing adequate
opportunities to all the interests concerned to express their
73views and consulting experts on the proposed change .
71* "The Law and Practice of Income Tax1« J.B. Kanga and N.A. 
Palkhiwala, Vol .1 (6th ed.), Preface p. ix.
7 2 . Supra note 3* at p.29 quoted from the 112th Report of 
the Law Commission1 Government of India.
73« -Supra note 71, at pp. x,xi. Similar views have been
expressed by the Administrative Reform Commission (1 9 6 9) 
p. (ii), para 6 . ’
Income-tax*
Income-tax, as its name implies, is a tax
upon a person in relation to his income^# But what is
income? The law does not define it. It is strange that
75the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961 , the British Income
7 6and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970 and the corresponding law
7 7
of other countries, namely, Australia,
74. fraranayanDa & Brothers v. I.T.O.A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 40,
42; Per Beaumont C.J., in Patiala State Bank v. C.I.T.. 
Bombay A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 93 at p.94* The view was 
approved by the Privy Council in appeal reported as 
Patiala State Bank v C.I.T., Bombay A.I.R. 1943 P.C.181. 
Bala.ii v. I.T.O.. Akola A.I.R. 1962 S.C.: 125*
75. The Income-tax Act, 1 9 6 1, section 2(24) instead of 
defining ’Income1, states “income" includes
(i) profits and gains; (ii) dividends and a number of 
other receipts as enumerated in clauses (iii) to (viii).
76. The Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1970 Chapter 10) 
in section 1 states charge of income-tax and not what 
is meant by ’income*. The section says that:
’Where any Act enacts that income tax shall be charged 
for any year at any rates, then,...the tax at those 
rates shall be charged for that year in respect of all 
property, profits or gains respectively described or 
comprised in the schedules contained in the following 
sections of this Act -
Schedule A-section 67(1)> Schedule B-Section 91> 
schedule C-Section 95 Schedule B-Section 108,
Schedule E-Section 181 (1), and Schedule P-Section 232 (1),
t....
77. The Australian Income Tax and social Service Contribution 
Assessment Act 1956-69 is equally vague. The Act merely 
says in section b(l) that:
’’Income-tax or “tax” means -
(a) income tax and social services contribution imposed 
as such by any Act, as assessed under this Act”.
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Canada^® and America*^ do not attempt to define the term
’income1, though in almost all the countries of the world
tax on income is levied in one form or another. The
justification for the absence of any such definition of the
word ’income1 from the statute book has been well, summarized
by the Taxation Enquiry Commission Ceylon (1 9 6 8) in the
following words:
"The word ’income’ is of such elusive import that 
it cannot be defined in precise terms which would 
adequately meet legislative requirements. Why its 
meaning is not to be found in any revenue tax 
statute is explained by the many shapes which income 
may assume, and the ultimate variety of circumstances 
in which it may be derived....There is indeed no 
concise and complete form of expression which would 
adequately serve for taxation purposes.”80
78. The Canadian Income Tax Act (ESC 1952 c 1 4 8) in section 
3 merely states that:
’’The income of a taxpayer for a taxation year *. ..is his 
income for the year from all sources inside or outside 
Canada and.. .includes income for the year, from all 
(a) business, (b) property, and (c) offices and 
employments”. Quoted from ’Canadian Income Taxi, by 
Mcdonald (1970), Butterworth, pp. 20,21•
79• Internal Revenue Code 1954 does not say anything about 
'income*. The Code merely defines ’Gross Income* and 
’taxable income' and leaves the matter to be decided by 
the Courts. Section 61 states that:
’...gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived...”, and section 63 says that:
“...the term "Taxable income means gross income, minus 
the deductions allowed...”
80. Report (April, 1 9 6 8), at p.194, para 67* The statement 
has been quoted from 'The Principles of Income Taxation*. 
by J.P. Hannan and E. Farnsworth, (Stevens and Sons, 
1955); see 'Development of the Concept of Income under 
the Indian Income Tax Laws (18l?0-1967) * by P.P.- Chawala; 
11968) 22 Bulletin for International Documentation, 
pp. 341-349; see 'Real Income*. V.S., (1963) 'lawyer' 
(Provincial Bar Federation, Madras), pp. 145-148.
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The Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, like the income 
tax laws of other countries, merely sets out provisions that 
particular kinds of income should be included or excluded 
when computing the income of a person for the purposes of 
tax. For instance, clause 24 of section 2 of the Act of 
1961 enumerates certain categories of receipts as
O A
constituting 'income1 • Perhaps the reason for not giving 
a comprehensive'definition to the word 'income' was to keep 
open the scope of its extension and to leave the matter for 
judicial decision in any given set of circumstances 
according to well established principles of law, in the 
light of needs of the time and change in circumstances.
One has to seek guidance from judicial pronouncements, which 
are based largely on economic usage. The earliest case in 
which the Privy Council attempted to define the term 'income' 
is that of C.I.T.+ Bengal v. Shaw Wallace and Co.. in which 
their Lordships observed that:
"Income*... connotes a periodical monetary 
return 'coming in' with some sort of 
regularity, or expected regularity from 
definite Sources....It is essentially 
the produce of something, which is often 
loosely spoken of as 'capital*. But 
capital, though possibly the source in 
the case of income from securities, is 
in most eases hardly more than an element 
in the process of production.M° .
81. See supra f.n. 75
82. A.I.R. 1952 P.C* 138 at p.140.
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It may be n ot'e.d- that their Lordships of the
Privy Council, while interpreting the scope of the term
’income* in Copal Saran Harain Singh v. C.I.T., Bihar and
Orisa, observed that:
"the word 'income* is not limited by 
the words 'profits* and ’gains*.
Anything which can properly be described 
as income, is taxable under the Act 
unless expressly exempted."83
83* (1935) 3 I.T.R. 237 at p.2 4 2. The question
for determination was whether a life annuity, taken in 
exchange, under an agreement, for an estate, was 
taxable as income. The Court, while holding that the 
annuity is taxable, observed that:
"Here the source of the life annuity is a covenant.
The life annuity is the produce of one of the items 
which the appellant has taken in exchange for the 
estate.M
Kamakshya Warain Singh v. C.I.T., Bihar and_Orisa,
11943). 11 I.T.R. 513 (P.CT)
The question arose as to whether a payment received by 
way of royalty under a mining lease, amounts to ’income’ 
for tax purposes or 'capital receipt’ (exempt from tax) 
representing the price of the mines. The Privy Council 
held that such receipts amount to ’income’ taxable under 
the Income Tax Act. Their Lordships observed that it 
was not material for tax purposes that the amount 
received came from a waste property.
Similarly, C.J. Jordan of the Supreme Court of Hew 
South Wales in Scott v. Commissioner of Taxation, (1935)
3 A.T.D. 142 at p.144 says:
"The word ’income’... must be determined in accordance 
with the ordinary concepts and usages of mankind...";
A similar statement can be found in Attorney General of 
British Columbia v. Ostrum. (1904) A.C., 144,147. The 
question for determination was regarding the scope of 
'income' under the British Columbia Assessment Act, H897> 
which imposed a tax on 'all land and personal property 
and income in the province, subject to certain exemptions, 
and explained 'personal property' as comprehending 'all 
income*. Their Lordships observed:V.There is no ground 
for cutting down the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
word 'income*. In their view the expression was intended 
to include and does include, all gains and profits 
derived from personal exertions, whether such gains and 
profits are fixed or fluctuating, certain or precarious, 
whatever may be the principle or basis of calculation.:"
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Thus, the courts in India, in their earlier 
decisions attributed two tests, viz., a source and a 
quality of periodicity or recurrence in order to name a 
receipt ’income1 for the purposes of income tax. However, 
in later decisions^ the courts have not even stressed 
these tests. For instance, in Rani Amrit Kunwar v. C.I.T., 
A.P., their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed:
». #. fljncome in order to be. taxable need not
arise from any business activity, investment 
or an enforceable obligation to pay but may 
arise from voluntary or customary payments.
Hor is it necessary that it should be the result 
of some outlay on the part of the assesses.” 85
84. Rani Amrit Kunwar v. C.I.T. A.I.R*. (.1946.) All.306 at p. 311 
(AlDiff.B.)V Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. C.I.T., (1952)22 
I.T.R. 484. The question for decision was whether a 
certain amount received by the assessee from an insurance 
company under a ’consequential loss policy’, as a result 
of the destruction of a mill by fire, was assessable to 
income tax. It was held that the definition of the 
word ’income’ given in section 2 (6C) of the Income Tax 
Act, 19^2 was inclusive and it included:
’’certain things which would possibly not be regarded 
as income but for the special definition. That, 
however, does not limit the generality of its natural 
meaning, except as qualified in the section itself.”
85. Ibid
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Thus, in short, ’income1 may be said to cover all
receipts, in the shape of money or money’s worth, arising
from a definite source ana capable of recurring from time 
86to time • As such ’income’ may arise from a number of
8 6 . Websters’ International Dictionary, 1903> at p.745,(Col.2 ) 
defines ’income' as follows:
"That gain which proceeds from labour, business, property 
or capital of any kind, as the produce of a form, the 
rent of houses, the proceeds of professional business, 
the profits of commerce or of occupation, or the interest 
of money or stock in funds, etc.; revenue, receipts; 
salary; especially the annual receipts of a private 
person, or corporation, from property.” Similarly, the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.I (1953) at p.981 
defines 'income' in the following terms:
"That which comes in as the periodical produce of one’s 
work, business, lands, or investments (commonly expressed 
in terms of money); annual or periodical receipts 
accruing to a person or corporation; revenue.”
Robert Murray Haig, an eminent economist, defines 
'income' as follows:
"income is the monetary value of the net accretion to 
economic power between two points of time.” Quoted from 
'Introduction to Income Tax Law* (Canada) by la Brie,
Francis Eugena, (C.C.H. Canadian ltd.)(1955)> P«19* 
'Development of the Concent of Income under the Indian 
Income Tax law (1860 -1967 ) '» by P.P. Ohawala: (1968)  22 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, p.341> 
at pp. 343-3 4 4, the author states that:
"Income has been generally described as the annual or 
periodical yield to a money or reduc ble to a money 
value, arising from the use of real or personal property, 
or from labour or services rendered. Dividends and rents 
derived from houses and lands are instances of income 
arising from the use of the property, whilst salaries, 
wages and professional earnings (including pensions) are 
instances of income arising from labour or services 
rendered. Income derived from business may in certain cases 
be a combination of both these classes.
'The legal Aspects of Money' by F.A.A. Mann (ll.D.
Thesis, london(1938J, pp. 1-25 (for concept of income).
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sources, viz*, salary, wages, dividends, business^, interests
on securities, capital gains, property, interest on loans
and in a thousand other ways. But the legislature have
incorporated a number of other kinds of receipts or supposed
87
receipts in the concept of income for the purposes of the 
Income Tax Act and have extended its scope beyond the 
ordinary meaning of the term*
Administration of Tax Laws
The Department of Revenue and Expenditure, Ministry 
of Finance, Government of India, which is in charge of a 
cabinet minister, is concerned with the financial and 
economic policy of the government. Thus, all legislations
concerning taxes are introduced in the Parliament by the
88
Finance Minister , as is done by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the United Kingdom. As far as the
87. For instance the Income Tax Acts generally include the 
following receipts as income, though they are not income, 
strictly speaking:
(1 ) the rent paid on behalf of a person by his employer,
(2) value of rent free house, (5)prerequisites etc.
8 8 . The Finance Minis ter, in February of each ye ar, submits 
to both the Houses of Parliament an ’annual financial . 
statement'y or ’budget1, of the estimated receipts and 
expenditures of the Government of India for the next 
financial year, commencing from April, to March 31.
The taxing proposals of the bddget are embodied in
the 'Financial Bill', which establishes the rate of. 
Income-tax for the next financial year, ana. contains 
proposed amendment of the tax laws, including changes 
in rates of customs and excise. In U.K* the financial 
year runs . from April 7 to April 6 of the next year.
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implementation and enforcement of direct taxes are
concerned, the Central Board of Direct taxes constituted
under the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1963 * is
responsible. In brief, the revenue administration may be
divided into two parts, viz., one installed at the head-
90quarters and the other in the field.
In the first category, comes the Central Board of 
Direct Taxes and the Directorate of Inspection located at 
New Delhi. The Central Board of Direct Taxes consists of 
five persons including a chairman. The Board performs 
functions assigned to it by the Central Government or by 
any other law. The Board frames rules and regulations, 
issues orders and instructions from time to time regarding 
assessment and collection of direct taxes to the officers 
employed in the administration of taxes. The Directorate 
of Inspection is to assist the Board. Beside this, the 
Directorate is engaged in many other activities, for 
instance, research, statistics, vigilance (investigation 
of alleged misconduct by the employees), training of staff,
89. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 116. Formerly, the 
Central Board of Revenue constituted under the Central 
Board of Revenue Act (4 of 1924) was responsible for 
the administration of taxation laws including Income- 
tax throughout the country.
90. Income-tax Act, 1961, in Chapter 13, sections 116 to 
138 prescribes the various categories of Income-tax 
authorities, their jurisdiction, powers and duties.
audit proceedings, conduct of difficult cases, investigation 
of major tax evasion cases, in addition to the organizational 
matters•
In the second category, comes the Commissioner of
Income Tax, Inspecting Assistant Commissioners, Income Tax
Officers and Inspectors of Income Tax. Thus at the apex
of the field structures are the Commissioners of Income
Tax. They have been invested with wide powers and authority
for the management of all direct tax operations in their
respective area. Each Commissioner of Income Tax is
assisted by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioners, who
exercise the general supervisory control over direct taxes
within their jurisdiction. Next in the line come the
Income Tax Officers, who are in fact the keystone of the
91Income tax arch. It is the Income Tax Officer, who is 
responsible for the assessment of returns, audit of returns 
and collection of taxes besides a number of other 
administrative responsibilities. It is the Income Tax 
Officer who comes in direct contact with the public. In 
other words, the Income Tax Officer oils the wheels of the 
tax system and enables it to function smoothly with the
91. Administrative Reforms Commissions Report of the Working 
Group: Central Direct Taxes Administration. Government 
of India, (1968), para 7#29, pp. 150-151,Report of 
the Income Tax Investigation Commission, Government of 
India, (1949), para 381, p. 168.
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minimum of friction* The Income-tax Officer is assisted
by an Inspector and four clerks in his operations* The
administrative set up is illustrated by the chart in 
92Appendix A^ •
The ordinary meaning of the term 'assessment of
tax' is the process of valuation of a taxpayer's income for
the purposes of taxation. As has been mentioned in the
Report of the Diredt Taxes Administration Enquiry Committees
"The term 'assessment' refers to the 
computation of income, wealth, expenditure, 
gift or estate for tax purposes as well as 
the determination of the amount of tax 
payable•"93
However, the word 'assessment' under the Income-
tax Act has been used in a much wider sense. In brief, the
assessment covers the entire gamut of proceedings, for
ascertaining and imposing liabilities upon the taxpayer,
starting from the stage of advance payment of tax, filing
of return to the final stage of collection of tax including
penalties. In C.I.T.. M.P. v. Lady Kanchanbai* Hegde J., while
delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court said that:
"As observed by the Judicial Committee, in C.I.T. .Bom, 
v. Khem Chand* A.I.R. 1936 P.O. 175* the word 
'assessment' is used in the Act as meaning 
sometimes the computation of income, sometimes
92. See Appendix A at p. 533*
93* Supra note 48, para 2.1, at p.5*
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the determination of the amount of tax payable 
and sometimes the procedure laid down in the Act 
for imposing liability upon the taxpayer.”94
There are three main stages in the imposition of
/ \ 95taxes, viz*, (i) the declaration of liabilities , which
determines what persons in respect of what property are
liable to pay the tax (these provisions are commonly known
as the charging sections); (ii) the assessment or
96determination of the tax payable , which quantifies the 
exact amount of tax, which a person liable has to pay by
94* A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 691 at p.693 (para 7)
O.A. Abraham v. I.T.O., Kottavam, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609 
at 611; .. T C.I.T. v. Jahdish Poasad Ramnath (1$55) 
27 I.T.R. 192, 196-7; Subramariam Ghettiar v. Tahsihdar 
1963) 47 I.T.R. 759; C.I.T. v. Bhika.ii Dad'abhai & Co.
(1961) 42 I.T.R. 123, 127 (S.C.); Kalawali Devi Har1alka 
v. C.I.T. (1967) 66 I.T.R. 680 (S.C.) (may include 
revision); Kunwar Bishwanath Singh v. C.I.T. 1942 I.T.R. 
322; Sankappa v. I.T.O. (1968) 68 I.T.R. (60 (S.C.) 
Kailashnath Bhargava v. C.I.T. (1962) 46 I.T.R. 928; 
Gurmukh Singh v. C.I.T. 1944 I.T.R. 393. 408. See also 
Bhailal Amin & Sons Ltd. v. Dalai (1953) 24 I.T.R. 229, 
City of London I.T. Comrs. v. Gibbs 1942. I.T.R. Suppl. 
121* 124 (HL); and SushiL'Chandra Ghose v . I.T.O. (1959) 
35 I.T.R. 379, 384.
95. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 4 to 9. It is a well 
settled rule tnat one's taxation liability is to be 
determined according to the provisions of the charging 
sections and not with reference to the provisions, 
which deal with the mode of assessment machinery 
prescribed for its recovery.
96. Income Tax Act, 1961, Chapter 14, sections 139 to 158 
deal with procedure for assessment.
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way of tax, to the exchequer; (iii) the recovery^, if the
98person taxed does not pay voluntarily the Income Tax
Officer proceeds to realize tax from the assessee. Thus,
the basic features of Income Tax law are the receipt of
tax returns, audit, tax computation, collection and
realization of taxes. Sub-section (i) of section 139 of the
99Income Tax Act, 1961, requires every person^ , whether
i
resident in India or not, whose 1 total income1 during the
97* Income Tax Act, 1961, chapter 17, sections 190 to 234 deal 
with recovery and collection of taxes.
98. In the United States of America the Internal Revenue 
Service relies primarily upon the disclosure of a taxpayer 
of the relevant facts in assessing income tax. Out T . 
Helvering v. Charles E. Mitchell U938) 303 U.S. 391-406.
99. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2 (31) defines 
•person1. It includes:
(1) an individual,
(2) a Hindu Undivided family,
C3) a company,
(4 ) a firm.
(5 ) an association of persons or a body of individuals, 
whether incorporated or not,
(6) a local authority, and
(7 ) every artificial Juridical person, not falling within 
any of the preceding sub-clauses.
A person with no taxable income should file a •return1 to 
get a refund of the tax, if any, deducted at source from 
his income and a person who has had a loss in business or 
profession to have the loss determined for carry forward 
and set-off against profits in later years.
1. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2, clause 45 says:
••Total IncomeMmeans the total amount of income referred 
in section 5* computed in the manner laid down in this 
Act. Section 5(i) of the Act states that: n...The total 
income of a person who is a resident includes all income 
from whatever source derived...1 Kalvani^ Vithal Das v 
C.I.T.(1937). 1 I.T.R. 90,95. IDncome is divided into 
•six heads or categories1, viz.,
1. Income from salaries. 2. Interest on securities.
3. Income from property. 4. Profits and gains from a
business, profession or 
vocation.
5. Capital gains 6. Income from other sources.
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2 3previous year , is taxable , to furnish suo mdtu. a ’Return
of total Income’ in the prescribed form^ to the Income Tax
*5 6Officer, generally by June 30 of the year of assessment •
2* Income Tax Act, 196.1, section 3 defines ’prdvious year1. 
Previous year is generally, the tax payee’s accounting 
year ending on or before March 51, immediately preceding 
the assessment year. Thus, in the case of a businessman, 
closing the accounts on 51st December, 1966, his 'previous 
year' for the assessment year 1966-67 is the calendar 
year 1966; in case of others the 'previous year' is the 
'Financial year' immediately preceding the assessment 
year; see C.I.T. M.P. v. Lady Kanchanbai*A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
6911, 693. In C.I.T.. Madras. v. Srinivasan and Gropalan 
(1953) 23 I.T.R, 87, Satyanarayan J, at p.99, explained 
the term 'previous year' as follows:
"The expression 'previous year' substantially means an 
accounting year comprised of a full period of twelve 
months and usually corresponding to a financial year 
preceding the financial year of assessment. It also means 
an accounting year comprised of a full period of twelve 
months adopted by the assessee for maintaining his 
accounts but different from the financial year and 
preceding a financial, year11.
3. Income tax is to be charged on the rate or rates fixed for 
the specific year by the annual Financial Acts.
4. The Income-tax Rules, 1962, Section 12, prescribes three 
types of forms of 'returns', viz., (l) Form no.1 (green) for 
companies; (2) Form no.2 (pink) for persons other than 
companies; (3) Form no.3 (white) to be used alternative
to Form no.2 for taxpayers (other than companies, 
cooperative societies ana local authorities) whose (i) 
total income aoes not exceed Rs. 15,000, or (ii) who have 
no income under the head 'profits and gains of business 
or profession'.
5. The Income Tax Officer is authorized by- the proviso to 
Section 139 ()) of the income Tax Act, 1961 g o  extend the 
time for furnishing the 'return* in deserving cases on
an application being made to him U/S 139 (1)U), (11) (111)
6. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2 clause 9 says that: 
"Assessment year" means the period of twelve months
commencing on the 1st day of April every year." A
taxpayer closing the accounts of his business or
profession after the 31st December of the year
immediately preceding the assessment year should make the
return of his income within six months from the date on 
which the accounts were closed.
Further sub-section (2) of section 139 of the Act authorizes 
the Income-tax Officer to serve notices on those persons 
whose total income rendered them liable to income-tax in 
his opinion, to furnish a return of income within a 
specified period and in the prescribed manner. On failure
i
to furnish a return, without reasonable cause, an assessee
renders himself liable to *best judgment assessment1, under
section 144* and refusal to grant registration or
cancellation of the registration of firms under sections
185(5) and 186(2) of the Act in addition to penalty and
prosecution under sections271(1) and 276(b) in appropriate 
7cases •
The general procedure after the return is filled 
is that the Income-tax Officer scrutinizes it, and, if 
he is satisfied that it is correct and complete, he will 
send the assessee a ’Notice of Demand1 and specify the
........................  Q . . . .  ..................................
tax due and the date of payment. In case the Income Tax
7. Supra note 71* pp. 704,705.
8. As a rule the income-tax in the normal course can only be 
levied after the completion of the assessee*s financial 
year. Sometimes, it happens that by the time the regular 
assessment under section 145 is completed, the assessee 
has spent his income, or has left the country, and 
disposed of his assets to avoid payment of taxes. In such 
cases provision has been made for assessment of income 
during the current Financial year under sections 174* 175 
and 176, in order to protect the interest of revenue, the 
Income Tax Act has made provision for the collection of 
tax at various stages, viz.,
1. the regular assessment including representative 
assessment (sections 145 to 149);
2. deduction of tax at source (sections 192 to 206);
5. provisional assessment (section 141);
4. advance payment of tax (sections 207 to 219).
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Officer wants further information or evidence, he sends 
a notice, either under section 142(1) or 143(2) of the 
Income Tax Act, 1961, as the case may he to the assessee 
to furnish such information or evidence by an appointed 
date. This notice calls upon the assessee to attend or 
to produce or cause to be produced any evidence on which
Q
he may rely to establish the correctness of his Return1 .
Thereafter the Income Tax Officer goes through the
information furnished and, if he is still not satisfied
10he may ask the assessee to furnish further details •
9. The assessee need not attend the office personally unless 
called for under section 131• He may depute any one of 
the following on his behalf, viz.:
1. a relative; 2. a person in his employment;
3. a lawyer; 4. an accountant;
5. an income-tax 6. an officer of a scheduled
Practitioner and bank with which the
assessee has regular, 
dealings.
10. The following are in short the various stages of 
assessment: ti) Submission of return of income by the 
assessee. (ii) issue of notice under section 142(i)' and 
143(2), (iii) determination of taxable income, (iv) 
service of the notice of demand. Income Tax Act, 1961, 
section 131 > has given wide power to Income Tax Officer.
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Thus, after examining the relevant documents, evidence 
produced by the assessee ana after taking into account the 
result of any other enquiries he might have made, he would 
determine the * total income* and tax payable* He would 
then send a *Demana Hotice* for the tax aue, accompanied 
by a copy of assessment order and a chalan*
Section 144 like section 23(4) of Income Tax Act, 
1922, empowers the Income-tax Officer to make the 
assessment to the best of his judgment in the following 
three cases, viz., where a person -
**(a) fails to make the return requirea by any notice 
given unaer sub-section (2) of section 13912 and 
has not maae a return or a revised return under sub­
section (4)1  ^ or sub-section (5)^of that section, or
11. Taxes Management Act (1970, Chapter 9) section 29(1)(b) 
provides provision for fbest judgement assessment*. See
*The Best Judgement Assessment undeff the Indian Sales 
Tax'haw*, by S.H. Jain Cl965) 7. Journal of I.L.I. p-82* 
_*_B_ritish Tax Encyclopedia, by Gr.S.A. Wheatcroft, Vol.i, 
para.1-1414t p*1696. C.I.T., Burma v. Mewsrs. E in St in. 
(1947) 15 I.T.B. 290, I.T.C. v. Beharilal I.'LVR ,19~42 All 452 
at p.114#
12. Sunra pp. 47-49 For section 139(2).
13. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 139(4) provides that if 
a return is not furnished within the time, the return 
may be furnished at any time before the assessment is 
made. However, the person will be liable to penalty, 
if the failure was without any reasonable cause*
14# Income Tax Act, 1961, section 139(5) empowers a person 
who has furnished a return to rectify any omission or 
wrong statement before the completion of assessment.
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(b) fails to comply with all the terms of a notice
/ \ 15issued under sub-section (1) of section 141 , or
(c) having made a return, fails to comply with all 
the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2 ) 
of section 1 4 3*
However, and assessee can apply to the Income Tax
Officer for cancellation of the best judgement.assessment
17and to make a fresh assessment under section 146 of the
Act of 1961, if he was prevented by sufficient or
reasonable cause to comply with the statutory requirements
18under the Act • And the Income Tax Officer is bound to
15* See supra p.50 for section 142(1)•
16. See supra p.50 for section 143(2)
17* A best judgement assessment can be cancelled on the 
following grounds, under section 146 of the Act of 
1 9 6 1, viz., -
M(i) that the assessee was prevented by sufficient 
cause from making the return required under sub-section
(2 ) of section 1 3 9, or
(ii) that he did not receive the notice issued under 
sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2 ) of 
section 143 9 or
(iii) that the assessee had not had a reasonable 
opportunity to comply, or was prevented by sufficient 
cause from complying with the terms of any notice 
referred to in clause (ii)...n
18. C.I.T. v. Hhanmal Chellaram, (1948 I.T.R. 319,322;
Abdul Baree Choudhary v. C.I.T., 5 I.T.C. 352, 358-59
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cancel the assessment if he is so satisfied. It may be
noted that the Income-tax Officer must act in a judicious
way and should not exercise his power in a vindictive
manner with a desire to punish. As said by Hegde J, in
State of Orisa v.Maharaja Shri B.P. Singh:
"The power to levy assessment on the basis of best 
judgement is not an arbitrary power; it is an 
assessment on the basis of best judgement. In other 
words that assessment must be based on some relevant 
material. It is not a power that can be exercised 
unaer the sweet will and pleasure of the concerned 
authorities.1119
In a recent case from British Guiana Argosy Co. Ltd.
20v. I.R.C. , the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
held that in the absence of materials necessary for forming 
an opinion regarding an assessee*s income for the relevant 
year, the best judgement assessment could not be made.
19* A.I.R# 1970 S.C. 670, at p. 671 (para 4); Ihe Privy
Council in C.I.T. v. Laksmi Narain Badridas (1937) 5 I.T.R. 
1 7 0, at p. 180, in a very lucid language has analysed 
the facts which an ^ Income-tax Officer should take into 
consideration in making a fbest judgement assessment. 1 
The Court said that:
"The Officer ... must make what he honestly believes to 
be a fair estimate of the proper figure of assessment, 
and for this purpose he must ... be able to take into 
consideration local knowledge and repute in regard to 
the assessee*s circumstances, and his own knowledge of 
previous returns by and assessments of the assessee and 
all other matters which he thinks will assist him in 
arriving at a fair and proper estimated11.
Ra.ia Puttaiah v. By. Commercial Tax Officer, Kumool 
A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 125>126; amini Bus Company Ltd. v. 
C.I.T., Colombo.1952 A.C. 571 IP.C.); Govindram Saksaria 
v. C.I.T. (Central Bombay) A.I.R. T943 Bom. 122; I.T.C. 
v. Badridas Ramrai Shop Akola ^ \ I..X.R/ 1941" Hag.3£0.1 r’ *
20. (1971) 1 W.L.R. 514 (P.O.).
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In this case the taxpayer company failed to
submit an income-tax return for the year of assessment
1962, because all the books of the company were destroyed
by a fire in a riot in February, 1962. The company had
incurred trading losses in the two previous years and had to
carry forward in the assessment year a loss of $62,344*
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue rejected the appellantfs
claim and made a best judgement assessment of $25,000 under 
21
section 48(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1953*
Their Lordships rejected the Commissioner's claim 
and held that the right of the Commissioner to make an 
estimated assessment never arose under section 48(4)j 
because on the facts of the case, he coula have formed no 
reasonable opinion that the company was liable to income-tax 
for the assessment year in question, owing to large loss 
carried forward which would have to be set against its 
chargeable income*
21* Sub-section (4 ) of section 48 provides that:
n Where a person has not delivered a return and the 
Commissioner is of the opinion that the person is 
liable to pay tax, he may, according to the best 
judgement, determine the amount of chargeable 
income for that person ana assess him accordingly*•*9
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The important question that arises in this 
connection is that what is the meaning ana scope of the 
phrase 1 sufficient or reasonable cause1, that may justify 
cancellation of a best judgement assessment and call for
a fresh assessment in accordance with the provisions of
22 23section 145 * or section 144 • It is surprising that the
terms Sufficient1 or 1 reasonable cause* have not been
defined by the legislature anywhere, and the judiciary,
too, has not attempted to do so. Every case is to be
judged and aecided according to its own facts and
circumstances. In other words, the question whether a
particular cause, that operated on the mind of the assessee
and prevented him from complying with the statutory
requirements of notice as provided by section 144* which
lea to the best judgement assessment was sufficient to
justify its non-performance or not, is a question of
22. Income Tax Act, 196i, section 143 lays aown the 
procedure for assessment which tne Income-tax Officer 
should follow.
23. see supra p^.51>52 for text of section 144.
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n  j
fact . Some of the cases which throw light on the point 
will now be discussed.
In Lachman Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax.
25
U.P., the respondent failed to produce tne accounts of
a branch before the local Income-tax Officer, as required
under section 23(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, but
promised to produce it before the Income-tax Officer
assessing the head office. He did not produce the account
at the head office on the pretext that it was inconvenient
to produce the branch accounts at the head office. It was
held that the Income-tax Officer was justified in making
a best judgement assessment and that the assessee was not
prevented by sufficient cause from producing the accounts
before the Income-tax Officer under section 27 of the
26Income-tax Act, 1922 • The Court observed that the question
24. C.I.T. v. Laxminarain Badridas,(1937) 5 I.T.R. 170, 179 (P.C) 
Abdul Baree Choudharv v. C.lTT. 5 I.T.C. 352,358 (F.B.);
A.I.R. 1931 Ran 194? Chinaranjni Lai Govinda Prasad v.
C.I.T«,5 I.T.C. 28? Nannesh Mai Jank has' v. C.J.I. 1941 
I.T.R. 333; A.I.R. 1934 ' Lah' 983; In re Keshardeo 
Chamria (1935J I.T.R. 418: Vithal v. C.I.T. /1938) I.T.R.
2 6 4. Chaturbhu.i v. C.I.T. A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 445;
She0du11raii IPannalal v. C.I.T. A.I.R. 1940 All. 530; 
Manbhum Transport Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. 6 I.T.C. 203; Ram 
Kaur Mohan Lai v. C.I.T 3 I.T.C. 375*
25. A.I.R. 1925 All 385.
26. Sec. 146 of the Act of 1961 is the corresponding section.
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is one of fact and the Income-tax Officer’s decision is
final on the point. While explaining the meaning of the
word ’prevent1, the Court said that:
"The word 'prevent'...involves some definite active 
cause, making compliance with the order impossible, 
and not a passive cause such as the opinion that 
compliance is not obligatory because of the rights 
supposed to be secured under the Act."27
In Lalit Kishore Mitra v. C.I.T.. Bihar.2^he 
petitioner failed to submit a return in accordance with 
a notice under section 22(2)^of the Income-tax Act, 1922, 
and his assessment was made summarily under section 23(4) 
of the Act. He filed an application to the Income-tax 
Officer under section 27 for the cancellation of the
assessment on the ground that the petitioner's son, who
was entrusted with the responsibility of preparing the 
return forgot to do so, due to his preoccupation with the 
arrangements of the petitioner's grand-daughter's wedding.
27. A.I.R. 1925 All. 385 at p.387.
28. A.I.R. 1952 Pat.166. See supra pp. 51-52.
29. Corresponds to section 139(2).
30. Corresponds to section 144.
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The application was rejected, the reason being inadequate.
when the petitioner moved the Court, it rejected the
petitioner’s application and held that the question of
sufficiency or insufficiency was not a matter of law*
In Banarai Das v* Q*I*T. Punjab, N.W.P., Delhi 
31and Lahore, the Lahore High Court rejected the 
petitioner’s application under section 66(3)^ of the 
Income-tax Act, 1922, for a mandamus to compel the 
Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, to state the case of 
the petitioner and the point of law arising therein to 
the court.
The petitioner, a mill owner, submitted a return 
for the assessment year 1952-33 declaring a gross income of 
Rs. 25>6 3 6, against which Rs. 76,885 was set on account of 
depreciation. The Income-tax Officer, being dissatisfied 
with the return, issued a notice under section 22(4) calling 
upon the assessee to produce complete account books. The 
assessee produced some but failed to produce the rest, in 
spite of a long extensiom of time. The Income-tax Officer
31. A.I.R. 1936 Lahore 489.
32. I.T.A., 1922, section 6 6(3 ) stated cases in which the 
High Court might require the Tribunal to treat an 
application within time where the Tribunal in reply 
decided that the application to refer any question of 
law to the High Court was time barred.
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proceeded to assess the income under section 23(4) of the
Act of 1922, to the best of his judgement, and the
assessment was completed on September 8, 1933• Ihe
petitioner filed an application to the Income-tax Officer
under section 27 for the cancellation of this assessment
which was rejected. Dismissing his subsequent petition to
the Court, Abdul Rashid, J.;said:
"... It was possible for the Income-tax Officer to 
find as a fsicj fact that the assessee had failed 
to establish'sufficient cause1 or 'not reasonable 
opportunity1 within the meaning of this Act."53
Similar view has been taken by the Rangoon High
Court in Abdul Baree Choudhary v. C.I.T. , the Madras High
Court in Siva Pratap Bhatiadu v. C.I.T.^. The Privy
36Council in C.I.T. v. Laxminarain Badri Pas. held that 
it was not possible to turn the iquestion of fact into a 
question of law, by asking whether, as a matter of law,
33* A.I.R# 1936 Lahore 489 at pp. 4919 492.
34. A.I.R. 1931 Ran. 194*
35. I.T.C.j 323*
36. 1937 I.T.R. 170 (P.O.).
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the Income-tax Officer arrived at a correct conclusion
upon a matter of fact. However, in certain cases where
the illegality of the notice or shortness of time is
pleaded as sufficient cause for non-compliance with notice,
or lack of reasonable opportunity is urged, it may involve
37a question of law^ .
38For instance in re Messrs. Sadaram Puranchamd, the 
assessee, an unregistered firm, did not file a return for 
the assessment year 1929-30, in pursuance of an Income-tax 
Officerfs notice unaer section 22(2) of 26th July, 1930, 
ana so he was treated as in default since 25th October,
1929# On 15th November, the Income-tax Officer issued a 
notice under section 22(4) requiring the assessee to 
produce the books of accounts on 16th December, when the 
assessee submitted a return showing an income of Rs. 18,000.
The Income-tax Officer, being dissatisfied with 
the return issued another notice under section 22(4) and 
23(2) on 16th December to produce evidence and accounts of 
the Head Office and of all the branches by the 19th December 
1929.
It was held tnat there was no doubt tnat the 
assessed was in default in submitting the return since 
October ^ 24, but the return submitted on 16th December was
37* Supra n.71 at p.768.
38. A.I.E. 1931 Cal. 729.
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a valid return within section 22(3)> as it was made before
the assessment was completed.. Before such a return could.
be disregarded, the assessee was entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to produce any evidence upon which he might
rely in support of the return. As regards the question
whether a notice issued on 16th December requiring the
assessee to comply with its provisions on the 19th December
is a reasonable notice* Eankin, C#J*, said,
"Whether a given time is a reasonable time is no 
doubt a question of fact; but on the border line 
tne question arises whether the time is not so 
short that it cannot be reasonable....1 am prepared 
to hold as a matter of law that he did not give to 
the assessee such reasonable opportunity as the Act 
requires to produce their evidence in support of 
their return.“39
Similarly, in Mohd Ishaq v. Commissioner of 
Income-tax, 4She Punjab High Court held that the question 
whether an assessee was given a reasonable opportunity to 
produce evidence in support of the return and whether the 
time given was so short as not to be reasonable are 
questions of law for reference to the High Court*
Another case on the point Is• Sg.ch-chi da.nfl.-nd a. - Sinha
41v. Commissioner of Income-tax ,in which the Court held
39. Ibid at p.731.
40. A*I*R* 1954 Punjab 296.
41. A*I*R*. 1924 Patna 644-
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that the sufficient notice should be given to an assessee 
when an order is passed against him under section 33 of 
the Act of 1922^2 , by the Commissioner of Income Tax 
while exercising the power of an Income Tax Officer under 
section 23(2)* The petitioner was assessed on the 25th May, 
1923• Subsequently, it was ascertained that the assessee 
owned certain house property at different places. The 
Commissioner of Income Tax issued a notice under section 33 
of the Act of. 1 9 2 2, on December 13> 1923 9 to the assessee 
to show cause within a week’s time as to why a sum of 
Rs. 2 ,4 0 0./-, the annual letting value of a house at 
Allahabad, should not be included in his return for the 
purposes of assessment. A supplementary demand was issued 
by the Income Tax Officer,on the assessee’s failure to 
explain. The Court held that the assessee was not given 
a reasonable opportunity and that one week’s notice was not 
reasonable under the circumstances.
In Smt. Ra.imani Devi v. C.I.T.  ^ it was held that the
42. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 33 originally dealt with 
the power of revision by the Commissioner. The section 
was replaced by another section in 1941, with the 
setting up of the Appellate Tribunal and provided for 
appeals against order of the Appellate Assistant 
Commissioner. The present Income Tax Act, 1961, has 
similar provisions in sections 253,254, 267*
43« A.I.R. 1937 All. 770; in re Radhey Lai Bal Mukund 1942
I.T.R. 631; C.I.T. v. Ekbal and Company. A.I.R. 1945 
Bom. 34.
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illegality of a notice under section 23(2) is a good 
ground for non-compliance with its provisions* Their 
Lordships held that where the Income-tax Officer, bound 
to issue a valid notice under section 23(2), issued a 
notice which was invalid, it must be deemed that no 
notice under section 2 3(2 ) was issued to the assessee 
and to that extent the Income-tax Officer was in default. 
It was further stated that the assessee, in default in 
having failed to comply with the terms of a notice under 
section 22(4)* could very well say that as the imperative 
notice ynder section 23(2) was not issued to him, he could 
ignord the notice issued under section 23(4) ana in that
/i A
sense he was prevented from complying with this notice.
4.5In re Ka.iori Mai Kalyan Mai * the Allahabad High 
Court ruled that the question whether an assessee was 
prevented by sufficient cause from complying with the 
notices issued by the Income-tax Officer is a mixed 
question of fact and law* The Income-tax Officer issued a 
notice on 13th April, 192b, under section 22(2) calling 
on the Karta (manager) of a joint Hindu family to submit 
a return of income by 12th May, 1928. As the assessee did 
nc : appear on the fixed date, the Income-tax Officer 
issued another notice under section 22(4)> to submit his 
account books on 28th May, 1928, which too was ignored by
44* Ibid at p.778.
45. A.I.R. 1930 All. 209.
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tne assessee, on the pretext of his son's wife's illness 
and his own toothache. Thereafter the Income-tax Officer 
made an assessment under section 23(4) of the Act to the 
best of his judgement. The question of law that arose 
in the case was whether the notice that was issued to the 
petitioner was a legal notice. It was held that the notice 
was not a legal notice, because the assessee was not given 
the minimum prescribed period of 30 days' within which to 
file the return. The notice provided 29 days only and so 
there was sufficient cause for non-compliance with its 
provisions.
The Income Tax Act, 1961, like the Act of 1922^
has made provision for assessment of income, which escaped
assessment at the time of the regular assessments in the
relevant years^, owing to a taxpayer not fully disclosing 
48
his income • Section 147 of the Act empowers an Income-tax
Officer to unearth undisclosed income and to assess it in
49order to make good to the State any loss of tax . And in 
cases of concealment of income penalty proceedings may also
46. Income-tax Act, 1922, section 34 provided for assessment 
of income escaping assessment. The present sections 
147 to 153 have taken the place of section 34 of Act
of 1922.
47. Supra n.71.
48. 'British Tax Encyclopedia! G.S.A. Wheatcroft, Vol.I, 
para 1-1432, p.1705.
49. In United Kingdom, British Tax Management Act, 1970, 
sections 36,37*39 provide for assessment of tax lost 
to the Government owing to fraud or wilful default or 
neglect of any person.
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be launched under section 27l(l)(c) of the Act^. Sections 
148 to 153 lay down the procedure to be adopted in such 
cases. Section 147 provides that:
"If-
(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that, 
by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an 
assessee to make a return under section 139 for any 
assessment year to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose 
fully and truly all material facts necessary for his 
assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has 
escaped assessment for that year, or
(b)... the Income lax Officer has, in consequence of 
information in his possession, reason to believe that 
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment... he 
may,..., assess or reassess such income or recompute 
the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case 
may be, for the assessment year concerned..."
Thus the section does not give unfettered 
jurisdiction to an Income-tax Officer to initiate 
proceedings for assessment of escaped income. The Income- 
tax Officer can exercise his jurisdiction under section 
147, only if conditions laid down in clauses (a) and (b)
50. S e e  infra pp.286,287 for section 271 (1) (c).
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51are fulfilled • For instance to initiate proceedings 
under clause (a):
(i) the Income-tax Officer must have 1 reason to believe 
that income has escaped assessment; and
(ii) income must have 1 escaped assessment1 by reason of 
the omission or failure on the part of the assessee
91* T.S. Chettyar Firm v. C.I.T. A.I.R. 1931 Raj. 333. 
the Income-tax Officer is empowered to assess only 
the income, profits or gains of a person chargeable 
to income tax, tnat have escaped income. He is not 
required to examine de novo the whole assessable 
income of such assessee. Section 148 provides for 
notice to be issued before initiation of proceedings 
for assessment under section 147 and section 149 
prescribes a period of limitation. /
52. ’Reason to believe’ has been interpreted by the 
Courts to mean that the belief must be that of an 
honest and reasonable man based upon reasonable 
grounds. Mere suspicion is not enough to take action 
under section 147. See Bhimra.i PannaJLal v. C.I.T.
(1957) 32 I.T.R. 289,304, affirmed (19^1) 41 I.T.R. 221 
(S.C.); Lakshman Shenoy v. I.T.O. and I.T.O. v. City 
Tobacco Mart (1958) 34 I.T.R. 275, 288 U.C.);
Mahabir Prasad Munna. Lai v. C.I.T. 1947 I.T.R. 393, 
402-3; Ha.ii Ahmed Eshak & Co. v. C.I.T. (1951) 19 I.T.R. 
3915 Haravanappa v. C.I.T., (1967) 63 I.T.R. 219 (S.C.). 
Income-tax Officer must give reason for rejecting 
accounts submitted by assessee for making assessment 
of escaped income. C.I.T. Calcutta v. Pudamchand 
Ram gopal (1970) I S, C,W,R,740.
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(a) to make a return of his income under section 139^*or
(b) to disclose fully and truly all material facts^ 
necessary for the assessment, and
under clause (b)
(iii) the Income-tax Officer must have "in consequence of 
55information in his possession reason to believe" that 
income has escaped assessment
53* Pannalal Nandlal Bhandari v. G.I.T* (1961-) 9 41 I.T.R. 
76CS.C.): Md. Bashir v. I.T.07(l962) 46 I.T.R. 827.
54* fMaterial fact* means primary facts*- the duty of the 
assessee is only to disclose the primary factsj and he 
is not required to indicate what factual or legal 
inferences should be drawn from the primary facts. See 
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd..v. I.T.O. A.I.R. 1961 S.C.
372; Rameshwar Groenka v. I.T.O., A ^ a r d 1 Shillong A.I.R. 
1970 Assam 84; 85; M/S Munilal Rand aval v. I.T.O.
Buripada A.I.R. 1970 Orisa 58; Muthiah Chettiar v. C.I.T. 
Madras. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 10; P.R. Muker.iee v. C.I.T.
Y/.B. A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 197. C.I.T. .Gujarat v. Messrs.
Bhon.ji Lav.ii Porbondar A.I.R. 1971 N.S.C. 91 at p.42.
Mere production of account books or other evidence does 
not necessarily amount to disclosure, C.I.T. Calcutta v. 
Bure op Dealers A.I.R. 1971 S.C.R., S.C~ 1O0 at p. 45*
55. "Information"has been defined by Shah J., in C.I.T. v. 
Raman & Company. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 49* P*51)» as, 
“...Instruction or knowledge derived from an external 
source concerning facts or particulars, or as to law 
relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. If as
a result of information in his possession the Income-tax 
Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to 
tax had escaped assessment, the Income-tax Officer has 
jurisdiction to assess or reassess the income..."
See V . Jaganmohan Rao v. C.I.T. & E.P.T. A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 300. ;
56. Supra n.71 pp*775>777. I.T.O.. Mangalore v. N. Damedar 
Bhat A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 408.
Collection and Recovery of Taxes
The Income Tax Act, 1961, provides provisions 
for collection and recovery of taxes in chapter 17* in 
sections 190 to 234”')^ . The Act of 1961,(like the earlier 
Act of 1922) provides two modes of collection of taxes, viz., 
collection of tax at source and direct payment of taxes .
If the tax demanded is not paid within the time specified
C Q
in the notice of demand under section 156*^or extended 
time^, the assessee has to pay simple interest at nine 
per cent , per annum for the period of default and the 
assessee shall be deemed to be in default . In addition 
to interest a defaulting assessee renders himself liable 
to a fine under section 221 •
The Income-tax Officer, where an assessee is in 
default or is deemed to be in default in respect of making
a payment of tax^, advance tax^, interest, fine, penalty
 ...........................
or any other sum payable under the Act , will send a
57. Similar provisions were contained in the Income-tax Act, 
1922, in chapter 6, sections 45 to 50.
58. See Chapter VI , pp.264-66.*
59* Income-tax Act, 1961, section 220(1) places the limit of
1 thirty-five days of the service of the notice*.
60. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 220(3) gives power to the
Income Tax Officer to extend the period for a payment
or allow payment by instalment.
61. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 220(1).
62* Income-tax Act, 1961, section 220(4)*
63* See Chapter VI , pp.! 334-36. Burshatton G-Quind.1 i «v .
B.M. Desai A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20,25 (para.14;*
64* Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 220(4),226(3)(x)•
65. Income-tax Act,1961, section 218.
66. Income-tax Act,1961, section 229.
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67certificate to the lax Recovery Officer specifying the
amount of arrears due from the assessee within one year
from the last date of the finance year in which the demand 
68was made . The Tax Recovery Officer, on receipt of such 
certificate, shall proceed to recover from such assessee 
the amount specified therein by one or more of the modes 
mentioned below; such as:
(a) attachment and sale of the assesseefs movable 
property;
(b) attachment and sale of the assessee*s immovable 
property;
(c) arrest of the assessee and his detention in prison^;
(d) appointing a receiver for the management of the
70assesseefs movable and immovable properties.
67. Income-tax Act, section 2(44) states that’Tax Recovery 
Officer* means-
(i) a Collector or an additional Collector;
(ii)any such officer empowered ... to exercise the 
powers of a Tax Recovery Officer;
liii) any Gaaetted Officer of the Central or a State 
Government w&o may be authorized ... to exercise the 
powers of a Tax Recovery Officer.,t
68. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 231.
69. Collector of Malabar v. Erimmal Ebrahim Ha.iee A.I.R.
19^7 S.C. 688.
70. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 226 provides other modes
of recovery, viz., deduction from salary, collection from 
persons who owe money to assessee, application to Court 
for payment of money in Court’s custody; section 227 
provides procedure for recovery through State Government 
and section 232 provides for recovery by suit.
TO
The present provision relating to recovery ana
collection of taxes is an improvement over its analogous
provisions contained in section 46(2) and Explanation
clause attached to section 46(7) of the Act of 1922, The
former provides a self-contained coae for the recovery of
71tax and other sums payable unaer the Act , whereas the
latter provided for recovery of tax by proceedings under
the State laws (which vary from State to State) for
72recovery of land revenue and the exercise of the powers of 
a civil court in those proceedings. The provisions under 
the Act of 1961 are more appropriate for the recovery and 
collection of taxes, because they are self-contained and 
lay aown the procedure to be adopted in such cases. The 
Department is not to seeK resort to some other agency as 
in case of the earlier Act, i.e. machinery for the recovery 
of land revenues in respective States of the Union.^
71. The Law and Practice of Income Tax. J.B. Kanga and 
EVA.' Palkhiwala, Vol.1 (6th Jdd.) p.936.
72. Land Revenue is a tax on agricultural land. It is an 
item.covered by Entry 45 of List II, of Vllth Schedule 
of the Constitution of India. Tax is assessed and 
collected by the proprietor of an estate or tenure 
according to the Land Revenue Act of the respective 
state under whose jurisdiction particular land falls. 
See Bageshwari v. G-owhar I.L.R. 3i Cal. 256 (P.O.); 
Jairam Sahu v. Emperor A.I.R. 1923 Bat 358.
73. Purshottam Grovind.ii Haiai v. B.M. Descis A.I.R. 1956,
S.C. 20,25.
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Appeal and Revision.
An assessee has the right of appeal*^ and revision^
if he has a grievance against the assessment order, the
imposition of fine, the initiation of a prosecution and the
issue of any other statutory order by the Income-tax 
76authorities' . The assessee can appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner against any order of the Income-tax 
77O f f i c e r ' T h e  appeal must be filed in a prescribed form
78within a period of 30 days of the receipt of the order •
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, after hearing the 
appellant and the Income-tax authorities, will pass his 
order and send copies to both parties. The assessee can 
further go in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribuna?^
74* Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 246 to 255*261,262.
75. Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 263*264*
76. Income-tax Act, 1961, 246 to 269 deal with the provisions
of appeal and review extensively.
77* Income-tax Officer will pass order under section 246,
247 and 248.
78. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 246.
79* The Tribunal is a high powered body with an equal number 
of judicial members and accountant members, one of whom 
is appointed President of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is 
a quasi-judicial body, independent of the Board of Direct 
Taxes and is under the adminstrative control of the 
Ministry of law. The Tribunal functions through various 
Benches, each ordinarily consisting of a judicial and 
an accountant member. At present there are 11 Benches 
working in the whole of India: Income Tax for the
Layman: The Directorate of Inspection, Research,
Statistics and Publication, Rew Delhi (6th ed.) 1966 
at p.82.
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80against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
81 op
or Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or Commissioner 
within 60 days of the receipt of the order. The Income Tax 
Department may also prefer an appeal against the order of 
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The Tribunal, after hearing the appellants and 
respondants, will pass its order and communicate the same 
to both the parties. The decision of the Tribunal is final, 
in so far as a question of fact is concerned and is not 
appellable. However, reference may be made to the High 
Court8  ^ and on appeal to the Supreme Court^$f India on an 
important question of law involved in the case, which needs 
interpretation. The aggrieved party may, within 60 days 
of the receipt of the Tribunal*s order, file an application 
to the Tribunal to make a reference under section 256 Ci) 
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the High Court of their 
respective State. If the Tribunal refused to do so, the 
interested party might move the High Court under section 
256 of the Act to direct the Tribunal to state the facts 
and submit the case for decision. The High Court may, if
80. Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 131,250 or 271.
81. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 274 (2)
82. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 263.
83. Income-tax Act, 1961, section 256 (Reference to the
High Court).
84. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 261.
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it thinks proper, direct the Tribunal to sena the case
and will decide the question in dispute• The judgement
of the High Court is final, unless an appeal is preferred
85before the Supreme Court of India , after obtaining leave 
to appeal from the High Court concerned or, on its refusal, 
by the Supreme Court itself. The Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal may also refer a case to the Supreme Court
8b
directly , if it considers this appropriate, in view of 
the conflicting decisions of the High Courts on the point 
in question.
8*7
The Income-tax Act, 1%1 has also prescribed an
alternative remedy to an appeal by an aggrieved party against
the orders of the Income-tax Officer, or the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner by way of revision. If an assessee
so desires, he can appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax,
88on paying the prescribed fee, against such orders • The 
Commissioner may also, on his own initiative, call for and
89examine the record of any case and pass appropriate orders 
However, if the assessee chooses this course of action, he
90cannot appeal to the Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal .
85. Ibid.
8 6 . Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 257*
87. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 263, 264.
8 8 . Income Tax Act, 1961, section 264 (3).
89. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 263*
90. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 264,
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C H A P T E R  III
TAX-AVOIDANCE
The Nature of 1Tax-Avoidance1
i
Though it is difficult to define 1tax-avoidance1,
2
it may be explained, as stated earlier , as an arrangement 
by which a person, acting within the framework of the law, 
reduces his true tax liability with the help of artificial 
schemes, devices, transactions and manoeuvres to pay less 
to the Exchequer than what he would have paid but.or the 
arrangement. It is nothing but the art of dodging payment
4
of revenue without actually breaking the law . Por
1• Lord Denning in Grifith (Inspector of Taxes]v. J.P. 
Harrison, (1963) A.C.I IH.L. ) = U9^2) 2 V.L.R. 609, while 
giving a dissenting judgement defined the word 1 trade1 
in the following words. This definition applies equally 
to the case of1 avoidance1. He states:
"...The word "trade" is one of those common English words 
which do not lend themselves readily to definition but 
which we all of us think , understand well enough. We 
can recognize a “trade" when see it... But we are 
hard pressed to define, it”(1962) 2 W.L.R. 609, 620. See 
chapter 4 , ih&ra p. 143 for details of the case.
2. See Chapter 1 for definition of tax avoidance.
3 .fReport of the Direct Taxes Administration Committee, 
1958-391» Government of India, para 7*3, p*147; 1 The 
Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance; Harry J. Rudick, 
(T9 4 0)~7 ,Law and Contemporary Problems, 243, 254 (Duke 
University Publication;; *An Ounce of Prevention: A Study 
in Corporate Tax Avoidancei by H.A. Preeman and L.H. 
kirshner (J946) 46 Col. lTr. 951, 953* Tax avoidance has 
been defined as the "escape from or the reduction of taxes 
by legally permissible means0.
4 . "Attitude of the Legislature ana Courts to Tax Avoidance 
by G. S. AV Wheat croft U935) 18 Mod. L.R., p 209^
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example, when a person adopts one of the several possible
courses open to him, because it would save him most in
taxes, without any reasonable cause and excuse, the
purpose of the transaction is obvious, i.e., to avoid his
true tax liability. Such an act is, in legal terminology,
'tax avoidance1.
One of the most common devices adopted for
avoiding taxes is that of transferring or dividing one's
assets, holdings or income between one's nominees and thus
splitting income into smaller units. In this way the
assets transferred are taxed individually at a lower rate-
income tax being assessed at a lower rate in the lower income
15
groups as compared with higher income groups .
An interesting device of reducing taxes is found 
in the case of re Central Talkies, Circuit, Matunga • The 
case shows how an ingenous taxpayer can outwit the 
provisions of tne law without breaking it. The assessees 
were a firm carrying on business in partnership in the 
name of Central Talkies Circuit, Matunga in Bombay. The 
firm consisted of husband, wife and their minor children.
In April, 1937, section 16(3)*^ of the Income Tax Act, 1922,
5. 'Tax Avoidance in India' by R.K. Dalai, (1953), 7, 
Bulletin for international Fiscal Documentation, p.i.
6 . A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 205.
7. See Chapter 4, p.179 for tne text of section 16(3).
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was amended, so that the share of a wife or a minor son 
in partnership in a business haa to be included in the 
income of an assessee for the purposes of income tax.
To defeat that provision of law, a new partnership was 
executed on July 14 > 1937> under which the mother of the 
assessee was substituted for his wife and children. The
g
Court approved the sfcheme and held that a man was entitled 
in law to arrange his affairs in any way he likes.
Tax avoidance operates in a thousand and one ways, 
depending on the nature and the legal effect of the 
particular transaction. The law discourages such types of 
anti-social conduct and tries to plug the loopholes in 
the law from time to time. In this way a constant battle 
is being waged between the specialists in avoidance of 
tax, acting for a small class, and the legislature, which 
represent the great body of taxpayers, as fast as the 
legislature closes one loophole, the tax-avoider discovers
Q
another loophole, and so the process goes on interminably.
In other words, it is a continuous battle of wits between
10the accountants, the lawyers and the Revenue .
However, it is not every tax saving device or
8 * See Chapter 4 for Courtfs attitude to tax-avoidance.
9* Evasion of Income-Tax1 (1941) 57 IuQ*R#, p. 458.
10 TTax Evasion and Avoidance: The Problem in the United 
Kingdom1, A.R. IlericV U954) 2 , Can. Tax. J. 3771 3 8 2.
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transaction that is discouraged by law, and is prohibited,
for in several cases the law itself encourages tax deductions,
11allows a number of concessions and gives allowances ,
12rebates and reliefs in various forms, for social, economic
13and fiscal reasons • Similarly, the law would not 
disapprove an arrangement of one's affairs, if the operation 
was a bona fide commercial transaction and was not designed 
for the sole purpose of avoiding liability to taxation^, 
even if it leads to the avoidance of taxes, likewise, the 
law cannot compel a mean to earn money, when he voluntarily 
stops earning more than a specified income, in order to 
avoid a high rate of taxation . In this way, tax 
avoidance may be explained in the words of Professor G.S.A.
1 1• See Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditure't Stanley S. Surrey, (1970) Mod. I.E. 705-38, 
income Tax’Act, 1961, sections 10 to 13 enumerate a 
long list of cases which do not form part of total 
income for the purposes of income tax.
12. Income Tax Act, 1961, provides reliefs in tax in certain 
cases, viz., when tax is paid on salary in advance (S.89), 
from double taxation (Ss. 90,91), to shareholders in 
respect of agricultural income tax paid by companies 
(S.2 3 5), to companies in respect of dividend paid out of 
past taxed profits (S.236) and to certain charitable 
institutions in respect of certain dividends (S.236A).
13* >Tax Spring: An Instrument to Retain and Attract Foreign 
0apital. by M . 0 . Bi .1 awat (1964) 6> J. I'. lL. I. p. 2 3 £. Supra 
note 4, p. 209. See 'Tax Avoidance v. Tax Evasion by Sydney 
A. Gutking and lavid Beck, (Ronald Press Company Ltd.,; p. 19 
Sometimes the Government offers tax havens to those who 
establish a particular industry in which the Government 
is interested. This is done with a view to give an 
incentive to start a business.
14. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 93 (3)(b).
1 5. 'Canadian Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation',
Vol. Ill, (1966), p. 539.
78
Wheatcrofts
11 As a transaction which (a) avoids tax,
(b) is entered into for the purposes of 
avoiding tax or adopts some artificial 
or unusual form for the same purpose,
(c) is carried out lawfully, and
(d) is not a transaction which the ^  
legislature has intended to encourage.R
Thus, in order to bring a particular tax saving
device or transaction within the scope of 'tax avoidance1,
the following elements must be present, viz.,
(i) there must be a tax gain or advantage,
(ii) there must be a motive to avoid tax,
(iii) the transaction must be carried out lawfully, 
and (iv) The act must be against the legislative policy.
It is evident that tax avoidance is remunerative
from the taxpayer's point of view and the Courts of law,
in most countries of the world have joined hands with the
17ingenious taxpayer ♦ The Courts have upheld the right of
a taxpayer to secure reduction in his liability by making
18use of loopholes and declared such transactions legal . 
Nevertheless, the practice is undesirable from the national
1 6. Supra note 4 at p. 209.
Similarly Harry J. Rudick states that: 
n...Tax avoidance covers every conscious attempt, 
successful or unsuccessful, to prevent or reduce 
income-tax liability by taking advantage of some 
provision or lack of provision in the law*.#** 
(1940J, 7 I*aw and Contemporary Problems, 243 5 at 
p.245.
17* See Chapter 4> PP* 131, 132.
18. Supra note 3 para 7«3 at p. 147.
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19point of view , and leads to many evil consequences. The
mere fact that the law is not violated does not mean that
20the act is justifiable . Some of the main evil consequences 
of tax avoidance are as follows:
(1) loss of Revenue to the State,
(2 ) inequality between taxpayers,
(3 ) it leads to tax evasion, and
(4 ) it wastes the community's intellectual manpower.
There are no official or unofficial statistics
available, showing the amount of revenue lost through tax
avoidance, nor is it possible to ascertain it. The reason
is obvious. Any estimate of loss of revenue on account of
tax avoidance would be merely hypothetical, as it would be
a comparison of taxation actually paid with taxation that
21would have been paid but for the arrangement , and to 
obtain such statistics is virtually impossible. However, 
it is undisputable that the loss of revenue to the 
Exchequer due to illegitimate tax avoidance, i.e., 
avoidance which is against the policy and intent . L.’.j
19* Supra note 4» P* 212.
20. 'Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission. 1933-54» 
Government of India, Volume 2, para 3 at p.189-.
21. 'Taxation in Australia: Agenda for Reform? Melbourne 
University Press, (1964), p*128, see 'The Undivided 
Hindu Family: Its Tax Privileges'by I.S. Grulati and 
K.S. Gulati, (Asia Publishing House), 1962, pp. 31 to 
71 for tax-avoidance by Hindu Undivided family.
'The Law of Federal Income Taxation', Randolph E.
Paul and Jacob Mertens, Vol.5> section 53*30, p.853*
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22of the law is enormous and it runs into millions; it has
posed a constant problem to the State and the Exchequer.
It is rightly remarked that tax avoidance poses a much more
2*5
serious problem than tax evasion ♦
Tax avoidance, although not illegal in all cases,
24is nevertheless, inequitable ^ and leads to a sense of 
25injustice in society. The provisions of the taxation
laws (including income tax and corporation tax) and the
rates of taxes levied by the Government under Finance
Acts passed from year to year are intended to secure a
predetermined quantum of revenue, as specified in the
budget of the year. If payment of a substantial amount of
revenue is avoided by the ingenious use of the loopholes
and the lacunas in law, it results in a loss to the
Exchequer. This loss of revenue must be madd good by the
remaining body of taxpayers, who either are unwilling to
frustrate the apparent intention of the legislature, or
26unable to profit by it, or have not the same knowledge
27or opportunity for avoiding the tax as the other taxpayers, 
who practice such tax avoidance methods have. For instance,
2 2 . Supra note 5 at p.1 .
2 3 - supra note 2 1 , para 305, at p . 130
24. Ibid, para 306 at p.131.
25. Supra note 15 at p.542.
26. supra note 2 1 , para 306 at p.131.
27. 1 Labour and Tax Reform1 by The Rt, Hon. Douglas Jayj
P.O., British Tax Review, (1957) p.160.
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to talk of tax avoidance in case of the salaried and wage
earning class of people is futile, because in those cases
taxes are deducted at source, i*e., by the employer at the
time of disbursement of salary. In fact, it is a practice
of wealthy people, i.e. big businessmen, industrialists
and companies, who can employ ingenious lawyers and
accountants to devise various schemes to outwit the Revenue.
In this way, tax-avoiaers enjoy tne fruits of their
ingenuity, not shared by the common people, without
contributing their due share to the national revenue and
thus bring inequality in tne society.
As a result of widespread tax avoidance, which is
mostly committed by persons failing in the upper strata of
income groups, a feeling of injustice is created in the minds
of those,who are less able to practice it, with the
result that such tax payers are tempted to adopt various
illegal means to evade payment of taxes lawfully due to
the State. Tax avoidance leads to deterioration of tax
28morality as well.
28. Supra note 15 p*542. see 1 Judicial Techniques in
Combating Tax Avoidance1 by Ralph S. Rice, (1955) 51> 
Michigan L.R. 1021. The author has rightly pointed 
out that success in one transaction of tax avoidance 
schemes gives impetus to others to resort to similar 
devices and the chain goes on.
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The ingenious taxpayers, on the one hand, employ
the country!s best lawyers ana accountants to work out
and plan devices to outwit the legislature and avoid tax; on
the other hand, the Income Tax Department employs persons
skilled in the art of combating such schemes* In this
way, the community pays both sides in the tax avoidance 
29battle , economically unproductive from the national 
point of view.
Methods of Tax Avoidance
Sagacious taxpayers, during the course of years 
have evolved a number of ingenious devices to avoid the 
impact of taxes, which might be considered their just 
burden of taxation. In fact, the process of evolution of 
tax avoidance scnemes goes on continuously, though stopped 
from time to time by tne legislature plugging tne loopholes 
in the law. Tax avoidance schemes , in brief, may be
29. Ibid
30. The following are some of the tax avoidance devices in 
vogue in different countries, viz.:
(i) United Kingdom : supra note 4 at pp.210,211.
(1) Schemes which depend on getting the taxpayer or 
his property or both outside the jurisdiction of the 
U.K. tax laws.
(2) The purchase of a defunct company, which has 
made a heavy loss, so as to use up that loss against 
future profit.
(3) Taking in a new partner or retiring an old one, 
to claim a tax concession.
(4) Accumulating income by means of a trust so as 
to avoid surtax.
(5) Arranging for the tax avoider's income to come 
to him as capital. Dor example,
(Note continued on next page)
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grouped into three parts, viz.,
3 0. (continued from previous page)
(a) letting property on a lease at a large premium 
with a much reduced rent, and
(b) selling securities just before the dividend is 
paid and repurchasing them after.
(6 ) Arrangements between a friendly employer and 
employees, which suit them both to the disadvantage 
of Revenue.
(7 ) Transferring income from a high surtax payer to 
someone who pays little or no surtax.
(8 ) Arranging expenditure in such a way as to 
qualify for deduction for tax purposes from his 
business, for example, by allowances to relations, 
paying charitable subscriptions and other domestic 
expenditures.
(ii) Canada : supra note 15, point 3 at pp. 539>540.
(a) Income splitting by means of intra-family arrangements, 
trusts and controlled corporations, ' \
(b)"Dividend stripping”, i.e., the distribution of 
corporate surplus, at less than the normal rates of 
personal or corporate tax.
(c) Purchasing a defunct company, which has incurred a 
heavy loss, in order to use that loss against future 
profits.
(d) Arranging transactions in such a way that what would 
normally be income is received as capital which is exempt 
from taxes.
(e) Transferring the income to a corporation or trust 
situated in a jurisdiction which levies tax at a 
nominal rate, or even no tax.
(iii) Australia s supra note 21, para 310, at p. 132 and 
para 351 at p. 1 4 8. Para 310 enumerates five kinds of 
tax avoidance schemes, namely,
(a) Splitting a tax payer*s income among members of his 
family,
(b) Spreading income over a number of years, thereby 
reducing liability,
(c) Exploiting companies to reduce one*s liability to pay 
tax on savings, or taking benefit of a lacuna in law 
available to a company but not to an individual taxpayer.
(d) Capitalizing a taxpayer’s income, deducting capital 
expenditure from income or converting income into 
untaxed capital gains, and
(e) arranging affairs in such a way as to receive income 
in the shape of expense allowances or benefits in kind, 
which are not fully taxable, for instance,charging 
personal expenses as business expenses. Again para 351 
at p. 148 lists four types of tax avoidance, viz.,
(continued on next page)
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(i) income splitting,
(ii) income spreading, and
(iii) income transformation.
Income splitting is the method by which the
income <hf a taxpayer, which is subject to a high rate of
tax, is split into many parts, each part paying a lower
rate of tax. Thus the aggregate tax payable would be less
than what would have been payable otherwise. It may take
place in several ways, for example, by the creation of
31family partnerships, trusts, companies, or payment of
3 0 . (continued from previous page)
(i) Purchasing securities with a low dividend yield 
but a high degree of expected capital gain, owing to 
rising dividend paymenta over time.
(ii) Purchasing Government bonds which provide discount 
and interest tax free,
(iii) Bond-washing and
(iv) Dividend stripping.
(iv) United States of America: see The Law of Federal
Income Taxation1 by Randolphs. Paul and Jacob Mertens, 
Vol.5* sections 53*35 at p. 859*
31* Supra note 2 1 , para 312 at p.133 an interesting example 
of family partnership has been given.
Pour brothers, who were carrying on business in partner­
ship with their seventeen children as limited partners, 
created two trusts for each child with their grandfathers 
as settlers. They successfully claimed exemption from 
the payment of taxes on the ground that the partnership 
consisted of four brothers and thirty-four trusts. Thms, 
on the basis of the multiple trusts as partners, only 
£7*710 was payable in tax, whereas, if the income had 
been assessed on the four brothers - the original 
partners, the tax payable would have been £27 *2 57 in the 
year 1939* See 1 Income Splitting as a Means of Avoidance 
of taxes. 1 (1967) 2, I.T.J. 41 (Reproduction from 
Venderbilt law Review). Bala.ii v. I.T.O., Special 
Investigation Oircle,A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 123* 125.
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salaries, interest or rent to their wives or children 
for nominal services* This device enables an assessee 
to secure the entire income of the business but at the 
same time evade payment of the whole income tax which 
he would otherwise have paid.
Income spreading is a device by which an assessee 
spreads his income and profits earned in one taxable year 
over a number of years. As a rule profits earned in one 
particular year should be taxed in that year itself. By 
adopting this device a taxpayer succeeds in paying only 
a portion of tax in one taxation year whereas the entire 
amount of tax is due. The aggregate tax payable over all 
the taxation years would be less than what would have been 
payable otherwise.
Income transformation is the most complex form of 
32tax avoidance technique^ . Income is divested into separate 
legal compartments, where it is taxed separately at a 
considerably lower rate or escapes it altogether, and after 
a while, the income comes back to the original taxpayer, 
or to a person whom ne wishes to benefit. Some examples 
are bond-washing, dividend stripping and benami transactions.
32. *The Use of Trusts and the Company for Tax Avoidance 
in Canada, the United States of America and Great 
Britain1, by Robert W.V. Diskerson (Ph.D. Thesis of 
University of London, 1965)> p.114«
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In bond-washing (i.e., selling securities before 
the dividend and repurchasing after) an arrangement is 
made by which a dealer in securities sells ‘securities 
cum-dividend* to a tax exempt party and subsequently 
repurchases the securities ex-dividend. The capital loss 
suffered by the dealer may be offset against his other 
income and thus taxation liability is’reduced.
Dividend-stripping is a form of transaction in 
which a finance-house purchases a company at a considerable: 
higher price than the sizable value of its assets. 
Subsequently, a dividend is paid and the residual assets 
are sold at a loss. The amount of loss is deductible from 
the finance-house dividend, income for tax purposes and 
the original company saves tax on the accumulated profits. 
Thus the tax saved is shared between the finance house 
and the original owners of the company.
A benami (ostensible ownership) transaction is a 
special type of transaction by which a person, instead of 
purchasing property in his own name, purchases it in the 
name of his wife, children or other near relative, so that 
he does not incur any taxation liability in the income of
•2 ■Z
the property^ .
33 • This type of transaction is very common in India and is 
in practice for quite a long time. J. Duncan.M. Derret, 
‘A Critique of Modern Hindu Law1, (1970).See 103 at. 
p. 76.
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*54.Taxpayers in India resort to devices^similar to 
those practised in other countries to avoid the incidence
34. supra note 5. The author has enumerated some of the 
tax avoidance devices prevalent in India, in the field 
of partnership, private companies, trusts, charitable 
institutions, bond washing, dividend stripping and 
other types of transaction.
Income Tax Enquiry Report. 1936, (Government of India), 
in Chapter XII, Section I at p.65 has enumerated 12 
types of tax avoidance methods prevalent in India at that 
time. Some are still in vogue in one form or the other. 
For instance,
(a) postponment of drawing of remuneration, resulting in 
a reduction in the rate of tax payable;
(b) the drawing of remuneration in the guise of 
allowances for expenses;
(c) the introduction into a registered firm of a 
partner for a short period only, so that an unaue 
proportion of the firm’s assessable profits is treated 
as his, or giving of a share in partnership profits to 
a near relative, e.g. the mother of the assessee.
^d) the formation by an assessee of a number of firms, 
ve) the taking of usufructuary mortgages in respect of 
money lending transactions,
(f) interest on debentures which is due to a resident 
from another resident being made payable abroad,
(g) settlements and dispositions,
(h) non-distribution as income of a company’s profits, 
and
(i) transfer of assets abroad.
Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, (1953-54),
(Government of India), Vol. I1 ,in Chapter 1 2, para 4 at 
p.190, states some examples of tax avoidance. These are 
the creation of corporate institutions, charitable 
trusts, the constitution of trusts and family 
partnership and the transfer of income earning assets 
to one’s wife and children for frationing income for 
tax purposes.
55. See supra note 30 for tax avoidance devices practised 
in United Kingdom, United States, Australia ana Canada.
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of tax. However, there are three potential areas of special 
significance, in which tax avoidance is widely carried out 
in India and which are unlaiown elsewhere. These are in 
relation to joint Hindu family property, partnership 
business and religious ana charitable endowments 
The Joint Hindu Family
The Hinau undivided family is a social institution
7 C
peculiar to India . It has been recognised by the Income-
tax statutes as a distinct legal entity, i.e., unit of
37assessment for the purpose of taxation 1. An individual
36. 'The Undivided Hinau Family: Its Tax Privileges!t by 1.3. - 
Oulati & K.S. Gulati7 T 1962)"," at p.1. see 'Tne Si story of 
the Juridical Framework of the Joint Hindu FamilyI by J. 
Duncan M. Derrett, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Ho.
6 , (1962), (Mouton & Co.), pp.1 to 47; 'Law and the' 
Predicament of the Hindu Joint Family'by J. Duncan M. 
Derret, The Economic Weekly (Eeb.13, 1960), pp. 305 to 311. 
'The Law and Practice of Income Tax', by Kanga and 
Palkhiwala, 6th ed. Vol.I(1969)* p.37. A Hindu undivided 
family consists of all persons lineally descended from a 
common ancestor and includes their wives, sons and 
unmarried daughters. Kalyan.ii Vithal Das v. C.I.T.V (1937)* 
I.T.R. 90 (P.O.) See 'The Joint Hindu Pamilv : Its 
Evolution as a Legal Institution by Gr.D. Sontheimer,(Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1965> University of London. PP*2. 17 to 22)
37. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2(31J(ii) and Income Tax Act, 
1 9 2 2, section 2 (9 ) specifically provide that 'person' for 
the purposes of the Acts includes a Hindu undivided 
family. See I.T.O. v. Bachulal (1967)1 739;
V. Venugepala v. Union of India A.I.E. 1969. S.G. 1094.
See 'The Relation^between Social and Economic 
Development of Society and the Development of Law:
Hindu Law in India'by J. Duncan M. Derrett, A.I.R. 1970 
Journal 2.
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member of the Hindu undivided family is not subject to 
taxation in respect of income received by him from the 
Hindu joint family. The Income Tax Act, 1961, like the 
Act of 1922, has given certain privileges to the Hindu 
undivided family not available to 6ther individual taxpayers* 
For example, the minimum exemption limit for the purposes of
20
imposition of tax and allowances claimable against the 
taxable income in case of a Hindu undivided family is 
much higher than that of the other taxpayers.^
But a Hindu undivided family like other taxpayers, 
does not appear to be content with what the legislature 
has conferred upon it. It adopts a number of undesirable 
methods to reduce the impact of taxes. The main devices 
are partition of the family assets and transfer of the 
joint family property within the family which require 
elucidation.
3 8. The Pinance Act (19 of 1970), 1st Schedule, paragraph A 
provides that tax shall not be levied in the case of
H.U.P. unless the income exceeds Rs. 7,000 and in case 
of an individual Rs. 5,000 per annum.
39. 'The Relation between Social and Economic Development of 
Society and the Development of Law: Hindu Law in India1,
J. Duncan M. Derrett, A.I.R. 1970, p.2. The differential 
treatment in the case of a Himdu undivided family has been 
criticised on the ground that it violated the provisions of 
the Constitution that the State shall not discriminate 
between individuals on the ground of religion. It is aaid 
that Muslim families are deprived of the advantages 
available to the Hindu undivided family. However, the 
Supreme Court in V. Yenugopala v. Union of India. A.I.R. 
1969 S.C. 1094 has approved of the scheme and held intra 
vires the Constitution.
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The partition of the joint family assets is
perhaps one of the easiest ana simplest methods to avoid
taxes. The moment the income of a Hindu undivided family
exceeds the exemption limit prescribed for the purpose of
taxation, or the income falls within a higher income group
which is subject to a higher rate of tax, the family effects
40partition of the joint family property • Partition may be
41total or partial . In case of total partition, the entire
assets of the family are divided amongst the coparaenrar:s
according to their individual shares in the joint family,
whereas in the case of partial partition the division
takes place only in respect of certain assets of the family,
generally business assets, and the family remains joint
42in other respects • Generally after partition the members
40* Supra note 36 at pp.32 to 53*
41. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 171. A Hindu undivided 
family seeking partition is required to apply to the 
Income-tax Officer to record the date on which the 
partition has taken place. It is only after the Income- 
tax Officerfs finding that partition has taken place 
that the Hindu undivided family will be deemed to have 
come to an end for the purposes of assessment of tax. 
Udayan Chinubhai v. C.I.T. (1967) 63 I.T.R. 416 (S.C.).
42. See supra note 36 at pp . 32 and 51; see supra note 39* 
p.2 . Partition need not be physical in all cases. It 
depends on the nature of property in question. In case 
of a H.U.F. carrying on business, division may take 
place by simply making appropriate entries in the account 
books•
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of the erstwhile joint family draw up a partnership deed 
consisting of the same members as individuals and get the 
firm registered under section 185 of the Act of 1961^.
As a result of all this the income of the family 
is divided into a number of separate units, each assessable 
in the hands of individual coparcerners at a considerably 
lower rate as compared with that payable by the undivided 
joint family. An illustration will show how the exemption 
limit of tax is raised by partition and thereby total tax 
payable is reduced. If a Hindu undivided family, consisting 
of five coparceners, resorts to partition, each of them 
will be separately liable to tax on his individual income. 
Thus the exemption limit of Rs. 7,000 prescribed for the 
Hindu undivided family is raised to 25,000 because the 
individual members will be taxed on their minimum taxable 
income of Rs. 5>000. In this way tne actual payment of 
tax by a Hindu undivided family which has not undergone 
partition would be much higher than one which has resorted 
to partition.
Unfortunately, the legislature has not'made any
43. The registration of a partnership may be refused, if 
it is not genuine and has been merely a cloak to 
avoid tax liability. See Sunder Singh Ma.iithia v.
0.1.I. (1948) 10. I.T.R. 457, 461-462 (P.O.);
Lachiram Baldeo Das v. C.I.T. (1954) 4, I.T.R. 279.
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provision to discourage a Hindu undivided family from
effecting a partition which is intended merely to reduce
the impact of taxes. The Courts also have not questioned
the desirability of such a transaction. Rather they have
approved of it^.
It would be desirable on the part of the Courts
to disapprove of a scheme of partition made simplynfco
defraud the revenue. In other words, if a partition is
sham and not real, it should not be recognized, as in the
case where a firm's registration is refused under section
185 of the Act of 1961, if the partnership is not genuine.
The second device which is used by a Hindu
undivided family to reduce the impact of taxes is either
to alienate the family assets to one or more of the 
45co-parcerners or to finance from the family funas an
44* Kathirvelu Hadar v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income 
Tax (1968) b8 I.T.R. 706; Sulakhe v. O.I.T. (1960) 39
I.T.R. 3 9 4:Aruna Group of Estates v. State of Madras (1965) 
55 I.T.R* 642; see supra note 36 pp. 34 to 71 for the 
amount of tax lost through tax avoidance by the Hindu 
undivided family.
45* Similarly members of a Hindu joint family in oraer to 
avoid the impact of gift tax throw tneir self acquired 
property in the common hotchpot of the family instead of 
making a gift of the property. The Supreme Court in a 
recent case Goli Eswarian v. Grift Tax Commissioner. A.I.R. 
1970 S.C. 1722, approved of a similar device and held that 
the act of throwing self-acquired property into the 
common stock of family, did not amount to transfer of 
property within the meaning of section 2(xxiv)(d) of the 
Grift Tax Act (18 of 1958), so as to attract tax. The 
following cases were overruled which had taken a 
contrary view. Commissioner of G-.T. v. Jagdish Saran 
(1970) 75* I.T.R. 529; G.V. Krishna Rao v . 1st Additional 
Gr.T.O.t 1970 A.P. 126; Commissioner of G.T. v. 
Satyanarayananamurthy,A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 95. See Inaugural 
Address by P.C. Sethi, 4th All India Conference of Tax 
Executives, Hew Delhi,(1970), pp. 6, 7.
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Individual member or to employ a eoparcerner to participate 
in an undertaking financed by joint family funds and to 
earn a salary or remuneration for his exclusive use^. As 
a result the family property is diverted into different 
channels; each claiming assessment in its own right, as 
the self acquired property of the earner himself^, and 
thereby reducing the incidence of tax*
The question that arises in this connection is 
whether the profits accrued from such transfers of the 
joint family assets or salary earned by a eoparcerner in 
an enterprise financed ■ by the joint family funds are 
separate income of the person to whom it was purported to 
have been given and taxable as his income or that of his 
family, the eoparcerner being simply a dummy for the purpose.
46. See for detailed discussion on the subject following 
articles by Professor J.Duncan M. Derrett:
(i) ’The Relation between Social and Economic Development 
of Society and the Development of Law: faindu Law in India1, 
A.I.R. 1976, p#3. —  ■ -
(ii) 1Acquisition of Joint Family Property. How the 
Presumptions Operate! (19(>7) 69> Bom. L.R., pp. 1-7.
(iii) Acquisition of Joint Family Property (Through a 
Coparcenier: let Sastric and Equity Principles Join 
H a n d s (1969) 71 B.L.R.J., pp. 75-81.
(ivf 1Acquisition of Joint Family Property and Recent 
Decisions of the Supreme Court1.. 1 S.C.W.R. pp* 19i to 25; , 
(1969) K.L.R.J. pp. 37 to 42.
(v) 'The Supreme Court and Acquisition of Joint Family 
Property1, (1960) 62 B.L.R. pp. 57 to 71.
(vi; 'The History of the Juridical Framework of the Joint 
Hindu Family; Contributions to the Indian Sociology,
Vol.6 (1962), S.O.A.S.,University of London, pp. 7-47.
(vii) 'A Critique of Modem Hindu Law1 (1970) para. 90- 
106, pp. 62 to 78.
(viii; fLaw and the Predicament of the Hindu Joint 
Family1, (1960, Feb.13) Ihe Economic Weekly, pp. 305-311• 
(ix)'The Supreme Court and the Acquisition of the Hindu 
Joint Family Property1. (1971) 1 S.C.W.R. 7-10.
47. Ibid. sub-note (iii) at p.76.
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The legislature, as usual, is silent on the issue 
and has provided no answer to the problem.
However, it appears that the juaiciary has taken 
note of it, ana the Supreme Court has enumerated a number 
of tests^ in order to find out whether a given income is 
the separate property of the person to whom it purports to 
have accrued or that of the joint Himdu family. But perhaps 
the law cannot yet be said to be settled beyond controversy. 
The earliest case on the point is that of Gokul 
Chand v, Hukum Chand Hath Mal^ t  in which their Lordships 
of the Judicial Committee held that a Hindu undivided 
family is entitled to demand the income from a eoparcerner, 
if the joint family fund was used for his education. It 
was observed that there could be no valid distinction between 
a direct use of the joint family funds and a use which 
qualified the members to make the gain by his efforts.
48. Ra.i Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. C.I.T. ♦ M.P. (1970)
II S.C.W.R. 674 > at p. 685, 686. The Court has 
summarized the tests invoked in deciding cases. These 
are: -
(i) Whether the income received by a coparcenner of a 
Hindu undivided family as remuneration had any real 
connection with the investment of the joint family funds,
(ii)whether the income received Has directly related to 
any utilization of the family assets,
(iii)whether the family has suffered any detriment in 
the process of realization of the income and
(iv) whether the income was received with the aid and 
assistance of the family funds.
49. (1921) 48 I.A. 162 (P.O.).
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The case aroused much controversy and public dissatisfaction,
with the result that the Hindu Gains of learning Act, (50
of 1930) was passed to nullify the effect of this decision.
Thereafter came decisions of the Supreme Court.
50There are about eleven cases decided by the Supreme Court
on the point, starting from C.I.T., West Bengal v. Kalu
51Babu Lai Chand which was decided in 1959* and going on to 
Ra,i Kumar Singh Hukam Chand v. C.I.T., M.P. ^  and Prem Nath 
v. C.I.T., Delhi and Ra.iasthan ^  decided in 1970.
In ail these cases the facts were similar. The 
joint family property v/as invested to acquire a benificial 
interest in some business concern, a company or a partnership 
and the Karta of the family was appointed manager or 
managing director of the concerns on a handsome salary or 
remuneration.
The Supreme Court applied the Doctrine of nexus,
i.e.^whether there was a real and sufficient connection
50. Mathura Prasad v. C.I.T. (1960) 60, I.T.K. 428 (S.C.) 
Piyeare Lai Adishwar Lai v. C.I.T. A.I.R* 1960 S.C. 997; 
V.D. Dhanwatey v. C.I.T., M.P., (1968) 1 S.C.W.R. 595, 
M.l. DKanwat'ey v. C.I.T.. M.P. ^ (1968) I.S.C.W.R. 463' 
Palaniappa Chettiar v. C.I.T., Madras (1968) I.S.C.W.R. 
495; C.I.T., Madras v. Gurunath lhakappa (1968) 2 S.C. 
W.R. 237; P.N. Krishna Iyer v. C.I.T., Kerala (1968) 2, 
S.C.W.R. 472; C.I.T., Mysore v. B.C. Shah (1969) I;
S.C.W.R. 417. See for other 3 cases notes 51 to 53*
51. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1289.
52. (197O) 2 S.C.W.R. 674.
53. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 545.
36
between the investment from the family funas and the 
remuneration paid to the coparcenner. If, tne answer was 
in the affirmative, the income was to be treated as the
income of the joint family; otherwise it would be that of
the individual member.
The Court has summarized the law on the point very-
lucidly in one of its latest cases, Ra.i Kumar Singh Hukum
Chand.ji v. C.I.T., M.P., wherein it was stated that:
n...Whether the remuneration received by the eoparcerner 
in substance though not in form was but one of the modes 
of return made to the family, because of the investment 
of the family funds in the business or whether it was 
a compensation made for the services rendered by the
individual eoparcerner. If it is the former, it is an
income of the Hindu undivided family but if it is the 
latter then it is the income of the individual 
eoparcerner. If the income was essentially earned as 
a result of the funds invested, the fact that a 
eoparcerner has rendered some service would not change 
the character of the receipt. But if, on the other 
hand, it is essentially a remuneration for the services 
rendered by a. eoparcerner, the circumstances that 
his services were availed of, because of the reason 
that he was a member of the family, which had invested 
funds in that business or that he had obtained the 
qualification shares from out of the family fluids would 
not make the receipt, the income of the Hindu undivided 
family.,J 54
Their Lordships, while applying the above test of 
reasonable and sufficient connection, decided five cases 
in favour of the revenue and six in favour of the 
individual coparcerners.
The cases decided in favour of the revenue are
those cases in which the Courts have 'upheld the claim bf the
54. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 674 at p. 686.
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family that the income earned by a coparcner in an 
enterprise financed by the joint family funds belonged to 
the family and not to the individual member. These cases 
are discussed below in chronological order.
The first case in the series is that of * , . 
C.I.T., West Bengal v. Kalu Babu Lai Qhand^ .  The facts 
of the case are that a Hindu undivided family put up almost 
the entire capital of a company named the Indian Electric 
Works and so acquired a majority interest in its business. 
The Karta (manage^of the family was one of the promoters 
of the company and was appointed as its managing director 
on a substantial salary.
It was held on the facts of the case that the 
remuneration earned by the Karta of the family was income 
assessable as part of the income of the Hindu undivided 
family. It was observed that the acquisition of the 
business, the floating of the company and the appointment 
of the managing director were inseparable and part and 
parcel of one scheme. Thus there existed a nexus between 
the expenditure of the joint family and the earnings by 
the Karta of the family.
56The second case is Mathura Prasad v. C.I.T. .
The facts of the case are more or less similar to those
55. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1289.
56. (1960) bO I.T.R. 428 (S.C.).
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in Kalu Babu Lai Chand discussed above* The appellant, as 
karta of a joint Hindu family, entered into a;partnership in 
a firm, the Agrawal Iron Works, for the benefit of the 
family. Joint Hindu family funds were used to acquire the 
share in the firm and the appellant Karta. as partner in 
the firm, was entrusted with its management, for which he 
was to get certain allowances.
It was held tnat the allowance received by the 
appellant belonged to the Hindu undivided family, because 
the allowance received by Mathura Prasad was directly 
related to the investment of family funds in the firm’s 
business.
The third case is V.D. Dhanwatey v. C.I.T.. M.P. ^  
The appellant, as the karta of a Hindu undivided family, was 
a partner of a firm. The family on his behalf contributed 
capital, on which interest was payable to the Hindu undivided 
family. Under the aeed of partnership, the appellant was 
entrusted witn the general management and supervision of 
tne lirm anu he was to be paid a monthly remuneration out 
of the gross earning of the partnership business.
It v/as held by a majority of the Court that as 
the remuneration paid by the firm to the appellant was 
directly related to the investment in tne partnership 
business from the assets of the family^ ana tnat tne re was
57. (1968) 1 S.C.W.R. 595.
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a real and sufficient connection between the investment 
from the family funds and the remuneration paid to the 
appellant, the salary paid to the appellant was assessable 
as the income of the Hindu undivided family.
The fourth case is M.P. Dhanwatey v. C.I.T., M«P. ^  
The facts of this case are identical with those of V.D. 
Dhanwatey (discussed above) and was decided by the Court on 
same day, i.e., October 27? 1967.
The appellant, as karta of a joint Hindu family, 
was a partner in a firm and the family contributed his 
share in the capital. According to the partnership deed 
the appellant was to act as a manager of the firm and was 
to receive a monthly salary.
It was held that the salary should be included in 
the total income of the joint Hindu family for the purposes 
of taxation, as there was a direct connection between the 
appointment of the appellant as the manager of the firm 
and the investment of the family.
The fifth and last case in the series is of 
P.H. Krishna Iver v . C.I.T., Kerala."^ The facts found in 
this case are that the appellant, the karta of a joint 
Hindu family^ received a salary, commission and a sitting 
fee as governing director of a private company, which
58. (1968) I*S.C.W.R. 463.
59. (1968) 2 S.C.W.R. 472.
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carried on a transport business. The shares which 
qualified the karta to become a member of the company were 
purchased with the aid of the joint family funds, and the 
entire capital of the company originally belonged to the 
Hindu undivided family.
On the facts of the case, it was held that the 
income belonged to the Hindu undivided family, because it 
was primarily earned by investing the joint family assets. 
Their Lordships observed that the mere fact that, in the 
process of deriving benefit, an element, of personal 
service or skill or labour was involved^did not change the 
character of the income. It was further held that the 
nature of the income had to be determined by reference to 
its source, its relation to the assets of the family of 
which the recipient was a member and the object with which 
the benefit received was disbursed*
How we come to those cases which were pronounced 
in favour of individual coparcerners and against the joint 
family and revenue*s interest. In other words, these are 
the cases in which the Courts have held that there were no 
real and sufficient connection between the investment from 
the joint family assets and the remuneration earned by 
the eoparcerner concerned, so the income was adjudged to 
be the individual income of the member in question and 
assessable in his hands.
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60In Piveare Lai Adishwar Lai v. C.I.T., one 
Sheel Chand, who was karta of an undivided family, consisting 
of himself and his younger brother, gave joint family 
properties as security for his appointment as treasurer of 
a bank* He would not have been appointed but for the 
security.
However, the Court negatived the Commissioner’s 
contention that the salary earned by Sheel Chand was family 
income. The income was not the fruit of the family's
investment. In fact, it was the reward of the eoparcerner's
skill. It was further held that the family was not at any 
real loss, because it earned interest over the security 
money, and so the income was adjudged to be assessable as 
Sheel Chard's separate income.
61In -C.I.T.. Mysore v . G-urunath Hhakappa, the karta 
of a Hindu undivided family, who was a partner in a firm,
representing his family, was appointed manager of the firm
on a salary of Hs. 5000/- per month.
It was held that in the absence of a finding that 
the salary received by the karta had a direct relation to 
the assets of the family, the income was assessable as 
his separate income.
60. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 997.
61. (1968) 2 S.C.W.R. 257
1 0 2
62In Palaniappa Chettiar v. 0. I.T., Madras, the 
karta of the family bought 90 out of 300 shares in a 
transport company with the family funds. The karta of the 
family was appointed a director and later its managing 
director. He was entitled to a salary and a commission on 
the net profits of the company in lieu of salary for his 
services as managing agent.
It was held that the karta was entitled to the 
remuneration in his personal capacity and the amount was 
assessable to income-tax as his individual income, because 
there had been no detriment to the family fund and no part 
of the family capital had been spent for the purposes of 
acquiring the allowances to the karta. In other words, 
there was no real connection between the investment of the 
joint family funds in the purchase of the shares and the 
appointment of the karta as managing director of the 
company.
63In another case C.I.T.« Mysore v. D.C. Shah  ^ the■" - 1 — u   •?
Court arrived at a similar conclusion. Therein the 
respondent, a Hindu undivided family, was the partner in 
two firms through its karta. Mr, Shah was appointed as 
managing partner of the two firms and was paid substantial 
remuneration on that account.
62. (1968) I,S.C.W.R. 495* C.I.T., Madras v. Sankaralinpa 
. Ayy8c A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 610.
63. 5369) IjS.C.W.R. 417#
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The Court distinguished the case from other
64similar cases discussed earlier , on the ground that there
had been no real and sufficient connection between the
investment of the joint family funds and the appointment
of Mr. Shah. It was held that Shah was appointed because
of his frich experience1 in the line of business which the
two firms were carrying on and that the remuneration was
not earned on account of any detriment to the joint family
assets. It was, therefore, held that the income was not
assessable as the income of a joint Hindu family but as
his individual income.
Similarly, in a recent case, Ra.i Kumar Singh Hukum
65Chandji v. C.I.T., M.P., it was held that the remuneration
received by the karta of a Hindu family, as one of the
managing directors of a firm in which the family had 
acquired an interest, was the individual income of the
respondent. It was held that the karta did not become the
managing director of the firm solely because his family had 
purchased a considerable number of shares in the firm but 
because of his personal qualifications; he was elected to 
the post by the Board of Directors.
64. V.D* Dhanwatey v* C.I.T..M.P., A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 683; M.P. 
Dhanwatey v. C.I.T.. M.P., A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 682; P.N. 
Krishna Iyer v. C.I.T., Madras, (1968) 2 S.C.W.R. 472; 
C.I.T.. West Bengal v. Kalu Babu Lai Chand. A.I.R. 1959 
S.C. 1289; Parbati Kuer v . Sarangdhar. A.I.R. 1960 S.C.403; 
Rameshwar Prasad v. C.I.T., Allahabad. A.I.R. 1@68 All.88.
65. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 674
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66Again in Prem Nath v. C.I.T., Delhi and Ra.i as than , 
tne Court held that the allowance received by the karta of 
the Hindu undivided family, as amanaging partner in a firm 
in wnich he represented his family, was his inaiviuual 
income for rendering services.
On a careful analysis of the above cases, one 
comes to the conclusion that the Courts have made a 
distinction between the remuneration earned by a eoparcerner 
as a result of investment made by a joint family funds in 
an enterprise ana the remuneration earned on account of 
his personal skill. If the remuneration is earned due to 
the eoparcerner1s personal skill, tne connection between 
tne investment of the joint family funus and the earnings 
of the eoparcerner will be held to be too remote to be 
adjudged the earnings of the joint family.
The proposition may appear sound but in actual
practice its application is unfair. For instance, if an
intelligent taxpayer, in order to avoid the incidence of
67tax, as stated by Professor Derrett , was cautious enough 
3imply to add in the deed of agreement of the concern, in 
which the interest had been acquired by the joint family
66. (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 545.
67. Suora note 46 (iii) at p. 76.
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funds, that the eoparcerner was appointed because of his
68frich business experience* or beaause of his 1 great
69personal qualifications’ , or because of his’personal
70skill and services’ it would be held that there was no
real and sufficient connection between the investment and
the remuneration, no matter how substantial the family
71investment might have been • This can hardly be justified•
Again, under the present rule, where the family
contributes 30 per cent, of the capital in a concern, the
member would be entitled to keep all his earnings on the
ground that there was no ’real and sufficient connection*
72between the investment and the earnings .
In such cases, as suggested by Professor Derrett,
who has very carefully dealt with this topic in various 
73places , there should be an evaluation of the family’s 
right as against the individual’s right and a balance should 
be maintained between the two interests. In other words, 
the doctrines of ’real and substantial* test should be 
replaced by the doctrines of ’proportional entitlement’, 
i.e. the family should be entitled to the income
68. C.I.T.. Mysore,— , v. D^C^Shah (1969) I,S.C.W.R* 417.
69. Ra.i Kumar Singh Hukum Chand.i i v. 0.1.3?. M.P., (1970) 2
S.C.W.R. 674.
$0. Prem Rath v. C.I.3?. Delhi, (1970) 2 S.C.W.R. 545.
71. See supra note 46 (iii) at p.76.
72. See ibid 46 (iv) at p.24.
73. See ibid.
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proportional to its contribution, subject to the claim of 
the individual eoparcerner contributing his skill evaluated 
in terms of a percentage contribution^. For instance, if 
a Hindu undivided family invests capital in, a concern and 
one of its coparcerners uses his *rich business experience1, 
the interest of both the family and the eoparcerner should 
be assessed while distributing their share in the earnings.^ 
At times the gains from 1 personal experience* might be 
proportional to the family investment and then both would be 
entitled to equal shares in the earnings.
But where the karta of the joint family or some
other eoparcerner places himself in such a position that 
he derives certain advantages by virtue of his status in 
the family, his position is that of a constructive trustee 
for the person or persons towards whom he stands in that 
fiduciary capacity, in regard to the gains derived out 
of that act. And such a person is accountable to the 
principal, i.e., joint Hindu family for the advantages 
derived and the earnings belong to the family and not to
74. Supra note 46(iii) at p. 73.
75* Supra note 46(iv) at p. 24. The author has traced the
law on the point in the old Hindu law. He has cited
authorities stating that * gains are proportionate to the 
investment, unless the partners otherwise agree*. A 
somewhat similar doctrine is applied in the law of torte 
while apportioning liability between the plaintiff and 
defendant in case of contributory negligence, and the 
parties are asked to contribute in that proportion.
107
him.76
Perhaps this would be the best propositioh in 
the circumstances; otherwise a joint family enterprise 
could become a cloak behind which ingenious taxpayers in 
the family could hide their individual interests at the 
expense of the family and the revenue,
Partnership
77The Income-tax statutes in India have recognized
78 7Q
a partnership as a unit of assessment like the Hindu
undivided family. Thus a firm is an assessee under section
2(7) of the Act of 1961 and is subject to tax, irrespective
of whether it is registered under section 185 of the Act, or
not, like other assessees at the rate or rates prescribed
by the Finance Act of the year.
76. This corresponds to a rule of equity. See supra note 46
(iii) at p.73* Messrs. Pierce Leslie v. Violet 0. Wapshare
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 843: Boqrflmaa v. Phipps (1966) 3 All. S.
R. 721 (H.L.).
77• Income Tax Act, 1922, provided for assessment of firms 
under section 23(5) of the Act*
78. The definition of the firms, partners and partnership 
will have the same meaning as in the Indian Partnership 
Act (9 of 1932). Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2(23)•
79* Income Tax Act, 1961. section 2(31)(iv) read with section 
4 (1) and section 2(7; state this fact. See C.I.T. v. 
Piggies and Company (1953) 24 I.T.R. 405,409~~(S..C.); 
UarayanaChetty v. I.T.O. (1959) 35 I.T.R. 388,393-5 (S.C.); 
I.T.0. v. Radha Krishna A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 46 at p.47.
Similar view has been taken in the United Kingdom 
regarding firms, i.e., they are assessable by the House 
of Loras in the IhdomeThxnCommissioner of the City of 
London v. Gibbs (1942) 10 I.T.R. Suppl.121 (H.L.).
However, a firm is not a legal entity under the general 
law. Dulichand Laxminarayan v. C.I.T.,(1956) 29 
I.T.R. 535 (S.C.;
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It may be noted that in 1930, by the Income Tax
Amendment Act (21 of 1930), firms were placed in two
80 81categories, namely registered and unregistered for
ihe purposes of assessment and collection of tax. A firm
o p
registered under the provisions of the Act enjoys the 
benefits of lower rates of taxation than unregistered firms. 
However, the registration of firms is optional on the part 
of partners, and the law does not impose any obligation to 
get the firm to register.
In the case of registered firms, the firm is 
assessed to tax at a specially low rate^and the partners 
are individually taxed on the basis of their total income,
80* "New Law Regarding Registration of Firms* by G.C. Sharma 
Tax Consultant Conference (1964)> Souvenir,pp. 115 j 116; 
Income Tax Act, 1961, section 182 provides for assessment 
of "registered firms1• See for "Registration of Firms: 
Some; Problems j K. Ponnuswami (1964) 6 J* 1.1*1,54 to 68.
81* Income Tax, 1961, section 183 provides for assessment 
of unregistered firms. Registration of firms takes 
place from the date the Registrar makes an entry in the 
Register of firms and not from the date application was 
sent for registration.C.I.T.,A.P. v. Messrs. Jayalaks- 
hmi Rice and Oil Mills. 1971 I.8.C.W.R. 183.
82. It was held by the Mysore High Court in Adinarayan Setty
I«T.0« (1964) 52 I.T.R. 987? that the provisions 
relating to assessment of registered and unregistered 
firms on a different footing was not unconstitutional.
83. Until 1956 there was no provision for assessment of tax 
in case of registered firms. It was only by the 
Finance Act, 1956, that the assessment in case, of 
registered firms started.
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including their share of the firm’s profits. A partial
relief is given against double taxation by section 67(l)(a)
84.of the Act . In the case of unregistered firms, the tax
is payable by the firm itself on the total income of the
firm as a distinct legal entity and no tax is payable by
the partners individually with the result that the total
tax payable by an unregistered firm is generally greater
than that payable by the partners in registered firms,
because the rate of tax is higher on a higher level of income.
In addition to the above advantage, a partner in a registered
firm is entitled to claim a set off in case of loss against
his other income or carry forward and set-off in accordance
85with the provisions of sections 70 to 75 of the Act .
This artificial distinction created between 
registered and unregistered firms is uncalled for. It has 
created a lot of problems both for the revenue and the 
taxpayers. A constant battle goes on between taxpayers . 
seehing registration of firms and the revenue refusing either
84. On principle the same income cannot be taxed twice in 
the hands of the same person. Madanlal Dharnidharka v. 
■C.I.T.j (194B) I.T.R. 227,236. The Central Government 
may enter into agreement with Foreign countries for the 
granting of relief in case of double taxation or for 
the avoidance of double taxation. Income Tax Act, 1961, 
sections 90 and 91•
85. See ’The Law and Practice of Income Tax’by J.B. Kanga 
and N.A.Falkhiwala, Vol.I, (bth ed.^ 1969) at p.875*
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86on some technical ground or on the basis that firm is not
07
genuine ana only a device to defraud the exchequer .
It would be in the fitness of things that this 
artificial distinction between the registered and unregistered. 
firms should be abolished. All firms should be treated 
alike and be assessed as a distinct taxable entity falling
QQ
in one class and subject to a progressive rate of tax 
And whatever allowance the legislature wants to extend to 
a firm carrying on business should be extended to all. This
86. Income lax Act, 1961, section .184 to 186 provide for 
registration of firms. The Act lays down the following 
conditions for registration of firms:
(1) An application should be made to the Income-tax 
Officer before the end of the accounting year.
(2) The firm should be evidenced by a partnership deed.
(3 ) Ihe document should mention the share of individual 
partners in the firm,and
\4) Ihe firm should be genuine and valid*
87. See supra note 85 at pp.886,887* Ihe Income-tax Officer 
may refuse to register a partnership in case it is made 
to defraud the revenue and is not real. Sundar Singh . 
Ma.iithia v. C.I.T. (1942) I.I.E. 457,461-62 (P.O.);
Ra.iu Ohettiar and Brothers v. C.I.T. (1949) I* T.R. 51,62. 
However, bare suspicion will not justify the inference 
that the partnership was not real. Umacharan Shaw and 
Brothers v. C.I.T# 11959) 37 I.I.R. 271. C.I.T.,M.P. v. 
Hukumchand Mannalal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 383* The Income- 
tax Officer is not concerned to determine in whom the 
beneficial interest in the share in the partnership 
restsfwhile granting registration under section 26A of 
the Act of 1922. The same is true in regard to the 
present Act of 1961.
88. See supra note 80 at p.124. Similar views have been 
expressed for the abolition of the artificial 
distinction between registered and unregistered firms.
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will have a double advantage over the present scheme of 
registration of firms. Firstly, it will remove the feeling 
of injustice experienced by unregistered firms and 
discourage the crafty taxpayer from seeking registration in 
order to avoid taxes. Secondly, it will save a lot of 
time for the Income Tax Department, which is now being 
wasted in the process of registration with no gain to the 
revenue. It will also reduce unnecessary litigation and 
close one of the potential areas of avoidance of tax.
89Religious and Charitable Endowments ^
90 91The institutions known as religious^ and charitable^
89. fThe Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts* by
B.K. Mukherjea (Tagore law Lectures 1936), 2nd ed. 1962.
The author states at p.3 that "A trust would be denominated 
a religious or charitable trust, if it is created for 
purposes of religion and charity."
90. Ibid at pp. 3*4*B.K. Mukherjea states, regarding
11V .7 religious purposes" ... R eligion is absolutely a
matter of faith with individuals or communities... All 
that we understand by religious purpose is that the 
purpose or object is to secure the spiritual well being 
of a person or persons according to the tenets of the 
particular religion which he or they believe in."
91• Ibid. Mr. B.K. Mukherjea states in relation to charity, 
that "By charity... is meant benevolence, and in its 
wide and popular sense it comprehends all forms of 
benefit, physical, intellectual, moral or religious, 
bestowed upon persons who are in need of them." Income 
Tax Act, 1961, 2(15) defines "Charitable purpose" as 
including relief of the poor, education, medical relief, 
and the advancement of any other object of general 
public utility not involving the carrying on of any 
activity for profit. See Commissioner for Special 
Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 551.
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92 93trusts and endowments are among the most ancient and well
94developed institutions in India . Properties dedicated
to such institutions were generally exempt from taxation or
95were taxed at nominal rates . The same is true of the
present day revenue legislation. And the Income Tax Act
since its beginning recognised that income from properties
held under such trusts and endowments are exempt from
96purview of taxation •
However, ingeneous taxpayers in course of time 
exploited these sacred institutions for their personal 
advantage. Eich taxpayers have sought to reduce their 
tax liability by creating religious and charitable
92. See supra note 89 pp. 5 to 7 for definition of Trust.
See also Indian Trusts Act (2 of 1882). 'Trust in the 
United States Entity in Federal Income Taxation1 by W.
H. Horror (1940-41)*25 Minn, L.R. 189; see Burnet v. 
Wells (289) U.S. 670 to 685 (1933), in which the United 
States Supreme Court has discussed in detail assessee's 
liability to pay tax in case of trust.
9 3. By 'endowment1 is meant, that,which is settled on any 
person or institution.
94* Supra note 8 9 , at pp. 1,2 .
95* See 'Tax Exemptions in Ancient India' by U.U. Kher 
(1963) 39, Indian Historical Quarterly, pp. 59 to 6 8, 
for different types of exemptions available to a 
taxpayer. 'The Liabilities of Deities to pay Taxes', by 
J. Duncan M. Derrett, (1969), 71, Bom. L.R., 38,59* See 
'Religious Endowments in India: The Juristic Personality 
of Hindu Deities',by Gilnther - Dietz Southeimer, (1965)
7, Zeithschriff fdr Yergleichende Re chtswis sens chaff, 
45-100 (A German Journal).
96. Income Tax Act, 1886. section 5(l)(e), Income-tax Act, 
1 9 1 8, section 3(2)(i) and (ii), Income-tax Act, 1922, 
section 4(3)(i) and (ii); Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 
11-13.
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institutions and claiming exemption from taxation. As a
result the legislature has gradually limited the scope of
exemptions allowed and fixed a maximum amount exempt from 
0 7
taxation . For instance, under the Income Tax Act of 
1922, there was no restriction upon the accumulation of 
income from the trust property and it was exempt from 
taxes under section 4(3)(l)(ii) of the Act, whereas under 
the Act of 1961, any income accumulated in excess of 25 per 
cent, of the total income of the trust or Rs. 10,000, 
whichever is higher, is taxable under section 11(1)(a), 
unless the accumulation is. made according to the conditions
n o
set out in section 11(2) of the Act • Again,a charitable 
trust, created after the coming into force of the Income 
Tax Act, 1961, is not entitled to exemption if: (i) the
99trust property is held in part only for charitable purposes , 
or (ii) the trust is for the benefit of any particular
A
religious community or caste , or (iii) any part of the
97* The first major concerted effort in the direction of
stiffening the law was made in 1956 by the Income Tax
Amendment Act (25 of 1953)* The second was by the 
Finance Act, 1955* See supra note 85; pp.196-198.
98. The Income Tax Act, 1961, section 11(2; lays aown two 
conditions for accumulation of profits, viz.,
(1) the purpose of the accumulation must be intimated 
to the Income-tax Officer, and
(2) the money so accumulated must be invested in 
Government securities.
99* Income Tax Act, 1961, section 1l(l)(b).
1. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 13(b).
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income is meant directly or indirectly for the benefit of
2
the creator of the trust or his relatives ♦ The legislature 
has also imposed eertain conditions on a grant of exemption 
from taxes, viz.,
(1) the property from which income is earned must be 
held under a trust,
(2) the property should be held wholly or partly 
for charitable or religious purposes ,
(3) the income must be applied to such purposes, and
(4) the exemption from taxes is limited to 2b per cent 
or Rs. 10,000 as stated above.
The attitude of the Judiciary in regard to the 
interpretation of these provisions when exemption from 
taxes is claimed does not appear to be satisfactory from 
the revenue point of view. The Courts have unduly favoured 
the taxpayers seeking exemptions and sometimes have even 
ignored the ordinary plain meaning of the statute in 
question.
In J.K. Trusts, Bombay v. C.I.T.. Bombay^. the Supreme 
Court held that a trust could carry on business, which had
2* Jbid. See supra note 85 > p*242 for changes made by the
Income Tax Act, 1961.
3. taxation of Charities and Trusts1 by T.V. Viswanath 
Aiyar, (1963)9 Lawyer, pp. 321-41; sea Guru Estate v.
C.I.T.. Bihar and Orisa.A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1452. See 1 The 
Juristic Personality of Deities in Hindu Law1J.A.S. 
Uatraja Aiyar, (1954)> 3* Vyavahara Uirhaya 106-177 (Law 
Faculty, University of Delhi).
4. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 846. See Trustees of the Charity Fund 
v. C.I.T.. Bombay. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1060.
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nothing to do with the primary object of the trust itself,
and still get exemptions within section 4(3)(i) of the Act
of 1922. The relevant section provided that:
"4(3) Any income, profits or gains falling within 
the following classes shall not be included in the 
total income of the person receiving them:-
(1) .. . Any income derived from property held under
trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious 
or charitable purposes, and in the case of property 
so held in part only for such purposes, the income 
applied, or finally set apart for application 
thereto."
In this case a trust known as J.K. Trust, Bombay, 
purchased the 'controlling interest* in the Raymond Woollen 
Mills for a period of 20 years from September 3rd, 1945> 
and the trustees who were appointed as *managing agents*, 
were to get a commission of 10 per cent of the amount of 
the annual profit of the company, subject to a minimum of 
Rs. 50,000 per annum and an office allowance of Rs. 1,000 
per month.
It was held that the income derived from the agency 
business, i.e. the commission earned by the trustees as 
'managing agents', was income of the trust and was, 
therefore, exempt from taxation, under section 4(3)(i) of 
the Act of 1922.
It is submitted, with respect, that their Lordships 
misconstrued the provisions of the section in question •
The exemption unaer section 4 (3) (i) was perhaps conferred 
upon income, which was derived from property settled upon a 
charitable trust. The mere creation of a trust of future
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income was not sufficient to justify exemption from taxation. 
In fact, the managing agency commission was neither derived 
from the trust fund, nor was the trust fund invested in the 
managing agency. Managing agency commission was paid to 
the trustees for the work they did as managing agents, and 
therefore, only after the tax was deducted, did an obligation 
fall on the trustees to invest the amount for the purposes 
of the trust.
Similarly, the Supreme Court held, in Trustees of 
the Charity Fund v. C.I.T., Bombay , that the income of a 
trust created for giving education, medical help and 
monetary relief to the poor is exempt from taxation, under 
section 4(3)(i) of the Act of 1922, even though the entire 
income was spent on the relations of the donor.
It is submitted, with respect, as pointed out by
6
the High Court of Bombay , this was a fairly blatant 
illustration of a settler trying to benefit his own family 
and his own relations, and that the benefit to the public 
was too remote and too illusory to come under section 
4(3)(i) of the Act. In fact, income from a business can 
only be exempt from taxation, if the business is done in 
the course of the actual carrying out of the primary purpose 
of the institution, and, in the present case the business was 
not being carried on in the course of carrying out
5. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1060 = (1959) 36 I.T.R. 513 (S.C.).
6. Trustees of Cordhandas Covindran Family Charitable Trust 
v. C.I.T. (Central) Bombay, A.I.R. 1$52, Bom. 346.
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the primary object of the trust, so the income could not be
exempt from taxation.
The legislature, by Act of 25 of 1953, added a new
proviso (b) to sub-clause (i) of section 4 X3) of the Act,
to nullify the effect of the Supreme Courtfs decision on
the point and to ensure that the income of religious and
charitable institutions arising from a business was only
exempt from taxes, if the business was carried on behalf
of such charitable institutions. The proviso (b) to S.
4(3)(i) says:
"..III n the case of income derived from business 
carried on, on behalf of a religious or charitable 
institution, unless the income is applied wholly 
for the purposes of the institution and either -
(i) the business is carried on in the course of 
the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of 
the institution, or
(ii) the work in connection with the business is 
mainly carried on by beneficiaries of the 
institution.
Nevertheless, the Bombay High Court in Dharm Vijay
7Agency, Bofabay v. C.I.T., Bombay , held that, where a business 
is carried on under a trust, the income of such a trust would
be exempt from tax, in spite of the non-fulfilment of the
conditions laid down in the proviso (b) to section 4(3)(i) 
of the Act.
O
In Jogendra Nath Naskar v. C.I.T., Calcutta, an
interesting question arose before the Supreme Court as to
whether a Hindu deity could be assessed to income tax through ihe 
7* A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 380.
8. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1089; see supra note 46(vii) at pp.
338-390.
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shebait (manager) as a unit of assessment under sections 3
and 4 of the Income Tax Act of 1922. The facts found are
as follows. This was a family private religious endowment.
One Ram Kristo Nashar left by a will dated May 17, 1899,
certain properties as debutter to two deities and appointed
his two sons as the shebaits♦ Elaborate provisions were
made as to the manner in which the income from the property
was to be spent.
The Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings for
the assessment of income from the property held by the
deities in question against the shebaits of the two deities
and completed the assessment on the deities as if they were
human individuals. The relevant assessment years in
question were 1952-53 and 1953-54.
The appellant objected to the assessment. His main
contention was that the deity was not chargeable to tax
under section 3 of the Act of 1922 and that deity was not
'individual* within tne meaning of the Act and so it could
not be taxed •
Their Lordships rightly brushed aside the
appellants contention ana held that:
"...The Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable 
of holding property and of being taxed through 
its shebaits» who are entrusted with the possession 
and management of its property. "9
9. Ibid. at p. 1093 (para 7)J See Pran Krishan Las v. 
Controller of Estate LutyfA.I.R~ 19bb Cal.496.”
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The Court refused to give a restricted meaning 
to the word ’individual* so as to limit it to human beings. 
They said that the word was capable of a wide and 
comprehensive meaning ana included juristic persons, 
corporations and so on. This decision is not open to 
criticism.
Tax Avoidance Legislation
Tax avoidance legislations may broadly be classified
10into specific and general anti-avoidance provisions
The first type of legislation is directed against particular
types of avoidance transaction, whereas the second aims at
10* See ’Company Taxation in Nigeria*by Agboola (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1968), at pp.214 to 233; * Some 
Problems of Evasion and Avoidance of Income Tax in 
Israeli Law compared'with Similar Problem's in English 
Law, by Arie Lepidoth (Ph.D thesis, University of London, 
1 9 6 4 Chapter 22; supra note 15 at pp. 533 to 573* The 
Royal Commission has classified anti-avoidance 
legislation into four categories, viz., (1 ) ’Sniper* 
approach (specific provision), (2) ’Shotgun’ approach 
(general provision), (3 ) ’transactions not at arm’s 
length (parties to particular types of transactions not 
following the same type of trade, i.e., when one is a 
grocer and the other is a steel manufacturer and they 
enter into business transactions) and (4 ) ’administrative 
control’ approach; supra note 4 at p.225* Professor 
Wheatcrdft has classified such legislation into five 
categories, viz., (1) The ’patching” method; (2) The 
”hit-or-miss” method; (3) the use of prior department 
consent; (4 ) making the law too wide and relying on the 
good sense of the Inland Revenue; and (5) retrospective 
legislation.
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11preventing tax avoidance in geperal ♦ In India as in
12the United Kingdom , the legislature has preferred to 
enact the first type of legislation rather than the second.
In other words, specific provisions which identify with 
precision the kind of transaction that is to be attacked 
has been enacted to invalidate the particular type of 
tax avoidance device resorted to by the ingenious taxpayer^.
Some of the anti-avoidance provisions in the Income 
Tax Act of 1961 ^are in Chapter 10 and others are outside 
it. Truly speaking, there is no difference between the two 
kinds of provisions; both aim at hitting transactions made 
with a view to avoid tax liability. The difference 
between the two is in the arrangement of the provisions in 
the statute. On the one hand, the legislature has enacted 
a separate chapter entitled: 1 Special provisions relating 
to avoidance of tax; dealing with some of the more important 
forms of tax avoidance1, prevalent in India. On the other
11. The legislature in most of the countries prefer to enact 
the first type of legislations only. However, during 
recent years, some countries have made provisions of a 
general type to combat large scale tax avoidance. See 
infra p. 126 for a list of the countries.
12. Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1970 e 10) includes 
comprehensive provision in 37 sections (460-496).
13• 1Final Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation of 
Profits and Income'* U955), Cmd. 9474* s. 1020, p. 306, 
has advocated specific legislation to combat tax 
avoidance.
14* The Income Tax Act, 1922, had no separate chapter 
dealing with tax avoidance. The provisions were 
scattered all over the Act.
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hand, the legislature has plugged loopholes in the law, by 
enacting specific provisions in the Act, wherever it thought 
fit.
In the first category, special measures have been 
taken to foil the attempt of taxpayers to avoid taxes by 
directing that no effect shall be given to transactions 
entered into for the purpose of avoiding income tax. For 
instance, sections 92 to 94 provide that one's liability 
to pay tax is not reduced and cannot be ignored, for tax 
purposes,
(i) where business is so arranged between a
resident and a non-resident that the business transacted
produces to the resident either no profit or less than the
15ordinary expected profit , or
(iij where a transfer of assets is affected in
such a manner that the income becomes payable to a person
not resident or not ordinarily resident in India, thus
making income-tax provisions inapplicable, whereas, in fact,
the transferor enjoys such income, whether forthwith or in 
16the future , and
(iii) where shares and securities, or securities 
cum interest and shares cum dividend are sold under an
15* See Chapter 4»p.l87 for section 42(2) of the Act of 
1922, which was the corresponding section 
92 of the present Act of 1961.
16. bee Chapter 4> P-189 for section 44D of the Act of
1922, corresponding to section 93 of the Act of 1961.
1 2 2
agreement to buy back, a transaction known as bond-washing,
17avoiding liability in respect of the interest or dividend .
The second category covers cases in whicn taxpayers
attempt to reduce the incidence of tax, either by transferring
18assets to a third party, or to his spouse or minor child ,
or by admitting the spouse as a partner or by admitting'a'minor
child to the benefits of partnership in a firm in which the
19taxpayer is a partner , or by purchasing property in the
20name of the other, a benami transaction , is foiled. In
such cases the transferor is deemed to be the assessee for
income-tax purposes, though he may not be the recipient of
the income in strict terms of the law, and he is made
liable to pay the tax due on the income of the transferee.
In certain cases mentioned under section 9 of the Act of 
211961 , certain income accruing to an assessee abroad is
deemed to accrue in India and is included in the assessee’s 
income for tax purposes.
17* Income Tax Act, 1961, section 94 is corresponding to 
section 44E and 44F of the Act of 1922. See supra p.86 
for meaning of bond-washing.
18. Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss 61 to 63 (= I.T.A., 1922, 
s.16(1).
19. Income Tax Act, 1961, C. 64 (= I.T.A., 1922, s. 16(3) •
20. Income Tax Act, 1961, 8. 143 I.T.A., 1922, s.23(3)*
21. See Chapter 4> p. 187 ■ for the text of section 42(l) 
of tne Act of 1922, which was the corresponding 
provision to section 9 of the Act of 1961,
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The Act of 1961, as a precautionary measure, has
also provided for the assessment of income of those
persons who are leaving India during the current assessment 
22year , or where a person is likely to alienate or dispose
of assets with a view to avoiding payment of any liability
unaer the Act , or where any business or profession is
dissolved or discontinued during the current accounting year;
24
the tax is assessed in that very year .
The legislature has also imposed certain statutory 
obligations on the part of the persons responsible for
ppr p/T
disbursing dividends , interest (other than interest on
27 28securities), salaries , contractors , liquidators of a
29company which is being wound up , and the directors of a
30private company in liquidation to aupply the necessary 
information as required under the relevant provisions of
the Act, to the appropriate Income-tax Officer, in order
....................................................... 3 1 .......................
to help detection of any avoidance of tax * Failure to
furnish such information without reasonable cause in the 
22. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 174*
23.
24. 
23. 
26,
27.
28.
29.
30.
175.
176. 
286. 
285 
206. 
285A. 
178. 
179.
31. !Law and Practice of Income Tax1 by J.B. Kanga and 
h.A. Palkhiwala, 6th ed., vol I., (1969), p. 917.
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first three cases is punishable with a fine v^ rhich may extend
to Rs. 10 for each day of default under section 276^ and
making a deliberately false return is punishable under
section 277 with imprisonment which may extend to six
months. Defaulting contractors are punishable under section
285A of the Act and in other cases appropriate sanctions
34have been provided .
Thus the legislature in India appears to be well
aware of the problem relating to tax avoidance and has
endeavoured from time to time to plug the loopholes in
the law as well as to introduce new provisions. But it
must be a long time before real success in combating tax
avoidance will be achieved.
It can be appreciated, from the decisions of the
35Courts in cases relating to tax avoidance , that the 
law must be much stricter, if the taxpayer*s attempts to 
avoid payment of taxes are to be frustrated as far as 
possible. The legislature should review the decisions of 
the courts on the point regularly and make suitable 
amendments, but hasty and half-hearted legislations should 
be avoided.
32. bee Chapter 7, Pp.353.
33. See Chapter 7, pp.398-99
34. See Chapter 7.
35. See Chapter 4 for Judicial Attitude to Tax Avoidance.
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It would be appropriate to suggest at this stage
that a new section of a general nature, on the lines of
section 260 of the Australian Income-tax and Social
Service Contribution Assessment Act, 1936-70 should be
enacted. This is necessary in view of the fact that under
the present provisions a tax avoidance transaction can
only be dealt with, if it comes within one of the provisions
enacted, with the result that a large number of tax-
avoiders succeed. Obviously, no legislature can forsee all
possible methods of tax avoidance, but there must be some
provisions to deal with undesirable elements. It may be
grgued that the wide power given to the revenue authorities
might be used to exploit innocent taxpayers. To prevent
that, appropriate measures can be taken. An official of
the rank of Commissioner of Income-tax only might be
*56
empowered to initiate proceedings . Moreover, such a
. . .     37
general provision is functioning well in Hew Zealand^ *
36. In Canada sub-section (1) of s. 136 empowers the 
Treasury Board to set aside a perfectly legal 
transaction for tax purposes, if it is convinced 
on reasonable grounds that the main purposes for
a transaction or transactions was improper avoidance 
or reduction of taxes. See TCanadian Income Tax: A 
Treatise on the Income Tax Law of Canada1 (1970),
Butterworth,'‘pp. 2851, 2852.
37. Income Tax Act, 1934? section 108.
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Canada^8 , South Africa^, Nigeria^, Ghana^1, Sierra
Leone^2, Gambia^ and The Netherlands^, and there is a
feeling in other places that such legislation is more
45effective in checking tax avoidance .
Section 260 of the Australian Income Tax and Social 
Service Contribution Assessment Act, 1936-1970 runs as 
follows:
"Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or 
entered into, orally or in writing, whether before 
or after the commencement of this Act, shall, so 
far as it has or purports to have the purpose or 
effect of in any way, directly or indirectly -
(a) altering the incidence of any income tax,
(b) relieving any person from liability to pay any 
income tax or make any return*
(c) defeating, evading, or avoiding any duty or 
liability imposed on any person by this Act: or
(d) preventing the operation of this Act in any 
respect,
be absolutely void, as against the Commissioners, 
or in regard to any proceeding under this Act, but 
without prejudice to such validity as it may have 
in any other respect or for any other purpose"•
38. Income Tax Act (ESC) 1952, c 148 as amended sec. 138.
39. Income Tax Act, 1962, section 103.
40. Companies Income Tax Act, 1961, section 25.
41. Income Tax Ordinance (27 of 1943) section 17.
42. Income Tax Ordinance (1 of 1943) section 19.
43. Income Tax Ordiance (26 of 1948) section 16.
44. Article 1 of The Netherlands Laws (29th April, 1925) 
Quoted from supra note 15, at pp. 571,572.
45. Supra note 4 at pp. 228 to 230. Professor Y/heatcroft 
advocates for such a provision in British Income Tax. 
See 1 Tax Reform Proposal in New Zealand1 by J.H. 
Jenkins (1968) Canadian Tax Journal, p. 151.
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C H A P T E R  IV
JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TO TAX AVOIDANCE
Construction of Taxing Statutes
A statute is nothing but the fwill of the
legislature’ . The task of the judiciary is to give
effect to the intention of Parliament from the actual
2
words of the statute , because it is the words that speak 
the intention of the legislature • In other words, the 
role of a judge is jus dicere not jus dare, i.e., words of 
a statute must not be over-ruled by the judges and reform, 
if any, must be- left to Parliament^.
Taxing statutes, like any other statute , are 
construed strictly and effect id given to the letter of the 
law, according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language used, irrespective of the spirit of intention of
1. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, 
1969, at p.1.
2. Ibid.; Report of the Royal Commission on taxation, Canada, 
TT966), Vol*3« at p.543* Bradbury v. Enfield London 
Borough Council. (1967*) 1* Y/.L.R# 1311 per Diplock, L.J.
at p. 1334. , „ T
3. Warburton v. Loveland (1832) 2 D. & Cl. 480, per Tindal Q-J* 
at p. 489. Quoted from (1901) 4 English Reports, p. 806.
4. Chenev v. Conn (1968) 1 W.L.R. 242; Eastwood v. Henod 
T T 5 W  2 Q.B.D. 932.
5. ’Odger’s Construction of Deeds and Statutes’, Gerald 
Dworkin (1967), p. 464; At tome y-Gener'al"~v. Carlton Bank 
(1899) 2.,Q.B.pi p.158 per Lord Russell C.J. (Quoted)
Styles v. Middle Temple, 4 tax cases, 123 per Y/ills J.
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the legislature, which prompted it to enact such provisions .
The burden of proof that any case falls within a taxing
7
statute is on the Revenue and the benefit of doubt, if any
Q
goes in favour of the taxpayer . The rule of construction 
of taxing statutes may be explained well by a frequently 
quoted passage of Lord Cairns in Charles James Partington v.
Attorney General* Lord Cairns says:
"...The principle of all fiscal legislation, it is 
this: If the person sought to be t axe dnomeswi thin the 
letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the 
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the 
other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, 
the subject- is free, however apparently within the 
spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to 
be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any 
statute, what is called an equitable construction, 
certainly such a construction is not admissible in a 
taxing statute, where vou can simply adhere to the 
words of the statute."^
Further Lord Cairns, the propounder of the rule of 
strict construction of statutes, explains the basis of such 
a principle in Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal and Railway 
Companies in the following words:
6. Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation : Canada,
1966, Vol. 3 at p.543.
7. The Construction of Taxing Statutes, Gerald L. Sangan, 
ri'94C77Tol7~Ui; The ..Canadian Bar Review, p.43 at p.45 ; 
Adamson v. Attorney-General (1953) A.C. 257# Russell v. 
Scott'"('1948) A.C. 422 at p. 433; see Chapter 8 pp. 473-~§&, 
Lekshmiratan Cotton Mills v. C.I.T. . U.P.,A.I.R# 1969
S.C. 917.
8. Escorts (Agents) Private Ltd. v. C.I.T., A.I.R. 1959 
Raj. 364,366; Hegde J. In C.I.T. Punjab v. Kulu Valley 
Transport Co. Ltd.»A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1734, said at p.
1741, that:
"If two views are possible, the view which is favourable
to the assessee must be accepted while construing the 
provisions of a taxing statute."
9. (1869) 4 L.R. 100, 122. (H.L.).
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nThe cases which have decided that taxing Acts are to be 
construed with strictness, and that no payment is to be 
exacted from the subject, which is not clearly and 
unequivocably required by the Act of Parliament to be made, 
probably meant little more than this, that inasmuch as 
there was no a priori liability in a subject to pay any 
particular tax, nor any antecedent relationship between 
the taxpayer and the taxing authority, no reasoning 
founded upon any supposed relationship of the taxpayer 
and the taxing authority could be brought to bear upon 
the construction of the Act, and therefore the taxpayer 
had a right to stand upon a literal construction of the 
words used, whatever might be the consequences.M^
Perhaps the rule of strict construction of statutes 
originated in the apathy of the judiciary towards 
unmeritorious defences to civil actions, relating to stamp 
duties, and it emerged as a rule that the onus was on the
11Crown to show clearly that the case fell within the statute
Thus it is a well established rule of law that a tax must be
12imposed in clear and unambiguous language , and that the 
language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction, 
which had not been covered by appropriate words by the 
legislature/^.
The principle of strict construction has been 
followed in the United Kingdom since the very inception of 
taxing statutes and from that time the judiciary has 
reaffirmed its unqualified approval of the century old
10. (1879) 4 A.C. 197 at pp. 202,203.
11. The Attitude of the Legislature and the Courts to Tax 
Avoidance. Y/heatcroft, G-.S.A. > (1955) 18, The" Modern
Law Review, p. 209 at p. 215.
12. introduction to Income Tax Law -Canada1, Francis 
Eugena Law Brie (19 5 5)Y PP• 359>3^0.
13. Supra note 1 at p.256.
I j O
14establishel principle . However, in case of ambiguity in
statutory provisions, the courts might reject the strict
15literal approach and apply the Golden Rule ^to carry out
16the general intention of legislature
14. Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. said:
"In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly 
said* There is no room for any intendment* There is no 
equity about a tax. There is no presumption about a tax* 
Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied* One 
can only look fairly at the language used." (1921) 1 K.B. 
64 at p.71; approved in Canadian Eagle Oil v. R (1946) 
A.C* 119 at p. 140 per lord Simon; Dewar v. I.R.C. (1935)
2 K.B. 351 at p.360 per Lord Hanworth Ivl.R.; I.R.C. v.
T/olfson (1949) 1 A}.} E.R. 865 at p.868 per lord Simonds; 
I.R.C. v. Hinchy (i960) A.C. 748 at p.766 per lord Reid; 
I.R.C. v. Clifforia Investment ltd. X1963) 1 W.l.R. 396. 
15* The Rule was enunciated by Lord Wensley in Grey v. Pearson 
in 1857. The Rule is as follows:
"In construing wills and indeed statutes and all written 
instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
words is to be adhered to, unless that v/ould lead to some 
absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsitency with the 
rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical 
and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so aa to 
avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." 
(1857) 6 H.l.C. 61 at p. 106; Cf Pakala Narayan Swami v. 
ICing-Emperor (1939) 66 Ind. App. 66 at p. 78.
16. The House of lords applied the. Golden Rule in .place of 
strict interpretation in I.R.C. v. Luke (i960) 40 T.C.
630. Their Lordships said at p.646 and 648 (per lord 
Reid):
"To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious 
intention of the‘legislation and to produce a wholly 
unreasonable result; we must do some violence to the 
words.... In order to avoid imputing to Parliament an 
intention to produce an unreasonable result, we are 
entitled and indeed bound to discard the ordinary 
meaning of any provision and adopt some other possible 
meaning, which will avoid that provision."
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It becomes apparent from the analysis of cases
17 18decided by the Courts in countries like India , Canada ,
19 20 21Australia , Israel and South Africa , which are influenced
by the Commonrlaw system that the principle of strict
construction of statutes is applied as in the United Kingdom,
Por instance, the Supreme Court of India said in C.A, Abraham
v. 1,1,0,, Kottayam that:
"In interpreting a fiscal statute the court cannot 
proceed to make good deficiences, if there be any; 
the court must interpret the statute as it stands 
and, in case of doubt, in a manner favourable to
the taxpayer, "’22
17* C.A. Abraham v. 1.1. 0. t Kottayam and another, A.I.R.
1961 S,C, 609 at p. 612; Phra Bhraison Salarak v, C,1,1,
3 I.l.C. 237, 243; Hari Krishna has v, 0,1,1, 5 I.l.C. 
275, 278; Behari Lai Bhargava v. C,I,T, 1941 I-T.R,
24; Charitable G-adodia Swadeshi Stores v. C, 1,1, 1944
1.1.R. 365, 391 ; G-appumal Kanhaiyalal v. 0,1.1, 1945
1.1.R. 210, 22V, affirmed by S.C. 1950 I.l.R. 584; 
Maharaja of Kapurthala v. C.I.T. 1945 I.l.R# 74, 93; 
Upper India Chamber of Commerce v. Ck.1.1. 1947 I.l.R. 
263, 281 ; Pragdas Mathura Das v. 1. 1T57 1950 I.l.R.
757, 761; Ambika Silk Mills Co. Ltd., v. C.1.1.,
Bombay (1952) 22 I.l.R. 58, £4.
18. M.IT.R. v. Maclnes (1954) (^x.C.R. 181} ) See 1 Canadian 
Income lax: A Ireatise on tne income lax Law of Canada, 
(1970), at p. 2833.
19. Legislation Against lax Avoidance: Ihe Australian 
Exp e rience , H . A . J. P or d , (196lJ, pp. 247 and 248.
20. C.A. 120/52, Kome Rovski v. Director of Land Betterment 
lax, 7 Piskein Din 141, at p. 153* Quoted from Arie 
Lepidoth’s Ph.D thesis (University of London - 1964)
at p. 224*
21. latem Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. C.I.R. (1941) 2 
A.E.R. 111; see 'Silke on South African Income lax,
5th ed. 1967) Jute & Co, Ltd., p. 858. ’
22. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609, 612. (para 6).
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Ihe rule of strict construction does not appear to
have been invoked in the United States of America, where a
23more equitable construction is applied .
There appears to be a problem area in the field of 
taxation statutes, in regard to cases where ingenious devices 
have been innovated by taxpayers, to defeat the very object 
of the legislature by reducing or avoiding tax. It wouldhptpnly 
be of academic interest but Of - administrative and 
sociological interest as well to discuss, in brief, the 
attitude of the courts towards such cases and to note how 
far the judiciary has stretched the wording of a statute to 
cover such types of cases.
It is, therefore, proposed to discuss in brief the 
views propounded by the highest courts of law in this area 
of taxing statutes in the United Kingdom and India 
respectively.
Traditional Approach in the United Kingdom
The judicial trend in the United Kingdom towards tax 
avoidance legislation, has been, ever since the beginning of 
such provisions, to construe statutes literally and to 
determine tax liability, according to strict legal canons.
That is to say, the courts take the words of the Statute as 
it is and apply them to the facts of the particular case,
23. See supra note 11, at p. 215; Gregory v. Helvering
(1934)69 P. 2nd. 809, 811 affirmed by the Supreme Court 
of the U.S. in (1935) 293 U.S. 465.
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irrespective of the intention of the legislature^^ or
the financial or economic effect of the decision. This
rule may be described as the rule of the legal effect or 
25result . In other words, the language of the statute is
o c.
not to be stretched either in favour ofnthe State or
27narrowed down in favour of the taxpayers . As a result
the courts have invariably upheld the rights of a man so
to arrange his affairs as to attract the least amount of
taxes, by making use of the loopholes in the law ana by
adopting ingeneous devices. This attitude of the judiciary
could be noted as early as 1889> when Lord Esher M.S. made
the following statement in Commissioner of Inland Revenue
v. Angus ana Co.;
"The Crown ... must make out its right to the duty, 
and if there be a means of evading the duty, so 
much the better for those who can evade it. It is 
no fraud upon the Crown, it is a thing which they
24* Supra note 11 at p. 214.
25. Supra note 6 at p. 546.
26. Supra note 1 at p. 141; C.H.W. (Huddersfield) Ltd. 
v. I.R.C. (1963) 1 W.L.R.: 767; I.R.C. v. Coutts and 
Co., 1964 A.C. 1393; W.M. Cory and Sons Ltd/ v.
I.R.C. (1965) A.C.. 1088.
27. Be Vigier v. I.R.C. (1964) 1 W.L.R. 1073; Ridge 
Nominees Ltd. v. I.R.C. (1962) Ch 376 and
Y/estward Television v. Hart (Inspector of Taxes) (1968) 
3 W.L.R. 480.
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pQ
are perfectly entitled to do.1
May be, the judiciary in Britain has failed to act 
as an independent umpire and has gone beyond its cherished 
role of impartial referee in deciding tax avoidance cases. 
Courts have not only vehemently opposed the idea of morality 
in tax avoidance cases, but'have gone to the extent of 
encouraging the idea that there is nothing wrong, either 
legally or morally, in the well-to-do reducing their tax
pQ
liability within the four corners of the law . Bor instance, 
Lord Clyde, Lord President of the Court of Session, 
emphatically said in Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v. I.R.C.:
28. (1889) 23 Q.B. 579 at p. 593# Similar statements can
be found in a number of cases. Por instance, Lord Sumner 
stated in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fisher1s 
Executors (1926) 10 Tax Cases 302 at p. 340 that:
"My Lords, the highest authorities have always recognized 
that the subject is entitled so to arrange his affairs as 
not to attract taxes imposed by the Crown so far as he can 
do,.so’ within the law, and that he may legitimately claim 
the advantage of any express terms or of any omissions that 
he can find in his favour in Taxing Acts. In so doing, 
he neither comes under liability nor incurs blame•"
Some of the other cases in which similar propositions 
have been made are as followss
Attorney-General v. Luke of Richmond and Gordon. (1908) 2 
K.B. 729 at p. 743 per Farwell. L.J.; S.liY. Hawker v.
J. Compton (1922) 8 Tax Cases 306 at p. 313 per Sankey J.; 
Lickinson v. Gross (1927) 11 Tax Cases 614 at p. 620 per 
Rowlatt, J.; Linton v. Chapman. (1928 13 Tax Cases 448 
at p. 454 per tord Clyde; Commissioner of Stamp Luties 
v# Byrnes t191l) A.C. 386 at p. 392 per lord Macnaghten.
29* Evasion of Income Tax1. A.F. (1941) L.Q.R. Vol.57 at 
458.
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"No man in this country is under the smallest 
obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal 
relations to his business or to his property as to 
enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible 
shovel into his stores* The Inland Revenue is not 
slow - - and quite rightly - - to take every advantage, 
which is open to it under the taxing statute, for the 
purpose of depleting the taxpayer’s pocket. And the 
taxpayer is, in like manner, entitled to be astute to 
prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of 
his means by the Revenue*H^
Similarly, the courts have dispelled the idea of
looking at the ’substance* of the transaction as opposed to
the ’form’ in order to arrive at a decision in such cases.
For instance, in the leading case of O.I.R. v. Duke of
Westminster, their lordships of the House of lords upheld
a scheme to mitigate tax, by which the former Duke of
Y/estminster reduced his surtax liability, by; paying a
portion of his servant’s wages in the form of a legally
binding annuity. The payments under the Deed were, in
substance, payments of remuneration to the servants and so not
deductible in computing surtax. Their Lordships, once again,
affirmed that a strict construction is applied to both the
wording of the statute and the form in which the taxpayer
has clothed his action. Lord Tomlin stated the principle
of law in the following words:
’Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his 
affairs so as that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would
30. (1928-29) 14 T.C. 754 at pp. 763, 764; .D.M. Ritche v.
Commr. of I.R. Levene v. O.I.R. (1928) A.C. 2 i7 at
p. 227* per Lord Sumner.
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be* If he succeeds in ordering them, so as to secure 
this result, then, however unappreciative the 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue or his fellow 
taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled 
to pay an increased tax* This so-called doctrine of 'the 
substance' seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt 
to make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered 
his affairs that the amount of tax sought from him is 
not legally claimable.”31
Tax Avoidance Cases
During the beginning of the last decade of the mid­
twentieth century, a welcome change in the attitude of the 
judiciary towards tax avoidance cases is discernible.
Perhaps the swing of the pendulum of the courts' attitude 
towards such cases, from a somewhat unconscious admiration
to a growing recognition of its social impropriety, may be
32due to the crisis of the Second World War.
The dawn of social consciousness on the part of the
judiciary towards the civic vice of "legal evasion" can be
found in the judgement of Lord Green in the case of Lord
Howard de Walden v.O.I.R. In this case for the first time it 
31.11936) A.O.I. pp. 19-20.
32.'Prevention of Legal Evasion' (1945) 61, L.Q.R. at p.228; 
'Evasion of Tax' .A.P. (1942) 58, L.Q.R. at p.. 168.
33.(1942 1 K.B.389. Lord Green M.R., while construing an 
anti-avoidance section said: "The section is a penal one, 
and, its consequences, whatever they may be, are intended 
to be an effective deterrent which will put a stop to 
practices which the legislature considers to be against 
the public interest. For years a battle of manoeuvre has 
been waged between the legislature and those who are minded 
to throw the burden of taxation off their own shoulders on 
to those of their fellow-subjects. In that battle, the 
legislature has often been worsted by the skill, 
determination and resourcefulness of its opponents,of 
whom the present appellant has not been the least 
successful. It would not shock us in the least to find 
that the legislature has determined to put ah end to the 
struggle by imposing the severest of penalties. It 
scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer, who plays 
with fire to complain of burnt fingers." (p.397).
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was recognized by the courts that the Crown stood for the
taxpayers as a whole and not for the greedy Revenue*
The judicial attitude becomes more apparent and
34-crystal clear in Latila v. I.R.C.  ^ In this case their 
lordships frustrated the appellant's attempt to avoid 
British income-tax and super-tax by artificial devices.
The Court's view cannot be better exemplified than by 
quoting verbatim from the Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon's 
remarks in the case. He said:
34. (1943) A.G. 377 (H.l.)=(1943) 1 All E.R. 265.
The appellant and three other ladies, residents of 
the U.K., sold their k/3rd shares in a partnership 
firm called John Mock and Company in Rhodesia to a 
company known as Latjohn Trust ltd. as from April 1, 
1932, the aate on which the company was registered.
The company issued 10,000 shares and 250,000 debentures 
for £1 each to the ladies, as consideration for the 
said transfer. The debentures carried no interest, and 
there was no provision as to the period of redemption. 
The business v/as making a gooa profit, but it never 
declared a dividend. The company used to apply its 
profit in redeeming debentures. The appellant, along 
with the other three ladies, used to borrow money from 
the company, in anticipation of the debentures which 
they had. Tnus they used to get a share in the profits 
of partnership business, through the Latjohn Trust Ltd., 
without incurring any liability to pay tax. In other 
worus, the redemption was a means for transferring part 
of the profits - [of the fitm; to these ladies in the 
form of capital. Their Lordships rightly rejected the 
appellant's contention that the share of profits to 
which the Latjohn Trust Ltd. became entitled could not 
be described as income under section 18 (1) of the F.A., 
1936; Congreve v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1948) 
L.ff.R., p. 1229.
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"My Lords, of recent years much ingenuity has been 
expended in certain quarters in attempting to devise 
methods of disposition of income, by which those who 
were prepared to adopt them might enjoy the benefits 
of residence in this country while receiving the 
equivalent of such income, without sharing in the 
appropriate burden of British taxation. Judicial 
dicta may be cited which point out that, however 
elaborate and artificial such methods may be, those 
who adopt them are "entitled1 to do so. There is of 
course, no doubt that they are within their legal 
rights, but that is no reason why their efforts, or 
those of the professional gentlemen who assist them 
in the matter, should be regarded as a commendable 
exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of the duties 
of good citizenship. On the contrary, one result of 
such methods, if they succeed, is, of course, to 
increase pro tanto the load of tax on the shoulders 
of the great body of good citizens, who do not desire, 
or do not know how, to adopt these manoeuvres."35
The Courts went a step further in exercising their 
inherent or statutory power to approve or disapprove of a
*2 C
legal transaction, involving tax avoidance • For instance,
37in re A. and L. Fraser Ltd. , the Court of Session rejected 
a petition by the company for reduction of capital, on the 
plea of 'public policy*, because the sole object of the 
transaction was to enable the shareholders to avoid taxation. 
Lord Keith said that the Courts should not be made an 
instrument for tax avoidance, even when the method proposed 
might be within the law. Lord Carmant made even more 
forceful comment. He said:
35. Ibid at p. 381 (A.C.
36. Supra note 11 at p. 218; He Lrages Ltd. (1942) 1 All 
Eng. Hep. 194; He Basden's Settlement (1942) 2 All
37. (1951) Sc. L.T. 273.
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”1 think also that the question Yrhether public policy 
demands that the Judicature should be kept in every 
way clear of association with transactions, which., in 
their best \aspect, are such as are not resorted to by 
the good citizen, is one which ought to be considered 
and acted on. , The confirmation by the court is, in 
public estimation, the approval of the court and even 
in doubtful transactions, it ought not to be given.
Much more so when a transaction is redolent of tax
evasion as its sole object. In the present case... the
whole transaction is for an oblique and illegitimate 
purpose; it is not for the benefit of the company but 
to enable individual shareholders to escape taxation.”38
Another remarkable shift in the attitude of judiciary 
can be noted in regard to provisions for payment of tax,
subject to a proviso. For instance, in CarbettTs Executors
r z q
v. I*R± 9 their Lordships held that, in order to claim the
benefit of the proviso of section 18 of the Finance Act,
1936^, a taxpayer must prove to the satisfaction of the 
Revenue that the transaction was effected “ mainly for some 
purpose other than of avoiding liability to taxation”. In 
other worasjthe burden of proof that the transaction is 
outsiae the scope of the section is on one, who wants to
38. Ibid at p.277 However, since the decision of the House 
of Lords in ^re. Westburn Su&ar Refineries y Ltd.. ('1951)»
A.G. 625, that the approval of a reduction of Capital, 
which was entered into to evade the Rationalization 
proposals, ought not to be refused, the Court of Session 
has reversed its practices. Row it does not treat tax 
avoidance as a ground for refusal of a reduction of 
capital. Re Davis Bell, Ltd., 1954 S*C. 33* Quoted from 
supra note 11 at p. 219; Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. 
v. Llewellin, (1957) 1 W.L.R. 464.
59. (1945)'"2"AU E.R. 218.
40. Sec. 18, of F*A* 1936 was aimed at those cases where
liability to income tax was avoided by means of transfers 
and other arrangements, of assets out of U.K* Similar
view has been taken by the Court of Chancery in I.R.C. v. 
Brown (1971) 1 \7*L*R* 11*
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enjoy its benefits. The Crovm need not establish that the 
main purpose of the transaction was the avoidance of 
taxation^ .
In an interesting case, Re Emeryfs Investment
42Trusts , the court refused relief to a husband on the 
principle of equity ex turoi causa non oritur actio . 
i.e., an action does not arise from a base cause.
The appellant, Emery, a British resident abroad, 
invested some money out of a joint account in the names of 
husband and wife, held by a bank in Hew York in the common 
stock of American companies in the sole name of his wife, 
though the parties intended that the beneficial interests 
in the stock should belong to them equally. This was done 
merely to avoid American Withholding Tax of 30 per cent on 
the dividends on the stock. If the investment had been 
made in the husband*s name, or if his beneficial interest 
had been known, the dividend would have been subject to the 
Y/ithholding Tax, because husband was an alien resident in 
the United States. Later on, the stock was sold by Mrs. 
Emery, and Mr. Emery brought an action, claiming that he was 
entitled to a half interest in the sale.
41.1 Legal Evasion of Taxation*, A. Farnsworth, (1944),
Modern Law Review, p.84.
42. 01959) 2, W.L.R. 461.
43, Similar to Ex dolo malo nor oritur actio:from fraud a 
right of action does not arise. A court of law will not 
lend its aid to enforce the performance of a contract, 
which appears to have been entered into by both the 
contracting parties for the express purpose of carrying 
into effect what is prohibited by the law of the land, 
or is founded upon an immoral consideration.
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Y/ynn-Parry, J.^held that Mr. Emery could not 
claim any relief, because, if two persons knowingly violate 
the lav/s of a country, they can not ask the court to assist 
them by enforcing such agreements. The investment of money 
in the name of the wife raised a presumption of advancement 
in the wife’s favour. To rebut such presumption the 
husband was bound to affirm the true facts, viz., that there 
was an agreement improperly to avoid payment of taxes.
Ana once it was established that the husband had come before 
the courts with unclean hands, he was not entitled to any 
relief^.
44. See "More About Unclean Hands”, Leolin Price, (1959)
B.T.R. 449 and 229.
In an earlier Canadian case, Coplan v. Coplan (1958)
14 B.L.R. (2d) 426, the principle of unclean hands was 
not applied. The affairs of the company, with a view 
to avoiding income tax were so arranged,that it might look 
like a ’personal corporation’ and not a ’commercial 
operation*. A, transferred shares to B and B wras 
registered as their owner, though B was never intended 
to have any beneficial ownership in the shares. 
Accordingly, B executed a blank transfer of shares with 
a certificate that prima facie entitled A to be registered 
as owner of the shares, but as the object of the 
transaction was to make it appear that B was their owner,
A was never registered. In an action by A ’s executors 
for a declaration that they were entitled to be registered 
as owners of the shares, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
allowed their claim. The court relied on the blank 
transfers and reversed the trial court’s judgement, in 
which the executors’ claim was rejected on the principle 
°f ex turpi causa non oritur actio.
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Lord Denning, L.J.,in Seaford Court Estates Ltd.,
v * Asher Texplains the role of a judge in interpretation of
a taxing statute in the following words:
n...[w]hen a defect appears, a juage cannot simply 
fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must 
set to work on the constructive task of finding the 
intention of Parliament, ana he must do this, not 
only from the language of the statute, but also from 
a consideration of the social eonditions which gave 
rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passea 
to remedy, ana then he must supplement the written 
word, so as to give ’ force and,life1 to the 
intnetion of the legislature•"
But, it would appear that, after the close of 'the war,
the tide turned again ana there has been a trend in the
reverse direction^. The ortnoaox principle of ’strict
construction1 and of ’form* still holds good. Por instance,
in Vestey’s Executors v. I.B.C., Lord Uormand saias
•‘Parliament, in its attempt to keep pace with the 
the ingenuity devoted to tax avoiaance, may fail 
short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for the 
taxpayers, who do not try to avoid their share of 
the burden, ana it is aisappointing to the Inland 
Revenue. But the court will not stretch the terms 
of taxing Acts, in order to improve on the efforts 
of Parliament ana to stop gaps which are left open 
by statutes. Tax avoidance is an evil, but it 
would be the beginning of much greater evil, if the 
courts were to overstretch the language of tne 
statute in order to subject to taxation people of 
whom they disapproved. ,f47
45. (1949; 2 K.B. 481 at p. 499.
46. Supra note t> at p.547* Law Commission of Inuia, 29th 
Report, I9b6 at p. 54; British Tax Encyclopedia.
Gr.S.A. Wheatcroft, (1971) Vol.I, para 1-070.
47. (1949) 1 All E.R. 1108, p. 1120; similar principle has 
been followed in Pott’s Executors v. I.B.C. (1951)
1 A.C. 443; I.R.C. v. Wolfson, (1*949) 1 A.E.R.
£65,868; Attorney-General v . A.w.&amgo Ltd. (1949)
2 A.E.R. 752, 734.
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Similarly, in Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v.
J»P. Harrison (Watford) Ltd* , the House of Lords approved
a dividend stripping transaction, entered into purely for
tax avoidance, relying on the principle of strict construction
of statutes. Yiscount Simond said that:
"It appears to me to be wholly immaterial, so long 
as the transaction is not a sham..., what may be 
the fiscal result or the ulterior fiscal object of 
the transaction, and since this can be the only 
ground upon which the commissioners could have 
reached their determination, I must conclude that 
it cannot be upheld."49
48. (1963) A.C. 1 (H.L.). The respondent company, dealers in 
shares purchased issued shares to the value of £16,900 
in Galiborne Ltd., upon which there was a declaration of 
a net dividend of £15>901, 19s. 3d. Later on, the shares 
were sold for their nominal value of £1,000. This being 
the sole share transaction carried out by the company in 
1953-54? it claimed a loss, on account of the sale of the 
shares, under section 341 of the Income Tax Act, 1952.
The claim was rejected by the commissioners, on the 
ground that the respondent company was neither carrying 
on trading or doing any adventure in the nature of trade 
in shares during the year in question. But the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords upheld the respondents 
claim. (Lord Reid and Lord Denning dissenting)• Lord 
Denning said at p.20 "There was only one true and 
reasonable conclusion to which the commissioners could 
come, namely, that the transaction was "an adventure in 
the nature of trade". "Here was a company", he said, 
"?/hich was authorised to deal in shares. It bought 
shares, received a dividend from these shares, and 
then sold them. What detail does it lack?"
49* Ibid at p.12.
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In Bishop (Inspector of Taxes) v. Finsbury 
50Securities Ltd. , the House of Lords appears to have taken
a somewhat stiff attitude towards tax avoiders, and perhaps
acted with an eye to the substance of the transaction to be
taxed, rather than its form, and distinguished the previous
51case of Griffiths v. Harrison  ^ , though the transaction was 
of a similar nature.
The facts in brief are that the respondent was 
incorporated in 1956, as a dealer in shares and securities. 
Relying on the Revenue practice, and with a view to avoid 
income tax under section 341, Income Tax Act, 1952, the 
respondents, in the years 1958 to 1960, entered into 
fifteen sets of transactions with other companies, described 
as 1 forward stripping1.
The question was whether companies acquired shares 
in these other companies in the course of their trade, so 
that they could claim a loss of business.
The House of Lords observed that, as it was the 
object of the transactions that the future interests of the 
vendors of the shares should be safeguarded and that the 
shares should be retained by the taxpayer company during the 
period of the transactions, the shares were not required for 
the purpose of dealing in shares and the transactions, 
although they were real, were wholly artificial devices to
50. (1966) 1 Y/.L.R. 1402.
51. (1963) A.C. 1 (H.L.).
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secure tax concessions and therefore not adventures or 
concerns in the nature of trade, within the statutory 
definition.
However, in a recent decision of I«R#C« v. Brander 
52and Crui&k Shank , the Court rejected the Commissioner^ 
claim that the compensation received by the respondent, a 
firm of advocates, on termination of their appointment as 
secretary or registrar of two companies, was revenue receipt 
chargeable under Schedule D, Case II of the Income lax Act 
of 1922. Their Lordships distinguished this case from the 
case of Blackburn v. Close Brothers Ltd. « in which it was 
held that the sum received in respect of the termination of 
a contract of service of a secretarial nature was a trading 
receipt, on the ground that the taxpayers in the latter case 
were a firm of merchant bankers, whose trading activities 
might include the serving of secretaryships, whereas it 
was not part of the normal profession of a lew agent to 
act as a registrar or secretary.
The distinction drawn on this ground between these 
two cases does not appear to be sound, which perhaps their 
Lordships realized afterwards, when they side tracked the main 
issue and said that:
52. (1971) 1 W.L.R. 212.
53. (i960) 39 I*C. 164; see Bllis v# Lucas (1967) Ch 858; 
Walker v. Carnaby (1970) 1 W.L«R. 276.
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tfIn any case, once it is decided that the emoluments of 
the office of the registrar are taxable under Schedule 
E, it is not legitimate to attribute the compensation 
for termination of the office to Schedule h.,f54
In this connection the case of Restorick (Inspector
c c
of Taxes) v. Baker , recently decided by the Chancery 
Divisioh is very interesting. The case is a good illustration 
of the extent to which the judges are still bound by their 
traditional outlook and are prisoners of precedent.
This was an appeal from a decision of the General 
Commissioner, holding that the respondent should suffer no 
deduction in personal reliefs under section 14(4) of the 
Finance Act,(1968), in respect of allowances received by 
him for his second child.
The taxpayer, who had two children, aged 11 and 7, 
received an allowance under the Family Allowance Act, 1965, 
for his younger child. The taxpayer*s. total income of 
£1*991 for the assessment year 1968-69* was reduced to a 
net chargeable income of £815* as a result of personal and 
capital allowances admissible to him. The amount of personal 
relief was, however, reduced by a sum equal to the amount 
of tax at the standard rate of £36, by virtue of section 
14(4) of the Finance Act, 1968.
The relevant portion of sub-section (4 ) of section 
14 provided that:
54. (1971) 1 W.L.R. 212, 220.
55. fThe Times1, March 5* 1971* p.21 (Columns 1 to 3).
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"Where an individual is assessable to income tax... in 
respect of payments on amount of.an allowance or 
allowances unaer the Family Allowance Act, 1956... the 
total deauction from tax to which, apart from this 
section, the individual...would be entitled unaer... the 
Income Tax Act of 1952 (certain personal reliefs) shall 
be reducea, for each allowance if more than one, by 
an amount equal to tax at the stanaard rate on £36 ...n
The question for interpretation was whether a 
taxpayer, who, having only one allowance, because he had 
two children, suffered no reauction in his personal reliefs, 
v/ould suffer a reduction in respect of both his allowances 
if he had three chilaren.
It was contended on behalf of the Crown tnat the 
intention of the sub-section could not be to free a person 
who received only one allowance from the reauction while a 
person with two woula suffer reauction on both. It was 
further pleaded that, even if the apparent intention of the 
sub-section conflicted with the strict wording, the intention 
of the legislature should prevail.
The Court brushea asiae the Commissioner's claim
and held that the taxpayer was entitled to relief according
to the strict provisions of the law, even though it might
appear absurd on the face of it. Foster J., who delivered
tne judgement of the Court said that;
"It would not be concluded that in a section which, 
though not a charging section, at least increased the 
liability to tax, the Court eould disregard clear 
words to accord with the intentions of the legislature. 
However absurd it might be that a taxpayer with two
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children was not liable to a reduction in reliefs, 
while one with three children suffered a reduction 
in respect of each of his allowances, the Court 
could not rectify the mistake by disregarding the 
words used*”56
Perhaps one cannot visualize the impact of this
solitary case on the exchequer. It is estimated that the
Inland Revenue stand to lose tens of millions of pounds in
57a full year in income tax as a result of this decision .
It appears from the perusal of cases dealing with
tax avoidance, that the law on the point is in a very sorry
state, The Courts have not been able to evolve a set principle
of interpretation in such cases, in conformity with social
and economic needs of the community. Perhaps Lord Penning1s
approach, to look at the substance rather than the form,
58would be the best under the circumstances .
Judicial Approach in India
The highest judicial authorities in India, as in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Israel and many other 
countries have followed the traditional rules of statutory 
interpretation in construing taxing statutes. A court would 
interpret a taxing statute on the basis of the plain
CQ
intendment of the word , even if such construction leads
5 6. Ibid.
57. Ibid., at p.1.
58. See supra p. 142.
59. C.I.T. Madras v. A.iax Products Ltd., (1965) 56 I.T.R.
7 4 1 , 7 4 7 (S.C.)*A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1358; C.I.T. v. Shahzada 
Rand & Sons (1966) 60 I.T.R. 592, 400 (S.O.) C.I.T. M.P. 
and Shopal v. Sodra Devi, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 852,835.
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60to hardship or is against the spirit of the law
Similarly, in cases where the legislature has failed to use
appropriate words in the statutes, the Courts would give the
61benefit to the taxpayer , even though it will result in
62the taxpayer obtaining a double advantage , which was never
contemplated by Parliament. The burden is on the Income Tax
authorities to show that the income is liable to be taxed
63under the statute • Of course, the assessee will have to 
prove an exemption in his favour from taxation, if he wants
/TJ
to take advantage of such provision .
60. C.I.T* v. Provident Investment Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 
664 C.I.T..A.P. v. Motors and General Stores (Private Ltd.,
(19671 66 i7T.lt. 6927 699-700 S.C. •
61. State of Bombay v. A.& A. Industries Corporation (1961
12 S.T.C. 122,125 (S.C.J. C.I.T. Patiala v . Shahzada Hand 
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1342 = (1966) 3 S.C.R. 379. Charitable 
Cradodia Swadeshi Sotres v. C.I.T. A.I.R. 1944 lah 465?
Upper India Chamber of Commerce v. C.I.T.. A.I.R. 1948 All. 
64; C.I.T. v. CVS. Sastri A/HR. 1959 Mad. 250; Ambika 
Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T.. Bombay A.I.R. 1952 Bom..483*
62. "J.PV kerar ^Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T. 
A.I.R. 1946 Nag 216; (1946) I.T.R. 479, 481.
63* The Law and Practice of Income Tax. J.B. Kanga and N.A.
Palkhivala, Vol.I; 6th ed. 1969 p.11.
64. Chidambaram Chettier v. C.I.T., Madras. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 
1453> 1457; C.I.T. v. Ramakrishna Leo A.I.R. 1959 S.C.
239; Udhavdas Kewalram v. C.iYt“I (1967) 66 I.T.R. 462 
S.C.; C.I.T. v. Maharaja Visweswar Singh, (1955) I.T.R. 216 
219; Rani Amrit Kunv/ar v. C.I.T. (1946) I.T.R. 561. 575; 
Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T.(19351. 
I.T.R. 158, 165, 16 5*
In regard to tax avoidance cases, the Judiciary in
65Inaia, like the English Courts have upheld the right of 
the citizen ana the resident to arrange his affairs so that 
he pays the minimum amount of tax, by adopting ingenious 
devices and by making use of the loopholes of the lav/ •
In other words, the Indian Courts have acknowledged the act 
of avoidance as legal* For instance, the Allahabad and
67Madras High Courts, as rong ago as 1922, in re Mukund Samp
68and C.I.T. v. T.K.S. Ibrahiman Ravuttar , and the Patna
High Court in 1950, in Ra.jniti Prasad Singh v. C.I.T. Bihar 
b9and Orissa * recognized the act of avoidance as legal and
lawful. Asworth J., of the Allahabad High Court said that:
1 It is not unlawful to avoid, by any means not 
forbidden by lav/, rendering oneself liable to the 
payment of income tax, though it is an offence by 
false return or by concealment to evade payment of 
income tax."70
6b* See supra pp.l3^/56Por English Courts attitude to tax
avoidance, bee (1 9 4 6J 47 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 994 
at p. 1252:
"It is not an offence for the taxpayer to attempt to 
avoid the payment of an excessive or unjust tax, or so 
to handle his affairs, provided his acts are legal, 
as to avoid or reauce tax liability.*^
Continental Oil Company v. Jones. 111 P (2 ) 587*
66. Jiva.ieerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. C.I.I. and E .P .T. A.I.R. 
1959 S.C.270; Raghbir Singh Sandhawalia v. C.I.T. A.I.R. 
1958 Pun. 250; C.I.T. v. M. & S.M. Railway Co. Ltd., (1943) 
I.T.R. 580,388; in re Central Talkies, Matunga, Bombay,
1941 I.T.R. 44»51 Pun.jabhai Dipchanc,v. C .1.1.,A.I.R. 1949 
Bom. 415; C.I.T. v. Raman & Co. \A;.J.B>(13£>6J.. S.C. 49*
67. A.I.R. 1928 All. 81 (F.B.)“.
68. A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 543 (F.B.).
69. A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 53 (F.B.).
70. Supra note 67 at p. 8 4 .
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The Allahabad High Court in Ganga Sagar v. Emperor^
in which the assessee had concealed a substantial part of 
income, earned from dividends and submitted a false return; 
went a step further and advised a taxpayer to use all possible 
devices to reduce tax liability. The Court said:
while refusing to answer the question as to whether there was 
a partnership or firm, which ought to be registered by the 
Income Tax Officer, said there was nothing wrong in avoiding 
taxes and one is at liberty to reduce tax liability. The 
Court went a step further in re Central Talkies Circuit. 
Matunga^and suggested devices to avoid taxes. Beaumont C.J.
”...fI] f a man finds that he will suffer less in 
taxation by carrying on business in partnership with 
his mother rather than his wife, he is entitled to 
select his mother11. *5
likewise, the Madras High Court observed, in
Pevarajalu Chetty and Co.. Madras v. C.I.T., Madras:
M...[l]n income tax cases the same result in a business 
sense may be reached by means of transactions clothed in 
two different legal forms, one of which may attract tax or
exemption from tax, while the other may not. It has been
said on high authority that a person is entitled to so
arrange his affairs as not to attract taxes imposed by
71. A.I.E. 1929 All 919.
72. Ibid at p.923 per Mukherjee J.
73. A.I.E. 1952 Bom. 116, per Beaumont C.J. at p.117.
74. A.I.E. 1941 Bom. 205.
75. Ibid at p. 206.
t!...[Aj man who is liable to pay a tax is entitled 
to take shelter under all devices which he ma,
within the law, to avoid payment of the tax.”
Similarly, the Bombay High Court in re Bad Sakinaboo^ .
said:
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statute provided he acts within the law, if he succeeds 
in ordering them so as to secure this result, he 
cannot be taxed, however unappreciative the revenue 
authority may be of his ingenuity*
In that case two partners of an old firm of five
retired and the remaining partners carried on the business
as a new firm. The new firm paid Rs. 6399 to each of the
partners at the time of the dissolution of the partnership,
as the price of their releasing all interest in the
partnership assets, including goodwill and Rs* 18,911 in
respect of the forward contracts, for the purchase of goods
from abroad, which had been entered into by the old firm,
but the deliveries were made after the new firm came into
being. It was held that the sum of Rs* 18,911 was deductible
under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act of 1922, as revenue
expenditure, laid out solely and exclusively for the business
of the new firm, while the former sum was not deductible
being capital expenditure* Section 1 0 ( 2 ) ( x v ) says:
"Such profit or gains shall be computed after 
making the following allowances, namely:- ....
any expenditure..♦.laid out or expended, wholly and 
exclusively for the purpose of such business, 
profession or vocation."
It is submitted with respect, that there is no 
difference in the nature of the two sums; both the amounts 
were paid as compensation for releasing retiring partners1 
interest in the old firm, and even if the forward contracts
had to be considered separately and in isoia-fci0n from the
76. A.I.R. 1950 Mad* 718 at p. 722 (para 10).
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rest of the business, the sum of Rs, 18,911 was the price paid 
for the acquisition of the interest of the retiring partners 
in those unexecuted contracts and would still be in the 
nature of capital expenditure not deductible in the 
computation of the profits and gains of business.
The Indian Courts have not adopted the ’doctrine 
of motive* in deciding the legality of a tax avoidance 
transaction. In other words, the Courts will not turn 
down a tax avoidance scheme on the ground of the assessee’s 
motive. The Judiciary has invariably upheld schemes for 
reducing tax liability, even if adopted with the sole 
motive of tax avoidance.
77In C.I.T. . Madras v. Ibrahimsa Ravuttar , the 
assessee lent a certain sum of money at a fixed rate of 
interest. Y/ith a view to avoiding income tax on the interest
earned, the parties entered into a circuitous transaction.
78A usufructuary mortgage was executed in favour of the
77* A.I.R. 1928 I,lad* 543; Raghbir Singh Sadhawalia v. C.I.T . 
(1958) 34 I.T.R. 719; A.I.R. 1958 Pun. 250.
78. The Transfer of Property Act, 4 of 1882, sec. 58 cl. (d} 
defines usufructuary mortgage. The sub-clause says: 
"Y/here the mortgagor delivers possession or enpressly or 
by implication binds himself to deliver possession of 
the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorizes 
him to retain such possession until payment of the 
mortgage money, and to receive the rent and the profits 
accruing from the property, or any part of such rents and 
profits, and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, 
or in payment of the mortgage money, or partly in lieu 
of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage money, 
the transaction is called a usufructuary mortgage."
Quoted from fMulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
Pifth ed. p. 562.
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assessee money lender to secure payment of interest, 
so that the income would be exempt from tax under section 
4(3)(viii) of the Act of 1922, being ‘agricultural income*.
In fact, the parties never intended it to operate and on the 
same day the properties covered by the usufructuary mortgage 
were given back to the mortgagor on lease, at a rent 
equivalent to the amount of interest.
It was held, that the interest was exempt from 
taxation under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act. The Court 
stated that:
"There can be no question... of considering the
motives of the assessee in bringing about a particular
arrangement because, as has been pointed out by the 
House of Lords in more than one case, it is not proper 
to take such motives or object into consideration.1 *9
Again, in Meyyappa Chettiar v. C.I.T.. Madras, while
deciding the question whether partition of a joint Hindu
family business had taken place, for the purpose of section
25A of the Act of 1922, which dealt with the assessment,
after partition, of a Hindu undivided family, Satyanarayan
Rao J«, said:
"So long as a transaction is legal, however
reprehensible the object may be, it must be given its
effect in law, unless there is a statutory provision 
invalidating it on the ground that the main purpose 
is to evade or get a tax reduced."®^
Similarly, the Bombay High Court in Pun.iabhai Lipchand 
v. C.I.T., &E.P.T., B o m b a y said th&t the motive of tax 
avoidance is no ground for nullifying a business transaction.
79» Supra note 77 at p. 544*
80. A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 506 at p. 514 (para 17).
81. A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 415*
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The assessee was a firm carrying on business at Ahmedabaa in 
piece goods, anu tne partners of the firm were Punjabhai, 
jjipcnand ana G-okulaas Chhotaial. On June 2b, 194'I another 
firm of the same name was startea in Waahwan State (then a 
Princely state) with one more partner, in order to take
op
advantage of section 5 of the Excess Profit Tax Act , under 
which the profits of business in the Princely States were 
exempt from profit tax. The Excess Profit Tax Officer, under 
section 10 A^  of the Exc&ss Profit Tax Act, which deals with 
: transactions designed to avoid or reduce liability to excess
| profit tax, adjusted the liability of the assessees to
excess profits tax, by adding to their profits accruing in 
Ahmedabad, the profits which accrued to them in the 7/adhwan 
State.
82.. Excess Profit Tax Act, 1940 sec. 5 says that:
"This Act shall apply to everyrbusiness of which any part 
of the profits made during the chargeable accounting 
period is chargeable to income tax...
Provided that this Act shall not apply to any business, 
the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise without 
(the taxable territories), where such business is carried 
on by or on behalf of a person who is resident but not 
ordinarily resident in (the taxable territories), unless 
the business is controlled in India.
85* Section 10A says that:
"(1) Where the Excess Profits Tax Officer is of the 
opinion that the main purpose for which any transaction 
or transactions was or were affected... was the avoidance 
or reduction of liability to excess profit tax, he may,... 
make such adjustments as respects liability to excess 
profit tax as he considers appropriate, so as to 
counteract the avoidance or reduction of liability to 
excess profit tax, which would otherwise be effected by 
the transaction or transactions."
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It was held that the assessee was not liable to pay 
tax in respect of profits accruing outside British India and 
so section 10 A was inapplicable• M.C. Chagla, C.J. said 
that:
"The motive of the assessee for opening the business is 
entirely immaterial and irrelevant. It is no concern of 
the Department how an assessee should conduct and carry 
on his business, and even if an assessee deliberately 
chose to start a business in a part of India where no 
excess profit tax is payable, he was perfectly entitled 
to do so and he was within the law in doing so.,f84
The Courts in India rejected the prevailing view that
tax avoidance, being immoral, should be discouraged and 
condemned, have taken a purely legislatic view, fthich does
85not even hold good today in the materialistic western world .
At times the judiciary, the guardian and protector of social
and economic interest of the community, has not only approved
tax avoidance devices, but has encouraged sagacious taxpayers.
The courts have applauded their actions in outwitting the tax
authorities and proclaimed in bold ani unequivocal language
that there is nothing immoral or unethical in reducing one’s
tax burden by subterfuge, within the circumference of the 
8 6law . In a recent case of Aruna Group of Estates v. State 
of Madras. Jagadisam J. affirmed the Court’s view on the 
subject of morality in tax avoidance cases in the following 
terms:
84. Supra note 81 at p. 416 (para 2).
85. See supra pp. 136-42.
86. lieyya/pra Chettiar v. C.I.T., Madras A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 506, 
5~i9; Punjabhai Dipchand v. Commr of Excess P.T.
A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 415,416.
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"Avoidance of tax is not tax evasion and it carries no 
ignominy with it, for, it is sound law and, certainly, 
not bad morality, for anybody to so arrange his affairs 
as to reduce the brunt of taxation to a minimum. »i87
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in C.I.T., Gujarat
v. A. Raman and Company, that:
"Avoidance of tax liability by so arranging commercial 
affairs that charge of tax is distributed is not 
prohibited. A taxpayer may resort to a device to 
divert the income before it accrues or arises to him. 
Effectiveness of the device depends not upon 
considerations of morality, but on the operation of the 
Income Tax Act. Legislative injunction in taxing 
statutes may not, except on peril of penalty, be 
violated but it may lawfully be circumvented.
The application of the economic approach in
interpreting taxing statutes is unknown to the Indian courts.
The judiciary will not invoke1 economic considerations1 to
strike down a tax avoidance transaction or to distinguish
Substance1 from fformf or fshamf from 1 reality1. Though,
in recent years, courts have casually used the phrase
'economic reality1 in some cases, possibly from considerations
of social responsibility, which had, in fact, no bearing on
the decision of the case. For instance, V. Ramaswami, G.J.,
while delivering the judgement of the Patna High Gourt in
Hahara.i adhira.i Sir Kameshwar Singh v. G.I.T,, remarked that;
"In my opinion it is not possible, in the circumstances 
of this case, to ignore or disregard the mask of 
corporate entity or to analyse the economic realities 
behind the transactions of sale."89
87. (1965) 55 I.T.R. 642 at p.648.
88. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 49>53 (para 9).
89. A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 231 at p. 235 (para 5).
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In fact^the economic factor was not a decisive
factor in the case. The assessee floated a private limited
company with an authorized capital, made up of 25,000 shares
of Rs. 100 each. The company took over the publication
business of the assessee as a going concern, along with its
assets and liabilities. In consideration of the transfer,
the company allotted to the assessee 12,500 shares and
another 12,500, for cash paid by the assessee to the company.
since, according to the sale deed the value of the movable
ana immovable properties transferred by the assessee to the
90company was in excess of the written down value , the
Income Tax Officer taxed the assessee on the difference
between the sale price and the v/ritten aown value under the
second proviso to section 10(2)(vii), of the Act of 1922
(corresponding to sections 32(i)(iii) and 4,1 (2) of the Act
of 1961). Tne relevant portion runs like this:
1 (2) Such profits or gains snail be computed after
making the following allowances, namely:- ,
• • • •
(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or 
plant which has been solu or discarded or demolished 
or destroyed, the amount by which the written down
90. Income Tax Act, 1961, sec. 43 (6) corresponding to section 
10 (5) of the Act of 1922, says: "written down value means-
(a) in the case of assets acquired in the previous year,
the actual cost to the assessee;
(b) in the case of assets acquired before the previous
year, the actual cost to the assessee less all 
depreciation actually allowed to him under this Act, or 
under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922...n.
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value thereof exceeds the amount for which the 
building, machinery or plant, as the case may be, 
is actually sold or its scrap value:
• • i •
Provided further that where the amount for which any 
such building, machinery or plant is sold, whether 
during the continuance of the business or after the 
cessation thereof, exceeds the written down value, 
so much of the excess as does not exceed the 
difference between the original cost and the written 
down value shall be deemed to be profits of the 
previous year in which the sale took place.n
The assessee!s claim that he was not liable to pay
tax on the excess over the written down value of the assets
sold to the company, in which he had practically all the
shares, because there was no material difference between the
vendor and the vendee, and do there was not, in reality, a
sale, was rejected by the Court. It was held, that the
appellant was liable to pay tax, not on the ground of the
economic effect of the decision, but on the ground that the
company was a 'legal entity', distinct from its members, and
so capable of enjoying rights and of being subjected to duties;
any individual might have a business dealing with a company
in the same way as with any other individual.
In a fairly recent case, C.I.T., Madras v. Meenakshi
Mills, Madurai, PLa.jendra Mills, Salem and Saroja Mills,
91Singanallmr , their Lordships of the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the relevance of 'economic realities' to 
exceptional cases. The respondents, the assessees, public
91. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 819.
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limited companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
yarn in India, had a branch at Padukottai (a former Princely 
State), The sale proceeds of the branches were periodically 
deposited in the branch of the Iladurai Bank at Padukottai.
The bank was incorporated in 1943, with T. Ghettiar as 
founder Director, the head office being at IJadurai. Out of 
the 15,000 shares of the bank, 14,766 were owned by I. 
Ghettiar, the Director of the bank, who was also the 
Director of the companies in question, his two sons and the 
three companies. The companies borrowed money from the 
iladurai branch of the Bank on the security of its fixed 
deposits made by their branches at the Padukttai branch of 
the bank. It was held, that the borrowing in British India, 
on the security of the fixed deposits made at Padukottai, 
amounted to a constructive remittance of the property by 
the branches of the assessee*s companies in their hands and 
that the entire transaction formed part of a basic arrangement 
or scheme between the creditor and the debtor, that the 
money should be brought into British India after it was taken 
outside the taxable territory. As such the transaction was
covered by sec 42 (1) of the Act of 1922, which provided that:
"All income, profits or gains accruing or arising 
whether directly or indirectly,... through or from 
any money lent at interest and brought into the 
taxable territories in cash or in kind ... shall be 
deemed to be income accruing or arising within the 
taxable territories,..."
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With regard to the respondent1s argument, that even 
if T. Chettiar, a director of the assessee company, knew in
his capacity as director of the Madurai Bank that money
placed om fixed deposit by the assessee-companies would be
transferred to the taxable territory, that knowledge cannot
be imputed to the assessee-companies, and so it cannot be
said that the transfer was an integral part of the loan
transaction attracting section 42 (1) of the Act of 1922,
their Lordships of the Supreme Court said that:
;iIt is well established that, in a matter of this 
description, the Income lax authorities are entitled 
to pierce the veil of corporate entity and to look 
at the reality of the transaction. It is true that, 
from the juristic point of view, the company is a 
legal personality, entirely distinct from its members 
and the company is capable of enjoying rights and 
being subjected to duties, which are not the same as 
those enjoyed or borne by its members. But in certain 
exceptional cases, the Court is entitled to lift the 
veil of corporate entity and to pay regard to the 
economic realities behind the legal facade. Por 
wxample, the Court has power to disregard the corporate 
entity if it is used for tax evasion or to circumvent 
tax obligation."92
The Doctrine of Porm and Substance
It is apparent, from the analysis of the cases on
the point, that the courts have taken in general a narrow,
strict and legalistic view in deciding cases relating to tax
avoidance. The Courts hardly bother to look at the substance
92. Ibid. p. 822 (para ?)•
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or the real nature of the transaction in question, or the
motive which led the assessee to adopt a particular course
of action. They simply apply the outdated doctrine of
•form1 and decide the cases on the legal basis of the
transaction, irrespective of its social, moral and economic
consequences. And where the Courts have invoked the
doctrine of substance, they have done so to assist taxpayers
to avoid payment of taxes, rather than to check tax 
93avoidance •
The application of the doctrine of 'form1 in tax 
cases has continued since the early stage of tax legislations^* 
and the judiciary has given its whole-hearted support to the 
assessee from time to time. Recently, this conservative 
doctrine received the blessing of the highest judicial 
authority of the land. Their lordships of the Supreme Court 
held in C.I.T. , Andhra Pradesh v. Messrs Motors & General 
Stores, that:
93* C.I.T., Bombay v. Kolhia Hirdagarh o. Ltd., A.I.R. 1950
Bom. 51; Sir Kikabhai Premchand v. C.I.T., Central Bombay 
A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 509; Messrs Assam Bengal Cement Go. Ltd. 
v. C.I.T., West Bengal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 89; The C.I.T., 
Bombay, E.P.T. Bombay City v. Sir Homi Mehta, I.L.R. 
(1956; Bom 154; Messrs Rogers & Co. Bombay v. C.I.T., 
Bombay City II A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 150.
94. Re Mukund Sarup A.I.R. 1928 All. 815 C.I.T. v. T.K.S. 
Ibrahiman Ravuttar, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 543; Ranjhiti 
Pransad Singh v. C.I.T.. Bihar and Orisa A.I.R. 1930 
Pat. 53; Ganga Sagar v. Bmperory A.I.R. 1929 All. 919* 
923; Re Bai Sakinaboo A.I.R. 193B Bom. 116, re Central 
Talkies Circuit, Iviatunga. A.I.R.19411.V'Bpn£2£>5.:Punjabhai 
Dipchand v. Commr. of L.P.T., Bombay, A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 
415; Meyyappa Chettria v. C.I.T., Madras, A.I.R. 1951 
Mad. 506.
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,f... [t] he doctrine, that in revenue cases the 
'substance of the matter1 may be regarded as 
distinguished from the strict legal position, is 
erroneous. If a person sought to be taxed comes 
within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, 
however great the hardship may appear to the 
judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the 
Grown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the 
subject within the letter of the law, the subject 
is free, however, apparently within the spirit of 
the law the case might otherwise appear to be.“95
In that case the assessee company, in pursuance of 
an agreement to sell a cinema for a consideration of Rs.
1,20,000, in the form of a transfer of 5 per cent, tax free 
cumulative preference shares, held by the vendee, executed 
a deed called an 'exchange deed' in favour of the vendee.
The question was whether the transaction in question was 
!a sale' within the meaning of the second proviso to section 
10 (2) (vii) of the Act of 1922^, so that the amount by 
which the written down value exceeded the amount for which 
the assets were sold, could be included in the taxable 
pro!its of the assessee.
It was held, on a consideration of the terms of the 
document, that the transactions were, in essence, an 'exchange' 
ana not a'sale1, ana therefore, the provisions of section 
10(2)(vii) aid not apply.
It may De notea that, in fact, ail the conditions
required for sale were present. There was a consideration,
offer and acceptance necessary for sale, nevertheless, the
Court adhered to the strict interpretation of 'exchange deed*
95♦ A.I.R. 196b S.C. 200 at pp.204,205 (para b ).
96. bee supra p .158/9for the section and proviso.
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and decided the case accordingly.
In C.I.T., Cu.iarat v, Messrs B.II. Kharwar^ T the 
Supreme Court reiterated its earlier view on the point, ana 
saia that the legal effect of a transaction could not be 
displaced by probing into the ’substance of a transaction.’
The respondents, a firm carrying on the business 
of manufacturing, purchasing ana selling cloth, closed the 
manufacturing siae of its business and transferred its 
machines to a private limited company, in the share capital 
of which the partners had the same interest as they hau in 
the firm.
The question was, whether, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the respondents were liable to
pay tax under section 10(2)(viij proviso (ii)^® of the Act 
of 1922, on the amount realized, above the written down 
value of the assets.
The Court did not decide the issue, in view of the 
absence of a clear finding of the Tribunal that the 
transaction was a sale. However, Shah, J., while delivering 
the judgement of the Court, said that the observation made 
by Bose, J.,in Sir Kikabhai Premchand v. C.I.T., Bombay to 
the extent that, nin revenue cases, regard must be had to
97. A.I.E. 1969 S.C. 812.
98. See supra p J-58/9.fox the text of the section and proviso.
I
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the substance of the transaction rather than its mere form, 1 
was casual, and could not alter the basic rule of legal 
interpretation, based on the principle of'form*•
Thus, there appears to be no room left for the 
judiciary to depart from the strict legalistic stand taken 
by the Supreme Court in the matter* Nevertheless, it will 
be of interest to discuss in brief the judicial trend in 
this regard from 1922, when effective income tax legislation 
came into force in India, with the passing of the Income Tax 
Act of 1922.
It may be noted, that, though in general the Courts 
have applied the strict rule of interpretation and adhered 
to the doctrine of ’form* an undercurrent of sympathy for 
the application of a more liberal rule and the application 
of the principle of ’substance* is discernible from time to 
time. Sometimes the judiciary has tried to introduce the
!
principle of substance in disguise, deciding a case on the 
basis of its facts and circumstances, and not its legal
i
form and effect. Sometimes, the Courts openly declared that 
they were applying the doctrine of substance in interpreting
|
I taxing statutes, though to help taxpayers to avoid taxes,
rather than to declare them liable.
The three earlier cases, re Mukund Sarup^, 0.1.T♦.
2Madras v. Ibrahimsa Ravuttar and Ra.initi Prasad Singh v.
99. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 509 at p. 510. See infra pp. 175-77 for 
details of the case.
| 1. A.I.R. 1928 All 81 (F.B.).
I 2. A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 543.
[
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C.I.T.. Bihar and Orissa , decided by the Allahabad, Madras
and Patna High Courts respectively, reveal the divergent
attitude of the Judiciary in deciding cases involving
similar questions of fact and law*
The facts, which were similar in all the cases,
their differences being purely phraseological, may be stated
4
briefly as follows. A usufructuary mortgage bond was 
executed in favour of the assessee, to secure a stipulated 
sum of money and interest; on the same day the properties 
covered by the mortgage bond were leased to the mortgagor 
by the assessee at a fixed rent, equivalent to the amount 
of interest.
The question for determination was whether the 
transaction was an unsufructuary mortgage so that the 
interest stipulated in the mortgage would be Agricultural 
income1, within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Act 
of 1922^, and so exempt from tax under section 4(3)(viii) of
3. A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 33.
4. See supra note 78 for definition of 1usufructuary 
mortgage1.
5. Sec. 2(1)(a) ”agricultural income” means:
(a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is used 
for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land
revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local 
rate assessed and collected by the officers of the 
Government as such.
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the Act of 1922, or merely a simple mortgage^, in which case 
the mortgagee would be liable to pay income tax on the interest 
earned. Allahabad and Madras High Courts upheld the 
assessee's claim to a reduction of tax relying on the 'form1 
of the transaction, whereas Patna rejected the claim on the 
principle of the 1 substance’.
It was obvious from the facts, that the transaction 
diet not amount to an usufructuary mortgage, but was a simple 
mortgage. The mortgagee did not enter into possession of the 
mortgaged property, nor did he enjoy the usufruct of the 
property; nor did he receive rents rrom the property, which 
would be a natural consequence of a usufructuary mortgage.
The mortagee received nothing but the fixed rate of interest 
on the loan ana it was apparent that the mortagage and the 
lease were part of one and tne same transaction, which was 
nothing but a simple mortgage. In the words of Courtney- 
Terrell, C.J.:
6. The Transfer of Property Act, (4 of 18b2), section 58, 
clause (b) defines 'simple mortgage' as follows:
"Inhere, without delivering possession of the mortgaged 
property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay 
the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly, 
that, in the event of his failing to pay according to 
his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause 
the mortgaged property to be sold, and the proceeds of 
the sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in 
payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is 
called a simple mortgage, and the mortgagee a simple 
mortgagee.il
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”. • . [t| he real arid obvious reason for splitting it up 
into two documents is to enable the maha.ian (money­
lender), who is the assessee, to put forward a specious
claim to escape income tax.”?
Das, J., made this illuminating remark:
"I am of opinion that we have to look to the substance
ana not to the form of the transaction,..when the two 
deeds are read together as forming parts of one 
transaction, there is little doubt that the lease is in 
the nature of machinery for the purpose of realizing 
the interest, what the mortgagee has in view is the 
realization of interest and the appropriation of theg 
rents, issues and profits from the lands mortgaged”.
In C.I.T., Madras v. The Madras and bouthern
g
Ivlaharatta Railway Co. Ltd., Madras , the Madras High Court 
applied tne doctrine of substance without expressing its 
dissent from the literal rule of Tform!.
The assets of the madras and Southern Maharatta 
Railway Company belonged to the Secretary of State and the 
Company managed the undertaking under the supervision and 
control of the Secretary of the State for India and the 
company contributed to the capital and the Secretary of 
State guaranteed interest on the company's capital, amounting 
to Rs. 23*33*3335 at the rate of 3.5 per cent, Under the 
original agreement between the parties, out of the gross 
revenue receipts, the working expenses ans interest on 
debentures were first to be deducted and the balance was 
thereafter to be divided between the Secretary of State and 
the Company.
7. Supra note 3 at p.35.
8. Supra note 3 at p. 40
9. (1943) 11, I.2.R. 380.
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This amount of f guaranteed interest1 received by
the company was held to be the profit of the company earned
in India and taxable in a case between the same parties
10decided earlier. To avoid the effect of that decision the 
contract was modified, so that the surplus, after providing 
for the payment of certain charges and the guaranteed 
interest payable to the company was to be divided between 
the Company and the Secretary of State*
It was held that the alteration of the contract did 
not aJTfect the nature of the guaranteed interest and the 
amount so paid towards it was assessable as the income of 
the company.
The Bombay Hign Court in C.I.T., Bombay v. Evans 
11lledical Supplies , relying on the substance rule held that
there existed a ’business connection1 within the meaning of
section 42 (1) of the Act of 1922, in regard to the goods
sold outside the taxable territories by the assessee company,
registered in the United Kingdom, to the Indian company,
their sole authorized agents in India. The relevant portion
of the section says that:
"All income, profits or gains accruing or arising, 
whether directly or indirectly, through or from 
any business connection in the taxable territories,... 
shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising 
within the taxable territories, and where the person 
entitled to the income, profits or gains is not
10. C.I.T., Madras v. M. and S.M. Railway Co. Ltd. (1940)
8 I.T.R. 280.
11. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 448.
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resident in the taxable territories, shall be chargeable 
to income tax either in his name or in the name of his. 
agent, and in the latter case such agent shall be 
deemed to be the assessee in respect of such income 
tax. M
Their Lordshipa of the High Court took a realistic view
and said that:
"It is well-settled law that the expression ’business 
connection1 is different from, though undoubtedly 
related to the expression ’business’ as defined in the 
Act. ¥hat is insisted by the language of the section 
is that there should be (i) a business in India
(ii) a connection between the assessee and that 
business; and (iii) the assessee must have directly 
or indirectly earned income by virtue of or through 
that connection. It is not necessary that the profit 
or gains should directly flow from the business
connection. It is to be deemed to be the income of
the assessee, who may well be a non-resident, even if 
it has arisen indirectly through the business connection 
in the taxable territories12 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of India in liessrs.
13Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T# , where section 10
(2)(xv) of the Act of 1922^ was the subject matter of
interpretation, held that the question whether an expenditure 
incurred in a particular case is ’capital expenditure’ or 
’revenue expenditure’ is a question of fact and not of law.
12. Ibid at p. 450 (para 5)*
13* A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 89; Liadhowji Dharamshi Manufacturing Co.v.
■C.I.T. Bombay A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1811; ivl.R. Coyal v.
C.I.T. Bomb ay A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 859; Erode Transport
(Pvt.' ) Ltd. v . C.I.T. Madras A.I.R. 1970 Had. 23 
Durga has Khanna v. C.I.T. , Calcutta A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
775;C.I.T. U.P.. v. LJ/S Hadan Copal Radneylal A.I.R.
1969 S.C. 840.
14. See supra p. 152 for text of section 10(2)(xv).
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In that case the assessee company acquired from the 
Government a lease of certain limestone quarries. In 
addition to the rents and royalties, further sums were 
payable under the special covenants contained in clauses 4 
and 5 of the lease as ’protection fees1. It was held, 
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, that 
the sum paid as ’protection fees’, is in the nature of the 
'capital expenditure’, not deductible from the total income 
under the provisions of section 10(2)(xv) of the Act for the 
purposes of taxation.
It may be noted, on a careful perusal of cases 
relating to fiscal statutes, that the Courts in India have 
in general dealt leniently with the commercial class, a 
well-to-do section of the community as compared with the bulk 
of the taxpayers. This becomes evident from the fact that 
the judiciary has invariably applied the 'doctrine of 
substance' to help ingeneous taxpayers to reduce their 
tax liablility to the State, either in the name of 'commercial 
necessity' or 'business transaction*• At times the Judiciary 
has joined hands with sagacious taxpayers by helping them 
to avoid payment of their legitimate share of taxes.
16
The Lahore High Court in re Benarasides. Jagannath. 
allowed the assessee to deduct, from the taxable receipts,
15- See supra p. 152.
16. (1947) I.I.E. 185 (F.B.).
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payments made to the owners of land., for extracting earth 
for the manufacturer of bricks, under section 10(2)(xv) of 
the Act of 1922- The Court upheld the assesseefs plea that 
the practice adopted in tne particular manufacturing 
concern made it evident that the expenses so incurred 
amounted to 'revenue expenditure1 and not 'capital 
expenditure', whereas the payments made by the assessee to . 
the owners of the land was to procure raw material for the 
manufacture of bricks and so amounted to ’capital 
expenditure', not deductible under section I0(2)(xv) of 
the Act, as pointed out by the Income tax authorities and 
the Tribunal•
The Bombay High Court in C * I.T., Bombay -Qity. v.
1 7
Kolhia Hirdagarh Co, Ltd* , interpreted section 10(2)(xv) 
of the Act in favour of the assessee who relied on the 
business aspect of the transaction.
One 0. sold his coal mine ana its assets to the 
assessee company in consideration of a sum of Rs. 75,000 in 
cash and 500 fully paid preference shares of Rs. pO each, 
of the face value of Rs. 25,000 witn a minimum annual 
dividend of four annas (one-fourth of a rupee) for every 
ton of coal raised, subsequently, the contract was modified. 
The pneference shares were converted into ordinary shares 
ana the assessee agreed to pay, in lieu of the annual 
dividend, commission to G- at tne rate of four annas per 
ton of steam and rubic coal ana three annas per ton of. .slack
17• A.I.R. 1951 Bom. p1; see C.I.T. Bihar v. Ramniklal
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 862,
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coal raised from the colliery*
The question arose as to whether the sum so paid 
was a capital sum or a revenue sum, deductible from total 
income under section 10(2)4xv) of the let of 1922.
It was held that the amount was deductible under the
impugned section, though it is evident from the facts that
the sum payable as commission was nothing but the payment of
a capital sum in instalments for the purchase of the colliery.
Perhaps, it would be relevant to quote verbatim a statement
made by Chagia, C.J., to show how far the Judiciary has gone
in lending its blind support to businessmen in avoidance of
taxes. He says:
"How, in taxation matters, it is not necessary to 
construe documents from their purely legal aspect. It 
is open to us, not merely to look at the documents 
themselves, but also to consider the surrounding 
circumstances, so as to arrive at a conclusion as to 
what was the real nature of the transaction from the 
point of view of the businessmen, who we re carrying 
out this transaction. In all taxation matters more 
emphasis must be placed upon the business aspect of 
the transaction rather than on the purely legal and 
technical aspect.1
In C«I«I. / E.P.T., Bombay v. Sir Homi Mehta^ ,  the 
question arose whether the assessee made any profit or gain
18. Ibid at p. 53 (underline mine to emphasize); In C.I.T. 
Madras, v. Mohammad Ibrahim Saheb (1962) 45 * I.T.R.
166, the Court ignored the provisions of section 44D 
(3)(a) of the Act of 1922, which imposes the burden of 
proof on taxpayers who claim the benefit of section 
44 D (1) pf the Act.
19* I*L.R. (1956) Bombay 154*
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by a transfer, the effect of which was to transfer shares of
20 joint stock companies, held jointly by the assessee and
his sons, to a limited company called Homi Mehta and Sons 
Ltd.
The contention of the Income Tax Department was that
Mr. Mehta sold shares in his individual capacity to the
company for Rs. 40,97,000, though they had cost him only
Rs. 30,45,017, so he made a profit of roughly Rs. 10 to
Rs. 11 lacs, which was liable to be taxed. While rejecting
the Revenue’s claim, their Lordships said:
11... |Al transaction for the purposes of income tax must
be looked at from a commercial point of view. In
dealing, with commercial men in income tax matters, we 
must try and understand what is the real commercial 
result of a particular action taken by a commercial man. 
Equally so, in trying to determine whether a certain 
transaction resulted in profits.
We must come to the conclusion that the transaction 
resulted in real profits, which from the commercial 
point of view, meant a gain to the person who entered 
into the transaction, not profits from any narrow, 
technical or legalistic point of view.”20
It is submitted with respect, that the Court itself
admitted the fact that:
”... [l] here can be no doubt that, in law, Sir Komi Mehta 
and his sons were very different entities from Sir Homi 
Mehta & Sons Ltd.”21
nevertheless, while deciding the case the Court ignored the
fundamental principle that a company is a distinct personality
from its members and as such an individual can transact
22business with a company
20. Ibid at p. 1 •
21. Ibid at p. 157.
22. Salmon v. Salmon and Co. (1897) A.C. 22.
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Similarly, in Messrs Rogers and Company v. C.I.T. ,
23Bombay , where the partners of a firm converted the firm
into a private limited company, they themselves becoming the
shareholders of the company, having shares in the same
proportion as the shares held by them in the partnership, it
was held that the transfer of the assets of the partnership
to the company by them did not amount to a Tsalef, which
v/ould operate so as to attract the second proviso to section.'.
(10}(2) (vii)2^of the Act of 1922, to make them liable for tax
over and above that payable on the written down value of
the assets. It was further held that the transaction did
not amount to a sale in the real sense of the term, as the
firm and the company were being . managed by the same persons.
However, decisions in C.I.T. / E.P.T., Bombay v.
25Homi Mehta by the Executor’s of the estate , Messrs.
26Rogers and Co. v. C.I.T., Bombay , C.I.T. Calcutta v.
27Hugneeram Bangur and Co. are no more valid, in view of
the Supreme Court fs decision in C.I.T. , G-u.jarat v. Messrs.
B.M. Kharwar^ .
nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Sir
29ICikabhai Premchand v. C.I.T., Bombay , in which the doctrine
23. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 150.
24. See supra bp 156/9 for text of S . 1 0( 2) (vii) and proviso.-
25. A.I.R.1956 Bom. 415.
26. A.I.R. 1956, Bom. 150.
27. (1963) 47 I.T.R. 565 (cal.)
28. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 812.
29. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 509.
176
of substance was invoked in favour of the assessee, still
holds good, as the Court in Messrs, B.LI. Kharwar, while
reviewing judgement in the case, simply said that the
reference of the doctrine of substance was casual and nothing 
30more •
Sir Kikabhai, who was a dealer in silver and shares, 
withdrew some silver bars and shares from the business and 
settled them upon trust, in favour of himself, his wife and 
children, of Y/hich he was the Managing Trustee. The deeds 
of the trust were valued, for the purposes of stamp duty, at 
the current market value of the shares and silver. Accordingly 
the Income tax authorities sought to tax the difference 
between the cost price of the assets withdrawn and their 
market value at the date of their withdrawal from the 
business.
The Court while holding that no income arose to the
assessee as a result of the transfer of shares ana silver
bars to the trustee, said that:
"It is well recognized that in revenue cases regard 
must be had to the substance of the transaction rather 
. than to its mere form. In the present case, disregarding 
technicalities, it is impossible to get away from the 
fact that the business is ovmed and run by the assessee 
himself. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion 
that it is wholly unreal and artificial to separate 
the business from its owner and treat them as if they 
were separate entities trading with each other and then
30. See supra PP.,164/5for the facts of Hessrs. B . H. Kharwer1 s 
case.
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by means of a fictional sale introduce a fictional 
profit which in truth and in fact is non-existent.
In the case of J«K« Woollen Manufacturers v. 0,I«T»,
tl.P., where the question was whether an account claimed as
expenditure was laid out or expended wholly or exclusively
for the purpose of business, profession or vocation as
required under section 10(2){x v ) of the Act of 1922, their
Lordships held that:
M... £0*1 applying the test of commercial expediency for 
determining whether an expenditure was wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business, 
reasonableness of the expenditure has to be adjudged 
from the point of view of the Income Tax Department•
However, in Ilessrs. Een/ral Enamel Works Ltd. v. C.I«T« ,
•Z "2
West Bengal , the Supreme Court moved slightly from its
rigid stand on the point. In this case it was held that
where the amount paid to an employee, pursuant to an
agreement, was excessive, because of extra commercial
consideration1, the taxing authorities could disallow a .
part of the amount or expenditure not incurred wholly or
exclusively for the purpose of the business.
nevertheless, the basic proposition remains the same.
This has been unequivocably affirmed by the Supreme Court,
in the recent case of C.I.T., Bihar & Orisa v. Ivlessrs
•34.
Kirkanand Coal Company » that admissability of an allowance
31. A.I.E. 1955 S.C. 509 at,p. 510 (para.10).
32. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 609 at p. 612 (para 5).
33. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1076.
34. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1586. See Bombay Steam navigation Co.
C.I.I.. Bombay A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1201.
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or expenditure has to be judged, not from the point of view 
of the revenue but from the standpoint of the businessman.
This appears to be hardly satisfactory. There 
should be a balance between the interest of the revenue and 
that of the taxpayer.
The Doctrine of Literal-Interpretation
One is amazed to note the extent to which the Courts 
have gone in interpreting provisions relating to statutes, 
enacted to check tax avoidance. At. times the Courts have 
taken a very rigid and narrow view and imposed a restricted 
meaning, which was not contemplated by the legislature, and 
which does not even conform to the ordinary meaning of the . 
term.
In C.I.T., 1,1.P. and Bhopal v. Mrs. Sodra Devi and
35Mrs. Danavanti Sahni v. C.I.T. .  the questions for 
determination were whether the word 'individual1 in section 
18 (3)(a)(ii) of the Act of 1922 (corresponding to section 
64 of the Act of 1961) includes a 'female', and whether the 
income of the minor sons, derived from a partnership, to the 
benefits of which they had been admitted, was liable to be 
included in the income of the mother, who as a member of 
that partnership. Section 16 (3) says that:
35. A.I.E. 1957 S.C. 832. See C.I.T., Madras v. U.K. Stremann 
A.I.E. 1965 S.C. 1494.
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(3)1 In computing the total income of any individual
for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included-
(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of 
such individual as arises directlt or indirectly-
(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm of 
'which her husband is a partner;
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits 
of partnership in a firm of which such individual
is a partner;
(iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly 
to the wife by the hudband otherwise than for adequate 
consideration or in connection with an agreement to 
live apart; or
(iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly 
to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by 
such individual otherwise than for adequate 
consideration; and
(b) so much of the income of any person or association 
of persons as arises from assets transferred 
otherwise than for adequate consideration to the 
person or association by such individual for the 
benefit of his wife or a minor child or both.1*
The Gourt took a very narrow view of the term 
individual1 used in section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Act and
said that the term has been used in a restricted sense to
include male only, i.e.'individual capable of having a wife
"56or minor child or both1 , on the plea that the section 
16(3) was enacted with a view to check tax avoidance, 
resulting from the widespread practice of a husband entering 
into a nominal partnership with his wife and minor children; 
so, by implication, it excluded . 'females1 and the mother's 
claim that the income of her minor sons, derived from a 
partnership, to the benefits of which they had been admitted,
36. Ibid. at p.835, para 11.
1 8 0
was not liable to be incluaea in the income of the mother,
who was a member of that partnership within section 16 (3)
(a)(ii) of the Act.
It is submitted, with respect, as said by S • K. Das J.>
in his dissenting judgement, that there is nothing in the
context of section 16 which confines the word'individual' to
a male individual only. Had the legislature intended to
confine the entire section to a male individual only, hothing
Could ,:hav£ been easier than to qualify the word 'individuals.
by the adjective 'male' in the first part of the sub-section,
which controls both clauses (a) and (b); alternatively, in
clauses (iii) and (iv) 'father' could nave been used in
37respect of'such individual'
However, the decision does not apply to the
corresponding section 64 of the Act of 1961, in which tne
38word 'individual' obviously incluu.es 'females' as well • 
Similarly in Philip John Plaskat Thomas v. C♦1. T . , 
Calcutta, ^ ,?here section 16 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act of 1922, 
was in issue, the supreme Court construed the provisions 
strictly.
37* Ibid pp. 842, 843, paras p7, 39• Similar view has been 
expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Chandra Devi 
v. C.I.T., Lucknow. A.I.R. ,1951, All. 586.
38. The Lav/ and Practice of Income Tax, J.B. Kang a and
11.A. Palkhivala Cvol* 1.6th ad*. 19b9), p. 530.
39. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 587.
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The question for determination was whetner tne 
diviuends paid to Lire. Thomas on the shares transferred to 
her by I,ir. Thomas before marriage, could be included in the 
income of Mr. Thomas, after the marriage, ana be taxed in 
his hanas unaer section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
It was held that tne section aid not apply, as the 
property in question was transferred before the marriage took 
place. To invoke the section, the relationship of husband 
and wife should subsist, not only at the time of the accrual 
of the income but also when the transfer of assets is made.
The Court1s view as regards the interpretation of
such provisions may be appreciated by the following statement:
"It [section 16(3) J clearly aims at foiling an 
individual’s attempt to avoid or reduce the incidence 
of tax by transferring his assets to his wife or minor 
child, or admitting his wife as a partner or admitting 
his minor child to the benefits of partnership, in a 
firm in which such individual is a partner. It creates 
an artificial income and must be strictly construed."40
The Court's own statement made in the case might
justify a conclusion contrary to that taken by it. S.K. Das,
J., while delivering the judgement of the Court said:
"On a plain reading of sub-sec. (3) of Si. 16 it seems 
clear to us that, at the time when the income accrues, 
it must be the income of the wife of that individual, 
whose total income is to be computed for the purpose of 
assessment; this seems to follow clearly from cl.(a) of 
sub-sec. (3). Therefore, in a sense, it is right to 
say that the relationship of husband and wife must
40. Ibid. at p. 590,(para 7). The rule of strict
interpretation has recently been approved bynthe 
Supreme Court in C.I.T., W.B. v. Prem Bhai Parekh 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1518, 1519; see C.I.T., Gujarat v. 
Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 806
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subsist at the time of the accrual of the income; 
other wise the income will not be the income of the 
wife.”41
In C.I.T., Bombay v. Provident Investment Co, Ltd.,^
the old section 12 B of the Act of 1922,^ was in issue,
which runs as follows:
”12B. - The tax shall be payable by an assessee under
the head '’Capital gains” in respect of any profits or
gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a 
capital asset**, and such profits and gains shall be 
deemed to be income of the previous year in which the 
sale, exchange or the transfer took place.”
The assessee company..'was the managing agent of two 
other companies D. and S., in which it held a substantial 
majority of the shares. The Dalmia Investment Company 
offered to purchase from the assessee company the shares 
which it held in the two other companies, D. and S, along 
with the managing agency of these companies, at a certain 
rate per share. The board of directors of the assessee
company resolved to accept the offer and further that, out
of the total amount received from the sale of the shares,
Rs. one crore should be paid to the assessee company as 
compensation for the loss of the managing agency. Hov/ever, 
the assessee. company, in pursuance of a request from the
41* Ibid. at p.591•
42. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 664.
43. Section 12B was first introduced by the Excess Profit 
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947> in the Income Tax Act, 1922. 
According to the provisions of the section ’capital 
gains’ arising after the 31st March, 1946, became 
subject to tax. The tax was abolished by the Finance 
Act, 1949, but it was reintroduced by the Finance Act, 
(3 of 1956) with effect from April 1, 1957. Since then 
it is continuing. The Act of 1961 has made elaborate 
provision relating to capital gains under sections
45 to 55.
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Dalmia Investment Company, resigned from the ’managing 
agency1, instead of transferring it to the company at the 
time of sale.
The question was whether the amount of Rs. one crore, 
which included a capital gain, estimated by the Income Tax 
Officer at Rs. 81 ,81,900 w/as taxable under section 12 B of 
the Act of 1922. It was held that the section refers to 
’sale, exchange or transfer* and the act of ’resignation' from 
the managing agency amounted to 'relinquishment’; it was not 
a transfer or sale, v/hich would attract the provisions of 
section 12 B.
It is submitted, with respect, that, the net result 
of the transaction was that the assessee company got Rs. one 
crore, in lieu of its managing agency, which v/as a capital 
asset. It is immaterial whether one calls the transaction 
a sale, a transfer or a relinquishment, from the revenue 
point of view. This becomes evident from the fact that the 
legislature had to add the word ’relinquishment* in section 
12 B in 1956, in order to nullify the effect of the 
decision in question.
In C.I.T. , West Bengal v. Rational & G-rindlays Bank 
Ltd., Calcutta^  the Calcutta High Court gave a restricted
a jr
meaning of the term ’money in kind’ in sec. 42 (l) of the
44. A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 71.
45* See supra p.lj60 for the text of section 42 (l).
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Act of 1922, so as to include bills of exchange, gold and 
silver bars, ingots etc., as used in the commercial world and 
not that understood in the ordinary sense of the term or by 
economists, that 1 money1 is a medium of exchange and includes 
whatever is obtained by money, so goods, plant: or machinery,
/i g
bought with money, are the equivalent of money .
The assessee, a non-resident sterling banking 
company, advanced money to tne Calcutta Electric Supply 
Corporation, which was incorporated in Britain, with its 
head office in London, ana was carrying on the business of 
supplying electricity in Calcutta, to meet its financial 
obligations in respect of equipment purchased by it in 
England and brought into and installed in India.
It was held that the plant, goods and machinery so 
brought was neither money in kina nor cash, within the 
meaning of the section, so the assessee was not liable to 
pay tax on the interest earned over the amount advanced by 
way of loan.
46. Supra note 44. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High 
Court at p. 75j(para 15) gave the definition of money 
as understood by the economists in the following words:
‘‘In the broadest concept and in some schools of economists 
money is a medium of exchange and money includes whatever 
is obtained by money. In other woras, goods or plants or 
machinery bought with money are the equivalent of money 
and should be regarded as money.” See for the concept of 
money, The Le,val Aspects of Money, P.A.A. Mann* LL.L. 
thesis (1958)V University of London, pp.56-4-2 • See supra 
pp. 26 to is for definition of Income.
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The Supreme Court in C.I.T., Punjab v. R.D. Agrawal 
47& Company . gave a restrictea meaning to the words 1 business 
connection*, usea in section 42 (1) of the Income Tax Act of 
1922. The assessee company, a registered firm, carried on 
business as importers and commission agents for non-resiaent 
exporters* Bor two of the non-resiaent exporters, an Italian 
and a Belgian, it canvassed orders in Amritsar, for the supply 
of worsted yarn and communicated the same to his non-resident 
principals and receivea commission on the sales made by them* 
The assessee actea as tne ’sole agents for the sale' of the 
Italian concern and as the exclusive representative of the 
Belgian concern for the whole of India, on condition that it 
dia not represent any other Belgian Hill or yarn producer 
and did not sell Belgian yarn in India on his own account.
It was held that there was no ’business connection’ 
between the non-resident exporters and the assessee, because 
the assessee had no authority to accept orders or enter into 
contracts on hehalf of the non-residents, within the meaning 
of section 42(1) of the Act.
It is submitted that the legislature never intended 
that the words should be given such a narrow meaning. Bo 
doubt the final authority vested in the non-residents, but 
their business was done in India., through the assessee only 
and it was entitled to get commission on every sale in India.
47. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1526.
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This fact alone might have been sufficient to establish 
a rbusiness connection1. A similar attitude by the Courts 
was adopted in Hira Hills Ltd,, Cawnpore v. I.I.Q., Cawnpore^ ,  
Jethabhai Javerbhai v. C.I.T., C«P« and Berar^ ,  0 J « T . ,
50Bombay Presidency & Aden v. Currimbhoy Ebrehim and Sons Ltd. ,
51C.I.T., Bomba?/' v • Ahmedbhai Umaabhai &. Co., Bombay , C. I.T.,
52
Gru;jurat v. Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel , C.I.T.. Bombay v. -
Ahmedbhai Advance Mills Ltd. ^
However, it appears that.in some cases the Courts
have taken a more realistic attitude and interpreted the
provisions in conformity with the context in which they
appear. For instance, in Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. C.I.T. ,
54Madras the Privy Council held that a 'business connection;' 
existed bet ween an Indian bank and a foreign bank Y/ithin sec.
42 (1) of the Act, when both were controlled by the same 
persons. The loans advanced by the foreign bank to the 
Indian bank were made outside India, through the foreign 
branches of the respective banks and were repayable outside
48. (1946) I.T.R. 417 (All).
49. A.I.R. 1951 Hag. 551.
50. A.I.R. 1956 P.C. 1.
51. A.I.R. 1950 S’.C. 134.
52. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 866 .
53. A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 36.
54. A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 183. Similar views were taken in the
following cases, viz., Bombay Trust Corporation Ltd. v.
C.I.T.,. Bombay, A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 448; on appeal C.I.T. v. 
Bombay Trust Corporation A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 54; C.I.T. v. 
Remington Typewriter Co. (Bombay) Ltd. A.I.R. 1951 P«C. 
42.
187
India* But the moneys were brought into India and used in 
the branches of the bank here.
The Court said:
"The words [of section 42 (1) } are wide enough to cover 
profits or gains y/hich can be said to accrue or arise to 
the ... [foreign} Bank directljr or indirectly or from any 
business connection which may exist between the...c-f- 
[foreign} bank and the ... bank in British India."
In Ilazagaon Bock Ltd. v. C.I.T. and B .P.T.^^t the 
Supreme Court took the correct viev/ and held that the 
appellant company was liable to pay tax on the profits, which 
it would have made out of 1 a business transaction with non­
resident companies, but for the arrangement, within section 
42(2) of the Act of 1922, (corresponding to section 92 of the 
Act of 1961). Section 42(2) says: '\
"Where a person not resident or not ordinarily resident 
in the taxable territories carries on business with a 
person resident in the taxable territories, and it; appears 
to the Income Tax Officer that, owing to the close 
connection betv;een such persons, the course of business 
is so arranged that the business done by the resident 
person with the person not resident or not ordinarily 
resident, produces to the resident either no profits or 
less than the ordinary profits which might be expected 
to arise in that business, the profits derived therefrom 
or which may reasonably be deemed to have been derived 
therefrom, shall be chargeable to income tax in the name 
of the resident person who shall be deemed to be, for all 
the purposes of this Act, the assessee in respect of such 
income tax."
The appellant was a private limited company incorp^tBtSd 
under the Indian Companies Act, and v/as carrying on business
55. Ibid at p.18b.
b6. U H .  1958 B.C. 861.
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as marine engineers ana ship repairers. Its entire capital 
was owned by two British companies, the P. ana 0. Steam 
navigation Co. Ltd. and the British Inaia Steam Navigation 
Co. Ltd., whose business consisted in plying ships for hire. 
Under an agreement entered into with the two companies, the 
appellant repaired their ships at cost and charged no profits.
The Court took a broad view of the term 1 business1 
usea in the section and came to the conclusion that the 
artificial transaction between tne two companies formed a 
concerted and planned activity to aeprive the Indian Revenue 
of the tax, which would otherwise be payable by the resident; 
this was computed at Rs . b ,80,00Q..for 1943-44 > at Rs. 4,67*559 
for 1944-45 and at Rs.4>o8,463 for 1945-46. It was further 
held that the subject of the charge unaer the section was 
tne business of the resident and not the business of the 
non-resiaent sp the appellant was covered by tne impugned 
section.
57Again in Chidambaram Chettiar v.-C.I.T., Madras , 
where tne application of section 44 D(i) (corresponding to 
section 93 of the Act of 1961), which nullifies the 
transactions made to avoid taxation by transfer of income to 
non-residents, was in issue, the Supreme Court took a 
pragmatic view.
57. A.I.R. 196b S.C. 1453.
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The relevant portion of section 44D (1) states:
"Y/here any person has, by means of a transfer of assets, 
by virtue or in consequence whereof, either alone or in 
conjunction with associated operations, any income which, 
if it were the income of such person, would be 
chargeable to income tax, becomes payable to a person 
resident but not ordinarily resident in the taxable 
territories, acquired any rights by virtue or in 
consequence of which he has, within the meaning of this 
section, power to enjoy such income, whether forthwith 
or in the future, that income shall,... be deemed to be 
income of such first mentioned person..."
In that case the assets of a firm, of the net value
of Rs. 12 lakhs, were transferred to a corporation,
incorporated outside India. The corporation allotted shares
worth the said amount to the firm. It was held that section
443) applied in respect of the income of the company derived
from those assets, since, by holding a sufficiently large
number of shares, the transferor could be said to have
acquired a right, by virtue of which he had 1 power to enjoy*
the income. As regards the appellant*s contention that the
expression *by means of a transfer* means the transfer by
an assessee and that, as in the instant case, the transfer
was by the firm, which was a juristic entity separate from
the assessee, the income of the corporation was not assessible
in their hands, the Court rightly said:
"The language of the sub-section is plain. It does 
not say "when any person has transferred any assets", 
but it says "by means of a transfer of assets".
The person who transfers assets is not designated 
but emphasis is laid on the consequences flowing 
from such a transfer. Whosoever effects the 
transfer, if by such a transfer the assessee acquires a 
right to enjoy the income, he is liable to tax.The words
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"means" and "acquired" in the context are only words of 
a passive nature. The hand that transfers is 
immaterial: what matters is the result envisaged by the 
said section, namely, a non-resident is the transferee 
of the assets but the assessee acquires the power to 
enjoy the income from these assets."58
R Q
In C.I.T., Madras v. C.IJ. Kothari , the Supreme
Court made a correct approach in turning down a tax avoidance
scheme entered into by a father and his son. . A, the
father-in-law, transferred assets worth Rs.30,000 to his
daughter-in-law IJrs. B. asia Leepawali present, (Festival of
Lights),and B made a gift of almost equal amount to her
mother, IJrs. A, as a birthday present. Bo such gift had
been made in the past. It was held that the transactions were
so intimately connected as to form part of one and the same
transaction, within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)(iii) of 
60the Act , though each of the two transfers might not
constitute consideration for the other in the technical
sense. Their Lordships rightly said:........................
"The present case is an admirable instance of how 
indirect transfers can be made by substituting the 
assets of another person v/ho has benefited to the 
same or nearly the same extent, from assets transferred 
to him by the husband."61
On the other hand the Supreme Court in C.I.T.,
6v/est Bengal v. Prem Bhai Parekh , while interpreting the
98. Ibid at pp~I 1455-1456 (para V) .
59. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 551;S.Srinivasan v. C.I.T., Madras (1967)
1 S.C.R. 727; Sevantilal Llaneklal Seth v. C.I.T., Bombay 
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 697; Pavat Kumar Ivlittar v. C.I.T. , W.B„ 
(1962) II LI.L.J. 119.
60. See supra note p.179 for text of section 16(3)(a)(iii).
61. Supra note 59 at p. 333 (para 7.).
62. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1518.
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provisions of section 16(3)(a)(iv) of the Act of 1922 
adopted a strict and legalistic approach as opposed to that 
in C.H. KothariTs case.
The facts were as follows. The assessee was a 
partner in a firm, having a 7 annas share therein. On July 
1st, 1954 he retired from the firm. Thereafter he gave to 
each of his four sons, three of them- were minors, Rs. 75,000. 
The firm was reconstituted from July 2, 1^54; the major son 
became a partner of the reconstituted firm and his minor 
sons were admitted to the benefits of that firm, each of them 
having a two annas share *
The question arose whether the income arising to the 
minors, by virtue of their admission to the benefits of
/T 7
partnership, came within the purview of section I6(3)(a)(iv) 
of the Act of 1922, and could be included in the income of 
the assessee.
The question was answered in the negative. It was 
held that the income did not come within the purview of the 
impugned section and so could not be included in the income 
of the assessee. One fails to understand the conflicting 
statements made by the Court in one and the same para of the 
judgement. On the one hand, the Court has admitted that the 
amount contributed by each of the minors came from his father1 
gift to him, but on the other hand it said that the connection 
between the gift and the income in question was remote. In
63. See supra p.179 for text of section 16(3)(a)(iv).
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other words* the Court held that there was neither direct nor 
indirect connection between the trnasfer of the assets and 
the income in question to make the provisions of section 
1 £>.(3) (a) (i) applicable•
In fact, the circumstances of the case justify a 
contrary conclusion. The facts of the assessee*s retirement 
from the firm, making gifts to his sons, the reconstitution 
of the firm and the sons* admission to the benefits of the 
firm show that they are at least indirectly connected if not 
directly.
It became evident, from the analysis of cases on
the point, that the Courts in India, like the Courts in
Britain, have not been able to evolve a fixed rule or
principle of construction as yet. It is regrettable that
the Courts are not clear in their approach to such a vital
issue. Conflicting decisions can be cited on points arising
64from similar facts and situations . Standards applied in 
favour of the taxpayer differ from those applied to the
65revenue •
The question is whether the country can in these 
times of economic stringency afford so grave a loss from
64« See supra pp. 166 .to,.172. 
65- See supra pp. 172 to 186.
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6 6
the unfavourable decisions of the Courts • The obvious
reply is: ho; the Courts must come to the aiu of the
legislature, as dia the Supreme Court of America.
The Approach in other Jurisdictions,
The role of the Supreme Court of America in this
context is commendable. The Court has not only paved the way
for the legislature tp proceed with its programme of combating
tax avoidance legislation^®, but has also by construing such
66”. "bee s up ra p p • 178 t o J8 6 0-0 ; see ’Judicial Techniques in 
Combating Tax Avoidance \ Ralph S. Rice, 51, Michigan L.R. 
102,1. It is rightly pointed out that the loss of revenue 
as a result of one decision is not limited to that very 
case but is followed by others to the advantage of 
taxpayers. One decision might encourage a large number of 
tax avoidance transactions, resulting in huge loss to the 
exchequer. See supra p.l4£ for the possible impact of the 
decision of Resorick v. Baxer on tne exchequer 
57. ’The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance1, Harry J. 
Rudick, (1940), 7, Lav; ana Contemporary Problems, p. 2^ -3 * 
at pp. 24a to 2o5; see for the attitude of the Courts in 
U.K. supra note 11, at pp. 2 14 to 220; for Canada supra 
note 6 pp. p4;> to 552; for Australia supra note 19/ at pt31. 
68. see Taft v. Bowers (1929) 2/8 U.S. 470; Lucas v. Earl 
(1y30) 281 U.S. ill; Burnett v. Y/ells (1933")' 289 U.S.
670. The Supreme Court by a majority of five to four 
upheld the constitutionality of section 219(h) of the 
Revenue Act of 1924* The impugned section provided for 
the inclusion of that part of the income of a trust which 
was to be applied to the payment of premium upon the 
policiies on the life of the grantor in his income for 
the purpose of income tax. The Court rejected the 
respondent's argument that the statute, in so far as it 
authorized taxing him 011 the income of the property that 
was no longer his (because an irrevocable trust was created) 
infringed the Eifth Amendment. It was held that the trust 
could not be used for such purposes as were for the 
exclusive benefit of the family and in such cases it 
would be deemed that so much of the income of the trust 
was retained by the testator for his use.
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69such provisions liberally . Probably Congress would not 
have advanced far in its battle against income tax
70avoidance, if the Supreme Court had not stood by it • The 
Courts have evolved three rules to combat tax avoidance 
devices, viz*, the business purpose rule, the economic
71approach rule and the search for legislative intentions .
69* Gregory v* Helvering (1935) 293 U*S* 465. The Supreme 
Court refused to give a literal meaning to the ftax free 
reorganisation* provisions of the Revenue Act, 1928.
They incorporated the requirement of 1 business purpose1 
of the transaction, which was not written into the 
provisions of the statute. Mrs. Gregory, in a * 
technically perfect scheme, carried out a series of 
transactions, each of which was free from tax liability 
on a lieral contruction of the statute. The Court, hoyre'ver, 
brushed aside the ’elaborate and devious* form of the 
transaction and upheld the revenue's claim to taxation.
The Court rested its conclusion on the ground that the 
statute meant by * reorganisation* a transaction in 
•furtherance of the recognized corporation’s business 
and that being lacking, the taxpayer*s claim could not 
be upheld. See Higgins v. Smith (1940) 308 U.S. 473« 
Helvering v. Cliford (1940)"60 Sup. Ct. 554* Lucas v. 
fear! (1930) 281 U.S. 111.
70. See supra note 67 at p. 246. ’Tax Avoidance Schemes End 
in Disaster', D. Howe P. Cochran (1950-51) 5 Miami L.q7 
435, 440 'Section 367 and Tax Avoidance*, James B.
Sitrick (1970) 2 5, Tax I.E. 429.
71. 'Judicial Technique in Combating Tax Avoidance', Ralph 
S. Rice, (1953) 51, Mich. L.R. 1021, at pp. 1041 to 
1047.; 'Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation:
Canada (T966T. Vol. 3. PP. 549 to 552.
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72 73In Australia and New Zealand also the Courts
have endeavoured to remedy some of the statutory deficiencies 
by giving a liberal interpretation to the provisions of the
rn a
Income tax statutes . For instance, the Privy Council in
75Newton v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation1 , a dividend 
stripping case, gave some life to &ectiQn\260do£ the 
Australian Income tax and Social Service Contribution
7 £
Assessment Act, 1936-60 , by extending the meaning of the
word 'arrangement1 used in the section so as to cover all 
transactions, which had the effect of avoiding taxes, whether 
conveyances, transfers or anything else.
72. 1 The Legislation against lax Avoidance: The Australian 
Experience, H.A.J. Ford, (1 961) B . i.it. pZ 247. 1 The 
lie ailing of the Term 'Arrangement* , Peter G. Y/hi tertian,
(1966) British Tax Review, p. 399*
73* Bell v. Federal Commission of Taxation (1953) 37 C.L.R. 
543.
74* Owen Thomas Liang in v. I.R.C. (1971) 2 Y/.l.R. 39>52.
75. (1953) A.C. 450. in that case the three Australian
companies, which dealt in motor cars, entered into 
various transactions, the effect of which was inter alia 
to increase the capital of the motor company in a way
which would attract as little tax as possible to enable
the shareholders to receive the amount of profits in the 
form of special dividends, without paying taxes on them 
and to make it possible for the company to earn huge 
profits on its deals. It was held that the case was 
covered by clause (c) of section 260 of the Act because 
the purpose and effect of the arrangement was to avoid 
taxes. See I.R.C. v. Europa Oil 0o:« ($971;i 2'.A7.£:ftR.
55c (PsC*); Dolors Hay v. BlcC lei land v. “Commissioner of 
Taxation (1971)~ 1 Y/.L.R. 191 (P.O.).
76. See supra p.126 for text of section 260 of the Act.
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And in a recent case from New Zealand, Owen Thomas v, 
77I.R.C. , the Judicial Committee pf the Privy Council foiled 
the appellant's attempt to avoid tax by creation of a 'trust' 
of his property by invoking section 108 of the land and 
Income Tax Act, 1954.
The appellant, a farmer, with a view to avoiding 
taxes, created a 'paddock trust1, whereby he leased 385 acres 
of his land in parts for one year at 13 an acre to trustees:,, 
who were to cultivate it. The trust income was to be held 
for his wife and children. The appellant was employed by 
the trustees to saw, harvest and sell the crop, and received 
remuneration. The remaining income, after deduction of 
expenses, was to be distributed amongst the beneficiaries of 
the trust. As a result of these transactions, a part of 
the appellant's total income became the income of his wife 
and children, who could claim allowances and reduced rate 
of tax on the sum and at tne same time the tax paid by the 
appellant was reduced.
The revenue assessed the entire income of the wife
and children with that of the appellant, on the ground
that the creation of a trust was absolutely void under
section 108 of the Act. The impugned section provides that
"Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or 
entered into,... shall be absolutely void in so far 
as, directly or indirectly, it has or purports to
77. (1971) 2 W.l.R. 39 (P.C.)
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have tne purpose or effect of in any way altering the 
incidence of income tax, or Relieving any person from 
his liability to pay income tax."
The Court traced the history of the impugned section, 
explaining the reason for its enactment ana gave a liberal 
interpretation to the provision. It was held that, since the 
appellant's principal or sole purpose in creating the 
'paddock trusts' was not to provide a trust fund for the 
members of the family but to escape liability for tax on part 
of his income, the trusts were void.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear 
that the Courts in India and Britain should change their 
outlook towards tax avoidance cases. They should co-operate 
v/ith the revenue in defeating tax avoidance devices.
Taxation should no longer be considered as extortion of money 
by the State; it should be regarded as just contribution of 
the individual to the State for the performance of its social 
welfare activities and for the economic prosperity of its 
people.
Everyone should recognize a duty, moral, social and 
legal to see that the State is not deprived of revenue it 
needs by the mischievious activities of a few individuals.
Ana the Courts, being the guardians and protectors of the 
social and economic interests of the state should compel the 
taxpayer to ao his duty. No aoubt there has been some change
•/ o
in the attitude of the Courts , but it has not been enough
78. See supra pp. 186 - 190.
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to check tax avoidance, rampant on a large scale in Inaia.
This requires a concerted effort, not oniy by the
79legislature but the judiciary as well.
79• *The Attitude of the Legislature and the Courts to Tax 
Avoidance, G-.S.A. Wheatcroft, (1955) 1S Mod. L♦ R. 209? 
229-250.
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C H A P T E R  V
Tax Evasion
The Nature and Extent of Tax Evasion
The word fevade* which is a verb of the noun
* evasion1, came into use in the English language for the 
first time in 1515 It has its origin in the French word
* evader* which is an adaptation of the Latin term 1 evadere/f
formed of two words, namely b/# (= out) and 1vadere * (= to go)
2
means to go out or to get away or to escape • Gradually,
the term * evade* acquired a special meaning and started to
be used to signify an individual*s particular course of
action. For instance, since 1710 it has been in constant
use to denote the act of avoiding one*s liabilities,
particularly the pressure of a charge by means of an
4
artifice, a trick or subterfuge.
1. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 
Principals, Vol.I (1933) P* 641*
2. Ibid.
3. V/ebsters* International Dictionary of English Language 
11903) p . 516.
4. Supra note 1 at p. 641; nWhartons* Law Lexicon, A.S. Oppe, 
14th Edition (1953) p. 332; The Dictionary of English Law, 
Clifford Walsh, Vol.I, (1959), p.740.
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In the law of taxation, the term ‘evasion1 at
times, is used to indicate or to signify two different types 
5
of activity , though the effect of both on the economy of 
the State is one and the same, i.e., both result in loss 
of revenue to the exchequer*5. In the first place the term 
1 evasion1 designates those types of activities of taxpayers 
which though, technically within the four corners of the 
law, are against the very intent and the policy of the law.
In the second place it covers all those fraudulent activities 
of a taxpayer, which are entered into with a view to 
escaping payment of taxes to the revenue by adopting
7
illegal means. The former usually applied to tax avoidance
Q
and the latter to tax evasion . It is the latter sense of
the term that is the subject matter of discussion in the
present chapter.
Tax evasion includes in brief all those activities
employed by a taxpayer to defraud the revenue by not paying
q
the tax that the existing law imposes upon his income .
5. Simms v. Registrar of Probates (1900) A.C. 323 (P*C.) Lord 
Hobhouse said at p*334 that the word ‘evade1 refers to'the 
two contrasting meanings, viz., Mone which sugges 1s under­
hand dealing and another which means nothing more than the 
intentional avoidance of something disagreeable”; Taylor 
v. Attorney General (1963) N*Z. L.R. 261 at p.262.
b. Report of the Working Group-Central Direct Taxes 
Administration. Administrative Reforms Commission, 
Government of India (1968), para 6.1; p. 105.
7. See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion on tax avoidance.
8. See Chapter I pp. 4,5. for the distinction between tax
avoidance and tax evasion.
9. Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income 
Pinal Report.Cmd. 9474, H.M.S.O*, London (1955)* para 1016,
p.304.
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It covers a wide range of the taxpayer’s activities, from 
making a fraudulent return, deliberately supressing or
10falsifying the facts relating to one’s true tax liability
to failure to make a return or to pay taxes in time# Thus
tax evasion is always illegal# There is no divergence of
opinion as to its nature, as in the case of tax avoidance
in the legislature, the judiciary ana the revenue# The
amount concealed is not material, for the offence of tax
evasion is complete, if there is a concealment of income#
However, the amount of tax evaaea may be taken into account
for the purposes of awarding a penalty#
A taxpayer bent upon evasion of taxes by fraudulent
means may resort to a number of devices, depending upon the
impact of taxation ana the prevalent economic and political
11conditions in the country# It may range from the simple
12ana cruae to complex and ingenious methods • A significant 
feature of tax evasion, like tax avoidance, is that new 
devices ana techniques are evolved from time to time, in 
order to frustrate the legislature’s and Revenue’s efforts 
to minimize and stop evasion. Some of the common forms of 
the tax evasion devices that are in practice may be 
enumerated as follows:
10. Report of the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry.
Committee - 1938-09 Government of India, para. 7*3 at p. 147 
11# Incidence of Tax and Tax Evasion, K.C# Khanna, 2nd All 
India Conference of Tax Executives, 1967; F*I:#C« C.t.
12# Penalties and Prosecutions for Evasion of the Federal 
Income Tax, Gerald L# Wallace (1946)# Tax Law Review#
(Hew York University School of Lav/, 329 at p.336#
(i) omitting to report taxable income,
(ii) making fraudulent changes, manipulations of 
and altering account books,
(iii) maintenance of a multiple set of account books,
(iv) opening accounts under assumed names,
(v) securing contracts in the name of dummies or 
figureheads,
(vi) keeping transactions out of account books ,
(vii) omitting to file a return in time, which may 
result either in escape from taxes altogether 
or in making an inadequate assessment,
(viii) filing of a fraudulent, incomplete or inaccurate 
re turn,
(ix) keeping incomplete accounts and claiming 
erroneous deductions,
(x) filing appeals against assessments supported 
by false accounts^,
(xi) inflating expenses, for example, charging 
expenses which, if incurred, could have been 
avoided by business prudence, or falsely 
showing expenses as incurred.
13. Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54* 
Government of India, Vol.2., para 4, p.190.
14* ’Incidence of Tax and Tax Evasion’. !Dr. Jacob Eapenn
2nd All India Conference of Tax Executives. 1967, E.I.C. 
C ♦I., p.7.
(-xii)
(xiii)
(xiv)
(xv)
(xvi)
203
intentionally not maintaining any standard 
form of accounts and thereby concealing income, 
suppressing documents of sales and other 
transactions*
purchasing tickets from the winners at race 
courses, gambling, betting and tote clubs, and 
turf accountants, for more than their face 
value* The purchaser of such tickets then asks 
the person liable to pay on the ticket to him 
by cheque so that he can claim that an 
excessively large amount credited to his account 
was due to * gambling and betting gains1, which 
are exempt from taxation*
purchasing restaurant bills for cash at a discount 
and then using them to inflate the expenses*
The sum named in the bills is then withdrawn by 
the proprietor of the business for personal use. 
t]qe endowment of a scholarship on condition 
tha,t the individual^ child is awarded that 
scholarship and that the school recoups the 
tax on the annual payment contracted for under
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15the covenant .
16As stated earlier it is evident from a study
of the history of taxation lay/s that tax evasion originated
with the very inception of taxation. But the stuay reveals
that its magnitude has increased tremendously in India
during the last two and a half decades, i.e., since the
17second World War
In fact, it is very difficult to ascertain 
accurately the exact amount of income-tax evasion in the
15. Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Tne Problem in the United 
King'dom, A.B. liersic", (19b4) 2, Canadian Tax Journal, 
pp. 378-379. The article narrates various types of tax 
evasion practices prevalent in the United Kingdom. They 
are illustrated under heads (xiv) to (xvi); The Royal 
Commission on Income Tax, Second Instalment of evidence, 
cmd. 288-2(1919)> HMSO., London, Bara 12,383(8), p.615.
E. Standford, Deputy Chief Inspector of Taxes? enumerates 
the following four methods usually adopted by taxpayers:
(i) omitting to make returns, (ii) making incorrect 
returns, (iii) supplying incorrect accounts, or replying
incorrectly to enquiries, i.e., accounts are manipulated,
and are not correct copies of the taxpayer!s own record,
(iv) falsifying books. In many cases, although the 
books are correctly kept and the accounts furnished are 
correct copies of those appearing therein, it is fouhd 
on investigation that the material items have been 
cancelled in the books themselves. See 'Tax Avoidance
in India, R.K. Dalai and R.C. Cooper, (1953) 7 Bulletin 
Bor International Documentation, pp.5-6 for various 
types of tax evasion that are being practised in India.
16. See Chapter I, footnote 12.
17. The Problem of Tax Evasion: Report of the Indian Tax
Reform, Nicholas Kaldor, Government of India (1956), 
para 183, p. 103.
country, because of the lack of any set and recognized
principles of calculation. Nevertheless, various attempts
have been made from time to time by officials as well as
non-official bodies to ascertain the amount of tax lost
through tax evasion. Perhaps the first bold attempt in
this direction was made by Professor Nicholas Kalaor in
the year 1956. He estimated the amount of Income-tax
evasion in India as between Rs. 200 to Rs. 300 crores a 
18year . He made his statement on the basis of certain
tentative figures relating to national.income supplied to
19him by the Central Statistical Organization . This
figure included the amount of Income-tax lost through tax-
20avoidance as well . The estimates given by Professor 
Kaldor caused a great uproar in the country and became the 
subject matter of much controversy and criticism. It was 
declared too high an estimate in various circles and based
p i .............. .................
on mere conjecture • However, Ursula K. Hicks, an eminent 
economist, not only supported Professor Kaldorfs statement 
but estimated tax evasion in the country even higher.
She says:
18. Ibid.
19. Surra note 10, para 7*5* p. 148.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. Memorandum of Dissent, Comment and Recommendations. 
G.P. Kapaaia, para 177-9* pp. 516-519.
206
"The truth probably lies nearer the high figure, 
as suggested by Kaldor 200-300 crores, and indeed 
it may even be an understatement, since the figures 
on which Mr* Kaldor bases his estimate show the 
highest ratio of income disclosed to estimated 
income received in the category of income derived 
from trade, which are notoriously the most difficult 
to assess..n“
As against Professor Kaldorfs estimate, the Central
Board of Direct Taxes calculated a leakage of revenue through
tax evasion between Rs.20 to Rs* 30 crore a year^*
whereas some of the eminent Indian economists, namely,
Dr. C.D. Deshmukh, former Finance Minister, Government of
India, estimated Income-tax evasion in the country around
24Rs*50 scrore a year . Sriman Narayan, former member of the
Planning Commission of the Government of India, as between
2bRs* 50 to Rs. 200 crore a year J and G.S. Sahota at the rate 
of Rs. 61 crore per year^.
Though it is not possible to ascertain the exact
amount of InGome-tax evasion in the country.,from the
analysis of the above data, it stands out clearly and
unambiguously that there is widespread tax evasion in India
27and the quantum of tax lost through evasion is quite high 1.
22. Mr. Kaldor!s Plan for the Reform of Indian Taxation 
(1953) 68, The Economic Journal, pp. 160-161.
23. Supra note 6, para 6.2, p.106.
24* Indian Tax structure and Economic Development. G.S.Sahota, 
Institute of Economic Growth (Bombay), at p.42.
25* * Socialism in Indian Planning1(1964;, p.41.
26. Supra note 24, p.50.
27. Supra note 10, para. 7.12, p. 150?
supra note 12, chapter 12, para 2, p.189, supra note 24,
p. 50.
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The dimension of the problem can further be appreciated,
if one looks into the amount of the concealed income unearthed
by and disclosed to the Income-tax Department during the
last two decades.
The first major and concerted effort of great
significance in the direction of unearthing concealed
income in India was done by the Income-tax Investigation 
28Commission • The Commission uncovered concealed income to 
the tune of Rs, 48 crores in cases referred to it by the 
Government of India under sections 5(1)^ and 5(4)^ of the 
Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, (30 of
■7 A
1947), on which the tax evaded was Rs. 30 crores 
Similarly, the Income-tax Department during 1958-59 disclosed 
concealed income to the extent of Rs. 3 1 •10 crores under 
section 34(l)(a) and (b)^, of the Income-tax Act of 1922,
which resulted in additional tax and penalties of Rs. 15.64
• ■ • 3 3 ........................................................................
crores . During the past four years from 1963-64 to 1966-675
the Income-tax Department detected a sum of Rs.8O .7 6 crores
of concealed income, on v/hich Rs. 30.44 crores was imposed
34as penalty and additional tax .
28. See Chapter 2,supra,p.31 for establishment of Commission.
29. See Chapter 8,p.495 for section 5(1) of the Act.
30. See Chapter 8,pp.492-93 for section 5(4)*
31. Supra note 6, para 6.4* pp. 106-107.
32. This section authorized the Income-tax Officer to assess 
income which escaped assessment or was under-assessed in 
the relevant assessment year. See Chapter II, p. for 
text of section 147* a corresponding provision in the
Act of 1961. >
33. Supra note 10* para 7*6* p. 1 4 8.
34. Supra hote 6, para. 6 .4 , p.107.
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In 1951 the Government of India, with a view to
uncover large sums of concealed income in the country,
launched a Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, which was a new
experiment in this direction, as a result of which concealed
income to the tune of Rs* 70 crores was disclosed by
20,9^2 persons, on which additional tax and penalty of Rs.
11 crores was levied . This scheme was somewhat akin to
the ’confession* method adopted under section 105 of
56United Kingdom Tax Management Act of 1970^ and the United 
States of America under section 5761 of the Internal Revenue
35. Supra note 1 0, para 7 .6 , p. 14 8.
3 6 . Sec. 105 states that, (It corresponds to section 504 of 
the repealed U.K. Income Tax Act, 1952)
(1) Statements made or documents produced by or on behalf 
of a person shall not be inadmissible in any such 
proceedings as are mentioned in subsection (2 ) below by 
reason only that it has been drawn to his attention that -
(a) in relation to tax, the Board may accept pecuniary 
settlements instead of instituting proceddings; and
(b) though no undertaking can be given as to whether or 
not the Board will accept such a settlement in the case 
of any particular person it is the practice of the Board 
to be influenced by the fact that a person has made a 
full confession of any fraud or default to which he has 
been a party and has given full facilities for 
investigation. And that he was or may have been induced 
thereby to make the statements or produce the documents.
(2) The proceedings mentioned in subsection (1 ) of this 
section are -
(a) any criminal proceedings, against the person in 
question for any form of fraud or wilful default in 
connection with or in relation to tax, excess profits 
tax or the profits tax.
(b) Any proceedings against; him for the recovery of any 
sum due from him, whether by way of tax or penalty, in 
connection with or in relation to tax.
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37Code for arriving at compromise regarding tax liabilities.
This scheme was much criticised by the public as we11 as
various committees appointed by the Government to suggest
measures for the elemination of tax evasion and tax 
38avoidance . They argued that it would amount to giving a
premium on tax evasion and have the most destructive effect
39on tax morality .
However, the Government of India again in 1965* 
after a gap of fourteen years, introduced two Voluntary 
Disclosure Schemes, similar to that of 1951. The first
37. See 3761 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 says*.
(a) Authorization - The Commissioner, with the 
approval of the Secretary or the Under Secretary of 
the Treasury, or of an Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury may compromise any civil or criminal case 
arising under the internal revenue laws prior to 
the reference to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution or defence and the Attorney General may 
compromise any such case after reference to the 
Department of Justice for prosecution of defence.
(b; Redord - Whenever a compromise is made by the 
Commissioner in any case there shall be placed on 
file in the office of the Commissioner the opinion 
of the General Council of the Department of the 
Treasury, or of the officer acting as such with his
reasons therefor, with a statement of -
(1) The amount of tax assessed.
(2) The amount of additional tax or penalty imposed 
by law in consequence of the neglect or delinquency 
of the person against whom the tax is assessed, and
(3) The amount actually paid in accordance with the terms 
of the compromise.
38. Supra note 10, para 7*79 at p.177)See supra note 1 2, pp.
Supra note 17> para 203, p.113 )341 to 346 for discussion
)of Voluntary Disclosure 
Scheme.
39. Ibid.
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scheme was introduced by the Finance Act, 1965? and remained 
in force for a period of three months only. Within this 
short period, it brought into the open concealed income to 
the extent of Rs,5 2,19crores, on which the tax came to Rs. 3 8 *8 0  
crores (calculated at the rate of 60 per cent). The number 
of persons who disclosed income was 2 ,0 01 and the average 
disclosure per assessee was Rs. 2,60,000^.
Inspired by the success of the scheme, the 
Government introduced another Voluntary disclosure Scheme 
in the same year, i.e. 1965. Under this scheme 113)628 
persons disclosed Rs. 145*51 crores of income on which 
the tax came to nearly Rs. 20 crores^ .
In addition to the above 1 ,900 persons made 
voluntary disclosure of Rs.21.76 crores of concealed 
income under the provisions of section 271(4A) of the
40. Supra note 6 , para 6*5? p* 107?
4 1 . Ibid.
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4-2Income I1 ax Act of 1961 which was added by S.3 of the 
Income fax (Amendment) Act 1 of 1963, within two ana a half 
years of its life, i.e., from April 1965 to December, 1967^.
42. Income lax Act, 1961, section 271(4A) authorizes the 
Commissioner to reduce or waive the minimum penalty 
imposed in the following cases, if the assessee:
(1) has made voluntarily and in good faith aisciosure of 
his income prior to the issue of notice under sub-section
(2 ) of section 1 3 9, or prior to the detection of 
particulars of concealment of income as proviaed under 
clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1 ) of section 271 
of the Act of 1961 (S.271(4A(ii)(a);
(ii) has co-operated with the Revenue in an inquiry 
relating to the assessment proceedings (Ss.4A(ii)(b) and
(iii) has paid or made satisfactory arrnagements for 
payment of tax and interest payable. (Ss.4A(ii)(c).
In case the minimum penalty leviable exceeas Rs.50,000, 
the Commissioner can exercise his authority only with the 
previous approval of the Board of Direct Taxes (Proviso 
to Ss. 4A).
The Commissioner's order under sub-section 4A shall be 
final and shall not be called in question before any 
Court of law or any other authority. (271(4B). However, 
the Commissioner's order may be called in question on 
grounas of law. A writ of certiorari unaer Articles 32 
and 226 of the Constitution may be issued from the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts respectively, on the 
grounds of excess of jurisdiction or fraud or error of 
law, see 'Penalty Provisions under the Income Tax Act 
and Yfealth Tax Act: Legal Aspects of Implications and 
Justification of Recent Changes*. R.S. Gae, 3rd All 
India Conference of Tax Exeeutives (1968) F.I.C.C.I.,
1 0 3, 106.
43* Supra note 6, para 6.5, p» 107. The period is
calculated from April 1965, when the Act was passed,to 
Dec. 1967, on the basis that the Report of the Y/orking 
Group was published in January, 1968, in which reference 
has been given.
One remarkable feature of the 1965 Voluntary
Disclosure Scheme is that it makes evident that the tax
evasion is concentrated more in the upper income group of
the business community as compared with the middle or lower
income group in which it is relatively less. This is
apparent from the fact that, in the first scheme, 2 ,001
persons made a disclosure of Rs. 52.19 crores giving an
average of Rs. 2,60,000 per assessee, whereas in the second
scheme 1 ,13*628 persons disclosed Rs. 145*51 crores, the
average disclosure being only Rs. 12,850 per assessee^.
All this goes to prove that a large sum of money
is lying hidden in the country. Perhaps Samyukta SadaCbar
Samiti (1965) is right in saying that the quantum of
unaccounted money in the country is approximately Rs. 3*400 
45crores . In fact, it might be even more. This is supported
from the fact that the Government of India could unearth a
sum of Rs. 300.21 crores of concealed income within four
4.6years, i.e. from 1963 to 1967 even by adopting a lenient
44* Supra note 6, para 6.6, p. 107*
45* TProblem of Unaccounted Money and How to tackle it1.
Quoted from supra note 14, p.7* It does not appear clear 
from the statement whether the author meant by unaccounted 
money; unaccounted money as such;or *unaccounted money in 
circulation as unaccounted incomeor unaccounted taxable 
income. Perhaps it realtes to unaccounted taxable income.
4 6. See supra pp. 208-11 Income-tax Department detected Rs.80.76 
crores during 1963-64* Voluntary Disclosure Schemes of 
1965 uncovered Rs. 52.19 and Rs. 145 .51 crores 
respectively and Rs. 27*76 was detected under the 
provisions of section 271(4A) of the Act of 1961. The 
total sum comes to Rs. 300.21 crores.
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policy towards tax dodgers and granting them immunity from 
prosecution and punishment.
The Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee,
1938-59> though it has not made an assessment of the 
unaccounted money in the country, appears to be well aware 
of the magnitude of the problem, in as much as it says,
4 7
“there are large sums of evaded money kept underground" .
Thus it goes without saying that tax evasion is 
deeply rooted in India and is widespread on an alarming 
scale. It has become more or less a perennial problem to 
the economy of the country, and calls for constant and
/ Q
concerted efforts by all sections of the community •
It may not be out of place to mention here that it 
would be desirable for the Government of India, to instal a 
Commission on a permanent basis, independent of the Income 
Tax Department, to estimate the exact amount of tax evasion 
in the country and to pin point the potential areas or 
sections of tax evasion. This would give a correct estimate 
of tax evasion as against the conflicting estimates given 
by different bodies , which are neither authentic nor
47* Supra note 10, para 7*79 at p*177-
48. See supra note 12, p.329. Similar suggestions were made 
in regard to drive against tax evasion in the United 
States as long ago as 1946.
49. See supra pp. 204-206.
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reliable* The estimate of tax evasion by an independent 
and impartial Commission would be more accurate and 
acceptable to all concerned, including the Income Tax 
Department.
This would help in ascertaining the most 
appropriate measures to be adopted against tax evasion 
and spotlight the various sectors for more effective 
examination* In this way, it would help to a great extent 
in restoring public confidence in the Income Tax 
Administration, which has been shaken by the almost total 
failure of the Department to check one of the most 
important economic crimes of the day, which affects the 
economic basis of the community.
The Commission could also be entrusted with 
similar assignments in regard to other direct and indirect 
taxes levied by the Government of India, which also 
require attention*
Social and Economic Consequences of Tax Evasion
The evils of tax evasion are many* It deleteriously 
affects the economy of the country, and has a number of 
other undesirable consequences. In fact, it would be a 
herculean task to enumerate and assess its total impact
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on Indian society. The impact of tax fraud is not confined 
to one particular area like other crimes, but is widespread.
In other words, its influence on society is not only 
economic but social, moral, psychological and legal as well.
As such, it would be difficult to make a thorough and detailed 
study of its various aspects. Perhaps a socio-psycho-legal 
study of the problem is required, which is beyond the scope 
of the present study.
However, an attempt is being made to point out some 
of the main effects of tax evasion on society and show its 
over-all impact. It may be discussed under the following 
heads
(i) Financial loss to the Exchequer,
(ii) demoralizing effect on the community,
(iii) inequality among taxpayers,
(iv) disrespect for law and the authorities,
(v) inflation of prices,
(vi) hoarding and black marketing,
(vii) corruption and graft,
(viii) evasion of other laws,
(ix) retardation of community*s economic growth.
50. See Chapter 3 pp. 78-82 for effects of tax avoidance. 
They are applicable to tax evasion also.
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51Prom the foregoing discussions it has become 
crystal clear that the Indian Exchequer is deprived of a
large amount of revenue every year as a result of tax
52 55frauds^ . This affects the economy of the State*^ as well
as the normal growth and prosperity of the society by
hampering ana disrupting the State’s commitments in its
various economic and social welfare plans.
Tax evasion causes irreparable injury to public
morals ana public health. It brings about frustration
amongst the people and has a demoralizing effect on an honest
ana law abiaing citizen when he notices tax evaders getting
honour ana respect in the society. Tax evaders are not
even treated as ordinary criminals, nor punished adequately.
Rather they succeed in moving about in society as respectable
ana good citizens. A tax evader feels proud in evading
taxes. There is no moral or social censure for his acts.
Tax evasion like tax avoiaance brings about 
54-inequality and thus cuts at the very root of the fundamental
51* See for loss of revenue aue to (i) tax avoidance Chapter 
PP* 79-80, (ii) tax evasion supra pp.204-13 and (iii) 
administrative delay in assessment and collection of 
taxes infra p.242 footnote 26.
52. Tax fraud in its wider concept includes loss of revenue 
through delay in payment of taxes, tax avoiaance and 
tax evasion.
53* K.C.Pant, Minister of State in the Ministry of Pinancd, 
2nd All India Conference of Tax Executives (1967),
p.2.
54. See Chapter III pp. 76-82. ibr effects of tax aboiaance.
A
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principle of taxation, as it leads to unfair incidence of
taxes in the community , because the honest and law abiding
taxpayers are asked to bear and shoulder the heavy burden of
dishonest taxpayers, who practise and adopt fraudulent and
unfair means and tactics, finally succeeding in escaping
payment of their just and due share of taxes. In fact,
the tax dodger is an unmitigated nuisance and menace to
society. The loss of revenue caused by his antisocial
56
activities increases the burden of honest taxpayers.
Tax evasion practised unchecked on such a large 
scale adds to the feelings of frustration of the honest 
taxpayers, places a premium on dishonesty and encourages a 
dangerous disrespect for taxation laws in particular and 
others in general. It shakes the faith of the masses in 
the custodians of the law on the basis of which the very
fabric and the foundation of democracy exists.
Tax evasion leads to inflation of money in the
market, because of the large sums of money in the hands of 
tax dodgers. Prices shoot up to the detriment of the common 
man. In fact, a handful of persons monopolize things and 
thereby regulate the market and prices to suit their own
55. Equality* is one of the four principles of taxation
enunciated by Adam Smith in his book 'Wealth of Nations1
(1776) Vol. I, Book I, Chapter 6.
56. Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54.
Vol.iV, (Evidence), Part II. Reply to' the questionnaire 
by the Millowners Association, Bombay: Supplementary 
Information, pp. 342-543*
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ends. At times they prevent competition by cutting down
the prices and by not allowing the small enterpreneurs to
participate. Mr. K.C. Pant, Minister of State in the
Ministry of Finance, Government of India in his inaugural
address at the 2nd All India Conference of Tax Executives
(1967) is frank enough to admit that:
"Unaccounted money had been responsible for 
aggravating inflation and rise in prices.
Such money is not available for legitimate 
investment and invariably finds an outlet either 
in extravagant spending or in speculative 
ventures57'» #
Tax evasion leads to large scale hoarding of goods 
and making profit by selling articles at exorbitant rates 
when a shortage results. Crafty and cunning traders, taking 
advantage of the shortage of commodities, lacunae in the 
laws and lack of strict enforcement of the provisions of 
the law, invest the proceeds of evasion in hoarding goods 
and sometimes create : an artificial scarcity. In this way, 
the chain of hoarding and black marketing goes on unchecked. 
Besides hoarding the goods of day to day necessities, the 
proceeds of tax evasion are also used in hoarding gold, 
jewellery and ornaments, kept in secret in their homes.
Tax evasion leads to corruption, in as much as 
unscrupulous tax dodgers utilize untaxed money in corrupting 
officials and staff of the Income Tax Department, in order
57. Supra note 53, p.2.
to get various undue concessions. The untaxed money is 
also utilized to corrupt public men, and political parties 
by making contributions to political funds and corrupting public 
servants.
Evasion of tax liability under the Income Tax Act 
also leads to evasion of tax under other Fiscal Statutes and 
vice versa. Because most of the Fiscal legislations, for 
instance, Income Tax, Sales - Ta* Customs Act, Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act and. Import Trade Regulations Act 
are inter connected with each other, in the sense that 
evasion of tax liability under one affects the liability 
under another. For example, if a trader in order to evade 
sales-tax, reduces his business turn-over by Rs. 10 million 
a year, say by 50 per cent, that would automatically help 
him in evading income-tax, because his total mount of 
profit on which income tax would be payable is reduced by 
half, as the profits in a business are directly related to 
the turn-over.
Tax evasion leads to hampering the economic growth 
of the community, as tax evaded is generally kept concealed 
in the form of unaccounted money. This money is generally 
kept concealed and not brought into the open or invested in 
the market from fear of being detected and caught. As a 
result the economy of the State is adversely affected. It 
was rightly pointed out to the Direct Taxes Administration
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Committee, 1956-59,
”...If only this money could be brought to the
open and made available for the development
the economy of the country would benefit considerably”  ^ .
Causes of Tax Evasion - Defects in legislation and 
Administration*
Various reasons are assigned for the large scale
tax evasion in India* Perhaps it would be appropriate to
discuss at the very outset the most debated point as regards
the main causes of tax evasion* It is stragLy argued in
many quarters that tax evasion on such a large scale has
been stimulated by the high rate of taxation, i.e* the
higher the rate of taxation, the higher the rate of tax 
59evasion' • This may be partially true, but it is not
universally true* It is a recognized fact that no one would
60resort to tax evasion, unless it was profitable* to him •
It would automatically stop, the moment the cost of evasion 
is higher than the gain from it. Had the above proposition,
58* Surra note 10, para 7*79 at p.177*
59* I<*N* Birla, 2nd All India Conference of Tax Executives, ■ 
(1967), para 12*3 at p*3; supra note 11 att pp. 1-2;
"The Investigative High Taxes Make Evasion and Inflation 
Inevitable1.Kailash Khanna (1968), 4 0•I*B* 211: The . 
Investigative Procedure for Criminal Tax Evasion", Joseph 
H* Murphy, 27, Bordham L*R* 48 11958); supra note 13, 
para 3, P«9; supra note 56. Answer to the Questionnaire by 
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, p*4« "Taxation and Private 
Investment",National Council of Applied Economic Research, 
New Delhi, (1961), p.2.
60. Supra note 6, para 6*8, p. 108.
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that the higher the rate of tax, the higher the rate of
tax evasion, been correct, tax evasion would have been
confined to the upper income group, where the rate of tax is
high. But it is not so. Tax evasion is common to all
classes of taxpayers, whether engaged in business or
practising a profession or vocation, where the tax is directly
61collected from the assessee • In fact, tax evasion takes
62place in the middle as well as the higher income group .
This is again supported by the result of the Second
Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of 1965t in which all the
individuals (belonging to the business community) who
disclosed concdaled income were from the middle and lower
income group and not from the upper income strata as in the
6“3case of the First Voluntary Disclosure Scheme . Of course, 
the intensity of the temptation to evade taxes is always 
more in the case of the upper income group, where rates are 
higher as compared with other groups of taxpayers, where 
the rate is lower. And so the concentration of tax evasion 
is obviously more in the former group than the latter*^. But 
this is not because of higher rates of taxes necessarily; 
it may depend on the opportunities available for tax
61. See Chapter 6, pp. 264-65 for modes of collection of tax. 
To talk of tax evasion in the case of the salaried class 
of people or wage earners, where the tax is deducted at 
source before it reaches the taxpayer*s pocket, is futile. 
See supra note 14* para 4, p.7*
62. First Five Year Plan, Government of India, Chapter III, 
para 13*
63. Supra note 6, para 6.5• at p. 107.
64* Supra pp. 212-13*
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evasion, which are more in the former group than the latter.
This is because the taxpayers in the upper income group can
65more successfully manipulate things in their favour  ^ and
66employ the best brains to assist them , not only in their 
anti-social activities but also in criminal acts of tax 
evasion.
No doubt taxation beyond the saturation point is 
not good for the economy, because it retards growth. Taxes 
beyond an accepted limit should not be imposed. But tax 
rates are not to be blamed for high rate of tax crimes^.
In fact, the fault lies elsewhere.
An attempt has been made in the foregoing pages
6ft
to illustrate some of the important causes of tax evasion
65. See Chapter I, footnote 8.
66. *The Attitude of the Legislature and the Courts to Tax 
Avoidance*, G.S.A.Y/he at croft (1955) 18, Mod L.R. 209 > 
at p.212.
67. Supra note 6, para 6.8, at p. 108, supra note 10, para
7.8 at p.149*
68. Royal Commission on the Income Tax: Second Instalment 
of the Minutes of Evidence", Cmd. 288-2 (1919) HMSO., 
London, para 12, 57 (U> p. 615. The report states 
four main causes of evasion. They are (a) fraud, (b) 
wilful witholding or misstatement of material facts, (c) 
ignorance or carelessness, and (d) legal avoidance.
*The Investigative Procedure for Criminal Tax Evasion*, 
Joseph H. Murphy, 27, Ro.rdham 1*. Rev. 48 (1958). Some
of the reasons stated for tax evasion are: High tax rates, 
prosperity, inflation and larceny.
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They are as follows:
(i) Complexities in the tax laws,
(ii) the absence of deterrent punishment,
(iii) the harassment of the taxpayers,
(iv) the lack of publicity of the names of tax 
evaaers,
(v) inefficient tax administration,
(vi) lack of integrity of the income tax staff ,
(vii) inadequate prosecution machinery,
(viii) shortage of experienced personnel; and 
inadequate staff,
(ix) lack of a proper system of assessment and 
collection of taxes,
(x) absence of co-ordination with other tax 
departments,
(xi) lack of adequate legal advice on potential 
prosecution cases,
(xii) evasion of other taxes,
(xiii) absence of a legal requirement to keep books 
and accounts in a standard form,
(xiv) low public morals and absence of social 
consciousness,
(xv) inflation and unstable economy,
(xvi) operation of controls and inadequate 
enforcement machinery,
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(xvii) lenient judicial attitude tov/ards tax evasion*^.
The lav; of Income Tax in India is complicated,
70intricate, technical and difficult to understand, like
71British Income Tax law . A brief examination of the present 
Income Tax law discloses how sadly hopes of our earlier 
days have been frustrated• The remarkably ingenious Income 
Tax Act of 1886, containing but fifty sections has gradually 
grown to the astronomic number of three hundred sections andv. 
sub-sections. Sections and sub-sections often seem so 
intermingled as to cause a strain to the and a puzzle to 
the brain. The Act lacks the characteristics of the ideal 
statute which should have simple provisions, predictable 
consequences and be susceptible of easy and effective
69• See following sources for causes of tax evasions supra 
note 6, para 6*9, pp. 108 to 111; supra note 10, paras
7.8 to 7*17. pp. 149 to 151; Report on Tax Administration 
in India: A Tax Assistance Survey, Poreign Tax Assistance 
Staff: U.S. Internal Revenue Service:.USAID; India (1964), 
P*6. Supra note 15, pp. 379 to 381 (deals with U.K. laws}; 
Ceylon: Report of the Taxation Commission, 1955, paras 
357 to 359, pp. 249,2^0;
Legislative measures to Right Tax Braud in Norwayt Kristian 
S t angeby, Oslo, (1953)7, Bulletin for International Piscal 
Documentation, p.262; The Struggle against Tax Evasion:
The Situation in Denmark, S. Hiort-lorenzen, President 
of the Rational Taxation Appeal Tribunal in Denmark,
(1953) 7, Bulletin for International Piscal Documentation, 
pp. 10 to 12; fThe Investigation Procedure for Criminal 
Tax Evasion*, Joseph H. Murphy, (1958), 7, Purdham L.~Rev. 
48; See supra note 14, p.11.
70. Supra note 10, para 7*9, p. 149*
71. ’Tax Reforms which Could be Y/orked*, W.J. Horner, Pormer 
Tax Inspector, HMIR (U.K.), ’The Guardian1, December 9, 
1969, p.14.
i
225
administration^2. As a result an average man of ordinary
intelligence can hardly foliow the provisions of the Act.
It v/ould not be an exaggeration to say that Income
Tax return forms in India are so complicated and obscure,
thkt even a law graduate can hardly file a correct income
tax return, with the result that one is compelled to seek
the advice of legal experts and pay them a considerable sum
by way of remuneration, in addition to the tax payable to
the Income Tax Department.- So ingeneous taxpayers attempt
to reduce the amount of legitimate tax due by resorting to
fraudulent practices. At times some of the experts aid
and abet their clients in the crimes of tax evasion and
play the role of middle-men between tax dodgers and
73unscrupulous officers of the Income Tax Department . This
is, in fact, a slur on the noble profession of the law and
an act of shame by those who regard themselves as the
custodians of civilization^. This undesirable act on the
part of the professional men can be checked only if they
are subjected to prosecution, as in the United States of 
75America. Similarly,. Morcrji Desai, ex-Pinance Minister and
72. ’Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration.’, 
Louis Eisentein, (1945) 58 Harv. L.R. 477, at p.482.
73. Supra note 10, para 8, 133, p. 237.
74.’Conduct at the Bar and Some Problems of Advocacy1,
J.E . Singleton, K•C. (1969), p.1.
75. Supra note 12 at p. 336; see ’Legal Ethics and 
Professionalism,(1970) 79 Yale L.J. 1179; "The Role of 
the Lawyer in Administartive Justice”, Harry Y/hitmore 
(1970) 33 Mod. L.R. 481-498.
2 2 6
Sx : Deputy Prime Minister of India, while giving evidence 
before the Select Committee on the Income lax Bill, 1961, 
said that:
"It is the help given by the expert which is
responsible for a lot of evasion* Therefore he
requires to be more severely punished*M76
lax advisers, lawyers and accountants should stick
to the advice adduced by Howe P. Cochran - a Washington
attorney in advising their clients. He states:
"If your client has made some money, or if he expects
to make some money and his hopes are later realized, 
let him pay his taxes, and you; and let him go out 
and earn some more money, so that he may pay some 
more taxes and some more to you. Such a course is 
far more profitable to him than wasting time and money 
in schemes to defeat his taxes."77
There is no dispute over the point that adequate 
punishment for the violation of the law is the only remedy 
and is essential to protect society from falling into 
disrepute and chaos. As stated by Manu, the Great Hindu 
law giver:
"Punishment governs all mankind; punishment alone 
preserves them; punishment wakes while their guards 
are asleep; the wise consider the punishment as the 
perfection of justice" *8
76* fEvidence', Select Committee on Income Tax Bill, 1961, 
(Government of India), p.207*
77. 1 Tax Avoidance Schemes End in Disaster1, Howe P. Cochran, 
(1951), 5 Miami L.Q. 435, 'The Responsibility of Tax 
Adviser Randolph E. Paul (1950) 6 3  Harv . 1* Rev", at
p.577.
78. institutes of Hindu Law or the Ordinances of Manu1, 
translated from the original by G.C* Haughton, Professor
of Hindu Lierature in the East India College, London (1825) 
Chapter VII, para 18, p. 189.
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Thus persons guilty of tax crimes, like other
79criminals should be punished adequately , according to the
gravity of the offence, to deter them from repeating it
and at the same time setting an example to others who are 
80like minded • As stated by Aristotle, ’Punishment is a
81
sort of medicine . But to one’s great surprise in India
82the tax-dodgers are treated very leniently . One would
perhaps not believe that hardly a dozen prosecutions for
fraudulent evasion of taxes wofth the name have taken place
in India since the enforcement of Income tax legislation.
Prior to 1959, the Income Tax Department used to resort to
83prosecution in some cases of tax frauds , but from 1939 to 
1960 hardly a single prosecution was launched, as no data 
are available for that period. This attitude of indifference 
and apathy on the part of the Department is a direct 
inducement to commit tax frauds. Not only this, but 
taxpayers are generally promised complete protection both 
from publicity and prosecution,if they are ready to pay a 
modest penalty^. In fact, a nominal monetary penalty or even
79. Supra note 56. Mill Owners Association, Bombay, p*340,
S. Yaidya Math Aiyer and Co., Delhi, p.486.
80. P.P. Patel v. Emperor A.I.R. 1933 Rangoon 292, 294;
Queen v . Roland Bertrand (1967) 67 D.T.C. 5245.
81• ’Crime wiThout Punishment: A Psychiatric Conundrum*, .Edward
De Grozie,(1952), 52 col. L.R. 746.
82 Supra note 17, para 202, at p. 11%
83. Supra note 10, para 7*12, p. 150.
8 4 . Supra note 17, para 202, p. 11%
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a short term of imprisonment would not deter tax evasion,
85if the tax evaded were large • The Income Tax Department
was the subject of vehement criticism for its inactivity
by various bodies8 .^ But it had no effect on the working
of the Department, as is apparent from the following data
available of prosecutions in tax frauds cases from 1961-62
to 1965-66* The Income Tax Department does not initiate
prosecution, even in cases where tax evasion i£ fully 
87established . The figures of prosecutions for the years 
1961-62 to 1965-66 are as follows:
85* 'Bias Against Tax Evaders*: The Economic Weekly, (Bombay) 
September 27, 1958 at p. 1234.
86. Supra note 10, para 7.12, p. 150; supra note 6, para 6.9*
pp. 110,111;
The Public Accounts Committee, 21st Report (1963-64) - 
Third Lok Sabha remarked:
In para 7.12 of its report, The Direct Taxes Administration 
Enquiry Committee observed that though the Direct Taxes 
Acts provide for prosecution and imprisonment in the 
cases of concealment of income, not a single person has 
been convicted for evasion during the last ten years, 
and recommended that unless it was brought home to the 
potential tax evader that attempts at concealment of 
income would not only not pay him but also actually land 
him in jail, there could be no effective check against 
evasion. The Committee are not a little surprised to 
find that, even though this recommendation has been 
accepted, Government sent for prosecution not more than 
one person in the whole of the country during 1961-62 and 
that case too was compounded.
87. Supra note 6, para 6.9 (f) at p. 121.
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88gable No.1 s Criminal Proceedings in India
dumber Jear Number of cases in 
which prosecution 
was launched.
Number of cases which 
resulted in conviction.
1 1961-62 1 Nil
2 1962-65 2 2
5 1965-64 Nil Nil
4 1964-65 28 Nil
5 1965-66 Nil Nil
Thus during a period of five years the Income Tax
Department launched 51 prosecutions for tax evasion and got 
2 persons convicted* This needs no further comment.
The position is similar in the case of administrative 
penalties levied by the Income Tax Department for defaults
QQ
committed under the provisions of the Act .
88. Ibid.
89* Ibid. The Income Tax Department imposed a penalty for 
deliberate concealment of income under section 271 (l) 
(c) of the Act, only Rs. 11.58 crores for a period of 
five years, i.e., 1962 to 1966. This might appear a 
big sum, but it works out to be even less than 15 per 
cent of the concealed income when lav/ provided at the 
relevant time for the imposition of a minimum penalty of 
20 per cant and maximum of 150 per cent. Nov/ the 
minimum penalty has been raised to 100 per cent of the 
amount of concealed income. See Chapter VI for 
provisions relating to administrative penalties.
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It may not be out of place to mention that even 
in Britain where a lenient attitude is discernible against 
tax evaders, a considerable number of prosecutions do take 
place every year, The following data from 19i?9-60 to 
1968-69 would justify the statement:
90Table No, 2 : Criminal Proceedings in Britain
Humber Year Humber of cases in 
which prosecution 
was launched
Humber of cases which 
resulted in conviction
1 1959-60 102 100
2 1960-61 132 130
3 1961-62 151 147
4 1962-63 120 115
5 1963-64 168 163
6 1964-65 139 130
7 1965-66 133 127
8 1966-67 141 134
9 1967-68 94 87
10 1968-69 122 115
Brom the analysis of the above data it emerges
that, out of 1248 prosecutions launched for various
90. 112th Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty*a 
Inland Revenue for the year ended 31st March, 1969, 
Hundred and Twelfth Report, London, p.49,
Table 26.
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categories of tax crimes for the years 1959-60 to 1968-69, 
the revenue got 1194 of them convicted, which comes to more 
than 95 per cent of convictions. This clearly indicates 
that the Revenue in the United Kingdom is more vigilant in 
launching prosecutions in cases of tax crimes. Such cases 
are thoroughly processed and scrutinized and the Revenue 
leaves no stone 'unturned in getting tax dodgers prosecuted.
Tax criminals in the United States of America are
dealt with even more severely than in the United Kingdom.
The taxpayer in America, unlike those in Britain and India,
is left to assess his income himself and pay tax accordingly
and if he is found guilty of concealment of income, is
fined heavily. In addition to a penalty, the assessee is
prosecuted, and this generally results in a long term 
91imprisonment • Bor example, the Inland Revenue Service in
1964 and 1965 recommended prosecutions to the extent of
• ■ ■ ........................ op
1032 and 1218 cases respectively • The number of
91. Supra note 17* para 204* P« 114* Prof. Kaldor cites two 
cases to show the extent to which prosecution provisions 
are resorted to in the United States. During the 2nd 
World War the Vice President of bhe of jthe- biggest New 
York Banks, the National City Bank and the Chairman of 
the New York Stock Exchange, were prosecuted for tax 
evasion and much publicity was given to it. In 1956 the 
head porter of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York was 
prosecuted for concealing a sum of 27,000 dollars earned 
in tips. He disclosed 33,000 dollars whereas he earned... 
60,000 dollars in tips.
92. Prosecution for Attempts to Evade Income Tax* A 
Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid1 , StevenT-Puke, 76 
Yale. L.J.. o.1, at p o 4  11964Is *Current Problems in Tax 
Braud Bield*, PaulP. Lipton, (1963) Wis. L. Rev. 41, r 
Policies and Procedure■in Income Tax Braud Gases*,
Turner L. Smith, 21, Tenn L.R. 498 (19p0).
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convictions has steadily increased. The total number of
convictions, which was 2,900 only from 1930 to 1952 went up
to 7>035 within a period of eleven years, i.e. from 1953
to 1964* Similarly, the number of convictions increased
from year to year. In 1958, the number of convictions were
492 only; it went up to 552 in 1962 and to 607 by 1964^*
94 95The position in Norway , Denmark^ and other countries is
similar, where penal and prosecution provisions are
frequently resorted to in tax fraud cases.
It may be noted that the policy of leniency would
be inappropriate in a developing country like India, where
a large number of taxpayers are not willing to fulfil their
obligations. A.M. Nremner while giving evidence before the
Royal Commission on Income Tax in 1920, rightly stated:
"The real way to prevent fraud ... is that fraud should 
be punished by terms of imprisonment; that is the way 
to stop it. It will never be stopped in any other way; 
the temptation is so great now. People must be made to 
understand that if they defraud the revenue, they are 
committing a mean and despicable offence against every 
one of their fellow taxpayers."96
93. Ibid p.70.
94* Legislative Measures to Fight Tax Frauds in Norway. 
Kristian Stangeby, Oslo, (1953) 7 Bulletin for 
International Piscal Documentation, p. 258.
95. 'The Struggle Against Tax Evasion in Denmark*. 
Hiortlorenzen, (1953)* 7 Bulletin for International 
Piscal Documentation, p. 13*
96. Supra note 68, para 16,028, at p. 800.
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It is an undisputable fact that, for a successful
tax administration, there must be mutual trust and
uo-operation between the Income Tax Department and the assessee'<
But contrary to this a sceptical and inquisitorial attitude
is generally displayed by the taxing authorities which
creates an undesirable gulf between the taxpayer and the
tax collector. The very first reaction of a taxing authority
to a taxpayer is that he is a tax dodger, whether he is or
not. The integrity of the bulk of the majority of taxpayers
97xs unquestionable . As a result the Department’s attitude
is biased from the very start and the assessing officers
do not accept the assessee’s return, even if it is correct
98and the assessee produces evidence in its support . This 
creates a feeling of dissatifaction amongst the taxpayers 
and they start understating their income, wealth, etd., 
knowing that it will be increased by the Income-tax Officer.
In fact, the conduct of an Assessing Officer 
should not be that of a tax-grabber but that of a referee, 
standing between the State on the one hand and the taxpayer 
on the other hand, with the sole idea ana desire that both 
parties should get a square deal. The assessees are often 
required to appear before the Income Tax authorities. They 
are asked to wait outside the Income Tax Office and to
97. Supra note 10, para 7.16, p.151.
98. Supra note 56. Reply to the questionnaire by Bombay 
Shareholders Association, p.261.
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come in their turn. To ones great surprise, they wait from 
morning until the office closes and are then told to come 
again on some other day and so the chain goes on. It is a 
great pity that the Income Tax authorities do not take any \ 
notice of the inconvenience caused to a taxpayer by this 
waste of his time and energy. After all, it is the taxpayer 
who is the pay master and contributes to the coffers of the 
State and not the Income Tax Department. The authorities 
must take due regard of the assessee’s time, convenience 
and provide proper facilities. It is notea with surprise that 
at some places the Department does not even provide a proper 
place for the taxpayers to sit.
Sometimes persons are maae to suffer for non- 
observance of minor technicalities of law, which are not 
even required. Perhaps an illustration would be appropriate 
to elucidate the point. A taxpayer who was an employee in 
the University was going abroad for a short period. Being 
a lav/ abiding citizen he thought he needed a Tax Clearance 
Certificate before leaving the country. Accordingly he 
approached the appropriate Officer for the purpose. To 
his great surprise he had to run to the Income Tax Office 
several times befofe he could get it. The work could have 
been done within five mmnutes. In fact there was no need
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of a Tax Clearance Certificate^in his case, as he was
going abroad for a limited period on leave from the University,
which he should have been told by the Tax Recovery Officer,
This shows the utter ignorance of the provisions of law by
even senior officials of the Department.
These acts of harassment and arbitrary disposal of
assessment cases embitter good relations between the
authorities and the taxpayer. Taxpayers remain dissatisfied
with the Departments working and with the attitude of the
dtaff. He gets a bitter experience on his very first visit
and an impression is created in his mind that honesty does
not pay in dealing with the Income Tax Department. Mistrust
begets mistrust and a vicious circle is created. As a
result the taxpayer starts non-co-operation with the Department.
becomes hostile and finally indulges in fraudulent tax
evasion , which ultimately pays him. The Income Tax
Investigation Commission (1949) has rightly analysed the
problem. The Commission says:
"It is evident...that a strong feeling of distrust 
and discontent exists in the public mind against
the administration of income-tax in this country.
So long as this feeling persists, various types 
and forms of evasion are likely to thrive."2
99* Income Tax Act, 19^1, section 230 requires only two classes 
of persons leaving India to procure a Tax clearance 
certificate, namely,
(i) where the person is not domiciled in India, and
(ii) where even if domiciled at the time of departure, 
has no intention of returning to India.
See *The Law and Practice of Income Tax*, J.B. Kanga and
N.A. Palkhivala, (1969), Vol.I at p. 950.
1 ♦ Report of the Income Tax Investigation Commission (1QAQ^
Government of India, para 357, p. 157.
2. Ibid ♦
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It is high time for the Income Tax authorities to 
change their attitude of bias and ill feelings towards 
taxpayers. The authorities should treat taxpayers as their 
friends and take into consideration their genuine grievances, 
and difficulties and remove them,as far as possible.Taxpayers 
should be told of their responsibilities to the State. They 
should be made to feel proud of their contributions to the 
economy of the btate however small it may be. This will 
establish a feeling of trust and confidence in the Income 
Tax Department and will help taxpayers in disclosing their 
correct income voluntarily on which the effective administration 
of income tax rests .
In fact, there should be more friendliness of 
manner, gentle treatment of the small fry, and more vigorous 
pursuit of the big fish. But it is found otherwise. Small 
traders and taxpayers are harrassed whereas big persons are 
left free. This will not help the Department in establishing 
good relations with taxpayers.
There can be little doubt that public censure 
and public exposure of an individual’s wrong doing through 
the modern media of communications, i.e., the press, radio
3. ’Incidence of Tax and Tax Evasion’, K.C. Khanna, 2nd 
All India Conference of Tax Executives (1967), pp.3,4.
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television and cinema is one of the most potent and
recognized forms of deterrent in the present era of social
consciousness. The very fear of being exposed to the public
acts as a deterrent against a crime. The publication of the
names of delinquent assessees, i.e., those convicted of tax
crimes as well as those fined by the Income Tax Department
is essential to a successful plan of control of tax crimes^.
However, the policy of the Government of India appears to
be otherwise in this regard. This is apparent from the
statutory provisions in the Income Tax Act in this connection.
The Income Tax Act of 1922 had no provision for the
5
publication of the names of such persons , instead the 
Department was statutorily prohibited from doing so •
4* Supra note 10, para 7*13* p. 150; 
supra note 5 6 , p.4 5 6;
'Evading Tax Evasion1: Economic Weekly, (Bombay),
Sept. 24, I9 6 0, p • 1422.
Report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee: Kenya: 1947>
Printed by the Government Printer, Nairobi, para 136, 
pp. 42-43.
Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee (Tod Hunter Committee), 
para 250 quoted from supra note 13* para^T49VP. 111 ; see 
supra note 85 5 p. 1234
5. In 1960 section 59A was inserted in the Act of 1922 
by s.9* of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, (280 of 
1960), with effect from 1st April, 1960 which 
authorized the Central Gove-nament to publish the 
names in.Certain.cases.
6 . Supra note 10, para 7.13> P* 150
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However, the Income Tax Act of 1961, under section 287 has 
made a half-heartea attempt in this direction. The section 
authorizes the Central Government to publish the names of 
the assesses and any other particulars, if the Government 
considers it appropriate and the public interest demands it.
D
It may be noted that the original section 287 of 
the Income Tax Act of 1961 was more pragmatic and potent, 
as compared with the present section, which is more or less 
ineffective. According to section 287 it was obligatory 
on the part of the Central Government to publish the names 
of assessees where a penalty over Rs. 5,000 was imposed
Q 1 0
or a conviction was made under section 271 , or 277 of
7. l(Income Tax Act, 1961, sec. 287 says:
"(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is 
necessary or expedient in the public interest to publish 
the names of any assessee , and any other particulars 
relating to any proceedings under this Act in respect of 
such assessees, it may cause to be published such names 
and particulars in such manner as it thinks fit.“
This section was substituted for the original section 287 
by the Finance Act (5 of 1964), with effect from April 1, 
1964*
8. The impugned section 287 of the Act of 1961 provided that; 
"(i) The Central Government shall cause to be published by
notification in the Official Gazette, the names and such 
other particulars, as may be relevant of -
(a) persons on each of whom a penalty amounting to not 
less than five thousand rupees ... has been imposed under 
clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271, and
(b) persons who have been convicted as a result of any 
proceedings under section 277 or under any provisions 
of the Indian Penal Code ... for any offence connected 
with any proceedings unaer this Act.1'
9. See Chapter VI, pp. 286-87. for section 271.
10* bee Chapter VII, pp. 398-9.9
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tne Income Tax Act, 1961, or under any provisions of the
11Inaian Penal Coae took place , whereas the present section
leaves everything to the discretion and gooa sense of
Government officials• One wonders whether this lenient
attitude on the part of the Government will help in curbing
tax cfimes. Publication should not be left so much to the
discretion which in practice can mean the v/him or arbitrary
choice of the officials.
It may be pointed out that the provision for
publicity of the names of tax evaders is well recognized
and practiced with good results in most other countries,
viz., Australia**2 , United States of America Kenya**2*’,
1 R 1 f\
New Zealand , Norway and various other countries of the
11. The impugned section 277 in sub-section (4) empowered 
the Government to refrain from publishing the names of 
persons if it was in the interest of revenue. But the 
reason for not publishing the names was to be recorded 
in writing.
12. Supra note 1, para 249, p.111.
13. American Public Finance, Shultz, 3rd ed. p. 329. 
Quoted from supra note 93, para 230, p .111;
14. Taxation Enquiry Commission, Kenya, 1947* para 136, 
p. 42.
15. Taxation of Income in New Zealand. G.A. Lau,
Bulletin for International Documentation, Vol. IX, 
(1955), p. 270.
Supra note 94 Section II, p. 258.
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world. The Seminar on the Administration of Income tax in
African countries, organized under the auspiceu of the
United Nations (during March 15 to April 5, 1968) has gone
to the extent of suggesting the publication of the list of
17all taxpayers . It may not be out of place to quote a
reply received by the Income Tax Investigation Commission
(1949) to the questionaire issued by it as regards the
feasibility of publicity provisions in the Income Tax Act.
It is as follows:
1 The penalty and public exposures which should be 
applied to those who deliberately cheat should be 
of utmost severity. The result of this would be 
that merit would attach to those who pay their just 
due s.«18
An efficient tax administration is essential for
19a successful programme to eradicate tax crimes. v As pointed
out by Schultz, an American writer on public finance:
nA haphazardly run office can no more be successful 
in its operations than a carelessly conducted business 
enterprise. If evasion is not to be widespread and if 
the taxpayer1s money is not to be wasted in inefficient 
tax assessment and collection, a technique of tax 
administration must be developed."20
17* Report of the Seminar on Administration of Income Tax 
in African Countries, United''Nations (1968), para 451 
at p . 11.
18. Supra note 13, para 248, at p.111.
19. Simplification and Rationalization of Income Tax Law: 
A Study: Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, (1965), p* 68.
20. Suprft note 13, para 357, pp. 156, 157 (quoted).
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21This is true of the Indian Income fax Department • The
Department lacks zeal and enthusiasm even in its day to day
work, to say nothing of detection of fraud cases• The
Report on Tax Administration in India has made a very
pertinent remark of the working of the Income Tax
Administration in India. The report says that:
nThe Income Tax Officers, as a matter of practice, 
seldom leave their desks in search of evidence of 
tax evasion# They tend to rely on relatively 
untrained inspectors to secure such evidence from 
records of the assessee and others, including banks.1’
This view is strengthened by the small number of
prosecutions launched every year by the Department, in
23cases of clear and glaring tax evasion in the country. ^
The Department should launch a vigorous scheme to audit
accounts thoroughly, as it is done in the United States of 
24America and prosecute tax evaders without respect of persons
21. The Problem of Tax Evasion: Report of the Indian Tax 
Reform, Nicholas Kulador (1956), p. 114.
22. Report on Tax Administration in India: A Tax Assistance 
Survey by the Doreign Tax Assistance Staff: U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service: USAID, INDIA 1964* p*17.
23. See supra pp. 228-29.
24. Internal Revenue Service audits three to four million 
tax returns per year and from this mass it selects 
approximately one thousand taxpayers whom it 
recommends to the Justice Department for prosecution. 
During 1965, the Internal Revenue audited 3,268, 000 
income tax returns, and out of this number 584,000 were 
audited in field audits, and the remainder in the office 
audit. (1965 Commissioner’s Inland Revenue Report,
P. 23).
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at least for the time being. This will h e l P t o  a great 
extent in curbing tax evasion.
In the case of assessment and realization of taxes
the Department’s role is unique. It is a matter of common
practise of the Income lax Department that delays are made
in the assessment proceedings - sometimes for as long as
3 to 4 years. At the end of the limitation period,
assessments are rushed through with a speed which appears
25to the taxpayers to be capricious . This leads to a 
feeling of injustice in thd minds of an assessee. It is 
a well known proverb that justice should not only be done 
but it must appear to have been done. It is not sufficient 
to do justice, but the tax paying public must be made to 
feel that justice is done. Similarly, the Department has 
not been able to collect millions of tax already assessed 
and lying in the hands of the taxpayers as arrears • A 
lot of time is wasted in looking for petty additions on 
account of minor disallowances with no advantage to the 
revenue•
25. Supra note 56. Answer to Questionnaire by the Madras 
Chamber of Commerce, p. 173.
26. The total amount of income tax (including corporation 
tax) realized for the year 1966-67 was Rs. 500.33 crores 
as against Rs. 541.73 crores lying outstanding in arrears. 
In addition a sum of Rs.90 crores owed to the Government 
is lying in the hands of the assessee on account of 
administrative delay in the assessment of cases in time. 
See Audit Report (Civil) Revenue Receipts. Government of 
India (1968), pp. 59*61.
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Though it would be too much to say that the
entire Income tax administration is corrupt, it would
not be an exaggeration to say that there is a strong
feeling in the public mind that the staff lacks the
integrity required of it, which is partly responsible for
27large scale tax evasion • The Committee on Prevention
of Corruption has analysed the various forms of corruption
28prevalent in the Income Tax Department . The Committee
is of the view that there are two main ways of corruption
in the Department, firstly by intentionally showing unaue
favour to assessees in relation to - assessments, penalties,
appeals, recovery of taxes, refunds, procedural tactics,
tampering with records, miscellaneous; and secondly by
deliberately causing unnecessary harassment in order to
29take illegal gratifications from taxpayers . It may be 
notea that hignest standards of integrity, honesty and 
fair play are essential for successful tax administration.
As pointed out by the Direct Taxes Administration Committee:
27• Repogt.of the-Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry 
Commit"tee i 1958-59 > para 7*17> p* 151.
28. . Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption .
C1964) (Government of India), pp. 266-273*
29. Ibid. p. 267; see for details of the scope for 
corruption at the different levels pp. 266 to 271.
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MNot only should the Department officials be 
honest but they must also be above suspicion 
and that they should so conduct themselves in 
their private as well as official life that no 
wrtog motives could be attributed to any of
their actions.”50
The very nature of fraud cases being complicated,
their detection requires an efficient well equipped and
properly organized machinery for investigation and
prosecution of tax offences. However, not much emphasis
is put on this side in India. Although there are three 
31agencies in the country to investigate and prosecute
cases of tax fraud, but hardly any tax-dodger is severely
punished. It is not because tax evasion has not taken
place, but because the officers responsible for the detection
of tax fraud cases do not take sufficient interest in the
investigation and prosecution of such cases. Firstly,
the officers who are entrusted with such work at the level
of Central Commissioner of Income Tax and Territorial
Commissioner of Income Tax are already overburdened with
their day to day work and hardly find time to pay proper
32heed to the cases of tax fraud . Secondly, they lack the 
proper training in investigation techniques, collection of
30. Supra note 27, para 7*17, p* 151.
31. The three agencies responsible for investigation and 
prosecution of tax offences are:
(1) The Directorate of Inspection (Investigation).
(2) The Central Commissioners of Income Tax.
(3) The Territorial Commissioners of Income Tax.
32. Supra note 27, para 7*69, at p. 172.
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evidence necessary to substantiate a charge and court
procedure. As a result most of the tax fraud cases are
hot made out and even in cases where the Department
initiates proceedings against tax-dodgers, it results in 
33acquittal • In brief the procedure adopted in the case
of tax evasion at different agencies are as mentioned.
The Directorate of Inspection (Investigation i
undertakes the responsibility for the investigation of
very few cases of tax frauds of a complicated nature , in
which a substantial amount of tax is involved. The
investigation Wing* of the Directorate collects
information relating to evasion in cases referred to it and
prepares cases for prosecution. A separate wing known as the
intelligence Wing* is attached to the Directorate, for
the purpose of undertaking investigation in difficult and
complicated cases and to render guidance regarding methods
3 4
of examination of accounts etc. . In the offices of the 
Central Commissioners of Income Tax (which are four in 
number at Delhi, Calcutta, Madraa and Bombay) and in these 
of territorial commissioners of income tax, tax fraud cases 
are prepared and investigated by senior officers of the
33. See supra p.229.
34. Report of the Working Group: Central Direct Taxes 
Administration/ Administrative Reform Commission (1968) 
para 6.25> at p. 121.
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Department, After investigation the case is sent for 
prosecution with.- the approval of the Commissioner of 
Income fax for the division.
It is at the level of Commissioner that emphasis 
is needed. In fact, a separate Department should be opened 
in every Commissioner’s jurisdiction to investigate 
flagrant cases of tax fraud and prepare them for prosecution. 
The officers appointed in the Department should be well 
versed in income tax law, criminal law and the techniques 
of investigation. They should be given intensive practical 
training in the techniques of investigation and preparation 
of cases. A suggestion somewhat similar to this was made
by the Direct faxes Administration Enquiry Committee;
351958-59 j but the Government did not pay any attention to
it. It is time the Government took a constructive step in
this direction and instructed the Income fax Department to
initiate prosecutions in cases of tax evasion instead of
imposing a penalty.
It may be noted in this connection that in the
United Kingdom^ and the United States of America^ tax 
55* Supra note z l , para 7*69» at p.172.
36. Supra note 27, at p.3 of the chapter, para 7.65 at p. 170.
37. fhe Law of Feaeral income faxation? John C.Chommi (1968), 
p. 673;1 fax Fraud and Evasion1, Balter, 3rd ed. (1963)> 
Chapter 37 ’Prosecution for Attempt to Evade Income fax:
A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid1, Stevens Duke,
(1966) 76, Yale L •J., pp. 34-75; ’Penalties and 
Prosecutions for Evasion of the Federal Income fax’, 
Gerald L. Wallace (1946) I fax L.R. 329 at' pp. 338-4#*
247
evasion cases are thoroughly scrutinized, prepared by a 
well trained staff and an attorney of the Tax Division in 
the Department of Justice. This ensures a great number of 
successful prosecutions in tax fraud cases, so that tax 
evaders think twice before indulging in the vicious act of 
evasion.
It may be useful to give in brief an account of 
the system of investigation of tax crimes in the United 
States, to show how much emphasis is placed on such cases. 
The investigation of criminal fraud and other potential 
violations of the revenue laws is conducted by special 
agents from the Intelligence Unit of the Treasury Department 
of the District concerned. After a thorough investigation 
of a suspected cage of evasion, the special agent submits 
his report to the superior officer in the Unit for approval. 
If the report is approved, the file is transmitted to the 
Penal Division in the office of the chief counsel of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. In case the Penal Division 
approves prosecution, the case is transmitted by the 
Commissioner to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Tax Division in the Department of Justice to launch a 
criminal prosecution. The cases are thoroughly scrutinized 
again in the Department by an attorney in the criminal 
section of the Tax Division, and the Assistant Attorney 
General finally decides for or against the prosecution.
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It is after such a thorough scrutiny at various levels 
that the prosecution is launched. This ensures 100 per 
cent chance of conviction by the court.
Other Causes of Tax Evasion
Since the last World War the number of taxpayers
■7 0
has increased nearly seven times. Within the period of 
six years from 1961-62 to 1967-68 the number of taxpayers 
has increased from 12 lakhs to approximately 27 lakhs, 
ana the revenue has gone up from Rs. 322 to Rs. 630 crores • 
This increase is bound to continue in coming years and an 
increase in revenue is necessary for a developing country 
like India. But to one’s great surprise the strength of 
the Income Tax Department has not increased in proportion 
to cope with the magnitude of the work. For instance, the 
number of officers entrusted with assessment work was 744 
in 1944-45 and 1,648 only in 1966-67. The number of 
officers has doubled but the increase in the number of 
assessees is sevenfold^. As a result many tax fraud cases 
go untraced ana undetected, a large number of assessments 
#8. Supra note 34> para 2>3 pp. 10,11.
39. ’Tax Payer^Education1, F.H. Yallibhoy, Member, Central 
Board of Direct Taxes, Government of India, Report
on the 3rd All India Conference of Tax Executives,
(1968) F.I.C.C.I. p.125.
40. Supra note 34 para 2.3 P« 10.
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41remain pending for years ana a huge sum of tax money is
42left unrealized . One can appreciate the heavy burden 
imposed on the Income fax Officers by the fact that each 
Officer is required to assess and audit an average of more 
than one thousand cases per annum, besides shouldering, many 
other responsibilities, which is evident from the following 
data of disposal of income tax assessment from 1959-60 ip 
1966-67.
41. Audit Report (Civil) Revenue Receipts, Central 
Government, (1968), Government of India, para 58, 
p. 59* 23*48 lakhs of cases were outstanding with
Income Tax Officers pending assessments. It is
estimated by the Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India that the approximate amount of tax involved 
in these cases is about Rs. 90 crores.
42. Ibid. para 59» P* 61.
The total outstanding demand of tax on 31st March, 
1967 was Rs. 541*75 crores.
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Table No. 3.
43Analysis of Disposal of Income Tax Assessments
Serial
No.
Year Average Disposal per 
Income Tax Officer
1 2 3
1 1959-60 939
2 1960-61 963
3 1961-62 1,008
4 1962-63 1,003
5 1963-64 1,113
6 1964-65 1,293
7 1965-66 1,543
8 1966-67 1,467
The problem needs a careful study and immediate
action is necessary, if tax frauds are to be minimised and
checked. As noted by Professor Kald;or:
H... The prevention of evasion is very greatly dependent 
on the standard of administration in the Revenue 
Department - on the zeal, ability, efficiency, and 
adequacy of number of tax officers. An efficient 
administration requires the ability of the Department 
to attract the best talents ana to attract them in 
adequate numbers.”44
43” Supra note 34« p. 11,
44. 1 The Problem of Tax Evasion: Report of the Indian Tax
leform, Nicholas . Kaider (1.956)' at'p. 114 (para 205)
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The machinery for assessment, collection and
recovery of taxes in Inaia is very intricate, cumbersome
ana defective. As a result, considerable sums of taxes
45remain in arrears , either because of delay in assessment
or delay in collection and realization, and ultimately a
substantial portion goes underground and becomes 
46untraceable . Again a large portion of assessees income
escapes untaxea, aue to the lack of proper vigilance on
the part of the Income Tax Department and carelessness in
mailing assessments. Por example, a test audit, conducted
during the period from September 1, 1966 to August 51st,
1967, revealed a total under-assessment of tax of Rs.
47'1179*98 lakhs in 9469 eases • One would be amazed-to note
that in 687 cases out of those 9467 a shortage of levy
48amounting to Rs. 1088.94 lakhs were detected • This
means that there was an average ... under-assessment of
approximately Rs. 1.6 lakhs in each case. This was the
result of the following lapses on the part of the Income
49Tax Department
45. Supra note 41 at p. 61, para 595 the report reveals that 
a sum of Rs. 541*73 was the amount of tax in arrears for 
the year 1966-67.
46. See supra note 68.
47. Supra note 41, para 40(i), p.38.
48. Ibmd.
49. Ibid, para 40 (ii), p.39.
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Table No. 4*
No. Nature of the Lapses Amount in 
lakh of Rs.
1. Errors and omissions attributable 
to negligence or failure to apply
the correct rate of tax. 33.99
2. Incorrect computation of income
under the head ”salary" 3.11
3. Incorrect computation of income
under the head "house property" 3.55
4. Incorrect computation of income
from nbusiness” 91.86
5. Under-assessment arising from 
wrong computation of development
rebate and depreciation. 41.94
6. Irregular exemption from tax of 
newly established industrial
undertakings or hotels 9.22
7. Incorrect allowance of rebate of
tax in relation to exports 1.33
8. Other irregular exemptions or
excess reliefs 294.56
9. Incorrect computation of super­
tax/income tax payable by companies 29.20
10. Non-levy of additional super-tax/ 
income-tax under sections 23 A/104
of I.T. Act, 1922/1961 36.22
11. Non-levy/incorrect levy of penal
interest 40.48
12. Mistakes committed while giving
effect to appellate orders 3.02
13. Income escaping assessment 83.50
14 • Incorrect determination of super­
profits tax or sur-tax. 5.97
15. Other lapses 502.25
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From the above statistics one can appreciate the 
gravity of the lapses in assessment on the part of the 
Income Tax Department and the amount of loss of revenue to 
the exchequer every year. It opens one's eyes when they 
reveal the fact that under-assessment to the tune of 
lakhs of rupees has taken place in individual cases. This 
is the result of the scrutiny of only a few hundreds out of 
the lakhs of cases assessed every year by the Income Tax 
Department. It is clear that millions of rupees go unassessed 
in India every year. This is a serious problem that needs 
a concerted effort by the Government and the Income Tax staff.
The first and foremost requirement in this direction
is, perhaps, as stated by the Royal Commission of Taxation
of Profits ana Income, 1955, that:
"To prevent evasion of tax it is necessary to 
secure that each taxpayer ' s tax is (a) properly 
assessed, and (b) properly paid."50
• ■ ■ r I ........................
This requires simpiification of the tax law , the 
introduction of simpler return, forms, proper and timely 
assessment of taxes, an efficient and trained staff, proper 
auditing and checking and strict supervision by the 
superior officers over the acts of their subordinates.
50. Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, 
1955. H.M.S.O., Cmd. 9474, para 1050, p.319#
51. Supra note 34, PP* 59-75.
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In big cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi
computers and other associated apparatus such as automatic
data and processing machines, as used in the United States 
62of America , should be introduced for calculation of income,
allov/ances and deductions. This will ensure quick disposal
of cases of assessment and minimize chances of error.
53As pointed out earlier most taxes are inter-related,
so that evasion of one tax directly or indirectly leads to
the evasion of the other tax. Thus it is necessary, in
order to check tax evasion effectively, that a system of
liason with other Central as well as State revenue Departments
should be made for the exchange of relevant information
from one Department to the other. This was suggested by the
54Taxation Enquiry Commission in its report in 1953-54 • But
it has not come into practice so far.
The Income Tax Officers, except in places like
Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi, do not have adequate
facilities to obtain proper legal advice on potential tax 
55fraud cases • Income Tax Officers are authorised to consult 
only those attorneys, who represent the Central Government
52.1 Taxation in the United States: World Tax Series; Harvard 
Law School; International Program in Taxation (1963)* 
para 2/6.4 page 144*
53. See supra, p. 219. -
54. Vol.II, Chapter XII, para 15> P* 193; supra note 17, 
para 42, p.11♦
55. Supra note 22, para 6, p.47, supra note 54> para 6.26 
at p . 121.
255
in State Courts, irrespective of their knowledge of the 
intricacies of the Income lax laws. Income Tax law being one 
of the most complicated and specialized branches of law, it 
is not possible for every lawyer to give proper advice in cases 
of tax evasion. As a result either no prosecution against 
tax-dodgers is iniated or, if launched, results in acquittal. 
This directly encourages potential tax evaders. It is 
essential that provision for adequate legal advice be made; 
it might be better to appoint one good tax lawyer in every 
District to represent tne Income Tax Department in income 
tax cases.
The average man does not want to part with his
earnings, and is encouraged to avoid payment of taxes,
because taxpayers get no benefit above those enjoyed by
56persons who ao not pay taxes , and this becomes more
conspicuous, when the taxpayer disagrees with the policy
pursued by the Government and when he notices that tax
57criminals are exempt from liability to pay taxes and are
58not prosecuted for their evasion • Even honest taxpayers 
start evading taxes.
It is, therefore, necessary that taxpayers should be 
made to realise that they owe a duty to the State to pay 
taxes. At the same time strict action should be taken 
against tax evaders to restore a sense of justice amongst
56. Supra note 94, p.262.
57. See Chapter I, footnote 8.
58. Supra note 54, para 6(a)(f), pp. 110, 111.
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the public*
The Indian Income tax^like the British Income tax^
does not impose any legal obligation on assessees to maintain
books and records of income. The assessee is not obliged to
verify the figures that he writes in his returns by the
production of vouchers, records or accounts. However,
section 145(2) of the Act of 1961, empowers the Income Tax
61officer to make a best judgement assessment in two cases,
viz., where assessee's accounts are incorrect or incomplete,
or where no method of accounting has been regularly employed
62by the assessee • Assessment on the basis of estimate is
merely guess work, and unless it is above the assessee*s
real income, in which case the assessee goes to appeal, his
true income may go unassessed for years. One can appreciate
the difficulty of the Income Tax Officer in verifying the
return submitted, in the absence of any authentic document. Of
course, the Income Tax Act, 1961, under section 145 clause 
£-2
(1) , enacts that, if the assessee maintains records in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed
59. Supra note 22, para 8, p.17«
60. Supra note 50, para 1051, pp. 319*320.
61. See Chapter II, pp. 51-54 for best judgement assessment.
62. Supra note 99, p. 741* There was no such provision in
the earlier Act of 1922. Some of the traders keep two 
sets of records, one for the Income Tax Department and 
the other for their own use. The first one mostly gives 
a false picture of earnings while the second one gives
a correct picture.
63. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 145(1) corresponds to 
section 13 of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
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by the assessee, in cases of income from profits of business,
r a
profession or vocation under section 28 or income from
other sources under section 56 ^of the Income Tax Act, 1961,
the income, profits and gains must be computed on the basis
of the accounts maintained. The Income Tax Officer can
refuse to rely on the accounts only if the true income,
66profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom 
But as the maintenance of records is optional, 
most traders, particularly small ones, prefer not to keep 
any record at all, rely on the Income Tax Officer*s 
assessment and thus escape payment of the whole tax due.
As suggested by the (U.K.) Royal Commission on the Taxation 
of Profits and Income (1955)j in its final report, a legal 
duty should be imposed on every person who carries oh a 
trade, profession or vocation to keep records in a standard 
form • Similar provisions are to be found in the Internal
64. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 28 states the items of 
income chargeable under the head ’Profits and gains of 
business or profession'. The section corresponds to 
section 10(1) of the Act of 1922.
65. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 56 (which corresponds to 
section 12 of the Act of 1922) deals with residuary head 
of income and states that every income which is not to be 
excluded from the total income shall be chargeable under 
the head 'Income from other sources'* Nalini Kant Ambalal 
Modi v. barayan-Row A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 193*
66. C.I.T. v. Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co. (1938).
I.T.R. 36,40 (PTC.).
67. Supra note 50, para 1052, p.320. Sir James Martin, while 
giving evidence before the Royal Commission on the 
Income Tax, said that:
"It should be incumbent upon all persons engaged in trade 
or business to keep such books of accounts as are usual 
and proper in the business carried on, and as will 
sufficiently disclose the business transactions and 
financial position." CMD. 288-2 (1919) H.M.S.O. para 
5213-5* see chapter Til.
2 5 8
6 8Revenue Code in the United. States of America • This
would help to a great extent in ascertaining the true
income and check evasion*
Since the last Yforld 17ar, due to the impact of
industrialization, urbanization and mass movement, a nev/
materialistic philosophy has gripped the nation* The theme
of this nev/ philosophy is that material advancement is the
only important matter in life and, in achieving it, one
need not hesitate to adopt unethical behaviour. For
instance unscrupulous traders never hesitate to do business
69not recorded in their account books and thus evade taxes.
70Similarly, some purchasers do not demand cash memos and
got opportunities not only to evade sales tax but income
tax as well.
People in India do not regard tax evasion as ,
71reprehensible as violations of other economic statutes ,
or crimes against property, such as theft, robbery,cheating,
72
embezzlement etc. Tax evaders are not treated as ordinary 
criminals and are not punished adequately. Instead they are 
accepted in society as respectable and good citizens, and
68. United States Internal Revenue Code, 1954-3.6001.
69. Socialism in Indian Planning* , Srimannoroyan (1964)* p.42. 
70- Supra note 27* para 7.14* p. 150.
71. 1 Criminology1, P. Goswami, Kitab Mahal,(Allahabad),
pp. 260-261•
72. The Crime of Income Tax Fraud: Its Present Status
and Function1, Charles Lyton, (1955) 55* Col. L. Rev.
476, at p. 480.
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a man who behaves honestly an.cLpays his due is considered
73stupid by all successful people . Such a social attitude
is conducive to tax evasion^. The more a person evades
tax, the more he is regarded as crafty and intelligent; his
75status is judged by the amount of tax evaded . The Income
Tax Investigation Committee rightly said in its report that:
MAs things are at present, there is no question but 
that those who are known to be the biggest deliberate 
taxation cheaters are received in all ranks of society 
in the country and by virtue of their very success in 
cheating are surrounded with an aura of ability and 
shrewdness instead of being ostracised and stamped 
with obloquy. There can be no public consciousness 
in the matter of taxation as long as these conditions 
o b t a i n . 6
It is high time for the people in general and the
business community in particular to abandon the present
materialistic approach and realize their social and ethical
responsibility. It will be appropriate to quote a passage
from lianu Dharma Sastra with regard to the standard of
conduct required of the business community. lianu says:
uTne possessive instinct need not be so blind as 
to make one callous in the mad lust for wealth. 
Occupation should be socially useful, morally 
uplifting. One need not take up a task that militates 
against social and personal welfare, nor should the 
body be abused. Desire for wealth must not be 
allowed to become a mania and defeat its own purpose. 
Values cannot be divorced from economic pursuits. A 
Vaisaya (merchant) should not, for the sake of his 
substance, follow evil ways. He should live a pure, 
straightforward honest life of a Brahmin type."'*
73. Select Committee on the Income Tax Bill:,(1961) Morarji 
Desai, i961 (Lok Sabha) Evidence, p.116.
74. Supra note 34, para 6.19 (e) at p.110.
75* Supra note 43, p*3.
76. bupra note 1, para 246, p. 111.
77. THanu Dharna Sastra1, Kewal Mutwani, Published by Ganesh &
0 omp any, Madras.,, p • 12 5 •
2 6 0
As a result of large scale inflation and unstable
economic conditions in the country, the prices of goods
have gone up and are going up every day. The currency has
gone down in value and will probably depreciate in future
as well. This encourages the desire for tax evasion, for
the profits of tax evasion today may be invested so as to
7ft
compensate for the falling value of currency . For example, 
if a person conceals Rs. one million due as tax and purchases 
property with this money in 19715 the same might be worth 
double the amount within ten years, due to inflation of 
prices. It is for the Government to check inflation by 
adopting a sound policy and enforcing the provisions of 
law strictly so that economy of the country may become stable 
and the tendency to evade taxes may be checked.
ITo doubt, India has striven hard, since the 
achievement of political freedom in 1947 and the emergence 
of free India as a sovereign democratic republic in 1950, to 
achieve economic independence , but it has not been 
successful as yet. The country has to go a long way before 
it.can achieve economic independence in the real sense of 
the term. There is always a scarcity of some goods. It 
may be in food grains, baby food, fuel, building materials, 
vehicles, conveyances and a number of other goods in daily
78. Supra note p*2.
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use. The Government, with a view to protecting the interests
of the common man, imposes statutory controls to check prices
and ensure a regular supply of such goods. But unscrupulous
traders take advantage of the situation. They sometimes
create an artificial scarcity in the market by hoarding
goods and thereby prices of goods shoot up beyond one's
imagination. In this way a huge sum of money is earned by
79traders and is made in the black market every year . They 
keep no account of such sales, because their earnings are 
illegal and would lead to prosecution, if recorded in account 
books. The income remains unrecorded and no tax is paid on: 
it.
This can be checked only by strict enforcement of
the control provisions ana adequate punishment in appropriate
cases, as suggested by Dr, Radha Krishnan, the Second
President of the Indian Republic. He said that:
"The practitioners of this evil, the hoarders, the 
profiteers, the black-marketeers, and speculators are 
the worst enemies of our society. They have to be 
dealt With sternly, however, well placed important 
and influential they may be; if we acquiesce in wrong 
doing, people will lose faith in us." 80
79. Supra note 34* para 6.09 (d) at p. 130.
80. 1 Hazards of Pood Adulteration: Souvenier1, Seminar 
organized by the Bharat S.ewak Samaj, Hew Delhi (2nd to 
4th Oct. 1964)t p.1.
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C H A P T E R  VI
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
4
Interest
Having discussed tax evasion in Chapter 5, it is 
proposed to discuss, in this and the next chapter, the 
legislative provisions enacted from time to time, to 
facilitate the proper assessment of taxable income , and
2
to ensure proper compliance with the statutory obligations • 
The Indian legislature appears to have realized, from
3
the beginning of Income tax legislation , the necessity for
4
coercive measures to prevent tax crimes and to compel
delinquent taxpayers to fulfil their obligations to the Statie
on the one hand, and towencourage the taxpayers1 honesty and..
to overcome his distaste for the payment of taxes on the other
hand. The coercive measures in brief, include imposition
T. IJaraddi Krishna Reddy v. I.tTC., Tenali A.I.E. 1957 A.P.
368 at pYT69 (para b).
2. Roseoe Pound, "Jurisprudence1. Vol.V. (1953)* P« 200, fAia 
obligation is a bond of right and law by which we are 
bound by a necessity of performing some act according to 
the lav/ of our State. 1
3. As early as 1869, when the Income tax law in India was in 
its initial stage, the Act of 1869 in section 25 provided 
a penalty of failure -to pay tax after due notice.
4. See Chapter 7p.,344 for different types of tax crimes.
5. See Chapter 5, .PP207-14 for persuasive measures. Some of 
these measures are programme, to educate taxpayers, to 
give incentive to those who pay taxes in time.
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of interest, fine, and imprisonment. The quantum of the
penalty is determined according to the nature and gravity of
the default • The sanctions provided under the Income Tax
Acts may be imposed by two different andindependent agencies,
7
viz*, the revenue authorities and the criminal Courts . 
Sanctions may therefore be broadly classified into two
Q
categories , namely, administrative sanctions, and criminal 
sanctions.
The administrative sanctions are those which are 
exercised by the revenue authorities in case of defaults
Q
committed by a taxpayer • The Indian Income Tax Acts like.
6. R. Prasad Mohanlal v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal A.I.R. 
1970 All £20 see p. 625 tP.B.;.
7* See Income Tax Act 1961, section 292. Offences under the 
Act could be tried either by a presidency magistrate or a 
magistrate of the first class. There are five categories of 
criminal courts, namely, Courts of Sessions, Presidency 
Magistrate, Magistrate of the first class, the second class 
and the third class. See Code of Criminal Procedure 
(5 of 1893), section 6.
8. C.I.T., Calcutta v. Anwar Ali A.I.R. 1968 (Calj. 345, 352:
The sanctions provided for various defaults m  relation to 
tax crimes in the United Kingdom, United States of America, 
Canada, Australia are classified into (i) civil and (ii) 
criminal. The former are enforceable by revenue 
authorities and the latter by criminal courts. See 1Fraud 
and Federal Income Tax in the United States1, Harold M. 
Groves and Arthur M. Selle 11955”)" 7, Bulletin for 
International Piscal Documentation 321 , 322. 1 Income Tax
Penalties * . Emanuel 1. Gordon (1944) 5 Tax L.R. 131 • In 
Japan the penalties are divided into (i) Administrative 
and (ii) Judicial penalties. *An Outline of Japanese 
Taxes, Chapter 14, para 19/1 at p. 139*
Halsburyfs Laws of England (Simond's Edition), 3rd ed.
Yol. 20, p. 715*
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the statutes of the United Kingdom"10 and the United States11l,
have provided two types of administrative sanctions, namely 
1 2interest and penalty.
The Income Tax Act has made provisions for imposition 
of interest as the first measure to encourage prompt payment 
of taxes. The Act provides for the levy of interest in the 
following four cases:
(a) Failure to deduct or pay tax,
(b) failure to file return of income,
(c) failure to pay tax on demand, and
(d) failure to pay advance tax.
Tha Act provides two modes of collection of taxes,
namely, collection at source, and direct collection from the
13 14 16assessee . A salary , interest on securities  ^ and
10. The Taxes Management Act, 1970, provides for’Interest 
on Overdue Tax’ in Part 9 (sections 86 to 92) and 
’Penalties’ in Part 10 (sections 93 to 106).
11. Inland Revenue Code, 1954* in section 6601 (a) provider 
for imposition of interest and in sections 6651 to 6681 
for imposition of penalties.
12. 'Interest' has been defined in the Chamber's Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, as 'premium paid for the use of 
money' (1968 Imprint), at p. 553*
13. Purshottamdas Ihakurdas v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Bombay City, A.I.R. V9&3 S.C7 1066, 1068; 'The Law and 
Practice of Income Tax' . J.B_. Kang a and U.A. Palkhiwala,
(£th ed. Vol.I, Bombay), p. 899* See 'Deduction of Tax 
at Source, P.L.Jaitly, 4th All India Conference of the Tax 
Executives (1969) p. 199.
14. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 192 (= Income Tax Act 1922, 
section 18(2). See 'Deduction of Tax at Source\ A.K. Bose.
. 4th All India Conference of Tax Executives, (1969)> p.
173.
15. Income Tax Act, 1961, sedtion 193 (= I.T.A., 1922 sec.
18(3)D.
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16dividends , tax is deducted at source, before it reaches
the hands of the earner* The person responsible for
payment of such amounts deducts the tax due at the time
of payment at the rates fixed in the Finance Act of the
17relevant year • Such deduction of income tax is treated
as payment of income tax on behalf of the person from
18
whose income the deduction was made and credit is given
19to him at the time of the regular assessment . Whereas,
in cases where tax is not deductible at source, as in
cases of non-recurring earnings, such as income from a
business, profession or vocation, or where tax has not been
deducted at source, as required under sections 191, 202 and
20205 the income tax is directly collected from the assesses * 
Section 200 of the Act imposes an obligation on the part of 
the person deducting the tax to pay the amount due to the
16. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 194 (=I.T.A., 1922, sec.
18 (3D). In C.I.T., Oalcutta v. Ralin Behari Lall A.I.R. 
1970 S.C. 388, Shah, Acting C.J., defines ’dividend* at 
p. 389 (para 3) as follows:
1 'Dividend* in its ordinary connotation means the sum 
paid to or received by a shareholder proportionate to 
his share-holding in a company out of the total sum 
distributed."
See C.I.T.t Madras v. M.V. Murugappan and others A.I.R. 
1970 S.O. 1712, 1713.
17. 'Income Tax for the Layman. The Directorate of Inspection, 
6th edition, (196^), p. 85.
18. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 198.
19. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 199*
20. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 191.
266
credit of the Central Government or as directed by the Board
of Direct faxes within the prescribed time. If such person
does not deduct the tax, or, after deduction, fails to pay
the tax, as required under the Act, he is deemed to be an
assessee in default under section 201(l), and is required -to
21
pay simple interest at nine per cent per annum on the amount
of such tax from the date on which such tax was deductible
to the date on which such tax is actually paid, under sub-
22section 1A of section 201 of the Act •
As stated earlier , sub-section (1) of section 139
of the Act of 1961 makes it obligatory on the part of every 
person, whose total income during the previous year exceeds 
the taxable income to- furnish a return of his total income not 
later than June 30 of the assessment year. The Income fax 
Officer has been given power to extend the period for 
submitting the return in genuine cases up to a certain 
period on an application being made, without charging any 
interest*^. But no further extension of time is admissible
under the Act, unless the assessee is willing to pay interest
at the rate of nine per cent, as required under clause (iii) 
of sub-section (l) of section 139 of the Act. However, 
to moderate the rigours of law, the Act has given power to 
the Income fax Officer to waive or reduce the amount of
21. fITinef was inserted for 'six* by the faxation (Amendment) 
Act (27 of 1967) with effect from October 1, 1967.
22. Inserted by the Finance Act, 1966.
23. See Chapter II, pp. 47 to 48..
24. Income fax Act, 1961, section 139 (l)(i) and (ii).
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interest under sub-section (8) of section 139^read v/ith rule 
2 6117 A of the Income lax Rules, 1962, in appropriate cases.
Sub-section (1) of section 220 of the Income Tax A0t,
1961, provides that any tax, interest, penalty, fine or any
27other sum mentioned in a notice of demand must be paid 
within 35 days of the. service of the notice, unless a shorter
OQ
period is specified by the Income Tax Officer . Sub-section
(2) of section 220 provides for the imposition of interest 
in case of failure to pay tax as required under sub-section 
(1). Sub-section (2) states that:
25. Ho such provision was in the repealed Income Tax Act, 1922.
26. Income Tax Rules, 1962, section 117A, provides five cases 
in which the Income Tax Officer may reduce or waive the 
interest payable under section 139* These circumstances 
are:
(i) where the return of income is furnished by... an, 
agent of a non-resident and is assessed in respect of the 
latter1s income;
(ii) where the return of income is furnished by an 
assessee whose only source of income during the relevant 
previous year is a share in the income of an unregistered
firm...; .......................
(ill)'where the £eturn of income of a deceased individual 
is furnished by his legal representative and ... he had 
reasonable cause for not furnishing such return within 
time;
(iv) where the return of income has been furnished in 
pursuance of a notice issued under section 148; 
tv) Any case in which the assessee produces evidence ... 
that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing 
the return within time."
27. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 156 authorizes the Income 
Tax Officer to issue a ’notice of demand*•
28. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 220(1) *proviso* 
authorizes the Income Tax Officers to reduce the 
period of 'notice of demand*, if necessary in the 
interest of the revenue.
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,f ♦. • the assessee shall be liable to pay simple 
interest at nine per cent per annum from the day 
commencing after the end of the period mentioned 
in sub-section (1).U
The Interest is payable in addition to the penalty
2Q
under section 221 of the Act .
The tax is levied on the total income of the previous
year at the rate or rates prescribed in the Finance Act of
the year. In other words, tax is paid in each year upon the
30income received in the previous year • This creates two 
problems. Firstly, it places persons whose taxes are 
collected at source at a disadvantage compared with those 
who pay tax directly. Taxpayers in the first category, pay 
tax in the year in which it is earned, whereas taxpayers in 
the latter category, pay tax in the following year, and enjoy 
the use of money due to the State, which is not available to 
those whose taxes are collected at source. Secondly, the 
State is deprived of the use of revenue accrued to it,.on 
the income already earned by taxpayers.
The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, (11 of 1944 )^ for 
the first time made provision for payment of tax in advance 
by inserting section 18 A in the now repealed Act of 1922. 
This provision was made applicable to taxpayers, who paid 
tax directly to the State where the total, income exceeded
29* See infra p.335for provisions relating to section 221.
30 'JThe Law and Practice of Income Tax', J.B. Kanga and
A. Palkhiwala, (6th ed., 1969), Vol.I, pp. 923*
31. Ohockalingam and M. ilayyappan v • Q.I.T., Madras A• I • R«
1963 8.G. 1456, 1457 (para 5; 1 Advance Tax - Legal &
Procedural Problems 1, S. Srisivasar, ‘ 4th All India 
Conference of the Executives, p. 185.
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the maximum amount not chargeable to tax by two thousand
five hundred rupees"^ ♦ Section 18 A, was probably inserted
in the Act of 1922, not to wipe out the discrimination
between the two classes of taxpayers, but as one of the anti-
inflatory measures made necessary by the Second Vforld War,^
to combat inflation and to reduce the huge sum of money
34-then in circulation . Sections 207 to 219 of the Income
fax Act, 1961, have reproduced the provisions in regard to
advance payment of tax contained in section 18A of the
repealed Act of 1922, with alight modifications. These
provisions are based on the ’pay as you earn* system1, i.e.
paying tax by instalments in respect of the very year in
35which the tax is paid, as the income is received .
Section 208 of the Income fax Act, 1961, requires
36 37every person, whether assessed previously or not , whose
32. Income fax Act, 1922, section 18A(l)(a).
33* 1fhe Law of Income fax in India1, V«S. Sundaram (7th ed.)
1954, at p. 759.
34* Purshottamdas Thakurdas v. C.I.f. A.I.R* 1963 S.C. 1066
TOlTsn
35. Ibid. Similar system is in practice in the United Kingdom, 
’Advance Payment of fax1, B.L. Kabra, 4th All India 
Conference of fax Executives (1969), p. 177.
36. Income fax Act, 1961, section 208 (2). The section has 
been substituted for the old section by sec. 12 of the 
Finance Act (14 of 1969) with effect from April 1., 1970. 
Formerly the maximum amount was fixed at Rs 2,500 for 
every one.
37. Income fax Act, 1961, section 212(3).
38total income for the latest assessment year, exclusive
39of capital gains , exceeds:
(a) in the case of a company or a local authority 
Rs. 2,500;
(b) in the case of a registered firm,.* Rs. 30,000;
(c) in the case of a person other than a company, a 
local authority or a registered firm, -
(i) where such person was not resident in India during 
the previous year... Rs. 5>000;
(ii) in any other case ... Rs. 10,000^
to pay tax in advance in the financial year.
The advance tax is calculated on the basis of the
regular assessment completed for the latest preceding year
A1
as provided under sub-section (a) of section 209 • The
Income Tax Officer, where a person has been previously 
assessed, passes an order under section 210(1) and issues 
a ’notice of demand1 to the assessee specifying the
38. Income Tax let, 1961, section 2 (45) states that ’total 
income! means the total amount of income referred to in 
Section 5, computed in the manner laid down in this let.
39* Income Tax let, 1961, section 45( 1)provides that:
nlny profits or gains arising from the transfer of a 
capital asset effected in the previous year shall,... 
be chargeable to income tax under the head ’Capital gain 
and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous 
year...”
40. Income Tax let, 1961, section 208 (2).
41. Income Tax let, 1961, section 209 provides the method 
for the computation of the amount of advance tax payable 
by an assessee.
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instalments in which tax is payable^*2. The Act does not 
permit the postponement of the dates of instalments of sdvance 
payment of tax* However, section 213 grants a concession to 
as assessee* An assessee may defer payment of advance tax 
on that part of his commission, which has not been received 
or adjusted in the assesseefs account by the time the 
instalment of tax becomes due* This has perhaps been done 
to avoid hardships caused to an assessee in such cases. In 
the absence of such provision, an assessee would be required 
to pay tax on that part of income, which has not been received 
at the time of payment of tax* But immunity from non-payment 
of tax on commission is not unfettered. The assessee must 
pay tax within fifteen days of the receipt of such commission 
or adjustment in his account. In case of failure to 
deposit the tax, the assessee would be liable to pay 
simple interest at nine per cent per annum from the date of 
such receipt or adjustment to the date of payment of the advance
42. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 211(1) which has been 
inserted by section 15 of the Finance Act (14 of 1969) 
states: _
n(l) ..•[Ajdvance tax shall be payable in three equal 
instalments on the following dates during the financial 
year, namely
(i) the 15th day of June, the 15th day of September and 
the 15th day of December, in the case of an assessee 
whose total income to the extent of 75 per cent thereof 
or more is derived from a source or sources for which the 
previous year ••• ends on or before the 31st day of 
December;
(ii) the 15th day of September, the 15th day of December, 
and the 15th day of March, in any other case11. Formerly 
the provision was for four equal instalments.
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If a person has not previously been assessed by way 
of regular assessment, lie is required to submit an estimate 
of his income to the Income Tax Officer and pay tax 
accordingly* Section 212 makes provision for making an 
estimate of onefs income and payment of advance tax in two 
cases* Firstly, where an assessee, who is required to pay 
advance tax by an order issued by the Income Tax Officer 
under section 210, considers that his total income is likely 
to be less than, or more than, what has been estimated by
A A
the Department^ * Secondly, where the assessee has not
45previously been assessed • This provision has been provided
43. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 213 •Proviso*• Income Tax 
Act, 1961, section 214 (1) like the corresponding 
provision^of; the Act:of 1922,, as 1 providedr-in section 18A(5) 
provides for payment of * interest* by the Government to
an assessee on the aggregate sum of advance tax paid in 
excess over the amount determined on regular assessment*
44. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 212 (1). It was added by
S. 16 of the Finance Act (14 of 1969) with effect from 
April 1, 1970*
45* Income Tax Act, 1961, section 212 (1) (= analogous to 
Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18A(2) ). Section 212(2) 
provided for revised estimate of advanced tax.
A.K* Bashu Sahib v* I.T.O* , (1967) 66 I.T.R. 20(Mad).
The estimate of tax must be sent to the Income Tax Officer 
on the prescribed form before the date on which that 
instalment becomes due* If the estimate is not sent 
before the date on which an instalment becomes due and 
the assessee did not pay the advance tax as per demand, 
he is treated in default as regards such instalment.
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to mitigate the hardships caused to assessees in genuine
cases, where the assessee is required to pay more than what
would other wise be due.
The Act requires fair play on the part of the
assessee as well. If the advance tax paid by the assessee,
on the basis of the estimate made by him turns out to be less
A6than 75 per cent of the tax calculated on regulaf 
47assessment , the assessee would be liable to pay simple
Aft
interest at the rate of nine per cant per annum on the 
difference between the tax due on regular assessment and 
the tax paid in advance.
However, in case of a hardship, the rigour of the 
law is mitigated by the discre tionary power given to the 
Income Tax Officer under sub-section (4) of section 215 
and sub-section (2) of section 217 of the Income Tax Act,
46. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 215(1)• In the earlier Act 
of 1922, the assessee was allowed a margin of'1 twenty 
per cent", only under section 18A(6).
Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. 0.I.T., Calcutta A.I.R. 
T9Fti: Gal. 560, para 4.
47* Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2(40) states that:
"regular assessment" means the assessment made under 
section 143 or section 144. See Purshottarn Thakurdas v.
0.I.T. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1066. An assessee need not 
include fdividend* in the estimate of income for the 
purpose of payment of advance tax.
48. See supra note 21. An assessee would be liable to a 
penalty as well in certain cases for failure to pay 
advance tax under section 275 of the Act of 1961. See 
infra pp.526-28.
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1961^ read with rule 40 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
Before the introduction., of section 212 (3A)^, an 
assessee was not liable to pay any interest, if the advance 
tax was paid on the Income Tax Officer's order under section . 
210, even if the tax calculated on the regular assessment 
was found to be much higher than the tax demanded. But now, 
after the insertion of sub-section (3A) in section 212 of 
the Act of 1961, an assessee may be liable for interest in 
such cases as well. Bor instance, if the assessee's current 
total income is likely to exceed the amount on which tax is 
demanded by the Income Tax Officer by more than 33& per cent, 
he should file an estimate of Current Total income, 
calculating the advance tax payable by him on that basis and 
pay tax accordingly. Failure to do so will make the assessee 
liable for interest as well as penalties under section 273 
of the Act.^1
49* The power relating to waiver of 'interest' was contained 
in the 'fifth' proviso of section 18A (6) of the Act of 
1922 read with Rule 48. The proviso was added by s. 13 of 
the Income Tax (Amendment) Act (15 of 1953)• See I.T.O. 
Madurai v. M»R. Fidyasagar A.I.R* 1963 S.C* 503,504; 
Chockalingam and Meyyappan v. C.I.T*. Madras. A*I*R. 1963 
S*C. 1456* It was held that the proviso five to Sub­
section (6) of Section 18A mutatis mutandis affects sub­
section (8)as well. There may be as good a justification 
for not paying the advance tax wholly, as for not paying 
it partly. The decision overruled lata Mangeshkar v.
Union of India (1959) 36 I.T.R. 527 and T. 
Panchavarnathammal. Sivakasi v . C.I.T.. Madras (1963) 1* 
M.L.J 109. In the latter cases the Courts took the view 
that the discretion to reduce or waive the interest 
conferred by the 'proviso' five to sub-section (6) of 
section 18A did not apply to sub-section (18), if no
payment in advance at all was made.
50. Section 212(3A)has been added by ihe Finance Act (14 of
1969), section 16, with effect from April, 1969*
51. See infra pp.317^4I!oT text and cases on section 273.
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The provisions relating to estimate of income tax
up
are mandatory* In Gursabhai Saigal v. C.I.T., Punjab ,
the Supreme Court held that an assessee, who did not submit
an estimate of income and pay advance tax as required under
sub-section (3) of section 18A^ of the repealed Act of 1922
would be liable to pay 'interest1 under section 18A(8) of
the Act* Sub-section (8) provided that:
"Where, on making the regular assessment, the Income Tax 
Officer finds that no payment of tax has been made,.*, 
interest calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section
(6) shall be added to the tax..."
The Court rejected the appellant's contention that 
since he had not paid tax at all, it was not possible to 
calculate interest in the manner laid down in sub-section (6 ) 
of section 18A of the Act. The relevant portion of the 
sub-section reads as follows:
52. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1062; A.K. Bashu Sahib v. I.T.O (1967) 66
I.T.R. 20. The fact that the delay in sending the 
estimate was only a day or two will not excuse a man of his 
liability and he will be treated in default. C.I.T. v.
Te.ia Singh A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352. Failure to send an 
estimate of* advance tax payable under section 18A (3)
will make assessee liable for penalty under section 28 (i)
(c) of the Act of 1922. See infra p. 324.
53. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18A(3) provided for the 
submission of an estimate of tax, where the assessee 
was not previously assessed.
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"Where in any year an assessee has paid tax*** on the 
basis of his own estimate , and the tax so paid is 
less than eighty per cent of the tax determined on the 
basis of the regular assessment.*•, simple interest 
at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 1st day 
of January in the financial year in which the tax was 
paid up to the date of the said regular assessment shall 
be payable by the assessee upon the amount by which the 
tax so paid falls short of the said eighty per cent."
Their Lordships made a distinction in interpretation
between a taxing provision creating a charge and a provision
dealing with assessment machinery and said that:
"The proper way to deal with such a provision is to 
give it an interpretation which, to use the words of 
the Privy Council in Mahaliram Ramjidas's case, A.I.R.
1940 P*C* 124," makes the machinery workable, ut res 
valeat potius fluam pereat*"54
It may be noted that the Courts have made a distinction 
between 'interest* and ‘penalty1.
The Bombay High Court in C.I.T*. Bombay v. Jagdishnrasad
55Ramnath*  ^while holding that the respondent had no right of
appeal under section 30(1) of the Act of 1922, against the
Income Tax Officer's order imposing 'interest' under section
18A(8) for the non-payment of 'advance' tax for the
assessment years, 1947-48 and 1948-49* observed that:
54* A.I.R. 1955 S*C. 1062, 1065 (para 13)* See India United 
Mills Ltd* v* C.E.P.E.. Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. *79,82; 
Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1926) 10 T*C.
88, 110; Allen v. Trehearne* 11938) 22 Tax Cas. 15*26.
55« A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 255: M/s Bhor Industries Ltd. v. C.I.T ., 
Bombay Pity A.I.R* 1961 S.C. 1100.
Income Tax Act, 1922, section 30(1) provided that:
"Any assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed... 
may appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against 
the assessment or against such refusal or order" Similar 
provisions are contained in section 246 of the Income 
Tax Act, 1961.
277
n lie legislature has clearly kept in mind the
distinction between a penalty imposed under certain 
provisions of the Act and the interest which the 
assessee is liable to pay under S. 18A, and while 
providing for a right of appeal against orders of 
penalty, the legislature has not provided for any 
appeal against the payment of penal interest,•• T he 
scheme of the Act is that penal interest must follow 
upon the regular assessment; the appeal should be 
against the regular assessment, and in the regular 
assessment it should be open to the assessee to take
all points which may legitimately not only reduce the
taxable income or the tax to be paid,,, but also 
reduce the quantum of penal interest*...^
Similarly, the Mysore High Court. inJHaravanaopa and 
57Brothers v , 1.1,0, held that an Income Tax Officer is 
empowered to impose a penalty and also to recover interest 
in respect of one and the same default under section 18A (8)
and section 46(l)*^of the Act of 1922. The provision did
not amount to an infraction of the right to equal protection 
of laws, embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution as 
contended by the assessee, the reason being that the objects 
of interest and penalty are altogether different. The
56., A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 255,256 (para 6).
57. A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 40, at p. 43 vpara 25)
58. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18A (8) provided that the
Income Tax Officer shall add interest1 in case of 
failure to pay advance tax according to the provisions 
of the Act on regular assessment. Income Tax Act, 1961 
section 217 contains the similar provisions.
59* Income Tax Act, 1922, section 46(1) laid down the
provision relating to imposition of penalty in case
of failure to pay tax on demand under section 29.
Income Tax Act, 1961, section 221 contains similar 
provision.
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interest is payable to the Government by reason of the 
assessee having withheld from the Government advance tax 
he was bound to pay, while penalty is in the nature of a 
punishment•
Chagla, C.J., delivering the judgement of the
Bombay High Court in Aruna Mills Ltd. v. C.I.T.. Bombay* said:
"... |f] ailure to pay advance tax is not a penalty in the 
sense- of the default carrying with it any mens res or 
subjecting the defaulter to any severe punishment*”60
And Balkrishna Ayyar, <T., speaking for the Madras
High Court in Magappa Chettiar v* I.I.O.. Padukottai. said
that:
"... fcThere is no element of penalty either in sub-sec.
(6) or sub-sec. (8) (of section 18A of the Act of 1922). 
The interest charged under those sections is an impost 
in the same way as income-tax is an impost
However, the imposition of 'interest1 is not
automatic. The assessee must be given an opportunity of
being heard before the levy of such interest. In
62Chockalingam and Mayyappan v. C.I.T.. Madras , the Supreme 
Court held that the denial of a hearing would amount to a 
violation of natural justice, even if interest is levied
60. A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 756 at p. 758. (para 4)
61. A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 205, at p. 208 (para 1^). 7.U.S.
Sockalingam Chettiar v. I+T.O. A.I.R. 1959 Mad 509*
It was held that interest was not a penal interest.
62. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1456.
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6:5under section 35 of the Act of 1922 , analogous to section
154 of the Act of 1961, in pursuance of rectification of a
mistake in assessment*
An assessee is not entitled to take advantage of his
own wrongs* Accordingly, interest paid by the assessee on
account of failure to pay advance tax is not allowed as a
deduction^. And interest received from the Government^ on
excess advance tax paid is taxable, being income by way of
66interest similar to profits earned out of an investment •
Penalties. in Chapter 21 of the Act of 1961
The provisions relating to the imposition of
administrative penalties are later additions to the Income
tax statutes in India than those relating to criminal
penalties. » Whereas provision for criminal penalties was
67made as long ago as 1869 , the administrative penalties were
68
added on the statute book only in 1918 • And it was only
65* Income Tax Act, 1922, section 55 authorized the Income Tax 
authorities to rectify any mistake apparent on record, 
either on their own motion or when such a mistake was 
brought to their notice by a party to the proceedings 
Sidhramappa Andannappa v. C.I.T* (1952) 21 I.T.E. 333.
64* Baimer Lawrie and Company v. C.I.T. (1960)399 I.T.R. 851*
65* Income Tax Act, 1 9 6 1, sections 214*243 and 244 provide 
for interest payable by the Government.
6 6. C.I.T. v. Mahara.jadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh (1953) 25 
I.T.k. 212; Visheshwara Singh v. C.I.T. C1954j 26 I.T.R. 
573, 5 8 8.
67. Supra note 3.
6 8. The Income Tax Act, 1918, section 24, provided an 
administartive penalty for concealment of income. It was 
only with regard to payment of tax on demand that the 
Income Tax Act, 1886, had provided a penalty for default 
under section 30(l) of the Act.
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in 1961, by the enactment of Act 43 of 1961, that for the
first time the penal provisions, previously scattered all
over the texts of the Income lax Acts, were collected in a
separate chapter 21, entitled: ’Penalties Imposable’. No
doubt,some of the penal provisions are still scattered
about the Act, but they are limited in number and are less
important as compared with those incorporated in Chapter 21.
Chapter 21 is a small chapter, consisting of six
sections only, namely, sections 270 to 275* The first four
sections, (270 to 273) provide the substantive penalties for
defaults committed under the Act, and sections 274 and 275
lay down the procedure to be adopted and the. periods of
limitation in the imposition of the penalties*
Administrative penalties under the Indian Income
Tax statutes, like the penalties provided under the Income
69Tax Acts of other countries, viz., the United Kingdom ,
70 71the United States of America * Australia ,
69. Taxes Management Act (1970 c.9), Part 10 provides 
provision for imposition of penalties in sections 93 to 
107. See sections 95>96 for ad valorem penalties. The 
Act also provides for ’exigible penalties’ in certain 
cases. See British Tax Encyclopedia . Wheatcroft, G.S.A. 
(1970), Vol.I. paras 1-1409, p. 1692/1.
70. Inland Revenue Code, 1954, chapter 68, sections 6651 to 
6680, provides provisions relating to civil penalties.
See,, ’Tax Fraud and Evasion’ Harry Graham Balter. (1963), 
3rd ed., para 8.5; Praud and Federal Means Tax in the 
United States.Harold M. Groves and Arthur M. Selle 11953)
7> Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 321 at 
p. 322. Administrative Penalties are.called civil 
penalties and assessed and collected as a part of the tax. 
The civil penalties are of two types viz., fraud and non 
fraud.
71. Income tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act, 
1936-69, Part 7. See Sectiohs 226,227,230,231.
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72Canada and New Zealand are ad valorem penalties imposed as
a percentage of the tax liability. Administrative penalties
have assumed great significance in the programme of tax crime
control in recent years and are being frequently invoked by
the Income Tax authorities than _ criminal penalties. The
penalties provided under the Act may be broadly classified
into those provided in Chapter 21 and those outside it.
There are five main types of penalties in Chapter 21 and three
7 4
outside of it • Penalties prescribed within Chapter 21 ares
(i) for concealment of income,
(ii) for failure to furnish return or comply with
notices,
(iii) for failure to furnish information regarding 
securities and dividends,
(iv) for failure to give notice of discontinuance of 
business, profession or vocation and
(v) for making false estimate of tax and failure to 
pay tax in advance.
72. Income Tax Act, 1952, 5*55 O )  (delay in making return);
S. 55(5) (failure to supply information) and S.56(1)
i (penalty for tax evasion). See Canadian Income Tax: A 
Treatise of Income Tax Law of Canada*. Toronto, 1970,
pp. 1500, 2854-2856.
73• The Land and Income Tax Act, 1954, Sections 228 to 238, 
deal with penalties. Section 231 provides for penal tax 
in case of tax evasion to the extent of treble the 
deficiency.
74. See infra pp. 331-39 for penalties outside Chapter 21.
R. Pres ad Mohanlal v. I.T.A. Tribunal A.I.R. 1970 All 
620,627 (para 23) (P«B,). S. Bhoothalingham in his 1 Pinal 
Report on Rationalisation and Simplification of the Tax 
Structure* (19^8). Government of India, at p. 78> has 
classified penalties into four headss-
(i) Por giving low estimates of income in connection 
with advance payments,
(ii) failure to file a return of income within the time 
allowed,
(iii) failure to produce books of account, etc., when
called upon to do so, and
(iv) concealment of income or giving inaccurate 
particulars of income.
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The Income Tax Act, 1961, in clause (c) of sub­
section (1) of section 271 , has provided one of the most 
important penal provisions to combat tax evasion and the 
Income Tax authorities have applied this provision far more 
frequently than any other penal provision. As a result it 
has been the subject of the largest number of cases and is 
a subject of much controversy.
The origin of this principal administrative sanction
is to be found in section 24 of the Income Tax Act (7 of 1918),
75which for the first time, bestowed on the Collector and 
76Commissioner power to assess and collect income tax and 
to invoke penal provisions against an assessee in case of
concealment of income* Section 24 provided as follows
/
11 if the Collector or the Commissioner, in making any 
assessment or adjustment,... is satisfied that the 
assessee has concealed the particulars of his income, or 
has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of 
such income, and has thereby returned it below its real 
amount, the Collector or the Commissioner may direct that 
$he assessee shall pay on the difference between his 
income, as finally ascertained, and the amount originally 
returned by him, income tax at a rate not exceeding 
double the rate which would otherwise have been payable: 
provided that no such order shall be made, unless the 
assessee has been heard, or has been given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard;
Provided further that no prosecution for an offencw 
against this Act shall be instituted in respect of the 
same facts on which a penal assessment is made under 
this section.”
75* Income Tax Act, 1918, section 2(5)* 
76. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 2(6).
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The following conditions had to be fulfilled before section 
24 could be invoked
(1) The revenue authorities had to be satisfied, when 
making any assessment or adjustment under Chapter II dealing 
with ’Deductions and Assessments', that the assessee
(a) had concealed particulars of his income, or
(b) had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars 
of such income, and thereby returned it below its 
real income*
(2) The assessee had to be given a reasonable opportunity
77of being heard * before assessment could be levied* A
proviso to the sub-section imposed a bar on prosecution for
an offence in respect of the same facts on which the penal
78assessment had been made*
The Income Tax Act, 1922 , repealed the Income Tax
Act, 1916, but retained the provisions of section 24 with a
slight modification of section 28 of the Act. The original.
section 28, which provided a 'penalty for concealment of
income or improper distribution of profits' runs as follows
"Section 28(1). If the Income Tax Officer, the 
Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner in the 
course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied 
that an assessee has concealed the particulars of his
77* See infra pp. 293-99 for discussion on 'reasonable 
opportunity'.
78. The Income Tax Act, 1961, has no such provision. A
person now may be liable both for penalty and prosecution.
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income, or has deliberately furnished inaccurate 
particulars of such income, and has thereby returned 
it below its real amount, he may direct that the 
' assessee shall in addition to the income tax payable by 
him, pay by way of penalty a sum not exceeding the 
amount of income tax which would have been avoided, if 
the income so returned by the assessee had been 
accepted as the correct income*"
On a perusal of section 28 of the Income lax Act,
1922, and section 24 of the Income lax Act, 1918, the 
following differences become evident:
(i) Section 28 of the Act of 1922, has used the
79word 'penalty' , whereas 'penal assessment' was used in 
section 24 of the Act of 1918*
(ii) Section 28 of the Act of 1922, has substituted/
'Income lax Officer' and 'Assistant Commissioner' in place 
of 'Collector' used in section 24 of the Act of 1918.
(iii) Section 28 of the Act of 1922, appears to be 
wider in scope than section 24 of the Act of 1918, inasmuch 
as, under the former, a penalty could be levied 'in the course
of any proceeding', whereas 'penal assessment' under the 
latter could be levied 'in the case of assessment or 
adjustment* only. The former would include cases of
79* 2?he Report of the All India Income Tax Committee, 1921, 
in para 40, made a recommendation for the amendment 
of section 24 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, so as to 
make it clear that the penalty imposed under it is a 
'penalty' and not 'income tax'.
The law of Income Tax in India* V*S* Sundaram, Vol.I, 4th ed 
1936, p. clxxiliT
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revisional proceedings and cases of refund , while the
82latter would not •
The year 1939 inaugurated a new era in the 
administration of the law of Income Tax in India8^. A 
number of changes of significance were made in the Act of 
1922 to deal with cases of an unusually difficult nature or 
cases in which concealment of income on a large scale had 
taken place#
The relevant portion of the sub-section (1) of section 
28 ran as follows, after the amendment:
1128(1) If the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate - 
Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal, in 
the course of any proceedings under the Act, is 
satisfied that any person- 
• • • •
(c) has concealed the particulars of his income or 
deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such 
income,
he or it may direct that such person shall pay by way 
of penalty, in addition to any tax payable by him, 
a sum not exceeding one and a half times the amount of 
the income tax and super tax, if any, which would have 
been avoided if the income as returned by such person 
had been accepted as the correct income#
The Act of 1939 brought about the following changes 
in sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Act of 1922:-
80# Income Tax Act, 1922, section 33A.
81# Income Tax Act, 1922, sections 48 and 49*
82. fThe Law of Income Tax in India1# V.S# Sundaram, 6th ed#, 
1954, p. 908.
83* (1939) 7, Income Tax Report, p#1# (Journal Section).
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(i) The scope of sub-section (1) of section 28 was 
enlarged, i.e., penalties for two new types of defaults were 
added , and a penalty for concealment of income was 
provided in sub-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 28.
(ii) The maximum amount of penalty for concealment of 
income was increased from 'the amount of tax which would 
have been avoided' to 'one and a half times the amount of 
tax which would have been avoided', in order to make the 
penalty more stringent*
(iii) The word 'super-tax'was inserted along with 
'income-tax', to make it clear that the penalty for 
concealment of income applied to cases of'super-tax' 
as well.
(iv) The power to impose the penalty was taken away
from the 'Commissioner' and given to the 'Appellate Tribunal'.
Section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, corresponds 
to section 28 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, with certain . 
modifications. The relevant portion of sub-section (1), which 
deals with the penalty for concealment of income stood 
originally as follows:
"Section 271(1)(c ). If the Income Tax Officer or the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in the course of any
proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person-....
(c) has concealed the particulars of his income or
84. See infra pp. 31)7 - 24 for two types of defaults.
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deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars 
of such income,
he may direct that such person shall pay by way of 
penalty,-
(iii) . in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum 
which shall not be less than twenty per cent but which 
shall not exceed one and a half times the amount of the 
tax, if any, which would have been avoided, if the 
income, as returned by such person, had been accepted 
as the correct income*1
The distinguishing features of sub-section (1) of
85section 271 are as follows
The jurisdiction to impose a penalty has been conferred
on Income Tax Officers and Appellate Assistant Commissioners
only, whereas section 28 of the Act of 1922, authorised the
1Appellate Tribunal1 as well*
An Income Tax Officer does not need the previous
sanction ibf the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner before
imposing the penalty, as was required by the corresponding
86provisions in the Act of 1922 • However, where the
maximum penalty imp os able exceeds Rs* 1,000, the Inspecting
87Assistant Commissioner alone is empowered to impose it, 
whereas, under section 28 of the Act of 1922, the Income Tax
Officer had such power once the approval of the Inspecting
88
Assistant Commissioner had been obtained *
85* See supra note 30* at p* 1033;R* Prasad Mohan lal v* I*T*A* 
Tribunal A.I.R* 1970, All 620,629 (para 27) (P*B.) Messrs, 
Jain Brothers v. Union of India A*I#R* 1970 S.C* 778 at 
P. 785.
86* Gnanmbika Mills Ltd* v. C*I*T* Madras?I*L.R*(1966) 2 Mad* 
491 >494; In re Kishore Chand Ram.ii Das A*I*R.1950 E.P# 814* 
87* Income Tax Act, 19^1> section 274 12).
88* Income Tax Act, 1922, section 28(6). In Lachman 3)ass Mehar 
Chand v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi (1944) I.I.R* 
4 3 2 ( Lahore}, it was held that the sub-section (6) of 
section 28 does not contemplate a hearing being given to 
an assessee by the Inspecting Asst* Commissioner beford
approving the penalty to be imposed by the Income Tax 
Officer*
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Sub-clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271
provides a minimum penalty imposable in cases of concealment
of income or furnishing of inacctoate particulars of income
as provided under clause (c). There was no provision for
a minimum penalty in the corresponding provisions of the
previous Acts* However, the Commissioner of Income Tax may
reduce or waive the minimum penalty in appropriate cases
under sub-section 4A of section 271 of the Act8^.
Penalty proceedings must be initiated by the Income
Tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the
course of assessment proceedings and should be completed
within two years of their commencement, according to section
275 of the Act* There was no such provision in the Income
Tax Act of 1922^.
The bar to the launching of prosecutions in respect
of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed, has
91been done away with *
89* See Chapter 5» P* 211, . f*n. 42.
90* R. Prasad Mohanlal v. I.TP.A. Tribunal* A.I.R* 1970 All
620, 638 (P.B.)
M/S Ramkrishna Baldeo Prasad v. C.I.T.* U*P* A.I.R.
1968 All 53: C.I.T..^ Mlinr^^and OrXSsa v. Rupsa Ricd Mills. 
1964 54 I.T.R. 328 (Orissa).
91. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 28(4) had given an
immunity from prosecution for a default in respectt of
which a penalty was imposed upon the assessee.
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In 1964 two important changes were made in sub-section 
(1) of section 271, by section 40 of the Finance Act, 1964*
The changes are of great significance, as they relate to the 
assessee's liability in case of penal proceedings* The 
changes are as mentioned:
Firstly, the word 'deliberately*, occurring before
the words 'furnished inaccurate particulars of such income'
in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 2 7 1, was
obliterated with effect from April 1, 1964* Clause (c) after
the amendment, runs as follows:
"271(1) If the Income Tax Officer or the Appellate 
Assistant Commissioner in the course of any proceedings 
under this Act, is satisfied that any person-
t  • 1
(c) has concealed the particulars of his income 
or ( ) furnished inaccurate particulars
of such income,.••M
92Secondly, an Explanation clause'^ was added to sub­
section (1) of section 2 7 1. Ihe clause provides that, if the 
total income returned by an asBessee is less than eighty per 
cent of the total income assessed, the assessee shall be 
liable for concealment of income under clause (c) of sub­
section (1) of section 2 7 1* In other words, the assessee will 
be deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income, 
or furnished inaccurate particulars of his income, unless he 
proves that the failure to return the correct income did
92* See infra p*313 for text of explanation clause*
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not arise from any fraud, or any gross or wilful neglect 
on M s  part.
Section 19 of the Finance Act, 1968, seeks to amend 
aub-clause (iii) of sub-section 271 of the Act of 1961, in 
order to increase the quantum of penalty prescribed for 
concealment of income under clause (c) of sub-section (1.) 
of section 2 7 1*
Sub-clause (iii) provides that,
"In the case referred to in clause (c), in addition 
to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall be not 
less than, but which shall not exceed twice the amount 
of the income in respect of which the particulars 
have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been 
furnished."
The amendment makes the penalty for concealment of
income more stringent and concealment unprofitable to
ingeneous taxpayers, if the provisions are implemented
promptly. The amendment shifts the basis for concealment of
penalty from the amount of ftax avoided1, as was the earlier
practice, to the amount of the 'concealed income'. In other
words, it makes the concealment of income the yard-stick
for measurement of the penalty and not the amount of tax
sought to be avoided as previously because the original
93provision did not wofck well .
93* 'Penalty Provisions Under the Income Tax Act and Wealth
Tax Act - Legal Aspects of Implications - and Justification 
of Recent Changes*. R.S.. Cae. Report on 3rd All India 
Conference of Tax Executives (1968), 103 at pp. 107-108 
(para 9 8) •
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In brief, clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section
QA
271 deals with making false returns . The clause requires
two conditions to be fulfilled for a penalty to be imposed.
Firstly, the Income Tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner must be satisfied 'in the course of any 
95proceedings'^ , and secondly, that the assessee must have
either concealed the particulars of his income, or 'furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income'.
The penal provisions contained in section 271
(1)(c ) of the Act appear to be very simple but they are not
so in fact. They have aroused much controversy amongst
the scholars and lawyers. Courts are also not unanimous in
their interpretation.
Procedure for Levy of Penalty.
The proceedings for the levy of penalty must be
96initiated by a prescribed authority^ in the course of
...................................................................................... 0 7  ■ ...............................................................
proceedings under the Act , and that such authority must
be satisfied about the existence of conditions specified
in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section
98271 before starting proceedings*^ . And a person against
94. C.I.T. Delhi v. Teja Singh A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352,354.
95. C.I.T.. M.P. v. Punjabhai Shah A.I.R. 1968 M.P.103, 106.
96. Messrs. Mayaram Durga Prasad v. C.I.T.. U.P. 5, I.T.C.
97. R. Prasad Mohan Lai v. I.I.A. Tribunal A.I.R. 1970 All. 
6 2 0 ,6 3 2 (para 35) (F.B.T
98. C.I.T.. Madras v. S.V. Angdi Ohettiar A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 
970; Gropichand Sar.iu Prasad v. Union of India A.I.R.
1969 M.P. 220,225; C.I.T.. Assam v. Tezapur Automobiles 
A.I.R. 1969 Assam 122,123.
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whom proceedings are to be taken should be given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard before any order imposing a
Q Q
penalty is passed . Compliance is essential in order to 
make the order imposing a penalty valid • The provision is
99* Income Tax Act, 1961, section 274 (1) (Corresponding to 
Income Tax Act, 1922, section 28 (3) ). See Banarsi Das 
v. C.I.T*. Punjab, A.I.R* 1936 Lah. 585, 566; Gnanmbika 
Mills litd* v* C.I.T.. Madras I.l.R. (1966) 2 Mad. 491 
494; Bha.iuram Ganpatram v* C.I.T.. Bihar and Orissa,.
A.I.R* 1970 9rissa] 38,40; Uaddula Appa Rao v. l.T*Q» A#I*R. 
1959 A*P*391* Messrs* JainHBrothcrs v. Union of India. 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 778,783
1. Ayyasami Nadar and Brothers v. C.I.T.. Madras A.I.R. 1957 
Mad. 74* Grant of a reasonable opportunity is sufficient 
compliance with the requirements of section. If the 
opportunity is not availed of, a notice does not become 
invalid on that account. Contra, see Shrilal v. C.I.T.. 
Bihar and Orissa. A*I.R. 1956 Prissa 33. It was held that 
the Income Tax Officer must hear the assessee before 
imposition of penalty under section 28 of the impugned 
Act, 1922. It was further held that in case that the 
assessee does not appear before the Income Tax Officer 
and renders no explanation the Income Tax Officer could 
not levy a penalty because it would amount to a denial 
of‘reasonable opportunity* as contemplated by sub-section
(3) of section 28. It is submitted with respect that 
Orissa High Court’s view needs revision. The view is too 
narrow and defeats the very purpose of the provision.
In Messrs Murlidhar Tenpal v. C.I.T.. Patna. I.L.R. (1961) 
40 Pat 571, it was held that the succeeding Income Tax 
Officer had power to initiate proceedings from where his 
predecessor left off. He need not call for a fresh 
explanation from the assessee, when his predecessor had 
already complied with the requirement for imposing a 
penalty under section 28 (l)fc) of the Act of 1922. The 
Act,of 1961 has provided similar provisions as those 
contained in the Act of 1922, in this connection.
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2
based on the Roman maxim of audi alteram partem , hear the 
the other side. The question whether a person was given a 
reasonable opportunity of being heard in a particular case 
is a question of fact •
The scope of the phrase fin the course of any 
proceedings* appears to be wide^# For instance, a penalty
may be imposed in the course of any proceedings under the
5 6 7Act, e.g., in assessment , additional assessment , and appeal •
However, the assessment or reassessment must relate
to the same assessee and the same period for which his
8
default is called in question. The Supreme Court in Messrs
q
Guduthur Brothers v. I.T.O., Special Circle, Bangalore , 
held that the Income Tax Officer had jurisdiction to start 
penalty proceedings again, if the earlier order imposing 
penalty for failure to furnish return within the time was
2. Anantha Naganna Chetty v. C.I.T#. A.P. Hyderabad. A.I.R.
1970 A.P. 367.
3 . Butto Kristo Kama!a Kanta Saha v. C.I.T.. Bihar and Orissa 
5 I.I.C. 122 '(Patna)
4. O.Y. Goundaralulu Iyer v, C.I.T.. Madras A.I.E. 1949 Mad. 
399 at p.401.
5. 'The Civil Court Manual (Central Acts)* A.I.R. Publication; 
10th ed., Vol.V. (1 9 6 1), p. 6010.
6 . In re Surcharan Prasad A.I.R. 1931 All 421
7. Malik hams a. 7. Khan v. C.I.T., Punjab A.I.R. 1947 P.O. 176 
Kamiapat Motilal v. C'.i;i~.~TT?62)45 I.T.R. 266 (S.C.)
8 . C.I.T. Hyderabad v. Angoru Satyum A.I.R. 1960$a.P. 205.
9. A.I.R. 19^0 S.C.1326.
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set aside, due to the failure to give a hearing to the
assessee, after correcting the error* The appellant failed
to file a return of income for the year 19 48 -49 within the
prescribed time* The Income Tax Officer issued a notice to
the appellant to show cause why a penalty should not be 
10imposed • The appellant filed a written reply* The 
Income Tax Officer imposed a penalty of Rs. 16,000/- without 
affording a hearing, as required by sub-section (3 ) of section 
28 of the Act of 1922. The order was set aside by the 
Appellante Assistant Commissioner who pointed out the defect. 
Thereafter, the Income Tax Officer started fresh proceedings, 
giving an opportunity to the assessee of being heard, as 
required.
Their Lordships rightly held that the Penalty 
proceedings which were started again could be described as 
the continuance of the original assessment proceedings, 
because the action would relate back to the time when the 
notice was issued*
An important question that arises in this connection 
is whether a penalty may be inflicted for concealment of
10. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 28(l)(a) provided for levy 
of penalty in such cases. The corresponding provision in 
the Act of 1961 is section 2 7 1 (1)(a) • Ravayuga Traders v. 
C.I.T. A.P*> . A.I.R. 1971 A.P. 319 It was held that 
the Income Tax Officer could rectify a mistake and send 
a notice under section 274 of the New Act. The fact that 
the first notice issued under the old Act does not make 
the second proceeding illegal.
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income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, if
the Income Tax authorities come to know of the fact of
concealment, after the close of the assessment proceedings.
Courts are divided on the point.
The Allahabad High Court held in Messrs. Mayaram
11Durga Prasad v. C.I.T. U.P. , that the appellant would not
be liable for a penalty for concealment of income under
section 28 (1) of the Act of 1922, for defaults made in
his return of income at the time of the original assessment,
discovered in the course of assessment proceedings under
section 34 of the Act of income escaping assessment.
The appellant, an unregistered firm, was assessed at
Rs. 2,650 for 1929-30. Afterwards it was discovered that
the assessee had a much higher income, so he was assessed
under section 34. This time he made a return of Rs.38,327.
The Income Tax Officer, being of the opinion that the
previous return of Rs. 2,650 was minimized deliberately, in
order to avoid payment of the just and proper tax, inflicted
12
a penalty under section 28 (1) . While allowing the appeal,
their Lordships, said that:
1 ...[I]he proceedings which terminated with the 
assessment of the income at the figure of Rs.2,650 
are proceedings distinct from the proceedings under 
section 34 of the Income Tax Act. That being so, it
11. (1930) 5 I*T.O. 471; Seth Kashinath Bagle v. C.I.T..
U.P., 4 I.T.C. 4 7 2.
12. See supra:p283/4for text of section 28(1).
2 9 6
cannot be said that the assessee "has concealed the 
particulars of such income"♦ If the two proceedings 
are separate, a reference to the previous proceedings 
can be made only by the use of the verb "to have" in 
the past tense,, and not by the use of the verb in 
the present tense. The result iss Hone of the 
ingredients necessary to bring the case within the 
purview of ss (1) of s. 28 exist in_this case, and the 
levy of penalty was wrong in law."^
Similarly, the Allahabad High Court in re Gurcharan
1 A
Prasad Khatri. held that where the income was returned 
wrongly, both during the original assessment under section 
23 and also during the assessment for escaped income under 
section 3 4 » a penalty could be imposed in respect of the 
latter concealment only and not the former. It was contended 
that the original proceedings, which terminated in the 
assessment, were closed and were no longer before the 
Income Tax Officer and the proceedings under section 34 were 
fresh proceedings in respect of escaped income; no action 
could be taken in respect of proceedings already closed.
On the other hand, the Madras High Court in C«I«.T».,-
15Madras v. Sheikh Abdul Kadir Maracayar,  ^held that, even 
if the Commissioner finds in the course of revision that 
there had been concealment of income in the original 
proceedings, he can levy a penalty.
In another case, C.Y. Govindara.julu Iyer v. C.I.T.,
16Madras , it was held that there was nothing in the language
13.(1936) 5, I.T.O. 471 at p. 474.
14. (1931) A.L.J. 336.
15. 2 I.T.C. 372.
16. A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 399.
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of section 28, which prevents an Income Tax Officer, if he 
is satisfied, in the course of a proceeding under Section 34 
relating to a particular period of assessment, that default 
has occurred at the earlier stage, from levying a penalty.
The appellant, in spite of a general notice under 
section 22(1) of the Act of 1922, did not, within the 
prescribed period, submit his return for the assessment 
years ending 12th April, 1942 and 13th April, 1943* The 
Deaprtment, however, did not proceed to issue notice under 
section 22(2) of the Act within the respective years of the 
assessment. Subsequently, on 25th January 1945> the Income 
Tax Officer issued notices under section 34 and section 28 
imposing a penalty for failure of the appellant to file his 
returns, in pursuance of the general notice issued under 
section 22(1) of the Act. A penalty was imposed, which was 
confirmed in an appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner 
and the Tribunal.
The appellant, relying on the decisions of the
17Allahabad High Court in Mavaram Durga Prasad and re Batuk 
18Prasad , contended that it was not competent for the 
Income Tax Officer to levy a penalty in the course of a 
proceeding under section 34 of the Act for a default not
17. (1930) 5, I.T.C. 471.
18. (1931) A.L.J. 336.
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committed in those proceedings* Rejecting the above 
contention, their Lordships said that:
[sj o long as the proceedings under s. 34 relate to 
the assessment for the said period as the original 
assessment, the Income Tax Officer will be competent 
to levy a penalty on any ground open to him under 
section 28(1), even though it relates to the prior 
proceeding.•• We do not find any justification for 
the artificial separation of a proceeding under 8 * 3 4  
from a proceeding relating to the original assessment 
or to proceedings which started before a notice under S.
34? so long as they all relate to the same assessee and 
the same period11'^ .
10b is submitted, with respect, that the Allahabad view 
is too narrow and needs reconsideration in the light of the 
Madras decision* It is a well established fact that a 
revised return of correct income made, after the Income Tax 
Officer has come to know of the fact of concealment, will 
not excuse a previous wrong return, made dishonestly and
20deliberately and absolve an assessee from penal liability .
On the same parity of reasoning the Andhra Pradesh High
21Court held in C* I.T., Hyderabad v. Angaru Sat yam *, that when
it is discovered, in proceedings under section 34 of the Act
of 1 9 2 2, that the assessee had made a concealment of income
in respect of the original assessment under section 2 3 » it 
could not be condoned, merely because the subsequent return
19* A.I.R. 1949 Mad* 399* pp* 400,401 (para 3)*
20* See Report of the Income Tax Investigation Commission,
1949*(government of India)* p. 100;'Income Tax Act, 1922*, 
A.H* Aiyar,(7th ed*, 1 9 5 0) p* 584; Vadilal Ichhachand 
v* C.I.T*t (1957) 32 I.T.R* 569* Lavabhai Girdharbhar v. 
C.I.T*^ M.P. A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 426.
21. A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 205.
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was correct and accepted by the authorities. To hold 
otherwise.would amount to putting a premium on dishonesty.
Another important question that arises in this 
connection is whether the notice of the contemplated penalty 
proceedings under section 271(1) of the Act of 1961, should 
be given before the assessment order is passed or whether it 
can be given later.
The question came before the Calcutta High Court for
2?decision in Guru Prosad Shaw v. C.I.T., Bengal . The 
InGomeoTax.iOfficer passed an assessment order upon the 
assessee on 23rd January 1941. Atnthe same time he 
discovered that the assessee had not made a return of income 
and had deliberately failed to disclose it. Accordingly, 
a notice was served upon the assessee on 25th January to 
show cause why a penalty should not be inflicted, as 
provided in section 28 and on 2nd May 1941* a penalty was 
imposed.
The assessee contended that notice should have been
given before the close of the assessment proceedings, but
the Court said:
"There is nothing in S.28 from which it can be said 
that the notice under sub-s (3) must be given before
22. A.I.R. 1945 Cal. 65.
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23the conclusion of the assessment" ^
The Supreme Court has also said in C.I.T., Madras v. 
S«Y> Angidi Chattiar^  that the proceedings to levy a penalty 
need not be commenced before the completion of the assessment 
proceedings.
Concealment of Income
The word 1 conceal' originated in the French word 
1conceler' and the Latin term 'concelare, which meansj to 
hide with intent (con., = intent and celare = to hide). In 
standard English dictionaries, the term has been defined as 
'to hide', 'to keep secret1, 'to disguise', 'to keep from 
telling' and so on .
We are concerned with the question what amounts to 
'concealment' for the purposes of imposing a penalty under 
section 271(1)(c ) of the Act. Should omission or failure to
23. A.I.R. 1945 Cal. 65>66. See Banarsi Las v. C.I.T.,
Punjab A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 585. C.I.T.* Madras v. Abdul 
Kaair A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 257. The Madras High Court in 
Sivagamintha Mo op an ar and Sons v. C.I.T., Madras. A.I.R. 
1956 Mad. 1, and the Lahore High Court in Vir Bhan Bansi 
Lai v. C.I.T., Punjab (1938) I.T.R. 616, have taken a 
contrary view. According to the Madras and Lahore High 
Courts the notice asking the assessee to show cause why
a penalty should not be levied for concealment of income, 
must be issued before the assessment order is made.
24. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 970,974* The position under the Act of 
1961 is similar. Shakti Offset Works v. Inspecting 
Assistant Commissioner (1967) 64 I.T.R. 637 (Bom.)
See supra note 30. PP* 1042, 1043 for contrary view.
25* 'Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary', (1968), p. 217.
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disclose a fact, in order to be termed 1 concealment1 be
intentional and deliberate, or is a bare omission or failure
to account for the material facts required sufficient to
bring a man within the clutches of the law?
The majority of the High Courts have held that the
act of concealment in order to attract a penalty under section
2 7 1 ( 1 ) ( c ) of the Act of 1961, must be a ’deliberate*
concealment. For instance, Venkatadri, J., delivering the
judgement of the Madras High Court in I.V. Thomas and Company
Ltd. v. C.I.T., Madras said;
"The word ’conceal* implies something more than mere 
failure to disclose ... To constitute concealment, it 
must appear that the statement or act of the person 
was calculated and designed to prevent discovery of the 
act with which he is charged ... All that it involves 
is the principle that the act must be attributable to 
the person, that is, it^must have been done intentionally 
and not accidentally”. b
Similarly Rajgopalan, J., in Radha Rukmani Animal v.
"The concealment penalized under S. 28 must be 
concealment of which the assessee is conscious.
Further it must be a concealment from the assessing 
authority” *
The facts of the case are as follows. Subbarayulu Chettiar 
was the karta (manager) of a Hindu undivided family which
26. I.L.R. (1967) 1 Mad. 255, p* 263, 264; see T.P. Hariram 
Suit v. C.I.T.« Madras A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 653*
27. A.I.R., 1957, Mad 568,569* Section 171(8) of the Act of 
1961 imposed joint and several liability on the members 
of a Hindu undivided family in regard to the levy and 
collection of any penalty including interest or a fine.
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consisted of his two minor sons and himself. S. Chettiar 
made some fictitious entries in the account books and also 
omitted to enter some receipts in it, but, before making 
his return for the assessment year 1944-4 5 , on behalf of 
the Hindu undivided family, he died. After his death, Radha 
Rukmani Animal, wife of S. Chettiar, represented the Hindu 
undivided family as the guardian of the minor coparceners 
and filed the return for the assessment year 1944-4 5 .
The Income Tax Officer assessed the income of the 
Hindu undivided family on the basis of this return. But, 
he subsequently came to know of the concealment of income
QQ
and fictitious entries • Accordingly, the Income Taz 
Officer issued a notice under section 28(3) and imposed a 
penalty under section 28(1)(c) of Rs. 5*000, which was 
confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner 
and the Income Tax Tribunal.
The High Court arrived at a different conclusion 
and held that, as the deceased karta had not concealed any 
income from the Income Tax authorities, and the succeeding 
karta was neither conscious of any concealment nor had a 
guilty mind, a penalty could not be levied on the family
28. Messrs. Hagin Chand Shiv Sahai v. C.I.T.. Punjab (1938)
6 I.T.R. 554 (Lahore), If a person claims a false 
deduction, he is liable to a penalty.
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under section 28(l)(c) for concealment of income.
The Bombay High Court in C.I.T#, Ahmedabad v. Gokuldas 
Harivallabhdas2^, said that penalty proceedings under section 
28(1)(c) were in the nature of penal proceedings and the 
fact that the explanation adduced by the assessee in regard 
to particular income is false, does not make him liable 
for a penalty.
The assessee was carrying on business in partnership 
with his brother at Hadiad in Ahmedabad. On 25th October, 
1946, the assessee opened a branch in Bombay. The Income 
Tax Officer, while examining the assessee1s accounts, found 
a sum of Rs. 15,205 credited in the names of a few persons 
of the Bombay branch. Being dissatisfied with the assessee1s 
explanation, the Income Tax Officer assessed the amount as 
income from undisclosed sources and imposed a penalty of 
Rs. 4,000 under section 28(1)(c ).
While rejecting the Revenue's claim to be entitled 
to ,impose the penalty, the court said,
"The gist of the offence under s. 28(l)(c) is that the 
assessee has concealed the particulars of his income 
or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of 
such income. Therefore, the Department must establish 
that the receipt of Rs. 15,20?/- constitute •income*of • 
the assessee. There is not an iota of evidence on the 
record, except the explanation given by the assessee, 
which explanation has been found to be false. How, it 
does not follow that because the particular explanation 
given by the assessee is false, therefore necessarily 
the receipt of Rs. 15,203/- constitutes taxable income
of the assessee.”50
29. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 96; T.P.Hari Ram Sait v. C.I.T., Madras ,
• A.I.R. .'1955 Mad. 653*
30. Ibid p. 97 (para 3).
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The Madhya Pradesh High Court in C«I«T«« M«P« v.
31Pun.iabhai Shah , expressed agreement with the view of the 
Bombay High Court in Gokul Pas Harivallabhdas* The Court 
said:
w•♦•[!]he bare fact that the explanation offered by 
the assessee in assessment proceedings was rejected 
and it was held in those proceedings that he had 
concealed his income or that the explanation was 
unsatisfactory by itself cannot be made the basis 
of the conclusion that he has been guilty of 
deliberately concealing the particulars of his 
inc ome#,f32
The Gujarat High Court in C«I«T«, Gujarat v* L»H.
77
Vora, has also approved of the Bombay view in the
Gokuldas Harivallabhdas case*
The Patna High Court in the case of Me ssrs * Khemra.1
34.Chagganlal v* C«I«T«, Bihar and Orissa , held that the
mere fact that the assessee was not able to establish by
satisfactory evidence the source of income did not imply
that the explanation was false and that the assessee had
been guilty of supression of facts within section 28(l)(c)
of the Act of 1922* This view was affirmed by the Court
in Murlidhar Te.jpal v. C«I«T«, Patna^ *
On the other hand;the Allahabad High Court in
36
Hazi Abdul Rehman. Abdul Q.ayuum v. C.I.T.. U.P. , observed
31. A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 103.
32. A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 103,106 (para 6).
33. (1965) 56 I.T.R. 126 (&uj.).
34. A.I.R. 1960 Pat 252.
35. (1961) 42 I.T.R. 129 (Patna).
36. (1965) 56 I.T.R. 172.
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that there is a difference between 1 concealed income1 and 
’giving inaccurate particulars of income1and that it is
only in the latter clause that the element of deliberation
37is required^ • Concealment is proved, when it is established 
that there was income and that it was not disclosed in the 
return*
In an earlier case of Lai Chand Gropal Das v. C*I*T* *
•r a
U*P* and V.P. , the matter was debated with much ingenuity* 
Luring the assessment year 1946-47 the Income Tax Officer 
discovered a sum of Rs* 5f000 entered as deposited, in the 
amanat khata (cash register) of the assessee* The book 
showed that the cash was received from a businessman but 
the name of the man was not mentioned. On enquiry the 
assessee failed to give any satisfactory account of the sum. 
His explanation, that as four years had lapsed since the 
date of deposit, he could not remember the name of the 
businessman from whom temporary deposits were received, was 
rejected as fallacious* Accordingly, the Income Tax Officer 
added the sum, as concealed income of the assessee from the 
business*
37* See supraP *289 Until March 31st, 1964* section 271(1)(c) 
contained ’deliberately1 in the latter part of the 
clause. This is now deleted w.e.f. the 1st April, 1964* 
by the Pinance Act, 1964*
38. (1963) 48 I.T.R* 324 (All); Mohan Ram Ram Kumar v* C.I.T* 
U.P.. (1966) 39 I*T.R. 135 (All) Messrs. Lwarka Prasad 
Sheo Karan Las v. C.I.T., U.P. A.I.R. 1954 All 123*
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It was held that the omission of the assessee to 
place materials before the Department to enable it to hold 
otherwise, constituted the materials on the basis of which 
the Department could legitimately draw the inference that 
the amount wasoconcealed income within section 28(l)(c).
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Subba Ka.iu v. C.I.T., 
Madras (How Hyderabad) ^  held that non-disclosure of material 
fact amounts to concealment within section 28(1)(c) of the 
Act.
The assessee, a firm, operating as a military 
contractor, submitted a return of Rs. 19*639/- for the 
assessment year 1944-45* The Income Tax Officer called for 
their accounts and on examination, found that they were 
defective, so he added a sum of Rs.54*455/- to the amount 
returned, which was reduced to Rs. 35*354/- on appeal. The 
authorities assigned three reasons for rejecting the 
assessee’s account book, viz., the assessee did not disclose 
the sale proceeds of two wagon loads of coal, Rs, 1,000,in 
the account books; the muster rolls produced by the assessee 
for wages did not seem to have been maintained in the usual 
course of business and that no vouchers were produced for 
the purchase of some material and payment of cartage. The 
Income Tax Officer, being satisfied that the assessee had
39* A.I.R. 1955 Andhra 281; C.I.T. .A.P. v. Messrs. Royala- 
Seemo Oil Mills A.I.R. 1971 A.P. 34*
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concealed part of M s  income, imposed a penalty under
section 28(l)(c) of the Act of 1922.
The appellant contended that the finding recorded 
related only to the non-disclosure in the accounts of the 
sale of two waggon-loads of coal; a penalty could be levied 
in respect only of concealed income, so no penalty could be 
levied under section 28(l)(c) of the Act.
The Court rejected the appellant’s contention and
said:
"... j[The appellant’s contention} ignores the express 
language of the section. The finding necessary,... 
for the liability to penalty in a case like this, is 
concealment of particulars of income or deliberately 
furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income.
Once that finding is recorded, it seems*., that it 
was open to the appropriate authority jso levy ... 
penalty ...l140
In another case of Mareddi Krishna Reddy v. I.T.O, 
Tenali^1, the Court went a step further and made it 
abundantly clear that mens re a is not required in every case 
of default under the Income Tax Act.
The appellant was a partner of the registered firm 
of Messrs. Talluri Suryanaray an. The firm carried on 
business in milling paddy from January 15, 1945 to December 
28, 1947, after which it discontinued its business. On 
August 7, 1950, Talluri Suryanarayan filed a return on 
behalf of the firm disclosing annincome of Rs. 2,389 for
40. A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 281,282, para 4*
41. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 368. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 271 
(2) provides provision for imposition of penalty in Case 
of firms both registered and unregistered and sec. 189
imposes joint and several liability on the members of 
a firm in case of dissolution or discontinuance ox 
business.
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the assessment year 1947-48. During the course of the 
scrutiny of the accounts, the income Tax Officer detected 
a substantial sum of money, which was not included in the 
return. The assessee admitted that some cash credits found 
in the accounts represented the firm’s income but for other 
credit items the assessee had no explanation. The Income 
Tax Officer computed tax on a total income of Rs. 50,776 
and levied a penalty under section 28(l)(c) of the Act of 
1922. As the firm had discontinued business the penalty 
was to be realized proportionately from each of the 
partners.
The assessee contended that a person could only 
be penalized if he acted with mens rea. so a member of the 
firm could not be punished for a default made by another 
partner if the firm had discontinued business.
While rejecting the appellant’s contention, Subba
Rao, 0.J., said:
"...It is not an inflexible rule of law that mens re a 
is a necessary ingredient of every default. One of the 
exceptions to that rule is : wherein .'Act excluded the said 
factor. Section 44 specifically provides for joint 
assessment in the case of discontinuance of a firm.
The position, therefore, is that, despite the 
discontinuance, all the partners would be jointly 
liable for assessment. If section 28 applies, the 
word ’person’ in that section, whose default attracts 
the penal consequences, takes in partners jointly
liable for the assessment.”42
42. Ibid. 369 (para 7)*
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The Supreme Court of India in C«I«T«, West Bengal 
4 dv. Anwar Ali, has approved of the view taken by the
Bombay High Court in C«I»T., Ahmedabad v. Cokuldas Harivallthi^ak
the G-ujarat High Court in C«I.T«, Gujarat v. L»H« Vora ,
the Madras High Court in Radha Rukmani Ammal v. C«I.T«, Madrai ,^
and the Patna High Court in C«I«T., Bihar v. Mohan Mallah^ *
4-8and disapproved of the Allahabad view in Lalchand Gopaldas 
The Income Tax Officer, while making the assessment 
of the respondents income, discovered an undisclosed bank 
account of the assessee with the Central Bank of India at 
Betiah in Patna. On scrutiny, it was found that the assessee 
had. made a cash deposit of Rs. 87,000 on 21 November 1946 
in the said bank. The explanation of the assessee as to the 
source of the deposit, was that, during the communal riots in 
Bihar in the year 1946, all his relations became panicky and 
entrusted him with whatever cash they had for safe custody; 
this was found to be false and unreliable. Accordingly, 
the Income Tax Officer held that the sum of Rs. 87,000 
represented the income of the assessee from an undisclosed
43. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1782.
44. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 96.
45. (1965) 56 I.T.R. 126 (Guj.).
46. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 568.
47. (1964) 54 I.T.R. 499 (Patna).
48. (1965) 48 I.T.R. 324 (All); Hazi AlMul Rehman. Abdul 
Q ay urn v. C.I.T.. U.P. (1965) 56 I.T.R. 172; Mohan Ram 
Ram Kumar v. C.I.T.. U.P. (1966) 59 I.T.R. 135 (All).
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source and imposed a penalty under section 28(l)(c) of 
the Act for concealment of income.
Their lordships rejected the Income Tax Department's
claim and held that:
"... jrjhe mere fact that the explanation of the 
assessee is false does not necessarily give rise to 
the inference that the disputed amount represents 
income •••• Before penalty can be imposed, the entirety 
of circumstances must reasonably point to the 
conclusion that the disputed amount represented income 
and that the assessee had consciously concealed the 
particulars of his income or had deliberately 
furnished inaccurate particulars.”49
It is submitted with respect that the Supreme Court's
view on the subject needs modification, in as much as the
Court should not impliedly insert the word 'deliberately1
before 'concealed the particulars of such income' in clause
(c), of sub-section (1) of section 271, when the legislature
has preferred to omit it from the time it was first enacted
50in Income Tax law^ . The legislature has since deleted
the word 'deliberately' occurring in the latter part
51of the clause as well^ . In the light of these facts, 
it would he appropriate for the Supreme Court to apply the 
same test for the inference of 'concealment' under section 
27l(l)(e) of the Act of 1961, as it had applied in Malegaon
49. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1782, 1785 (para 6).
50. See supra p. 282 for the provision under the Income Tax 
Act, 1918.
51. See supra p. 289 for the text of the provision.
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Electricity Co. (P) Ltd# v. C.I.T., Bombay^2, for the 
purposes of assessment of ’income escaping assessment* under 
section 34(l)(a) of the Act of 1922, corresponding to 
section 147(l)(a) of the Act of 1961“^ .
The case relates to the provisions in the Act of
1922, but it will apply to the provisions of the Act of
1961 as well. The appellant sold its assets to the
Amalgamated Electricity Co. (belgium) Ltd. The assessee
received a sum as consideration for the sale of its assets,
which was more than their written down value. The assessee
informed the Income Tax Officer about the sale, but did not
show/ in its return any profits under section 10(2)(vii) of
the Act of 1922 nor did it show the amount received for the
sale in excess of the written down value of the assets,
section I0(2)(vii) provided that:
’’Such profits or gains shall be computed after making 
the following allowances, namely
. . . . . . . .  .....................................................................................................................................................
(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or 
plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished 
or destroyed, the amount by which the written down 
value thereof exceeds the amount for which the building 
machinery or plant, as the case may be, is actually 
sold or its scrap value.”
52. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1982; Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I.T.O. 
Calcutta A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 372; P.R. Mukher.iee v. C.I.T. 
W.B. A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 197? Muthiah Chettiar v. C.I.T., 
Madras A.I.R. 1970 S.C* 10. See Indo-China Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Jas.iit Sing A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1140;
A.I.£7 19^4 Bom. 274.
53• See Chapter 2,p.65 for text of section.
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The Income Tax Officer, being of the opinion that 
the profits deemed to have been earned by the assessee 
company under section 10(2)(vii) had not been assessed, 
proceeded under section 34(l)(a) to assess the income 
escaping assessment. Section 34(l)(a) provided that:
"If-
(a) the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that, 
by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an 
assessee to make a return of his income... or to 
disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary 
for his assessment for that year, income, profits or 
gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment 
for that year.......
he may, in cases falling under clause (a), at any time 
..., serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a 
company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice..• 
and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, 
profits or gains...rt
The appellant’s contention that the disclosure made 
by the assessee was true and full in all material particulars 
inasmuch as it had placed before the Income Tax Officer all 
the material facts for the assessment so that no proceedings 
could be taken under section 34(l)(a) of the Act, was 
rejected. It was held that the failure of the assessee to 
disclose to the Income Tax Officer the fact that the price 
realized by it by sale of its assets was more than the 
written down value of those assets, amounted to a failure 
on its part to disclose, fully and truly, the material 
facts necessary for its assessment. The Income Tax Officer, 
therefore, could commence proceedings, under section 34(1)(a) 
of the Act, on the ground that the entire profits deemed to
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have been earned under section 10(2)(vii) had escaped 
assessment*
Similarly, a person should be deemed to have
Concealed the particulars of income1, if he does not
disclose fully and truly all material facts or adduce a
satisfactory explanation as regards the nature of the
income discovered* This proposition is supported by the
1 Explanation clause* attached to section 27l(i)^of the
Act, which provides 6lS follows:
"Where the total income returned by any person is less 
than eighty per cent of the total income•*•as assessed 
.••such person shall, unless he proves that the failure 
to return the correct income did not arise from any 
fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part, be 
deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income 
or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income for 
the purposes of clause (c) of this sub-section.
Furnishing, of,inaccurate Particulars
As noted earlier, the word 1 deliberately* was
jr c
originally included in the later part of the clause , so
that a man was not to:,be held liable for furnishing
56inaccurate particulars of income in the return unless it
54* The Explanation clause was added by the Finance Act, 
1964, with effect from the 1st April, 1964.
55* See supra pp. 286-87.
56. Kaloogala Estate Hamunugalaby Partner A«K» Ohettiar, 
Ceylon v. C.I.I., Madras (1966) 1 M«L.J. 25. It was 
held that ‘particulars of income* is wide. It does not 
simply cover cases where details concerned with the 
trading activities are not disclosed or are inaccurately 
disclosed, but includes also the overall effect 
achieved by any improper method adopted by the assessee.
H.D. Rajah v. C.I.Q!.. Madras A.I.R. 1965 M^d, 574.
J14
was proved that he had a guilty mind* The Courts applied the 
common law doctrine of mens rea in adjudicating cases under 
the provision. The imporatant question that arises in this 
connection is whether the subsequent omission of the word 
’deliberately* from the clause haa made any significant change 
in the assessee*s liability for a penalty. Two diametrically 
opposite views may be noted in this regard.
The proponents of one view maintain that the 
omission of the word 'deliberately1 from the latter part of 
the clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the 
Income Tax Act, 1961, has made no difference as regards 
the assessee's penal liability for 'furnishing inaccurate 
particulars of income' are concerned. The assessee's 
liability under the clause will be the same as before the 
amendment of the provision. In other words, the penalty 
cannot be imposed on an assessee, unless it is proved 
beyond doubt that the 'furnishing of inaccurate particulars 
of such income' was intentional and that the assessee was 
conscious of the commission of the offence at the time when 
it was being committed. It is said that, though the word 
'deliberately* does not appear in the first part of clause 
(c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act of 1961 
(and section 28 of the Act of .1922), it was implicit in the 
word 'concealment*. Similarly, the presence of the word 
'deliberately* would be inferred in the latter part of the
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clause before 'furnished inaccurate particulars of scuh 
income1
Reliance is placed on the decision of the Madras
157
High Court in Radha Rukmani Ammal v. Q.I.T., Madras and
58other cases discussed earlier*^ in support of this view.
The emphasis is directed towards the statement of Rajgopalan
J., in Hadha Rukmani Ammal case that:
"... Notwithstanding the absence of the qualifying word 
'deliberately' in the first alternative referring to 
concealment, undoubtedly the concealment also has to be 
conscious and so a.deliberate: act, which is involved on 
the very expression 'concealed'.1' 59
According to the other view, the omission of the 
word 'deliberately' from the latter part of the clause (c) 
and the addition of an explanation at the end of sub-clause 
(iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act of 1961 
is of special significance. It is maintained that the 
legislature in India for the first time has taken a bold 
step to ensure that the tax dodgers, enemy No. I in Indian 
society, may not take shelter behind the established 
criminal law doctrine of mens re a, v/hich is now completely 
excluded from consideration when the assessee has 'furnished* 
inaccurate particulars of income*. The combined effect of 
the amendment is that the penalty can now be imposed, even 
if the furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income' is 
not intentional, but is the result of gross or wilful
57. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 568.
58. See supra pp • 301-4 for other cases.
59. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 568, 570 (para 9).
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neglec^or is accidental^ • The Explanation clause makes a 
drastic change in the procedure, inasmuch as the burden of 
proof is cast upon a taxpayer where the income returned by
him turns out to be less than 80 per cent of the income
assessed*
This view appears to be more appropriate and in 
conformity with the object of the legislation*
It is submitted that whether there has been
* i
concealment or’furnishing of inaccurate particulars of 
income' is a question of fact to be determined in the
circumstances of each caae . No hard and fast rule can be
laid down. The relevant facts ane the magnitude of the 
amount omitted, the method of accounting adopted, the nature
61of the transactions and the evidence adduced by the assessee. '
60. 'The Law and Practice of Income Tax'. J.B. Kanga and N*A. 
Palkhiwala (6th ed. 1969) Vol.I, p. 1038.
61. 'Penalty Provisions under the Income Tax Act and health
Tax Act- Legal Aspects of Implications and Justification 
of Recent Changes; Report on 3rd All India Conference of 
Tax Executives, R.S. Gae. (1968) p. 104. R . Bras ad Mohan 
Lai v . I.T.A. Tribunal, A.I.R. 1970 All 620, 630 (para27)
TTTr . ).
62. C.I.T.. M.P.. Nagpur v. Punjabhai Shah Chindwara, A.T.R. 
1968 M.B. 105; re Lachmondas Bra.iballabhbas. 1942 I*T. R. 
186 (All); Lachmindra Mahrchand v. Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal. 1944 I.T.R. 432 (Lahore); C.I.T.. Madras, v.
V.V. Venaktaramiiah. A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 579, 581.
63. Supra note 82, at p. 910. Appavoo Pillai v. C.I.T., Madras 
A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 406; C.I.T*. A.P. v. M/s.Ravalaseema Oil 
Mills. A.I.R. 1971 A.P. 34 see Cliford v. I.R.C., tN.Z.) 
~Cl96e>J A.I.T.R. 35; C.I.R. v. Brethey , (1961) N.Z.L.R. 
245. It was held that substantial understatement of 
income may by themselves furnish evidence of guilt. See
'Current Problems in Tax Braud'. Paul P. Lipton, 1955. 
Wisconsin L.R. 416, 438.
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The Courts will not ordinarily interfere with the amount of 
the penalty imposed by the Income Tax authorities under the 
clause, unless their discretion has been exercised
A.
arbitrarily .
Failure to Furnish Returns or Comply with Notices
The provision relating to the imposition of a penalty 
for failure to furnish a return of income in time, as 
required under the Act, and to comply with notices to
j
produce accounts, documents and other information for the
purposes of assessment was put on the statute book in 1939.
The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, (7 of 1939) added clauses
(a) and (b) to sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Act of
1922 and provided a penalty for such defaults. The Income
Tax Act, 1961, has reproduced those provisions with some
modifications in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of
section 271. These provisions axe as follows:
"Section 271 Cl) If the Income Tax or the Appellate 
Assistant Commissioner, in the course of any proceedings 
under this Act, is satisfied that any person -
(a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the 
return of ( )®5 total income, which he was required
to furnish under sub-section (1) of section 139 or by 
notice given unddr sub-section (2) of section 139 or 
section 148 or has without reasonable cause, failed to 
furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner
64* Re Gropaldas Pursfr&ttam Pas (1941) 9 I.T.R. 372 (All).
65. The word 'his' was deleted by the Income Tax (Amendment 
Act (13 of 1963).
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required by sub-section (1) of section 139 or by such 
notice, as the case may be, or
(b) has without reasonable cause failed to comply with 
a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub­
section (2) of section 143,
• t * •
he may direct that such person shall pay by way of 
penalty, -
(i) in the cases referred to in clause (a), in 
addition to the amount of tax, if any, payable by him, 
a sum equal to two per cent, of the tax for every month 
during which the default continued, but not exceeding 
in the aggregate fifty per cent of the tax;
(ii) in the case referred to in clause (b), in addition 
to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less 
than ten per cent but which shall not exceed fifty per 
cent of the amount of the tax, if any, which would have 
been avoided if the income returned by such person had 
been accepted as the correct income.”
The present provision differs from the corresponding 
provisions of the Act of 1922 (Section 28(l)(a) and (b), in 
two respects. Firstly, it provides for imposition of 
minimum penalty in cases of defaults committed under clauses
(a) and (b) of section 271(1)• There was no such provision 
in the Act of 1922. Secondly, the maximum penalty imposable 
has been reduced as compared with the corresponding clauses
of section 28(1) of the Act of 1922^.
Unlike clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271,
67clauses (a) and (b) recognize 'reasonable cause* as a good
excuse for defaults committed under the clauses.
66. See infra p.322 for S.28(1) (a) and (b).
67♦ Similar defence is available in the case of criminal. 
prosecution under sections 276,276A and 276B of the Act. 
See Chapter 8, pp#354,363-5 . - and Chapter 2 pp. 55-67 
for meaning of 'reasonable and sufficient cause'.
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Clause (a) provides for the imposition of a penalty 
for failure to furnish a return* It contemplates two kinds 
of default, viz., one committed when no notice is given and
go
the other committed after notice . For instance, the
formenpart of the clause provides for the imposition of a
penalty in case of default committed under section 139(1)
of the Act, which creates a statutory obligation to furnish .
69a return of income suo motu by or before a particular 
date, whereas the latter part of the clause provided penalty 
for failure to file a return after due notice under section 
139(2)*^, or section 148^ or after expiry of the time 
allowed beyond the statutory limit provided in section 139(1) 
of the Act.
In C.I.T. Ra.iasthan v. Messrs. Indra and Company.
72Jodhpurj the question was whether the assessee's fault of 
failure to file a return of income, suo motu. as required 
under section 139(1) of the Act, is condoned by the 
submission of a return in reply to the Income Tax Officers 
notice under section 139(2) of the Act.
68. C.I.T. Rajasthan v. Messrs. Indra and Company A.I.R.
1970 Raj. 2 6 7* 209 (para 3) •
69* There was no such provision in the repealed Act of 1922, 
see chapter 2, pp 30,31*
70. See Chapter 2, p.49 for section 139(2).
71. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 148 authorizes the
Income Tax Officer to issue notice for reassessment 
where income has escaped assessment.
72. A.I.R. 1970 Raj. 207.
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The respondent, a registered firm, and one of its 
partners, Jivalal Maheshwari, did not submit their income 
tax returns as required under section 139(1) of the Act on 
or before the 30th June 1962. They asked for an extension ]
■I
of time for filing their returns several times, though this 
was granted no return was filed, until after a notice under '
section 139(2) of the Act, they filed a return on 25*4.63. I
During the course of assessment, the Income Tax Officer issued | 
notices to the assessee to show cause why a penalty should j
not be imposed for failure to submit the return under section j
139(1) of the Act. In the absence of a reasonable explanation, j 
the Income Tax Officer imposed a penalty under section 271
(l)(a) of the Act.
The Court rightly rejected the assesseefs contention
that, as soon as notices under section 139(2) of the Act
were issued, the delay in filing the returns under section
139(1) was condoned by the Income Tax Officer, so that no
action could be taken against him for not filing the returns
in time as laid down in section 139(1) of the Act. Their
Lordships declined to recognize the theory of implied
condonation. Bhadari, C.J. delivering the judgement of the
Court, said that:
“...Unless there is any express order for condonation 
of such default, we cannot take it that the Income Tax 
Officer, merely because he has issued a notice under 
Section 139(2) to a person who has not filed the return 
under section 139(1) must be taken to have condoned his 
default in not furnishing the return under Section 139$1)73S
73* Ibid. p. 209 (para 6)
321
Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the 
Income lax Act, 1961, provides for the imposition of a penalty 
in case of failure to produce accounts, documents, total 
wealth statements and other information and for failure to 
attend at the Income Tax Officer’s office or to produce 
evidence on which he relies in support of the return, on 
receipt of a notice issued under sections 142(1) and 143(2) 
of.the Act.
In the fairly recent case in the Mysore High Court
74of Narayanappa and Brothers v. C.I.T#, Mysore , (under the
repealed Act of 1922), the question was whether the Income
Tax authorities can levy penalties on an assessee both under
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 28, when
the assessee has committed a default by not filing a return at
all, though required to do so by a notice under section 22(2)^
of the Act and by further not complying with a notice under
section 22(4)^of the Act of 1922.
The assessee, a Hindu undivided family, committed
default in furnishing its return for the assessment years
1951-52 to 1954—55» in spite of a notice issued under
sections 22(2) and 22(4)* Accordingly, the Income Tax
77
Officer completed the assessment under section 23(4) of
74. I.L.R# (1961) Mysore 77.
75• Income Tax Act, 1922, section 22(2) provided provisions 
similar to that of section 139 (2) of the Act of 1961.
76. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 22(4) corresponds to 
section 142(1) of the Act of 1961. See Chapter 2 p. 50.
77. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 23(4) provided for ’best 
judgement assessment*. Section 144 of the Act of 1961 
contains similar provisions. See Chapter 2, pp.51-52.
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the Act* Thereafter the Income Tax Officer issued notices 
to show cause why penalties should not be imposed for failure 
to furnish a return under section 2 2(2 ) and for failure to 
produce accounts, as required by notice under section 2 2(4 ); 
after hearing the assessee, the Income Tax Officer imposed 
penalties under both clauses, 28(l)(a) and 28(l)(b) of the 
Act* The relevant portions of sub-clause (a) and clause (b) 
provides
M28(l). If the Income Tax Officer**. is satisfied that 
any person-
(a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the 
return of his total income which he was required to 
furnish by notice given under ••• sub-section (2 ) of 
section 2 2, or ••• , or
(b) has without reasonable cause failed to comply with 
a notice under sub-section (4 ) of section 22 ••*
• • •
he «• • may direct that such person shall pay by way of 
penalty, in the case referred to in clause (a), in 
addition to the amount of the income tax and super tax, 
if any, payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and a 
half times that amount, and in the case referred to in 
clauses (b) ••*, in addition to any tax payable by him, 
a sum not exceeding one and a half times the amount of 
the income tax and super tax, if any, which would have 
been avoided if the income as returned by such person 
had been accepted as the correct income. ’1
The assessee conceded liability under clause (a) of 
sub-section (1) of section 28, but not under clause (b) of 
sub-section (1) of section 28* He contended that no penalty 
could be imposed under section 28(1)(b) for failure to 
produce accounts when called upon to do so under section 
2 2(4 ), until such failure preceded by the furnishing of a 
return under section 22(2) of the Act, because, it would not 
be possible to calculate the penalty under the provisions of
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the Act, if there was no return at all.
The Court agreed with the assessee and answered
the question in the negative. The Court said that:
"... {wjhere a penalty is proposed to be imposed under 
section 28(1)(b), the maximum penalty which could be 
so imposed is a sum representing one and a half times 
the difference between the tax payable on the income 
returned by the assessee and the tax payable on the 
income as determined under the Act. The two factors, 
on the basis of which the amount of the penalty payable 
can be determined by the Income Tax Officer, are the 
tax payable by the assessee on the return furnished by 
him and the tax as determined by the Income Tax Officer 
by the assessment made by him under the Act. If an 
assessee did not at all furnish a return to the Income 
Tax Officer, though called upon to do so under section 
2 2(2 ), one of the factors which should form the basis 
for the quantification of the penalty being non-existent, 
it seems ... clear that it would not be possible at all 
for an Income Tax Officer to impose any penalty on such 
assessee •••• (T]he words f,the income as returned by 
such person* (as used under section 28(l)(b) )... make 
it clear that for the imposition of penalty under 
section 28(l)(b) the indispensable condition precedent 
is that before the assessee commits the default 
referred to in section 28(l)(b), such default must have 
been preceded by the production of a return under 
section 2 2(2 ) !,.7 8
It is submitted, with respect, that the High Court 
view needs revision. The two faults under clause (a) and 
clause (b) are independent of each other and they may take 
place simultaneously. In such a case, where the assessee 
has not furnished a return at all, it should be presumed for 
the purposes of section 28(1)(b) by legal fiction that he 
has furnished a return of his income informing the Income 
Tax Officer that his income was nil and the penalty should
78. I.I.E. (1961) Mysore 77 a-fc pp# 80,81.
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be calculated on that basis. Holding otherwise will 
encourage default in making returns and create obstacles in 
the calculation of the penalty under section 28(1)(b ) of 
the Act.
7 q
In C.I.T.. Delhi v. Tela Singh. J a somewhat similar 
situation arose, in which the Court held the assessee liable 
to a penalty under section it8 A(9)(b) read with section 28 of 
the Act of 1922, for failure to submit the estimate of 
advance tax, as required under section 18A(3). It was held 
that the failure to submit an estimate of advance tax 
amounted to a failure to file a return by legal fiction and 
that the necessary notice was issued for the purpose of 
imposing a penalty.
Failure to Furnish Information Regarding Securities. Dividends
and Discontinuance of Business. — —
As discussed earlier , the Income Tax Act, 1961, 
has made provision in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2 ) of 
section 94 to prevent tax avoidance by certain transactions 
in shares and securities, known as bond-washing and sale of 
securities cum-interest or shares cum-dividend. In order to 
facilitate the cumbersome and difficult task of checking 
tax avoidance, sub-section (6 ) of section 94 has empowered 
the Income Tax Officer to issue a notice in order to extract 
the necessary information in this regard from an assessee. 
Sub-section (6 ) states:
79. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352. See infra pp. 330-31.
80. See Chapter 3> PP* 8 6 , 122.
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“The Income Tax Officer may* by notice in writing, 
require any person to furnish him within such time 
as he may direct (not being less than twenty-eight 
days), in respect of all securities of which such 
person was the owner or in which he had a beneficial 
interst at any time during the period sepcified in 
the notice, such particulars as he considers necessary 
for the purpose of this section and for the purpose 
of discovering whether income tax has been borne in 
respect of the interest on all those securities,”
Compliance with the notice is obligatory on the part
of the assessee. In case of failure to furnish the
information, required, the assessee would be liable to a
penalty under section 270 of the Act of 1961, which states:
”... such person shall pay by way of penalty a sum 
not exceeding five hundred rupees and by way of 
further penalty a like amount for every day after 
the infliction of such penalty during which the 
failure continues.”
Similar provisions regarding penalties are found in
sub-section (6) of section 44E and sub-section (5) of section
44F of the repealed Income Tax Act of 1922.
Section 176 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, gives power
to the Income Tax Officer to make an assessment in case of
discontinuance of any business, profession or vocation, in
the year of discontinuance on the entire business income
from the end of the previous year relevant to the assessment
year till the date of discontinuance. The Income Tax Officer
81
need not wait for assessment until the usual financial year 
With a view to expedite assessment, sub-section (3) of 
section 176 makes it obligatory on the part of the person 
discontinuing a business, profession or vocation, to give
y. Srinivasas and Gopalan (195^  9^ t.T-P. P7 (g r. )
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a notice of discontinuance to the Income lax Officer within 
fifteen days of such discontinuance. The requirement of 
notice is obligatory; failure on the part of the person 
responsible makes him liable to a penalty under section 
272 of the Income Tax Act, 196182. Section 272 of the Act 
says:
"Where any person fails to give notice of discontinuance 
of his business or profession, as required by sub­
section (3) of section 176, the Income Tax Officer may 
direct that a sum shall be recovered from him by way of 
penalty, which shall not be less than ten per cent of
the tax but which shall not exceed the amount of tax
subsequently assessed on him in respect of any income 
of the business or profession up to the date of its 
discontinuance.1
Section 272 of the Act of 1961, is distinguishable
from its corresponding provision in section 25(2) of the
repealed Act of 1922, in one respect. The former provides
for a minimum penalty of 10 per cent of the tax in case of
default tinder the section, whereas the latter did not
provide any such minimum.
False Estimate and Failure to Pay Tax in Advance
Section 273 of the Act of 1961 provides for
imposition of penalty in a case of false estimate of or 
failure to pay advance tax as required under the Act • 
Section 273®^ of the Act states that:
82. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 25(2) corresponded to 
section 272 of the Act of 1961#
83- See supra pp.268-79 for provisions relating to the 
advance tax.
84* ^he present section has been substituted for the original
section of the Act by section 22 of the Finance Act (1 4
of 1969) with effect from April 1, 1970. See *Advance
Payment of Tax1. B.L. Kabra, 4th All India Conference 
01 Tax Executives (1969), p. 177.
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“If the Income Tax Officer, in the course of any 
proceedings in connection with the regular assessment 
•.•, is satisfied that any assessse: -
(a) has furnished under section 212 an estimate of 
advance tax payable by him which he knew or had reason 
to believe to be untrue, or
(b) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish an 
estimate of the advance tax payable by him in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-section (3; of section 212, or
(c) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish an 
estimate of the advance tax payable bv him in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 212, 
he may direct that such person shall, in addition to the 
amount of tax, if any, payable by him, pay by way of 
penalty a sum -
(i) which in the case referred to in clause (a), shall 
not be less than ten per cent but shall not exceed one 
and a half times the amount by which the tax actually 
paid during the financial year . falls short of-
(1) seventy-five per cent of the assessed tax ..., or
(2) where a notice under section 210 was issued to the 
assessee, the amount payable thereunder, whichever is 
less;
(ii) ... in clause (b), shall not be less than ten per 
cent but shall not exceed one and a half times of 
seventy-five per cent of the assessed tax..*; and
(iii) ... in clause (c), shall not be less than ten per 
cent but shall not exceed one and a half times the 
amount by which the tax payable under the notice issued 
to the assessee under section 210 falls short of 
seventy-five per cent of the assessed tax...1
Section 273 of the Act of 1961 differs from its
corresponding provision in sub-section (9) of section 18A
of the repealed Act of 1922, in two respects. Firstly,
section 273 states the conditions under which a false
estimate or failure to furnish an estimate of advance tax
will attract a penalty and afterwards lay down the amount
of penalty to be imposed in such cases, whereas section
18A(9) did not state the amount of penalty. The penalty
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for default contemplated under section 18(A)(9) was imposed 
under section 28(1) of the Act of 1 9 2 2. Secondly, the 
penalty under section 273 could only be attracted, if the 
advance tax paid on the basis of the assessee1s own 
estimate were less than 75 per cent of the tax determined 
on regular assessment, whereas, the proviso to sub-section
Q C
(9 ) of section 18A provided a margin of 20 per cdnt only.
Section 273 of the Act of 1 9 6 1, like section 18A(9),
contemplates an assessee1s liability in two cases. In clause
(a) it is dependent on the assessee*s knowledge and in
clauses (b) and (c) on the basis of lack of the reasonable
care necessary under the circumstances^ J.
In 19^5 9 a question came before the Madras High Court
87
in Appavoo Pillai v. C.I.T.. Madras , a case under section 
18A(9) of the Act of 1 9 2 2, was whether the assessee*s 
failure to furnish a correct estimate of advance tax would 
be deemed intentional so as to attract the penalty under
85. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18A(9)> proviso states: 
'‘Provided that the amount of penalty leviable shall, in 
the case referred to in clause (a), be a sum not 
exceeding one and a half times the amount by which the 
tax actually paid during the year under the provisions 
of this section falls short of the tax that should have 
been paid by the assessee under sub-section (1) eighty 
per cent of the tax determined on the basis of the 
regular assessment as modified in the manner provided in 
sub-section (6 ), whichever is less, and in the case 
referred to in clause (b), one and a half times the said 
eighty per cent. ' 1
8 6. H.V.H. Hagappa Chettiar v. 1.1.0. Pudukattai A.I.E. 1959 
Mad. 205, at p. 208.
87. A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 406.
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section 28(1) of the Act.
The assessee submitted an estimate of his income in 
pursuance of the Income Tax Officer*s demand under section
g o
18A(1) of the Act, to pay tax in advance# The assessee
estimated his income from all sources at Es. 35>515* This
sum was far below the amount calculated on assessment,
which amounted to Es# 90,759* Accordingly, the Income Tax
Officer imposed a penalty under section T8A(9) read with
section 28(l)(c)8^, as the estimate of income was found to
be untrue to the knowledge of the assessee and he did not
produce any satisfactory basis for his estimate# Section
18A(9) provided as under:
tfIf the Income Tax Officer, in the course of any 
,proceedings in connection with the regular assessment 
is satisfied that any assessee-
88# Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18A(l)(a) = (Income Tax 
Act. 1961, section 207(1), 208(a), 209, 210(1) & (2),
211 (1) provided that:
f,In the case of income in respect of which provision is 
not made ••• for deduction of income tax at the time of 
payment, the Income Tax Officer may, on or after the 1st 
day of April in any financial year,#.# require an 
assessee to pay quarterly to the credit of the Central 
Government on the 15th day of June, 15th day of September, 
15th day of December and 15th day of March in that year, 
respectively, an a m o u n t  equal to one quarter of the income 
tax and super tax payable on so much of such income as 
is included in his total income of the latest previous 
year in respect of which he has been assessed, if that 
income exceeded the maximum amount not chargeable to tax 
in his case by two thousand five hundred rupees#...u
89* See supra p. 285 for text of section 28(l)(c).
(a) has furnished ... estimates of the tax payable 
by him which he knew or had reason to believe to be 
untrue, or
(b) has without reasonable cause failed to comply with 
the provisions of sub-section (3)*
the assessee shall be deemed, in the case referred to 
in clause (a), to have deliberately furnished inaccurate 
particulars of his income, and in the case referred to 
in clause (b), to have failed to furnish the return of 
his total income; and the provisions of section 28, so 
far as may be, shall apply accordingly*rt
It was rightly held that the disparity between the 
estimate (Rs.35>515) and the finally assessed figure 
(Rs* 90,759) was so great that it left no room for doubt 
that the under-estimate was deliberate and intentional. The 
contentions that the assessee thought his estimate represented 
the probable income and that it was made honestly could not 
be accepted under the circumst&nces.
In C.I.T* * Delhi v * Te.ia Singh^ ,  (a case under the 
Act of 1922) the question which arose before the Supreme 
Court was whether the Income Tax Officer eould impose a
Q1
penalty under section 18A(9)(b) read with section 28(l)(a)^ 
on a person, who had failed to furnish an estimate of advance 
tax payable under section 18A(3)^2within the time required.
90. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352.
91. See supra p.322 for the text of section 28(1)•
92. Section 18A(3) provided that:
”Any person who has not hitherto been assessed shall 
before the 15th day of March in each financial year, if 
his total income of the period ... is likely to exceed 
the maximum amount not chargeable to tax in his case by 
two thousand five hundred rupees, send to the Income Tax 
Officer an estimate of the tax payable by him ... and 
shall pay the amount, on such of the dates specified
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The assessees (two in number), who had not 
previously been assessed, aubmitted returns of their income 
fsuo motu1under section 18A(3) of the Act. As the returns 
were submitted after the 15th day of March which concluded 
the1 statutory period1 within which the estimate had to be 
filed, the Income Tax Officer imposed a penalty under section 
18A(9)(b) read with section 28(1) of the Act.
The assessee contended (and the High Court agreed) that 
liability under section 18A(b) read with section 28(l)(a) 
accrued only when a person failed to furnish the return he was 
required so to do by notice under section 22 or section 34> 
and no such notices could be issued with reference to 
estimates of tax on income to be sent under section 18A(3)„.
Their Lordships, while rejecting the appellant's
contention held that the failure to send an estimate of Tax
under section 18A(3) is treated as failure to furnish a
return of income under section 22 by a legal fiction and
the true effect of that fiction is that it imports that
notice has been issued. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for
the Court said:
"... On the construction contended for by the 
respondent, S. 18A(9)(b) would become wholly nugatory, 
as Ss. 22(1) and 22(2) can have no application to 
advance estimates to be furnished under S. 18A(3)> &nd 
if we accede to this contention, we must hold that 
though the legislature enacted S. 18A(9)(b) with the 
very object of bringing the failure to send estimates 
under H.18A(3) within the operation of S.28, it 
signally failed to achieve its object. A contruction 
which leads to such a result must, if that is possible, 
be avoided on the principle expressed in the maxim,
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*ut res magis valea qugm pereat1, Vide Curtis v. Stovin 
(1889) 22 Q.B.D. 513."55 ~ “ !
However, as the present Act of 1961 has provided a
penalty under a separate section 273, unlike the Act of
1922, for failure to submit a return, no difficulty can
now arise.
Penalties Outside Chapter 21.
The Act of 1961 provides penalties in three cases, 
which are not covered by Chapter 21. These ares
(i) For failure to comply with the provisions of a 
summons issued by an assessing officer;
(ii) For failure in payment of tax on self-assessment 
and
(iii) For non-payment of tax.
Sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 131^of the Act 
confer the powers of a court of law on the Income Tax 
authorities in regard to discovery and inspection, 
production of books, , evidence and eliciting of information 
necessary for proper levying of taxes^ ♦ And sub-section
(2) provides for the imposition of a fine in case of 
failure to comply with such orders. There was no such 
provision in the earlier Act of 1922. Sub-section (2) of 
section 131 states:
93. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352 at pp. 355,356 (para 9).
94. The provisions of this section correspond to sub-sections
(l) and (3) of section 37 of the Act of 1922.
95. Supra note 60, p. 685. Union of India v. State (1961) 42 
I.T.R. 753; G-anpatrai Rawatmull v. Collector of Land 
Customs (1961) 42 I.T.R. 107.
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"•♦• [w)here a person to whom a summons is issued 
either to attend to give evidence or produce books 
of account or other documents at a certain place and 
time, intentionally omits to attend or produce the 
books of account or documents at the place or time, 
the Income Tax authority may impose upon him such 
fine, not exceeding five hundred rupees, as it thinks 
f i t , • • •11
This is a step in the right direction and will 
go a long way towards helping the authorities to get the 
necessary evidence for ascertaining the veracity of the 
assesseefs return of income.
In 1964, section 140A relating to self-assessment, 
was inserted by the Finance Act (5 of 1964), in the Act of 
1961, with effect from the 1st April, 1964*^ Sub-section
(1) of section 140A makes it obligatory on the part of an 
assessee, who makes a return of his total income under 
sedtion 139, if the tax payable on the basis of the said 
return less any tax already paid exceeds Rs.500, to pay the 
sum due within thirty days of furnishing the return. Non- 
fulfilment of the statutory requirement makes the assessee 
liable to a penalty, which may extend to 50 per cent of the 
amount of tax unpaid under sub-section (3) of section 140A.
Section 140A (3) states as follows:
"If any assessee fails to pay the tax or any part 
thereof in accordance with the provisions of sub­
section (1), he shall, unless a provisional assessment
96. Similar provisions are contained in the United States of 
America. See fSelf Assessments1• Personal Income Tax: 
The American System, Harry Gr. Johnson "l1971) B_*T*R. 
78-85* Self assessment has been introduced in limited 
cases in the United Kingdom with effect from October 5, 
1970. See (1970) British Tax Review p.282.
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under sdction 141 or a regular assessment under section 
143 or section 144 lias been made before the expiry of 
thirty days..., be liable, by way of penalty, to pay 
such amount as the Income Tax Officer may direct, so 
however, that the amount of penalty does not exceed 
fifty per cent of the amount of such tax or part, as 
the case may be:
Provided that before levying any such penalty the 
assessee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard.”
The liability for failure to pay tax appears to be
absolute, inasmuch as the legislature has not included
such words as 'deliberately1, 'knowingly', or 'without
reasonable cause or excuse' as in other penal provisions in 
97the Act • This view receives support from the use of the 
word 'shall' in the clause, i.e., Income Tax Officer must 
impose the penalty 'unless a provisional assessment... has 
been made'. However, in the absence of any case on the 
point it remains to be seen how the courts will interpret 
the clause.
The Income Tax Act, 1961, in section 221, like the 
earlier Income Tax Acts of 1922^8 , 1918®^ and 1886^ provides 
penalties for default in making payment of tax, including 
advance tax. Section 220 states that any tax, interest, 
penalties, fines or any other sum’ specified in the notice 
of demand under section 156 should be paid within 35 days of
97* See , sections 270,271(1)(a), (b) and (c), and 273* at 
pp. 325, .317-18, 286-87 and 327 respectively.
98. Income Tax Act,, 1922, sections 46(1; and 46 (1 A).
99* Income Tax Act, 1918, section 36(1).
1. Income Tax Act, 1886, Section 30(l).
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the service of the notice, unless a shorter period is
notified under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section
220. An assessee who does not pay the tax due or advance 
2
tax so demanded within the period specified in the notice
of demand or the extended time is deemed to be in default
and is required to pay the penalty under section 221 of the
Act. Section 221 provides that:
”221.(1). When an assessee is in default or is deemed 
to be in default in making a payment of tax, he shall, 
in addition to the amount of the arrears and the amount
of interest payable under sub-section (2) of section
220, be liable to pay, by way of penalty, an amount 
which, in the case of a continuing default, may be 
increased from time to time, so, however, that the 
total amount of penalty does not exceed the amount of 
tax in arrears:
Provided that, before levying any such penalty, the 
assessee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being 
heard.”
In order to attract the penalty under section 221, 
two conditions must be satisfied. One is that notice must 
be given and the other is failure to pay the tax^. Section 
221 is wide enough to impose a penalty in case of failure
2. Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 218 states that:
”218(1) If any assessee does not pay on the specified 
date any instalment of advance tax that he is required 
to pay ..., he shall be deemed to be an assessee in 
default in respect of such instalment or instalments.
(2) If any assessee has sent an estimate or a revised 
estimate of the advance tax payable by him, but does not 
pay any instalment in accordance therewith on the date or 
dates specified,... he shall be deemed to be an assessee 
in default...”
3. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 220(3)*
4. C.I.T. v. Mohd. Abdul Rahiman Sait A.I.E. 1960 Ker. 345» 346. 
Additional Income Tax Officer v. E. Alfred A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 
663, at p. 666 (para 8).
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of payment of any tax, including advance tax and tax
payable under a provisional assessment • An assessee is
deemed to be in default if he fails to pay a particular
instalment of advance tax on the due date, in the same way
as if no tax had been paid and the assessee will incur a
7
penalty on that account . The subsequent revision of a
statement does not wipe out default in payment of an
instalment due8.
The Supreme Court held in Additional Income Tax 
q
Officer v. E. Alfred, the word 'assessee in default1 in 
section 46(1) of the Act of 1922, analogous to section 
221(1) of the Act of 1961, is wide enough to include 'legal
5* S. Harayanappa and Brothers v. I.T.C. A.I.R# 1960 Mysore 40. 
It was held that advance tax, being a tax in relation to 
the income of the assessee, was to be regarded as income 
tax. It is submitted with respect that the contrary view 
held by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench 'C* , 
Ahmedabad in Income Tax Appeal No. 15576 of 1964-65 decided 
on 23*2.1968 (as reported in 4th All India Conference of 
Tax Executives, 1969* p*184)* is incorrect.
6. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 233*
7* A.K.Bashu. Sahib v. I.T.C. (1967) 66 I.T.R. 20; J.N. Putt 
v. C.I.T., 'Bihar and Orissa A.I.R. 1959 Pat 34*
8. Ibicn
9. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 663; C.I.T. Kerala v. Mohd.Abdul Rahiman 
Sait A.I.R. 1960 Ker 345. It was held that a penalty 
could not be imposed on the heir of the deceased. It is 
submitted the decision does not hold good in view of the 
Supreme C ourt's j udgement•
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10representatives1 • A legal representative will be liable
for default in payment of tax due in the same manner and to
the same extent as an ordinary assessee would be liable
11under the same circumstances
An assessee must be given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard, before imposition of the penalty under this 
12section • The order imposing a penalty must specify the 
amount of penalty , and the exact date for payment of tax# 
An assessee will not be liable for failure to pay the tax 
on the due date if the Income Tax Officer makes a mistake in 
mentioning the date of payment in his order.
In K.M. Abbu Qhettier v# Income Tax Officer^ , a 
notive was issued against the assessee under section 18A
10. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 2(29) states that ’legal 
representative1 has the meaning assigned to it in section 
2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, (5 of 1908), which 
runs as follows: 'legal representative' means a person 
who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, 
and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate 
of the deceased and, where a party sues or is sued in a 
representative character, the person on whom the estate 
devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued11.
11. Section 159 deals with liability of 'Legal representative' 
Sukumar Mukherjee v. C.I.T. (1958) 35 I»T.R. 231; Madhu 
Appa bao v. 1.1.0.(1959) 36 I.T.R. 140 C.R. Nagoppa v. 
C.I.T.A.I.R.~19g9. S.C. 888
12. There was no such provision in the Act of 1922.
N.H. Kotak v. C.I.T.. Bombay City A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 242
13., A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 388.
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pay advance tax for the year 1952-53* The Income Tax
Officer when fixing the date for payment of the instalments
instead of specifying the 15th September 1954, 15th December
1954 and 15th March, 1955, as the due dates, specified the
corresponding dates of the succeeding year* The Assessee
did not make any payment on 15*9#1954 and the Income Tax
Officer imposed a penalty for default in payment of tax.
It was held that no penalty could be imposed for failure to
pay the tax on 15th September, 1954, because the date
mentioned was 15th September, 1955*
There is a difference of opinion amongst the
Allahabad and the Kerala High Courts regarding the question
whether a penalty can be levied for default in payment of
a penalty already imposed*
The Allahabad High Court in Choteylalt Kanpur v.
I*T.O.* *0* Ward* Allahabad^ .  relying on the decision of
15the Supreme Court in C*A. Abraham v* I*T*C. , Hottayam
16and C*I*T*« Andhra Pradesh v. Messrs* Bhika.ji Dadabhai , 
that the penalty imposed in assessment proceedings amounts 
to additional tax, held that the penalty could be imposed 
for non-payment of the penalty.
14. (1962) 46 I.T.R. 762 jAll).
15. A.I.R. 1961 S.O. 609.
16. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1265.
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On the other hand, the Kerala High Court expressed its
dissent from the Allahabad view in P . Kunhalumina v. I.T.O. t
B fWardf * CalicutT The Court, relying on its earlier
decisions in Padmanabha Menon Krishan Menon v. C.I.T.
18
Bangalore , and M.W. Mathew v. Ilnd Additional I.T.O.,
19Kottayam , held no penalty could be imposed for non-payment 
of penalty.
It is submitted, with great respect, that the Kerala
view does not appear to be sound or in conformity with the
basic canons of construction of penal provisions. The
relevant penal provision would be frustrated, if no sanction
could be imposed in cases of flagrant evasion of provisions
of law. It is perhaps with this end in view that section
221 itself provides for an additional ’penalty1 in case of
20continuing default •
17. A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 173.
18. (1957) 32 I.I.E. 651.
19. A.I.R. 1956 Trancore Cochin 184.
20. See supra p.335 for section 221.
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C H A P T E R  VII
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Penalties Provided in Earlier Income Tax Acts.
As is evident from its title, the present chapter 
is concerned with questions of criminal liability for tax 
crimes♦
While the object of administrative sanctions is to
safeguard the revenue by rendering evasion unprofitable and
to reimburse the State for heavy losses caused by evasion
and avoidance , the aim of criminal sanctions is to discourage
2
future violations , to enforce public justice, to punish the 
offender for deliberate infractions of the lav; and to enforce 
payment of the tax and the penalty^". Criminal sanctions, 
unlike administrative, sanctions , are specific penalties
1. Sivagamintha Moopanar and Sons v. I.T.O., Madurai, (1955)* 
281 iVt.R/ 601 at p. 609. Helve ring v. Charles E. Mitchell, 
(1938) 303 U.S.391 at p. 401.
2.*Fraud and Federal Income Tax in the United States11,
Harold M. Groves and Arthour M. Selle Jt., 7. Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation, 1953* p.235; "Fraud 
on Federal Income Tax11* Myron L. Gordon, 32, Marq. L.R.
120; "Law of Federal Income Taxation", Randolph E. Paul 
Jacob Mertens, Vol.5. (1934)* section 48.44 at p. 457.
3. Supra note 1.
4. T.S. Baliah v. I.S. Rangachari,^.I*R«(1969) Mad. 145 at 
p. 154 {par a 497^
5. See chapter 6 for administrative sanctions.
34:i
6 7of fine and imprisonment enforced by prosecution .
It may be noted that the Income Tax statutes in 
India provided criminal sanctions long before they recognized
Q
the feasibility of imposing administrative sanctions . As
long ago as 1869^* the Income Tax Act of that year (9 Of 1869)
provided a criminal penalty for failure of an assessee to
pay tax as required under the Act* Section 25 of the Act of
1869 provided,
"If any person served with a notice...does not, within 
the period specified in the said notice, pay the amount 
required thereby, he shall on conviction before a 
Magistrate be fined twice the amount mentioned in such 
notice... u
Since then the legislature in India has progressively
tightened this system of control* However, it will be a long
time before material success is achieved*
The criminal sanctions for violation of income tax
11provisions in India, as in the United Kingdom , United
6* 'Law of Federal Income Taxation1, Randolph E. Paul, Vol.5* 
(1934) section 48.02, p. 416; "Criminal Liability for 
Evasion of Federal Income Taxes" (1941)* 86 L. ed. 392,
7. See chapter 6, f.n. 7 , at page 263.
8.The administrative sanction was provided for the first time 
in 1918 (by Act 7 of 1918) in section 24* whereas criminal
sanction was provided in 1886 (by the Act 2 of 1886) in
sections 34 to 38 of the Act.
9.See Chapter 2, p. 71 for history of taxes.
10.Quoted from The Queen v. Mudheo Putt, (1884)* 14* W.R. p.7.
11.1Halsbury1s Laws of England,Vol. 20, 3rd ed. (Simons Edition) 
1957* paras 1448, 1449 at p.720.
12 13States of America and Australia may be classified in two
categories, those within the Income Tax Act, and those outside
it •
Criminal penalties, unlike administrative penalties,
which remained scattered all over the Act until the enactment
of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961,1^ had a distinct and
conspicuous place in the Income Tax Acts since the beginning
of such legislation. This is evident from the fact that the
Income Tax Act, 1886, the first general All India Income Tax
Act, incorporated criminal provisions under a separate
heading, Penalties1, in Chapter 5 of the Act, dealing with
the 'Recovery of Arrears of Tax'. The Income Tax Act (7 of
1918), after repealing the Act of 1886, went a step further
and consolidated the criminal penalties in a separate Chapter
7, entitled: 'Offences and Penalties'. The subsequent
Income Tax Acts, of 1922 and 1961, followed suit and kept the
criminal provisions in a separate chapter, though with some
changes, and the number of sections has increased. For
instance, whereas the Income Tax Act, 1961, has eight sectiohs
15in Chapter 22 dealing with 'Offences and Prosecution' , the
12. "Tax Fraud and Evasion". Harry Graham Balter, (3rd ed., 
1963) 9 chapters 1 1.2 , 11 •3•
13* 'Gunn's Commonwealth Income Tax Law and Practice'»(6th
ed. 1966), para 3446, p. 1437, paras 3130, 3131, pp. 1417?
1413 for meaning of evasion.
14. Income Tax Act, 1961, chapter 21: 'Penalties Imposable'. 
Provisions relating to 'Interest' are still scattered all 
over the Act.
15. Income Tax Act, 1961, Chapter 22 contains 8 Sections,viz275a 
276, 276A, 276B, 277, 278, 279 and 280.
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Acts of 18861^, 19181^and 192218 had four sections only.
The Indian Income Tax Acts contemplate criminal 
prosecution for various defaults committed by a person in 
respect of duties imposed by the Act. These provisions are
similar to those in the Income Tax statutes of the United
19 20 21Kingdom , the United States of America , Australia ,
16. Income Tax Act, 1886, sections 34 to 37.
17. Income Tax Act, 1918, sections 39 to 42.
18. Income Tax Act, 1922, sections 51 to 54.
19. Taxes Management Act, 1970 (1970 c.9)> section 107 deals
with criminal liability for false statements made to 
obtain allowances.
20. Internal Revenue Code, 1954> Chapter 75 deals with Crimes, 
other offences and forfeitures in sections 7201 to 7344.
The most important provisions relating to Crimes are 
dealt with in sections 7201 to 7207; 7201; Attempt to 
evade or defeat tax, 7202: Wilful failure to collect or 
pay over tax, 7203: Wilful failure to file return, supply
information, or pay tax, 7204s Fraudulent statement or 
failure to make statement to employees, 7205s Fraudulently 
withholding exemption certificate or failure to supply 
information, 7206: Fraud and false statements, 7207:
Fraudulent returns, statements, or other documents.
21. Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act, 
1936-19699 Fart VII deals with 1 Penal Provisions and 
Prosecutions1 in sections 222 to 251. The following are 
the main sections dealing with prosecutions
sections 223: Failure to furnish returns or information, 
etc., 224: Refusal to give evidence, 227: False returns
or statements, 228: Failure to sign or false certificate, 
229: False declarations, 230: Understating income, 231: 
Fraudulent avoidance of tax, 232: Obstructing officers.
(See Income Tax law and Practice (Commonwealth), 2nd edition 
N.E. Challener and J.M. Greenwood, Australia: Law Book 
Company, 1962 with 1969 Supplement, p. 1156.
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22 23Canada and hew Zealand , though they differ in scope and
weight of the penalties. The offences under the Indian
Income Tax Act may be broadly classified into the following 
24categories ,
(i) failure to make payments or deliver returns or 
statements or to allow inspection of accounts^
(ii) failure to deduct and pay tax,
(iii) failure to give notice of winding-up of a company 
in liquidation>•
(iv) false statement in declaration,
(v) abetment of false return,
(vi) failure to co-operate in search and seizure, and
(vii) disclosure of confidential information.
22. The Income Tax of Canada, 1952, Part VI, which is designed 
to prevent avoidance or reduction of tax liability, 
provides for criminal prosecutions under sections 131 (i) 
for failure to file return, under 131(2), for failure to 
comply with or contravening provisions relating to 
withholding of tax by employers, or failure to keep books 
or records etc., under section 132 for making or 
participating in the making of a false or deceptive 
statement in a return or certificate, for evading.payment 
of a tax imposed by the Act, for making false or deceptive 
entries, or omitted to enter material particulars in 
record, wilfully evading or attempting to evade tax, and 
for conspiracy to commit such offences.
23* The Income Tax Assessment Act, (93 of 1957)* sections 33 
and 34* deal with offences and penalties.
24. fThe Indian Income Tax Act, 19221 , A.N* Aiyar, S.V. Aiyar 
and T.A. Hajgopal, 7th edition (1950), pp. 707,708. Pour 
types of offences were provided in the Act of 1922, viz., 
(i; failure to make payments or deliver returns etc.,
(ii) false statement in declaration, (iii) disclosure of 
confidential information, and (iv) failure to give 
particulars of securities.
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The Act has made distinctions between these offences, 
based " on the nature and gravity of the offence in question, 
providing heavier punsishment for the graver off ences .For Instance, 
offences falling under the first category, (i) the punishment
provided may extend to ten rupees for every day during which
25 / \default continues , whereas in cases of offences under tii;,
:(iv) and (v) the punishment may extend to two years rigorous
imprisonment^^.
The Income Tax Acts, like other taxing statutes,
impose certain obligations on a taxpayer, in order to help
the authorities in making proper and just assessments and
timely collection of taxes with a view to check and minimize
tax evasion and tax avoidance. Omission to discharge such
27statutory obligation is a penal offence . In other words,
if a person fails to perform the duties imposed under the Act,
28he is liable to prosecution, in addition to other penalties 
It may be interesting to discuss the provisions on the point 
under the various income tax statutes in the following order,
viz., the provisions unders
25. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 276.
26. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 276A, 277, and 278.
27. Similar liabilities accrue;in other^taxing statutes, viz#, 
The Sea Customs Act, (8 of 1878;, section 167, 168; The 
Indian Stamp Act, (2 of 1899)> sections 62 to 72; The 
Central Excise and Salt Act, (1 of 1944)>sections 9, 17,
24 and 27; The Central Sales Tax Act, (64 of 1956), 
sections 10 and 10A; the Wealth Tax (27 of 1957) section 
18 deals with penalty for concealment and S. 36 with
prosecution; The Expenditure Tax Act (29 of 1957),
sections 17 provides for penalty for concealment and 
section 32. for prosecution; The Gift Tax Act, (18 of 
1958), section 17 deals with penalty for default and 
concealment and S. 35 with prosecution.
28. See Chapter 6, pp. 317-18,324-27 , .
3 AS
(a) The Income Taz Act, 1886,
(b) The Income Tax Act, 1918
(c) The Income Tax Act, 1922, and
(d) The Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Income Tax Act, 1886, provided for the prosecution 
of a taxpayer who failed to 'make payments or deliver returns 
of statements. Sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act 
states that;
"If a person fails-
(a) to deduct and pay any tax as required by section 8,
PQ
sub-section (1) or section 13, sub-section (1) , or
(b) to deliver or cause to be delivered to the Collector,
in due time the return or statement mentioned in section
31 3210 or section 11, , or
(c) to produce or cause to be produced, on or before the
■2 2
date mentioned in a notice under section 12^ , such 
amounts as are referred to in the notice,
29* Income Tax Act, 1886, section 8(1) laid down the mode of 
payment in cases of servants and pensioners of local 
authorities, i.e., the tax was to be deducted at source.
30. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 13(1.) states the mode of 
payment of tax on interest and on securities; it was to 
be deducted at source.
31. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 10 provided for the delivery 
of an annual return to the Collector by the principal 
officer of the Company or association.
32. Income Tax Act, -1886, section 11, prescribed, for the 
annual statement of net profits made by companies to be 
submitted to the Collector yearly.
33. Income Tax Act 1886, section 12 gave power to the 
Collector to require officers of companies to produce 
qccounts, if he had reason to believe that a statement 
submitted under section 11 was incorrect or incomplete.
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((d) to furnish within the specified period a return
34 \35required of him under section 14-A ,)
he shall, on conviction before a Magistrate, be 
punishable with a fine which may extend to ten rupees 
for every day during which the default continues.u
A remarkable feature of the Act of 1886 was that it 
imposed absolute liability in eases of default under sub­
section (l), of section 34 of the Act. A person was liable 
to be prosecuted for failure to act according to the 
provisions laid down in the aforesaid sub-section and a 
reasonable cause or excuse was no defence as it was in the
'Z r
corresponding provisions of the subsequent Act6cof 1918 ,
1922^ and 1961^. It was perhaps to avoid hardships caused
to taxpayers, that sub-section (2) of section 34 of the Act
of 1886, gave power to the Commissioner to mitigate the
rigours of the law in genuine dases. Sub-section (2) of
section 34 stated:.
"The Commissioner of the Division may remit wholly or 
in part any fine imposed under this section.rl
39It may be noted that the courts, during those days^ , 
were strict in interpreting such provisions and would not
34. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 14-A authorized the 
Collector to issue notice to persons with income of not 
less than one thousand rupees to furnish a return.
35. Inserted by the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, (7 of 
1917).
36. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 39*
37. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 51.
38. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 276, 276A, 276B for 
the present attitude of the Courts.
39. See Chapters 4 and 8, for the present attitude of the 
Courts.
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incorporate the concept of Reasonable cause or excuse* by 
implication. This is evident from the two cases decided in 
the seventies of the nineteenth century.
The first is, The Queen v* Mudhoo Dutt^ i n  revision
before the High Court under section 438 of the Criminal
Procedure Code^. The question in issue was whether an appeal
would lie to the Sessions Judge from the order of a Magistrate
42convicting a defaulter under section 25 of the Income Tax
Act, 1869* because the accused did not pay the tax within
the time specified in the notice. While accepting the
Magistrate’s contention and setting aside the Session Judge,*s
order that an appeal would lie from the Magistrate’s order,
their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court said:
"It is my impression that no discretion and no 
alternative is left to a Magistrate, he must fine the 
defaulter in twice the amount. He has no power to 
listen to any plea put forward by a defaulter, provided 
it is proved that the notice under section 16* was 
actually served upon the man, and that he neglected, to 
pay the money... Section 24 leaves no alternative to a 
Magistrate. The defaulter shall, for every day during . 
which the default continues, be fined on conviction 
before a Magistrate ten rupees.**43
The next case is Queen v. Chait in which the
40. (1884) 14 W.E. 71*Cal. H.C* Though the systematic 
imposition of taxes begun in India since 1886 by the 
passing of the Income Tax Act.(2 of 1886), it was 
started as long ago as 1860. See Chapter 2, for ’origin 
of Income Tax*.
41. The Code of Criminal Procedure (5 of 1890), section 439 
deals with the power of revision.
42. See supra, p.341 for the text of the section.
43. (1884)14 W.R. (Cal.) p.71 at pp. 71*72 (Criminal). The 
case was decided in 1870.
44. (1870) 2 N.W. p. 113 (High Court).
the High Court of North West Provinces set aside the conviction
of the accused for failure to mane payment of income tax as
required..by sections 24 and 25 of the Income Tax let, 1869,
45for lack of sanction by Collector : But the Court expressed
strorgviews against violators of statutory provisions* Their
Lordships observed as under:
"By failing to make payment within the time specified 
in the notice, the taxpayer is guilty of an offence 
within the terms of Section 25, and subsequent payments 
does hot'take the case out of the provisions of that
section.
Section 59 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, is the 
corresponding provision to sub-section (1) of section 54 of 
the Act of 1886, with some consequential changes* Section 59, 
which provided for prosecution for failure to make payments 
or deliver returns or statements or allow inspection states:
"If a person fails without reasonable cause or excuse-
An
(a) to deduct and pay tax as required by section 1 5 ,  
or under section 56(2)^;.................................
45* Ihe Income Tax statutes have since the very beginning
provided for sanction by a higher authority for launching 
prosecution for offences relating to Income tax in order 
to save the harassment of persons by junior officers* See 
infra' pp. 414-21.
46*(1870) 2 N • W • p.15 (H.C.) at pp. 114, (Head note).
47. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 15 provided for deduction 
of tax at source.
48. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 56(2) authorized the 
Collector to require any person paying a salary to 
deduct from such payment the tax recoverable under sub­
section (1) of section 56 for default in making payment.
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(b) to deliver or cause to be delivered to the Collector
in due time any of the returns mentioned in section 16^,
50 51section 17 or section 28 ;
(c) to grant inspection or allow copies to be taken in
52accordance with the provisions of section 29^ ;
(d) to attend or to produce, or cause to be produced, on
or before the date mentioned in a notice under section 
5318, such accounts and documents as are referred to in the 
notice;
he shall, on conviction before a Magistrate, be 
punishable with fine, which may extend to ten rupees for 
every day during which the default continues•'*
Section 39 of the Act of 1918 differs from the
corresponding provision; in section 34 of the Act of 1886 in
two respects.
49* Income Tax Act, 1913, section 16 provided for submission 
of an annual return by the employer in.respect of 
1 salaries1 paid or due to his employees to the Collector 
within fifteen days from the 31st day of March in each 
year.
50. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 17 provided for submission 
of return by the principal officer of every company and 
the individual assessees to the Collector by June 15 > of 
each year.
51. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 28 gave power to the 
Collector or Commissioner to call for information.
52. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 29 authorized the
Collector or the Commissioner to inspect the register of
members of any company and take copies, if necessary.
53. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 18 laid down the procedure
for assessment.
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Firstly, the Act of 1918 has introduced the phrase
‘reasonable cause or excuse1. The result is that a person
would not be liable to conviction under section 39 of this Act,
if he could prove ‘reasonable cause or excuse1 for not
discharging the obligations imposed under the Act. The phrase
appears to have been added to mitigate the hardships caused
to taxpayers in genuine cases, because of the strict view of
54
the provisions taken by the Courts in . earlier case .
Secondly, section 39 of the Act of 1918 is wider in 
scope than section 34 of the Act of 1886, inasmuch as the 
former imposes liability in a number of other cases, which 
were not covered by the earlier Act. For instance, failure 
to grant inspection or allow copies to be taken of the 
register of any company as provided under Section 29* was 
made punishable under clause (c) of section 39 of the Act, 
which was not so previously.
Section >^1 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, is a 
reproduction of section 39 of the Act of 1918, with some 
changes. Clause (b) is a new provision, which was not in 
the Act of 1918. Section 51 of the Act of 1922 states that:
54* See The Queen v.Mudlieo Dutt (1884) 14 V7.R. 71; Queen v. 
Chait Ram (1870) N.Y/. 113 supra pp.348-9*As a result of 
insertion of the phrase ‘Reasonable cause or excuse1 in 
section 59 of the Act of 1918, the discretion given to the 
Commissioner in the earlier Act to mitigate the hardships 
of law under section 34(2) was withdrawn. See Chapter 2 • 
pp. 55 to 64 for meaning of ‘reasonable causes or excuse1.
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"If a person fails without reasonable cause or excuse-
(a) to deduct and pay any tax as required by section
55 \ 5618"^ or under sub-section (5) of section 46 ;
(b) to furnish a certificate required by sub-section
n o
(9) of section 18 or by section 20 to be furnished;
(c) to furnish in due time any of the returns mentioned
59 60 61in section 19A , section 20A , section 21 , or
55• Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18 laid down the procedure 
for payment by deduction at source.
56. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 46(5) authorized the Income 
Tax Officer to require any person paying ’salary* to an 
assessee to deduct from such payment the arrears of tax 
and to deposit it to the credit of the Government.
57* Income Tax Act, 1922, section 18 (9) required every
person deducting tax to furnish a certificate to the person 
in question, specifying the amount so deducted and the 
rate at which the tax has been collected.
58. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 20 required every company
to issue certificates to shareholders receiving dividends.
59. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 19A was inserted in 1926.
It required the principal officer of a company to furnish 
a return of the names and addresses of the shareholders 
who were paid dividends.
60. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 20A was added in 1933* The 
section required information to be furnished by the 
person responsible for paying 'interest* other than 
'interest on securities' to the Income Tax authorities.
61. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 21 required an employer 
to furnish a return in respect of salaries paid or due 
to his employees.
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62 zr *2
sub-section (2) of section 22 , or section 38 ;
(d) to produce, or cause to be produced, on or before
the date mentioned in any notice under sub-section (4)
64of section 22 , such accounts: as are referred to in
the notice;
(e) to grant inspection or allow copies to be taken in
65accordance with the provisions of Section 39 >
he shall, on conviction before a Magistrate, be 
punishable with fine which may extend to ten rupees 
for every day during which the default continues.*1
The Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Income Tax Act, 1961, retained the provisions of
section 51 of the Income Tax Act of 1922 in section 276 with
necessary changes. Section 276 authorizes the prosecution
of those who fail to comply with the provisions of the Act
without reasonable cause or excuse. Section 276 reads as
f ollov/s:
62. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 22(2) required the Income 
Tax Officer to serve on every individual, whose total 
income, in his opinion, renders him liable to income tax, 
%o furnish within a specified period of time a return of 
his total income.
63. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 38 gave power to the Income 
Tax Officer or the Assistant Commissioner to call for 
information for the purpose of this Act.
64. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 22(4) authorized the Income
Tax Officer to issue notice to produce accounts, 
documents, wealth statement or other information as he 
might think necessary.
65. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 39 authorized the Income 
Tax authorities to inspect the register of the members
of any company, if mecessary.
35.4
MIf a person fails without reasonable cause or excuse-
(a) to grant inspection or to allow copies to be taken
66in accordance with the provisions of section 134 ,
(b) to furnish in due time any of the returns'or
6 1
statements mentioned in section 133 > sub-section (2)
of section 139^> section 206^, section 285^* or 
section 286^ ;
(c) to produce, or cause to be produced, on or before
the date mentioned in any notice under sub-section (1)
72of section 142 , such accounts and documents as are
referred to in the notice:
7 ^
(d) to deduct and pay tax as required (* * * *)»-' under 
sub-section (2) of section 226^or
66. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 134 empowers the Income Tax 
authorities to inspect the register of companies and take 
copies thereof, if necessary.
6 7. Income Tax;Act, 1961, section 133 gives power to the Income
authorities to call for information from a person for the 
purposes of the Act.
68. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 139(2) states that the Income
Tax Officer may serve a notice on an assessee or
representative assessee, whose total income renders him 
liable to income tax, requiring him to furnish a return 
within thirty days of the service of the notice.
6 9. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 206 requires the person 
paying the salary to furnish the prescribed return.
70. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 285 provides that the person 
responsible for paying interest (other than interest on 
securities) exceeding Rs. 400 should furnish a return of 
the names and addresses of all such persons to the Income 
Tax Officer.
71. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 286 requires information to 
be given by the Companies to the Income Tax Officer 
regarding payment of dividends to shareholders.
72. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 142(1) gives power to the 
Income Tax Officer to issue a notice for the production of 
such accounts and documents as he may require for the 
purpose of assessment of tax*
73* The words fby the provision of Chapter XVII-B or1 were 
omitted by the Finance Act, 1968, with effect from 1st
April, 1968. , .
74. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 226 (2; authorizes the Income
Tax Officer to require the person paying the salary to 
deduct from such payment any arrears due from the 
assessee.
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/ \ 75(ej to furnish a certificate required by section 203 ,
he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten 
rupees for every day during which the default continues.”
A cursory examination of the penal provisions for
failure to comply with the statutory obligations imposed under
section 276 of the Act, would suggest that the Indian
Parliament is ignorant of the large scale evasion and
avoidance of taxes. ITo doubt the responsibility for controlling
evasion and avoidance lies heavily on the officials of the
Income Tax Department. But one can hardly find justification
for retaining a punishment ’which may extend to ten rupees a
day1 for the faults committed under section 276 of the Act of
1961; this punishment was introduced almost a century ago in
76section 34 of the Income Tax Act of 1886 , for similar
offences, when conditions were altogether different. Perhaps
the law makers have failed to appreciate that the deterrent
effect of a punishment of ten rupees a day a century ago was
greater than today. It would seem that the Legislature in
the earlier period was more conscious of the evil consequences
of tax evasion and tax avoidance. As Early as 1869 > section 
7725 of the Income Tax Act provided for punishment on 
conviction before a Magistrate to the extent of double the 
amount of tax due in the case of a person who failed to pay
within the period specified in the notice issued under
75. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 203 requires the person 
deducting tax at source to issue a certificate.
76. See supra p.34 6/Tfor text of section 34 of the Act of 1886.
77. See supra p.341 for text of section 25 of the Act of 1869.
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section 16 of the Act.
One may argue that the retention of a punishment of Rs.
ten a day for such offence is fitting because it is not the
amount of fine but the stigma of conviction that matters in
such offences. This may be true in regard to offences falling
under the general criminal law of the country, but it is not
so in the case of offences under the Income Tax Act, the Wealth
Tax Act, the G-ift Tax and the Sea Customs Act. Convictions for
such offences hardly bring any stigma or disgrace on the
person involved. As was pointed out by the Lord Ordinary in
a Scottish case, Lord Advocate v. A.B., as long ago as 1897 >
in rejecting the defendants claim for a jury trial for
prosecution under section 52 and 55 of the Income Tax Act, 1842,
in respect of neglect to deliver a true and correct statement
required under the Act,
‘'If I thought that a judgement against the defender 
v/ould affix upon him a stigma of crime, then I would 
certainly be in favour of sending the case to a jury;
even though the amount involved is small; but I do
not take the view that the result of an adverse judgement 
v/ould be of that nature. I think practically speaking, 
it may leave the defendant's character uninjured... "78.
It may be mentioned that the corresponding Income Tax 
statutes in the United Kingdom, United States of America, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa provide more 
severe punishment for offences similar to those consolidated 
in section 276 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961. These
78. (1897) 3 Tax Case 617 reported from 35 Sc. L.R. 190.
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provisions are as follows:
United Kingdom
The Taxes Management Act, 1970, in sections 93 and 9 4 ^
provides penalties for failure to make returns of income or
capital gains and for corporation tax. Section 93 states that:
"Section 93.(1) If any person has been required by a 
notice served... to deliver any return, and he fails to 
comply with the notice he shall be liable,...
(a) to a penalty not exceeding, except in the case 
mentioned in sub-section (2) below,£50, and
(b) if the failure continues... to a further penalty not 
exceeding £10 for each day on which the failure so 
continues.
(2) If the failure continues after the end of the year 
of assessment following that during which the notice was 
served, the penalty under sub-section (l)(a) above shall 
be an amount not exceeding the aggregate of £50 and the 
total amount of the tax with which the said person is 
charged...1
United States of America.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in section 7202 and
7203, provides for prosecution in cases of wilful failure to
collect tax as required, to file returns, to supply
information, or pay tax to the treasury. The relevant
provisions are as follows:
"Section 7202. Any person required...to collect, account 
for, and pay over any tax imposed...who wilfully fails 
to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such 
tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by 
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for 
not more than five years, or both, together with the 
costs of prosecution."
Section 7203. Any person required...to pay any estimated tax 
ortaxjor required... to make a return..., keep any
79. Tax Management Act, 1970, section 94 provides similar
penalties as that mentioned in section 93 for failure to 
make a return for corporation tax.
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records, or supply any information, who wilfully fails 
to pay such estimated tax or tax , make such return, 
keep such records, or supply such information,... shall, 
in addition to other penalties provided by lav/ be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof shall be 
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 
1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”
Australia
The Income Tax and Social Services Contribution
Assessment Act, 1936-69? in section 223 and 224,provides
penalties for failure to furnish returns or information and
refusal to give evidence. Section 223 states:
"223.(1) Any person who fails to duly furnish any return 
or information or comply with any requirement of the 
Commissioner as and when required by this Act or the 
regulations or by the Commissioner shall be guilty of an 
offence•
Penalty: Not less than four dollars or more than two
hundred dollars.
(2) A prosecution for an offence against this section 
may be commenced at any time."
Similarly section 224 reads as follows:
"Any person who refuses or neglects to duly attend and 
give evidence when required..., or to truly and fully 
answer any question put to him by, or to produce any 
book or paper required of him..., shall, unless just 
cause or excuse for the refusal or neglect is shown by 
him, be guilty of an offence.
Penalty: Hot less than four dollars or more than two 
hundred dollars.
Further section 225 provides:
"(1) Upon the conviction.•.for an offence against either 
of the last two preceding sections, the Court may order 
him within a time specified in the order to do the act 
which he has failed or refused or neglected to do, and 
any person who does not duly comply with such order 
shall be guilty of an offence.
Penalty: Not less than twenty dollars or more than one 
thousand dollars.
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Canada
The Income Tax Act, 1952, sections 131(1) and 131(2),
authorizes prosecution for failure to file a return or to
comply with various other provisions of the Act. Sub-section
(l) of section 131 states:
"Every person Y/ho has failed to file a return as and 
when required... is guilty of an offence and, in 
addition to any penalty otherwise provided, liable bn 
summary conviction to a fine of not less than $25 for 
each day of default.”
Similarly sub-section (2) of section 131 states:
"Every person who has failed to comply with or 
contravened (s. 47(1)-withholding of tax by employers...), 
(s. 123 (5) - imposes duty to keep withheld tax 
separate and apart in trust for the Revenue), s. 125 
(requires the keeping of books and records) or s.126 
(provides for tax investigation and requires non- 
resistance by investigated persons) is guilty of an 
offence and, in addition to any penalty otherwise 
provided, is liable to summary conviction to
(a) a fine of not less than $200 and not exceeding 
$10,000, or
(b) both the fine described in paragraph (a) and 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.
New Zealand.
The Land and Income Tax Act, 1954, clause (b) of 
sub-section (1) of section 33, makes it an offence to use 
tax money other than in payment to the revenue. The sub­
clause states:
"33(1)•*• [E] very person commits an offence against the 
the principal Act, who- 
• • •
(b) knovringly applies or permits to be applied the 
amount of any tax deduction or any part thereof for 
any purpose other than the payment of the tax deduction 
to the Commissioner;...
• ♦ • •
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(2)... Sj hall be liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding twelve months or to a fine not exceeding 
(two hundred dollars) or to both.”
South Africa
The Income lax Act, 1962, section 75 > deals with 
provisions relating to penalties for defaults committed by 
a taxpayer under the Act. Section 75(i) reads as follows:
"Any person who-
(a) fails or neglects to furnish, file or feubmit any
return or document as and //hen required under this Act; or
(b) without just cause... refuses or neglects to 
furnish any information or reply or to attend and 
give evidence as and when required..., or to ansv/er 
truly and fully any question put to him, or to produce 
any book or papers required of him by the Secretary or 
any such officer; or
(c) fails to show in any return... any portion of the
gross income received by or accrued to, or in favour
of himself...
(d) fails to show in any return prepared on behalf of 
any other person any portion of the gross income 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such other 
person, or fails to disclose... any facts which, if 
disclosed might result in increased taxation, or
(e) obstructs or hinders any officer in the discharge 
of his duties; shall be guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one 
hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three months or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment.
It may be observed that not only the Legislature
but also the judiciary in these countries has viewed tax
crime&Ctfffences) with concern. For instance, in Jackson
80(Federal Commissioner of Taxation) v. ffrnmann , an
SO. (1949) 8 A.T.D. 317.
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Australian case on the point, Fullagar, J. advocated the 
need for a severe deterrent punishment in ojrder to check 
tax evasion.
Q  -1
The defendant was prosecuted under section 230 ,
Part VII of the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act, 
1936-43, for knowingly and wilfully omitting to include 
certain income accrued in the year ending 30th June, 1943, 
from his return for that year, l/hile rejecting the 
defendant’s plea for the imposition of a moderate penalty 
on the ground that the maximum penalty under the section 
was intended for cases of extraordinary gravity, Fullagar, J. 
said,
"•..[h] eavier the tax the greater the temptation to 
evade it and therefore the greater need for a 
severe deterrent•
Under the circumstances, perhaps, it would be more 
befitting the needs of the time, that the amount of 
punishment provided under section 276 of the Indian Act 
of 1961 should be raised at least to the extent provided
81. Section 230 which provided provision relating to 
understatement of income stood at the relevant time 
as under:
"230.(1 ) Any person who, or any company...in any return 
knowingly and wilfully understates the amount of any 
income or makes any misstatement affecting the liability 
of any person to tax or the amount of tax shall be guilty 
of an offence.
Penalty: Not less than Twenty-five pounds, or more than 
five hunred pounds* and, in addition, the Court may order 
the person to pay...a sum not exceeding double the 
amount of tax that would have been avoided if the 
statement in the return had been accepted as correct. 
(Read * Fifty dollars and * One thousand dollars now}.
82. (1949) 8 A.T.D., p. 317 at p. 319 (para 1).
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under section 276B8^of the Act. This would not only act 
as a deterrent but remove the discrimination caused by the
Q /
insertion in the Act of 1961, of section 276B . Section
276B provides rigorous imprisonment to the extent of six 
months and a minimum fine of 15 per cent per annum on the 
amount of tax from the date on which such tax was deductible 
to the date on which such tax is actually paid, for failure 
to deduct and pay tax as provided under sub-section (9) of 
section80E  ^or Chapter XVII-B , whereas clause (d) of
o<7
section 276 provides a penalty extending to ’ten rupees 
for every day during which default continues’, for failure
83. See infra pp263”4 for section 276B.
84. Section 276B was inserted by the Finance Act, 1968, with 
effect from the 1st April, 1968.
85. Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 80E (which was inserted in 
1965 by the Finance Act, 1965) states in sub-section (9) 
as follows:
"Where any payment by way of annuity or otherwise is 
made by a person to whom premiums or contributions are 
payable... such person shall,... deduct from the total 
amount so paid duting any financial year, tax... and 
shall pay the amount so deducted to the credit of the 
Central Government within the prescribed time and in 
such manner as the Board may direct...”
86. Income Tax Act, 1961, Chapter XVII-B has provisions 
relating to ’Deduction of Tax at source* in cases of 
payment of salarv jjs.192), interest on securities (s. 193), 
dividends (s.194), interest other than ’interest on 
securities' (s.194A), and any other sums payable to a 
non-resident (s.195). The person responsible for 
disbursement of such amounts is to deduct the tax and
to pay it to the credit of the Central Government.
87. See supra p.354.
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for failure to deduct and pay tax as required by sub-section
22688of the Act.
Failure to Deduct and Pay Tax
The Indian Income Tax Statutes have imposed
criminal liability since the beginning of tax-legalisation 
89in India on those responsible for disbursing salaries, ntterec
and dividends. For failure to deduct tax before making such
payments to the taxpayer and remit the amount of tax so
deducted to the credit of the Central Government. However,
90till 1968 , the punishment provided for failure to deduct
and pay tax was merely 'up to Rs. 10 for every day during
which the default continued’. This was considered by the
legislature inadequate to have a deterrent effect on
fraudulent taxpayers. Accordingly, section 276 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961, was amended in 1968. The provisions
relating to punishment for failure to deduct and pay tax,
as contained in clause (d) of section 276, starting with
the words "by the provision of Chapter XVII-B”or was
deleted by the Finance Act, 1968, with effect from the
1st April, 1968, and a new section 276B was inserted in
the Act of 1961, which imposes a heavier criminal liability
on the defaulting taxpayer as compared with the corresponding
91earlier provision"1. Section 276B states:
88. See supra note 74.346
89. See Income Tax Act, 1886, section 34(l)(a) supra p. 346.
90. Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 276.
91. See supra p.354.
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"If a person, without reasonable cause or excuse, 
fails to deduct or after deducting fails to pay 
the tax as required by or under the provisions of 
sub-section (9) of section 80E-*2 or Chapter XVII-B^, 
he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to six months, and shall 
also be liable to fine which shall be not less than 
a sum calculated at the rate of fifteen per cent per 
annum on the amount of such tax from the date on which 
such tax is actually paid*"
In 1965 the Indian Income Tax statute imposed 
criminal liability under section 276A of the Income Tax 
Act, 1961^, on a liquidator of a company in liquidation 
for failure to inform the Income Tax Officer of the assets 
of the company. This has been done in order to help in 
checking tax avoidance by companies in liquidation. Sub­
section (1) of section 178, of the Act of 1961, requires 
the liquidator of a company, which is being wound up, either 
under the orders of a court or otherwise, to inform the 
Income Tax Officer of the assets of the company within 
thirty 'days of his appointment. And sub-section (3) of 
section 178 places an obligation on the liquidator to set 
aside the amount of tax before parting with any of the
assets of the company, except for paying secured creditors,
95entitled to have priority over Government dues. If the
92. See supra n. 85*
9.3• See supra n. 86.
94* Section 276A was inserted by the Finance Act, 19659 
with effect from the 1st April, 1965*
95. !The Law and Practice of Income Tax1, J.B. Kanga, and
lv!.A . Palkhiwala, (6th edition), Vol• 1 , 19699 P« 870.
liquidator fails to comply with, the said provisions, he 
renders himself liable for prosecution under section 276A 
of the Act of 1961, which says:
nIf a person, without reasonable cause or excuse -
(i) fails to give the notice in accordance with sub­
section (1) of section 178; or
(ii) fails to set aside the amount as required by sub­
section (3) of that section; or
(iii) parts with any assets of the company or the 
properties in his hands in contravention of the
provisions of the aforesaid sub-section,
he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to two years:
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate 
reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgement 
of the court, such imprisonment shall not be for less 
than six months•”
It may be appreciated that the Legislature has taken 
a serious view of a liquidator1 s failure to inform the Income 
Tax Officers about the assets of the company under sub-sectiors
(1) and (3) of section 178, of the Act of 1961. For the
first time in the history of Income Tax legislation in 
India, punishment extending to two years rigorous 
imprisonment with a minimum of six months has been provided 
for failure to perform the statutory obligation under the 
Act. This is indeed a healthy sign and the Legislature 
deserves to be congratulated for taking such a bold step. 
However, the question remains to be seen how far the Income 
Tax authorities make use of such penal provisions.
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.and South, African Laws. ~ ~"
A bird’s-eye viev/ of the penal provisions for
failure to comply with statutory duties imposed by the
q  c
revenue laws of different countries would reveal that 
the countries differ as regards the taxpayers criminal 
liability for such offences.
97 98 99In the United Kmgdonr , Australia , Canada^ , Sew
1 2 Zealand , and South Africa the tax-payer’s liability is
absolute in regard to the specific obligations imposed.
Words like fwilfully1, ’knowingly1, * intentionally’ or
’reasonable cause or excuse’ are not found in such
provisions. The Courts will neither consider the accused’s
state of mind when trying such offences, as it normally does
in criminal cases, nor will it include the concept of mens
rea in the interpretation of the offence by implication.
Some cases on the point will be discussed here.
.......................................... 3 . . . .
In Attorney General v. Till; , the respondent was
convicted under section 55 of the Income Tax Act, 1842 for
delivering an incorrect return of his income in contravention
of section 52 of the Act. The relevant portion of section
55 reads as follows:
”... [i] f any person, who ought by this Act to deliver 
any list, declaration or statement as aforesaid, shall 
refuse or neglect so to do within the time limited in 
such notice, .every such person shall forfeit
96. See supra pp. 357-60
97. See supra p. 357*
98. See supra p. 358 •
99* See supra pp. 359.
1. See supra p. 359-60.
2. See supra p. 360.
3. U 9 1 E 7 T70. 50 (H.L.).
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any sum not exceeding twenty pounds and treble the 
duty at which such person ought to be charged by 
virtue of this Act...'1
Rejecting the respondents contention that section 
55 applied only to non-delivery of a statement, as distinct 
from delivery of an untrue and incorrect statement, Lord 
Gorell said;
"The frame and object of the sections, which are to 
compel the necessary disclosure for the purposes of 
taxation, seem to me to shew that the construction 
contended for by the respondent is unreasonable.
Their Lordships referred to the Lord Ordinary’s 
(Lord Stormonth Darling) statement in Lord Advocate v. A,B«, 
(35 Sc.L.R. 190, quoted at (1897) 3 T*C. 617> 618), where 
he says:
"If. a man were to put in a piece of blank paper and 
call it a statement, or if he were to lodge a 
statement flagrantly and extravagantly deficient or 
incorrect, then,-according to the argument of the 
defender, he would be exempt from prosecution at all 
events under 3.55, The reasonable reading of 3.55is that, 
if there is a failure to deliver the kind of the 
statement required byS.52 ,either by (failure to deliver 
any) statement at all, or by delivery of a statement 
which is untrue or incorrect, then the penalty is 
incurred and may be recovered in the prescribed
manner."5
In Bales v. General Commissioners of Income Tax for 
Richford , the Chancery Division of the High Court refused
4. (1910) A.C. 50, at p, 61,
Ibid. In the original report (1897) 3 T*C. 617, at p.618, 
in place of 'failure to deliver any1 statement, the words 
'delivering no' have been substituted.
6. (1963-66) 42 Tax cases 17*
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to take a lenient view of the accused’s failure to make an
appeal in time, against the imposition of a penalty for
non-appearance as a witness before the Court in response
to a summons, A penalty of £25 was imposed on Bales, under
7
the provisions of section 59 of the Income lax Act, 1952 , 
and section 59 of the Finance Act, 1960^, on 5th March, 1964
7* The Income Tax Act, 1952, sedtion 59 dealt with the power 
of General Commissioners to summon and examine witnesses.
The section 59 states:
’The General Commissioners may summon any person whom 
they think able to give evidence respecting an assessment 
made or to be made on another person, to appear before 
them to be examined, and may examine such person on oath,.*
• • •
(3) A person who after being duly summoned -
(a) neglects or refuses to appear before the Commissioner at
the time and place appointed for that purpose ;
tb) appears, but refuses to be sworn or to subscribe the
oath; or
(c) refuses to answer any lawful question touching the 
matters under consideration 
shall forfeit a sum not exceeding twenty pounds.”
(section 59(1) was repealed by F.A. 1969 Sch. 21, Pt VII, 
section 59(3) replaced by Tax Management Act, 1970, 
section 52(3).;.
8. The Finance Act, 1960, sec. 59 dealt with the power of 
General or Special Commissioners in relation to appeals 
and assessments. The relevant provisions were as follows 
(repealed):
’section 59(1). Any penalty incurred by any person for 
a failure to comply with a precept under section fifty- 
four of the Income Tax Act, 1952, or incurred by any 
person under sub-section (3) of section fifty-nine of 
that Act...may be awarded summarily by them, notwithstanding 
that no proceedings for its recovery have been commenced,... 
(3) Any penalty awarded by virtue of this section shall 
for all purposes be treated as if it were tax charged in 
an assessment and due and payable.”
F.A., 1960, section 59(1) to (3) have been incorporated in 
Tax Management Act, 1970, section 53> and F.A., 1960, sec.
59 (4) in T.M.A., 1970, sec.52 (3).
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for failure to appear before the Court. A certificate of 
award of penalty was sent to Bales and he was informed of 
his right to appeal to the High Court within 30 days after 
the award of penalty on 5th March, 1964. The appellant 
moved the Court on 30th April, 1964, to set aside the penalty 
award, alleging that the time for appeal should run from the 
date when the General Commissioner notified him of his right 
to appeal, i.e., 31st March, 1964, and not from the 5th 
March, the date when the penalty was awarded.
While rejecting the appellant’s contention, Ungoed
Thomas, J., said:
”... There is no requirement in the Acts of Parliament 
and no requirement in the Rules that the Appellant 
should be notified of a right of appeal in this case, 
any more than there is a requirement that an appellant 
should he notified of a rightnto appeal in the case of 
any other order made by any court... If time for appeal 
were extended in this case, then... in every case where 
notice was not given to an appellant of his right of 
appeal, the right to appeal should normally be 
automatically extended from the date at which he was 
given such notice, despite the absence of any such 
requirement in any Statute or statutory rule.”9
10In Rex v. Caron , the Montreal Court of Sessions 
went to the extent of making the Director of a company 
personally responsible for its failure to pay the penalty 
for non-payment of fine owing to the company being in 
liquidation. The Labella Aluminium Company, Inc., having 
been required by the Special War Revenue Act, 1927, section 
111(1), to pay Federal taxes to the Treasury, failed to do
9. (1963-66) 42 Tax Cases, 17 at p.22.
10. (1948) 91 Can. Cr. Cases 389*
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so for the months of July, August and September, 1945. The
Company was condemned to pay a fine of $25 plus costs and
a penalty equivalent to the amount of the tax in default
i.e., $682,34 or in default suffer distraint. As the
company was unable to pay the amount, proceedings were
instituted against the Director under section 111(3) of the
Special War Revenue Act, 1938, for realization of the sum.
The section provided:
"Where an incorporated company has been convicted of 
any offence against this Act, every officer, director 
or agent of the company who has directed, authorized, 
condoned or participated in the commission of the 
offence, shall b^liable to the like penalties as 
such company..."11
The accused was the President and the real 
administrator of the Labella Aluminium Company. He co­
operated in the formation of a group of enterprises by 
amalgamating the Company with three other concerns, that 
would take over -all their assets and liabilities. This 
resulted in huge loss and the Company had to go into 
liquidation.
The respondent contended that he was not liable 
for penalty, because he did not have any evil intention in 
the formation of a group of the companies. The Court 
rejected the respondents plea and held him liable under 
section 111(3) of the Act. Manet, J., speaking through the 
Court said:
11• ibid. Quoted from pp. 389*390.
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"In statutory matters and notably in fiscal lav;, 
when the Act creates an offence by reason of any 
omission whatever (e.g. failure to make a report) 
such omission in itself constitutes the whole 
offence, regardless of any question of intent....
The Act being one of public order and its application 
essential to the proper functioning of the State, 
for which it constitutes one of the sources of 
revenue, it must provide that, whether through 
negligence or bad faith, it is not possible for 
directors, or other agents of the company named by 
them, to elude payment of taxes, the levy of which 
is enacted. Hence, without a provision such as 
s. 111(3)5 which prohibits any director or agent of 
an incorporated company to permit, participate in or 
simply condone the commission of an offence, no 
collection would be possible for the Crown or, at 
the very least, the Crown would lose a substantial 
part of the revenue that it needs. The object of 
a. 111(3) is...to oblige each director to personally 
watch and to verify, in case of need, whether all 
the taxes due under the statute are paid on time by 
the c ompany."12
13In R v. Lamothe , the Court upheld the Crown1s 
contention regarding remittance of tax deducted from 
employee*s wages. The accused failed to pay to the 
Receiver G-eneral income tax deducted from his employees* 
pay amounting to 8 468.75 as required by Section 47(1) of
12. Ibid. p*392; A.G. of Canada v. Cossette, (1967)5 3 Can. 
Crim. cas. 100; see Poulin v. Belanger (1961) 132 
Can. Crim. cas. 94.
13. (1958), 119 Can. Crim. Cas. 330.
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the Income Tax Act, 1952^. The accused’s plea that he 
was entitled to set-off the tax payable against the sum 
of S 2,000 owed to him by the Receiver-General in respect 
of his own personal income tax was rejected. It was held 
that the duty to remit tax under section 4-7(1) was absolute 
and unqualified and excluded any question of set-off; in 
any event there was no question of set-off against the 
Crown for to permit such a claim would allow a cause of action 
to be sustained against the Crown without the necessary 
sanction.
1 5The Courts in Canada, in a series of cases , have 
upheld that a convicting Magistrate has no discretion 
either to limit the number" of days for which the penalty 
is to be imposed or to reduce the amount of punishment 
provided under the respective sections of the Income Tax 
Act .
In Rex v. Thompson Manufacturing Company , the 
defendant company failed to make a return of information
14. "Every person paying
(a) salary or wages or other remuneration to an officer 
or employee
• • •
at any time in a taxation year shall deduct or 
withhold therefrom such amount as may be prescribed 
and shall ... remit that amount to the Receiver 
General ... on account of the payer’s tax for 
the year ...”
15* Rex v. Harvison, Rex v. O’Kelly (1924) 3 D.L.R. 312 
Panton v. Spencer (1921) 57 D.L.R. 447
16. (1920) 47 Ontario Law Report 103.
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for the year 1918 required to be given under the provisions
of section of the Income T^x Y/ar Tax Act, 1917, within
the prescribed period, of time. The Court refused to accept
the accused’s plea for the exercise of judicial discretion
in the matter and imposed a penalty of $ 600 for the six
days’ default of which he was convicted under sub-section(i)of£
9 ^  of the Income Y/ar Tax Act, 1917. The Court said:
"ho discretion was left to the magistrate to limit 
the number of days for which the penalty was to be 
imposed, or to reduce the amount of the penalty
below $ 100 for each day’s default.” J
20In hin£_v. Smith , the Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
took a similar view. Chisholm J., speaking for the Court 
said:
"The magistrate’s discretion as to the amount of the 
fine is not an unrestricted one, it is to be exercised 
within the limits prescribed in that behalf. If 
Parliament has fixed the exact penalty, then there are
17. Income Y/ar Tax Act, 1917, sec.8 authorized the Minister 
of Finance to require a return containing such 
information as he thought necessary to be furnished 
within 30 days, and any officer authorized by the 
Minister could make such inquiry as he might consider 
necessary for ascertaining the income of anv taxpayer.
18. Income War Tax Act, 1917, (Can) Section 9(1) provided: 
"For every default in complying with the provisions of 
the next preceding section, the persons in default 
shall each be liable on summary conviction to a penalty 
of twenty-five dollars for each day during which the 
default continues." Section 131(1) of the present 
Income Tax Act, 1952 is the corresponding provision of 
section 9(1) of the Act of 1917. See surra pp. 359. 
for section 131 (1)•
19. (1920) 47 Ontario Law Heports 103,104.
20. (1923) 38 Can. Crim. case 327.
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no limits prescribed,... If Parliament meant to 
limit the penalty and to make the smallest coin 
the minimum and $ 25 the maximum,one would expect 
it, to use the phrase so frequently employed in 
Acts of Parliament, namely, 'a penalty not exceeding 
* 25' ".21
Similarly, the Ontario High Court held in Queen 
22v. Smith , that the offence of failing to file a return
under section 131(1) of the Act of 1952, is a continuing
one. McRuer, C.J., said:
”... [t] he offender is liable to prosecution from day 
to day until he files a return, to hold otherwise 
would put a construction on the section that would 
defeat its purpose. Its purpose is to compel persons 
coming within its scope to file income tax returns. 
The purpose could not be accomplished if, after 
conviction, the offender should be immune from 
prosecution, although continuing to fail to file the 
income tax: return required by the s e c t i o n . " 2 3
24A contr&iy view is found in Rex v. Bell , where 
the Alberta Supreme Court did not follow the earlier cases 
on the point and held that the magistrate had a discretion 
to award a lesser fine than $ 25 for each day's default 
under sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Income War Tax 
Act, 1917.
However, the view expressed in Bell1s case has not
been approved by the Courts in subsequent cases. In R v.
25Smith , the Ontario High Court held that the magistrate 
does not have jurisdiction to impose a greater or a lesser 
fine than $25 on a charge showing one dayfs default under
21. Ibid at p.531, 332.
22. 1 1 9 5 8 )  58 B.T.C. 1125. £.v. Bonen (1925). 1, B.L.R. 1141. 
25. Ibid. at p. 1127.
24. (1925) 42 Can, Cr. Case 253.
25. (1958) 120 Can. Crim. Case 241.
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2 6
sub-section (1) of section 131 ' of the Income Tax Act, 1952.
In regard to the amount of evidence necessary under
these provisions to establish a case against the accused,
the Courts have placed the revenue in a better position
than the prosecution in criminal cases for other offences.
27In R. v. T.yhurst the respondent was charged under
sub-section (1) of section 131 of the Income Tax Act, 1952,
for failure to file a tax return, after a demand had been
made by the Minister of National Revenue persuant to sub-
28section (2) of section 44 of the Act. It was held that 
an affidavit made in compliance with section 136(5) J of 
the Act that such demand was sent by registered letter, was 
prima facie evidence not only of sending such demand but 
also of the receipt thereof by the taxpayer, and hence the 
revenue was not obliged to prove, as part of its case,
26. See supra p. 359.
27. (1962). Can Crim. Case 89.
28. Income Tax Act (ESC 1952, c148), section 44 (2) states: 
"...[Ejvery person shall, on demand by registered 
letter from the Minister, file, within such reasonable 
time as may be stipulated in the registered letter, ... 
a return of the income for the taxation year designated 
in the letter.'1
29. Income Tax Act, 1952, Section 136(5) (Can) reads as 
follows:
"When,... provision is made for sending by mail a 
request for information, notice of demand, an affidavit 
of an Officer of the Department setting out that... 
such a request, notice or demand was sent by registered 
letter on a named day to the person to whom it was 
addressed... shall be received as prima facie evidence 
of the sending and of the request, notice or demand.
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(as in criminal cases) that the accused received the 
letter of demand sent to him.
In South Africa the courts have taken a very strict 
view of the taxpayer in default and have placed the burden 
of proof of non-receipt of a demand notice or return on
the person denying its receipt.
30In L  v. Botha , a taxpayer was convicted under
31
sub-section (a) of section 76' of the Income Tax Act,
1962, for failure to furnish a return of his income as 
required under the Act to the local Receiver of
Revenue within thirty days of the dispatch of the ’form of 
return’ to him from the Receiver’s office. The taxpayer 
preferred an appeal against his conviction.
Rejecting the taxpayer’s claim that he had not 
received a ’form of return’ for completion, the Gourt 
held that in the absence of proof by the taxpayer that no 
'form of return’ was received, the taxpayer should be deemed 
to have failed to furnish the return and section
30. (1960(4) S.A. 6(T); 24 S.A.T.O. 22. See ’Silke On 
South African Income Tax’, A.S. Silke, 5th ed.,
1967), p. 850.
31. The Income Tax Act, 1962, (South Africa), Section 
76(1)(a) provides as follows:
”A person shall be required to pay in addition to the 
tax chargeable in respect of his taxable income -
(a) if he makes default in rendering a return in 
respect of any year of assessment, an amount equal 
to twice the tax chargeable in respect of his 
taxable income for the year of assessment.
377
32
287 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955 9 would apply.
The Court approved of the magistrate’s decision and observed 
that the magistrate had been right in assuming that the 
taxpayer had failed to file a return of his income within 
the prescribed period of time.
Mens Rea in American Tax Lav;
In the United States of America, unlike the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, 
the taxpayer’s criminal liability is not absolute. A 
person will not be held criminally liable for failure to
*7 '2
collect , or for failure to file return, supply
34information,, or pay tax unless the failure is’wilful’.
In other words, a person would be exonerated from statutory 
liability to comply with the specific provisions under the 
Act, if there is an absence of the requisite mens rea 
necessary to constitute such offences.
35It may be noted that, although sections dealing
32. The African Criminal Procedure Act (56 of 1955)> 
section 287 states:
’’When a person is charged with any offence whereof 
failure to furnish any information...is an element, he 
shall be deemed to have failed...to furnish that 
information unless the contrary is proved.”
33. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 7202.
34. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 7203*
35. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, Chanter 75» deals with
crimes, other offences and forfeitures. They are sub­
divided into the following sub-chapters:
Sub-chapter A : Crimes: Part I : General Provisions Ss. 
7201 to 7215: Penalties 7231 to 7241.
Sub-chapter B: Other Offences Ss. 7261 to 7275. 
Sub-chapter C: Forfeitures 7301-7304 and 7321-7329.
Sub chapter D : Miscellaneous Penalty etc. 7341-7344.
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with the criminal provisions prescribe different
punishments for different offences, 1 wilfulness * is an
36element common to all crimes • Two important questions
in ielation to the use of the word ’wilfully’, which have
diverted the attention of the Courts and which need
37elucidation, are firstly, its meaning , and secondly, its
scope, when used in defining of felonies and misdemeanours.
However, the courts are not unanimous on the point.
38I*1 U.S. v. Palermo , the Court had to determine
the meaning of ’wilfully’ and what amounts to ’wilful
failure to pay income taxes in time as required by lav/’ .
The defendant had been convicted, in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for failing
to pay income tax for the calendar years 1953 and 1954 at
/ \ 39' the required time in violation of section 145 la) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 1939 (for 1953) and section
36. ’The Law of Peaeral Income Taxation’, John C. Chommie, 
University of Miami, \1968), p. 672.
37. In Re City Equitable lire Insurance Co. (1925) Oh. 407;
4345 Romer J., said ”...An act, or an omission to do an
act, is wilful where the person... knows what he is 
doing and intends to do what he is doing.”
38. 1959, (CA 3), 259 P. (2d) 872, rev’g 157 P. Supp 578.
39- Internal Revenue Code, 1939, section 145(a), was the
corresponding provision of section 7203 of' I.R.C. 1954. 
see supra pp. 357-8 for text of section 7203. Section 
145 Ta) stated as follows:
1 ...Any person required... to pay any... tax... who 
wilfully fails to pay such...tax...at the time or times 
required by law or regulations, shall in addition to 
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a 
misdemeanor...”
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7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, 1954^(for 1954). It 
was found as a matter of course that the defendant had been 
delinquent in payment of taxes from 1947 to 1952 and that 
he preferred to spend his money on items of luxury rather 
than pay taxes.
The District Court arrived at the conclusion that 
the defendant's failure to pay taxes in time "was stubborn, 
obstinate and perverse;" he acted "without justifiable 
excuse"; "his conduct was marked by a careless disregard" 
and"there was a want of justification". And it made the 
ultimate fact-finding of wilfulness, relying on the meaning 
laid down in United States v. Murdock^1, where the Court 
used 'bad purpose' as part of the definition instead of
40. See supra pp. 357-58 for text of section 7203 of the 
Act.
41 . (1933)» 290 U.S. 389- The Court says:
"The word (wilful) often denotes an act which is 
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished 
from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute 
it generally means an act done with a bad purpose... 
without justifiable excuse... stubbornly, obstinately, 
perversely... The word is also employed to 
characterize a thing done without ground for believing 
it is lawful... or conduct marked by careless disregard 
whether or not one has the right so to act." (p.394).
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1 evil motive 1.
In appeal the conviction was quashed and the Court
of Appeal held that the District Court had applied an
improper standard in finding the requisite 'wilfulness',
and that there was insufficient evidence of 'wilfulness'
to sustain the conviction. The Court stated the proper
standard of 1 wilfulness' to be applied in such a situation
in the following words:
"Y/ilfulness is an essential element of the crime 
prescribed by S. 145(a). It requires existence 
of a specific wrongful intent - an evil motive - 
at the time the crime charged was committed; viz., 
fhilure to pay the tax due at the time required by 
law. A series of defaults, indicating a pattern 
of behaviour, knowingly and intentionally made, 
may suggest the existence of the specific 'evil 
motive'. Mere laxity, careless disregard of the 
duty imposed by law, or even gross negligence, 
unattended by 'evil motive' are not probative of 
'wilfulness'. "42
43On the other hand, in U.S. v. Ostendorff , the 
4th Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's view that 
'wilfulness' could be inferred under section 7203 from 
careless disregard of the statutory provisions. The 
defendant did not file income tax returns for the years 
1959, 1960 and 1961, as required under section 7203 of
42. 1959 (C.A. 3), 259F (2d) 872 at p; 882; See U.S. v.
Martell 1952 (C.A. 3), 199 F (2d), 670 at p. 672;
Bloch b. U.S. 1955, (C.A.9.), 221 F (2d) 786; Forster v.
U.S. (19561(0.A.9 ) 237 F (2d) 617, cf. Imholte v.
U.S. (1955), (C.A. 8) 226 F (2d) 585; Wardlow v. U.S. 
1955 (C.A. 5), 203F (2d) 884; Haiger v. U.S. (19497” 
(C.A. 10), 172 F (2d), p.986.
43. (1967), (C.A.4), 371 F (2d), 729.
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the Internal revenue Gode, 1954. And the only defence
offered by the defendant was that his business required
too much time and he had just not been able to get it done.
Graven, Circuit Judge, speaking for the Court said:
n.. .[l] he jury could permissibly infer that Ostendorff 
wilfully failed to do what the lav/ requires to be 
done, i.e., that he had the specific intent to disobey 
or disregard the requirement of the statute that he 
file tax returns."44
45The 9th Circuit Court in Edwards v. U.S7 affirmed
the trial Court’s view that the defence, that the appellant
was busy with other matters and simply overlooked his duty
to file a return, as required under section 7203, was no
answer to a charge of 'wilful failure' to file a return.
In U.S. v. Wilson^the U.S. District Court of
Delaware refused to hold ignorance of law as an excuse for
failure to pay the required tax.
The defendant was charged on information with
engaging in receiving wagers and wilfully failing to pay
the special wagering occupational tax in violation of
sections 441 14Lid 7203 of' the Internal Revenue Code, 1954.
It was held that the requirement of 'wilfulness'
of a violation was satisfied where the defendant conceded
that he had heard of the provisions of the law requiring the
44* Ibid. at p. 731.
45- TT9P 7) (C.A.9.), 375 I1 (2d), 862.
46. (1963) (DC-2el), 214 R. Supp. 629; see U.S.. v. Roy,
(1962)(DC-Del),215 P. Supp. 479.
47. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 4411 states:
"There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per year to 
be paid by each person who is liable for tax under section
4401 (tax on wager) or who is engaged in receiving wagers
for or on behalf of any person so liable."
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purchase of the $50 wagering tax stamp prior to engagement 
in the business, and that he had been violating the lav/ 
for six months, because deliberate violation of lav/ for 
a substantial period of time with the intention of getting 
away with it, is indicative of ’evil motive’ necessary to 
constitute 'wilfulness’.
/ o
In Abdul v. United States'1' , the Court was called 
upon to adjudicate on whether there was any difference in 
the degree of ’wilfulness’ required when used in defence 
of felonies and misdemeanours. Appellant was indicted on 
twelve felony counts, charging him with wilful failure to 
truthfully account for and pay over taxes, in violation of 
section 2707 Internal Revenue Code, 1939, and six
misdemeanour counts charging him with wilful failure to file
tax returns at the time required by law, in violation of
, 50
section 2707(b)* of the Internal Revenue Code, 1939.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Hav/aii 
acquitted the accused on the felony charges but convicted 
on the misdemeanours, on the ground that he knew that he 
v/as required to submit a return in time, but nevertheless 
failed to file it. This fact was held sufficient to 
convict the appellant for misdemeanour, because the two 
charges required different degrees of wilfulness. The trial 
judge instructed the jury as follows:
48. 1958, (C.A.9), 254 R (2d), 292.
49. See supra p.357 for section 7202 of Internal Revenue 
Code, 1954, which is the corresponding provision to
section 2707 (c) of I.R.C., 1939.
50. 8ee supra pp.^^/Pfor section 7*03 of I.R.C., 1954, the 
corresponding provision to section 2707 (b) of I.R.C.1939.
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"...The word ’wilful* as used in (the misdemeanour) 
counts..., that is, failing to make a tax return, means 
with a bad purpose or without grounds for believing 
that one's act is lawful or without reasonable cause, 
or capriciously, or with a careless disregard whether one 
has the right so to act. The word ’wilful* as used in 
the (felony) counts... that is, in failing to truthfully 
account for and pay over the taxes, means with knowledge 
of one’s obligation to pay the taxes due and with intent 
to defraud the Government of that tax by any affirmative 
conduct. '
Accordingly, the trial Court held, that the accused's 
defence that he believed that he could not file a return 
unless he paid the taxes at the same time and that, since 
he did not have the money, he did not file the return at 
the required time, was no excuse to the offence of 
misdemeanour. The Circuit Court approved of the Trial 
Court's view of wilfulness on the point, though the decision 
was reversed on the ground of error in cross examination 
being prejudicial to the defendant. Orr, Circuit Judge,
speaking for the Court said:
".. • [t! he word 'wilful', as used in the misdemeanour 
statute, means something less when applied to a 
failure to make a return than as applied to a felony 
non-payment of tax..."52
The Court quoted the following passage from Spies 
v. United States in support of its view-
51. 1958, (C.A.9), 254 P(2d) 292 at p. 294.
52. Ibid at p. 294 (para 3) U.S. v. Pi Silvestro, (1957), 147
P. Suppl. 300. The Pistrict Court made a similar 
remark in regard to the evidence required for conviction 
in case of misdemeanour offences. The Court says:
"... [T] he present 'lesser offence' of a misdemeanour 
requires a showing considerably less positive than
required for a conviction under the felony statute..."
At. P.304 (paras 4-5 see Yarborough v. U.S. (1956),
(4 Cir.), 250 P. 2(d) at pp.' 60,61.
384
"The difference between wilful failure to pay a tax 
when due, which is made a misdemeanour, and wilful 
attempt to defeat and evade one, which is made a 
felony, is not easy to detect or define. Both must 
be wilful, and wilful, as we have said, is a word of 
many meanings, its construction often being influenced 
by its context: U. b. v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 . It 
may mean something more as applied to non-payment of 
a tax, than when applied to failure to make a return. 
Mere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished from 
accidental, omission to make a timely return might 
meet the test of wilfulness."53
54In the recent case Edwards v. U.S. , it was held 
that a different degree of ’wilfulness1 is required for 
conviction for wilful failure to make a return under section
pr p:
7203 , from that required for a conviction for making a
c r
false return under section 7206(2) and for wilful attempt
57to evade or defeat tax under section 7201 of the Internal
53. (1943), 317 U.S. 492, at pp. 497,498.
54. 1967 (CA.9), 375 F (2D), 862.
55. See supra p. 357-58 for section 7203.
56. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 7206 (2) states:
"Any person who-
• • • •
(2) Wilfully aids or assists in or procures, counsels, 
or advises the preparation or presentation of a return, 
affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent 
or is false as to any material matter, whether or not 
such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent 
of the person authorized or required to present such 
return, affidavit, claim or document;
• • • •
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of 
prosecution."
57. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 7201 states:
"Any person who wilfully attempts in any manner to evade 
or defeat any tax... shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$ 10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both , 
together with the costs of prosecution."
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Revenue Act, 1954.
The defendant was convicted in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Oregon of Income Tax violations 
arising out of (i) failure to file income tax returns for 
the years 1959* 1960 and 1961 as required under section 
7203, (ii) for making false returns for certain named 
clients under section 7206 (2) and (iii) for attempting to 
defeat or evade tax under section 7203. With regard to 
the first charge, the Court affirmed the trial Courts 
holding that the defence that the appellant was busy with 
other matters and simply overlooked the need to file a 
return, did not relieve him of the statutory liability 
under section 7203. It held that the appellant's omission 
to meet the statutory requirements would satisfy the test 
of 'wilfulness' under the section.
The facts with regard to the second charge in brief 
are that the appellant, a tax attorney, prepared statements 
of estimated tax due and collected from his clients the 
amounts payable, representing that the statements would be 
filed and the payments would be made, but he failed to file 
the statement or pay the tax. At the time when the final 
returns were prepared, he falsely showed the estimated tax 
payments as having been made and as being proper credits 
against the total tax due. The clients signed the returns
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so prepared on the appellant’s representations and the 
returns were filed. It was found that it was the practice 
of the appellant to secure from his clients a cheque payable 
to him, covering the amount of tax due and his fee, and to 
deposit the amount in a ’special trust* account on which 
he drew cheques in favour of the Collector of Inland Revenue 
against his clients’ tax charges. In fact, the appellant’s 
purpose was to take advantage of the time lag in Government 
investigation of delinquent returns to tide him over a period 
of financial hardship.
The Court made a distinction with regard to the
degree of 'wilfulness’, i.e., evil state of mind required
for conviction of the felony of fraud and false statement
and attempt to evade or defeat tax under sections 7206 and
7201; the accused was convicted of the former and acquitted
of the latter on the same facts. With regard to the
appellant’s contention that the record did not establish
that his motive was sufficiently evil for conviction under
section 7206, the Court said:
’’The offence to which this section (7206) is directed 
is not evasion or defeat of tax. Rather it is 
falsification and the counselling and procuring of 
such deception as to any material matter. Here 
the falsification was committed deliberately, with 
full understanding of its materiality; with intent 
that it be accepted as true and that the appellant 
thereby gain the end he sought. This, in our judgement, 
is sufficient to constitute ’wilfulness’ under this 
section.”58
58. 1967 (C.A.9) 375 PC 2d), 862, at p. 865.
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As regards the charge of attempt to evade or defeat
the tax or its payment under section 7201 , it v/as held that
a specific intent to do so was necessary to satisfy the test
of ’wilfulness1 under the section. The Courts said:
’’...Evasion and defeat,... contemplate an escape from 
tax and not merely a postponement of disclosure or 
payment. A knowing and intentional omission to file 
could be the result of either purpose, and either 
purpose might support a prosecution for the state 
crime of embezzlement or other forms of theft. Tax 
evasion, however, focuses on the accused's intent to 
deprive the Government of its tax moneys, and this 
requires more than just d e l a y . "59
On the other hand the 5th Circuit Court in Haner
6 0v. United States , disapproved of the 9th Circuit Court's
61view in Abdul v. United States , in which similar charges 
of wilful failure to file an income tax return at the 
appropriate time, in violation of section 7203 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 1954? was made. The Court refuted 
the Government’s claim that the word ’wilful' meant 
something less when used in a statutory misdemeanour than 
when used in a felony and held that the same standard of 
proof is needed, irrespective of its use in any context. 
Hutcheson, Circuit Judge, delivering the majority judgement, 
s aid.i.
"...Wilful' generally means intentional, knowing, or 
purposeful, as opposed to careless, thoughtless, 
heedless, or inadvertent, and it means nothing less 
as used in section 7203."62
59. Ibid at p. 867. See 'Collateral Estoppel Applied to 
Civil Fraud Penalty', Buchwald, (1965; 719 U. Miami, L. 
Rev. 672 at p. 674.
60. 1963 (C*A.5), 315 B. (2d) 792. However, '..isdom, Circuit 
Judge dissented from the majority view and upheld trial
Court's upholdings.
61. 1958, (C.A.9), 254 F (2d) 292.
62. 1963 (C.A.5) 315 F. (2d), 792, at p.794 (para 2).
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63Similarly in the United States v. McGonigal ,
where the defendant was charged with wilful failure to pay
the special wagering or occupational tax, as required under
section 4411^and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, 1954>
the District Court of Delaware, demanded a greater degree
of proof for conviction. Layton, District judge, said:
"In order for the jury to return a verdict of guilty, 
it must find, not only that the defendant was engaged 
in the business of a writer but that his failure to 
purchase a $ 50 gambling tax stamp was wilful. In 
order for a criminal act to be wilful, it must not 
only be committed deliberately and knowingly, but with 
a bad motive or evil intent."°5
The Court further noted that the Government had to 
produce satisfactory evidence to establish beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant deliberately committed the specific 
offence with the intention of getting away with it. In 
other words, the revenue has to discharge the same haavy 
burden for a misdemeanour as is required in the case of 
a felony.
Mens Rea in Indian Tax Law
In India the legislature has adopted a middle course, 
i.e., an approach midway between that followed in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Dew Zealand and South Africa on 
the one hand and the United States of America on the other, 
in regard to a person's criminal liability for failure to
63. 1963 (DC-Del), 214 P. Suppl. 621.
64. See supra note 47 for section 4411.
65. 1963 (DC-Del), 214 P. Suppl. 621 at p. 622 (para 1).
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perform statutory duties imposed under the provisions of
the Income Tax Act. Neither is absolute liability imposed
nor is a search made for the accused's evil state of mind.
A person can plead 'reasonable cause or excuse' as a
defence to a charge of failure to discharge statutory
obligations^.
The question that arises in this connection is what
is the meaning of the words 'reasonable cause or excuse1.
It may be noted that, though this defence has been available
6 7
to a person since 1918 (as contained in section 39 of the 
Income Tax Act, 1918); there is hardly any case in which 
'reasonable cause or excuse' has been pleaded in defence to 
a criminal charge of failure to comply with statutory
obligations.
In the solitary case, Bai Lalita Ratanchand Khimchand
68v * Tata Iron and Steel Go. Ltd. , the question came before 
the Bombay High Court as a collateral issue. The respondent 
company paid dividends to the appellants, the second 
preference shareholders, after deducting income tax for the 
years 1926-27 to 1935-36, and issued no certificate of
66. Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss. 275^,276, 276A and 276B. See 
for 'reasonable cause or excuse' surra pp.354,364-65>411. 
It has also been recognized as defehce under Ss. 270,
271 (i)(a), 271(i)(b), 273(1)(b) and 273(1)(c). See 
Chapter 6, pp.325,317-18,327 respectively.
67. See supra pp.349-50 for text of section 39 of the Act of 
1918.
68. (1940) 8 I.T.R. 337 (Bom.);A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 97.
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69deduction,as provided under section 20 of the Income Tax 
Act, 1922. The company did not pay any income tax
to the revenue authorities as its profits were wiped out 
by the depreciation allowance and arrears thereof under 
the provisions of section 10(2) (vi)^of the Act of 1922.
The appellants brought a suit against the company
to recover dividends, without any deduction in respect of
income tax, as no tax was paid by the company. The Court
upheld the appellant’s claim. As regards the plea that the
provisions under section 20 are mandatory and attract
prosecution under section 51 of the Act of 1922, for failure
to issue a certificate, Beaumont, C.J, said:
"The provisions of section 20 are no doubt mandatory, 
but, ... they only apply where the company is liable 
to tax, and I cannot think that the officers of the 
company in this case were justified, as against their 
preference shareholders, in giving year after year a 
certificate that income tax had been or would be paid 
on the profits being distributed when in fact no 
income tax was being charged on such profits. The 
penalty imposed by Section 51 on a failure to furnish 
a certificate under Section 20 only arises where the 
failure is without reasonable cause, or excuse and the 
fact that the certificate would be untrue would seem 
to provide reasonable cause for not issuing it."
69* See supra p. 352 for section 20.
70. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 10(2)(vi) dealt with the 
depreciation allowances available to an assessee which 
could be deducted in computing ’profits and gains’ for 
the purposes of assessment of tax. Income Tax Act, 1961, 
section 32(1)(i), (ii) & (iv) is the corresponding 
provision to section 10(2)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 
1922.
71. (1948) 8 I.T.R. 337, at p. 345 Bom. (P.B.).
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In the usual sense of the term ’reasonable cause
or excuse’ means such a cause as would prompt a man of
ordinary intelligence to act under similar circumstances
as did the taxpayer in failing to comply with his statutory 
72obligations. In brief it may be summarized on the lines
of the test applicable in the law of tort as follows:
"If the taxpayer exercised ordinary care and prudence 
and was nevertheless unable to file the return in the 
prescribed time, then the delay is due to reasonable 
cause.”73
The question whether the circumstances justify the 
defence of ’reasonable cause’ in a particular case is 
entirely a question of fact .
A somewhat similar defence is available under section
75146 of the Act of 1961 to a taxpayer for cancellation of
7
a 'best judgment assessment’ made under section 144 .
Section 146, as stated earlier, provides for cancellation, 
if there is 'sufficient cause’ for non-compliance with the 
statutory requirements under the section. And the courts 
have interpreted the question of sufficiency or non­
sufficiency of facts to justify 'sufficient cause’ as an 
77issue of fact
72. 'The Law of Federal Income Tax', Randolph E. Paul and 
Jacob, Marten, Vol.V, (, 1934), s. 4815> at p. 427.
73. Ibid., see'Fraud and the Federal Income Tax in the United 
States' , Harold M. G-roves and Arthur M. Selle (1953)» 7 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 321 atp.32;
74. Orient Investment and Finance Go. v. Commissioner,*166
1 (2d) 601, 604 (1943).
75. See Chapter 2, p. 52 for section 146.
76. See Chapter 2, pp.51-52 for section 144.
77. See Chapter 2, pp.65-67.
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A case decided by the U.S. Court of Claims,
78Handley Motor Company, Inc. v. United States , appears to
be relevant here to show when the defence can be sustained.
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue assessed a penalty,
7a
pursuant to the provisions of section 6651 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 1954, because of the appellantfs failure to 
file an excise tax return with respect to the sale of a 
certain authomobile from Germany.
The question was whether the plaintifffs failure
to file the return was due to 'reasonable cause and not
due to wilful neglect'. The Court, rejecting the plaintiff's
defence that he had filed no return, because he believed in
good faith, that no tax was due, said:
"... |t] he plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it exercised ordinary business care 
and prudence in connection with its failure to file 
an . excise tax return. Mere uninformed and unsupported 
belief by a taxpayer, no matter how sincere that 
belief might be, that he is not required to file a tax 
return, is insufficient to constitute reasonable cause 
for his failure so to file... The term 'reasonable cause' 
in section 6651 has been interpreted to mean no more ;>q 
than the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence.
78. (1965), 338 F (2d), 361.
79* Internal Revenue Code, 1954, 6651 states:
"In ease of failure to file any return required ... on 
the date prescribed therefor •••, unless it is shown 
that such failure is due to reaaohable cause and not 
due to wilful neglect, there shall be added ... 5 per 
cent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for 
not more than one month, with an additional 5 per cent 
for each additional month or fraction thereof during 
which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 per cent 
in aggragate.".
80. (1965;, 338 P (2d), 361 at p. 365: Pisk v. Commissioner
(1953), 203 F (2d), 358 (6 Cir.).
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And the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove 
reasonable cause for failure to comply with the statutory
o -]
obligations under the Act° .
false Statement in a Declaration.
Success in administering the Income Tax Act, like
other fiscal statutes depends on the honesty and co-operation
of a taxpayer in making a true and correct statement of
82income, disclosing all material facts and information, as
required under the provisions of the Act, to the Income Tax
authorities. This is necessary for determining the true
tax liability. As stated by has Gupta, J., in Calcutta
hiscount Company Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, while delivering
the majority judgement of the Supreme Court,
"... In every assessment proceedings, the assessing 
authority will, for the purpose of computing or 
determining the proper tax due from an assessee, 
require to know all the facts which help him in coming 
to the correct conclusion."83
81. In the United States the burden of proof is on the 
taxpayer in the case of defence of Reasonable cause' 
for exemption from civil liability. Breland v. U.S.,
203 B(2d), 492, 497 (5th Cir. 1963). See for ’burden of 
proof1, infra , Chapter 8,pp.
82. C.I.T., Gujarat v. Raman and Company, A.I.R. 1968 S.n.
49; Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I.T. 0. A.1 R. 1961 SC 372,376. 
P.R. Mukherjee v. C.I.T. , W.B. , A.I.R.,~ 1956 Cal. 197. 
Rameswar Goenka v. I.T.O., Shillong, A.I.R. 1970 A and h. 
85 at p. 89. Cpara 16); Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. 
v. I.T.0., Nagpur, A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 1011; S. Narayanappa 
v. C.I.T., Bangalore, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 523; Kantamami 
and Sons v. 1st Additional I.T.O. Rajahmundry, A.I.R.
1967 S.C. 587.
83. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 372 at p. 376 (para 8).
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However, compliance with the provisions can only
be ensured by a threat of punishment for failure.
Accordingly, the Indian Income lax Act, like the
corresponding statutes of the United Kingdom , United
States8 ,^ Canada^, Australia0^and Hew Zealand®^, provides
a fine and imprisonment for wilfully furnishing false and
89inaccurate statements in returns, and concealing facts J*
Like other penal provisions, the scope of the 
provisions providing punishment for making false statements 
in returns and in declarations has been extended from time 
to time. For instance, the Income Tax Act, 1886, provided 
for prosecution under section 33 in one situation only, i.e., 
where a person required to submit a return of his income in
84. Taxes Management Act, 1970, sections 95 and 96 provide 
penalty for furnishing incorrect returns or accounts for 
income tax or capital gains tax and corporation tax 
respectively.
85. Internal Revenue Code, 1954* section 7204 provides 
prosecution in the case of a fraudulent statement or 
failure to make a statement to employees, section 7206 
for fraud and false statement and 7207 for fraudulent 
returns, statements or other documents.
86. Income Tax Act (RSC, 1952, c 148), section 132(l)(a).
87. Income Tax and Social Service Contribution Act, 1936- 
1969, sections 227, 228, 229, 230 and 231 have 
provisions relating to prosecution in cases of false 
returns or statements, failure to sign or false 
certificate, false declarations, understating income 
and fraudulent avoidance of tax respectively.
88. The Land and Income Tax Act (1954), section 33 provides 
for prosecution.
89. Sivagomintha Moopnar and Sons v. I.T.O., Madurai, (1953) 
28 I.T.R. 601.
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pursuance of a notice issued under sub-section (1) of 
90section 14A , furnished a false declaration that the
estimate of income was correct, whereas, the Income Tax
91Act, 1961, in section 277 made every case of false 
verification punishable under the Act. The relevant 
provisions are as discussed below.
The Income Tax Act, 1886, section 359 which dealt 
with a false statement in a declaration provided:
1 If a person makes a statement in a declaration under
/ \ 92sub-section 14-A, sub-section (2) , which is false,
and which he either knows or believes to be false or 
does not believe to be true, he shall be deemed to
93have committed the offence described in section 177 
of the Indian Penal Code.'1
The Income Tax Act, 1918, in addition to re-enacting
the provisions of section 35 of the Act of 1886 in section
90. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 14A was added by the Indian 
Income Tax (Amendment) Act, (7 of 1917). It authorized 
the Collector to issue a notice to persons with income
of not less than one thousand rupees to submit a return 
of their income.
91. See infra p. 399.
92. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 14A (2) stated:
"A person making a return ... shall add at the foot 
thereof a declaration that the income shown in the 
return is truly estimated on each of the sources 
mentioned,...1
93. Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), provides punishment 
of a person, who being legally bound to furnish 
information to a public servant, furnishes as true, 
information he knows or has reason to believe to be 
false.
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40 , provided for the prosecution in two other cases, viz,,
where the principal officer of a company required to
submit a return of total income of the company under sub-
/ \ 95section (1; of section 17 , and a person presenting a
96petition against assessment under section 21^ mak® false 
statements in the verifications. The Act of 1918, is 
remarkable in that it made a significant change in the 
arena of criminal prosecution for tax crimes, when the 
Officers of a company were made vicariously
94. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 40 provided that:
"If a person makes a statement in a verification 
mentioned in section 17 or section 21(3) which is 
false, and which he either knows or believes to be 
false or does not believe to be true, he shall be deemed 
to have committed the offence described in section 177 
of the Indian Penal Code.”
95. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 17 (1) provided:
"The principal officer of every company shall prepare, 
and, on or before the fifteenth day of June in each 
year, deliver or cause to be delivered to the 
Collector a return in the prescribed form and verified 
in the prescribed manner of the total income of the 
company during the previous year".
96. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 21(1) gave power to an 
assessee to present a petition to the Commissioner 
for relief against any order of the Collector in 
respect of assessment or adjustment under the Act.
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97liable for making false verification in returns 
submitted on behalf of a company.
Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which 
corresponds to section 40 of the Act of 1918, and section 
35 of the Act of 1886, introduced punishment in a number 
of other cases of false statement made in verifications 
contemplated by different sections in the Act. For 
instance, section 52 provided:
"If a person makes a statement in verification
98 99mentioned in section 19A or section 20A^or section
97. As a general principle of law a person is subject to 
assessment and payment of tax in respect of his own 
income. But in certain circumstances a person is made 
answerable in respect of assessment and payment of tax 
of another person as well, by virtue of the provisions 
of the Act, and he is deemed to be the assessee in law.
The Income Tax Act, 1961, has made such provisions in 
sections 159 (legal representative), 160 to 167 
(representative assessees) 170 succession to business or 
profession), 171(6) (former members of a Hindu undivided 
family which was partitioned), 177 (members of an 
association dissolved or discontinued), 178(4)
(liquidators of a company) and 179 (directors of a 
private company in liquidation. See ’Vicarious 
Liabilities under the Income Tax Act, 1961*, V.B. 
Haribhakti, Tax Consultants Association Souvenir (1964)? 
Jaipur97.Kapurchand Shrimal v. Tax Recovery Officer. A.I.R. 
1969 S.C. 682.pp. 93-110.
98. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 19A dealt with supplying 
information regarding dividends.
99* Income Tax Act, 1922, section 20A, dealt with supplying 
information regarding interest.
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1 p /21 or section 22 or sub-section (2) of section 26A
or sub-section (3) of section 30^or sub-section (3) of
5
section 33 * which is false, and which he either knows 
or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, 
he shall be punishable, on conviction before a 
Magistrate, with simple imprisonment which may extend 
to six months, or with fine which may extend to one 
thousand rupees, or with both.
The basic feature of section 52 of the Act of 1922 
was similar to the corresponding provisions in the earlier
g
Acts, but in 1939 it was amended by the Act 7 of 1939* so 
that instead of the reference to section 177 of the Indian 
Penal Code, the section was self-contained and itself 
provided the punishment for the offence of making a false 
return.
Section 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, unlike 
the corresponding provisons of the previous Acts specifying 
sections or catena of sections under which prosecutions 
could be launched for false declarations, made the penal
1. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 21, required an employer to 
furnish a return in respect of ’salaries’ paid or due to 
his employees.
2. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 22, provided provisions 
relating to furnishing a return of income to the Income 
Tax Officer of the local jurisdiction.
3. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 26A, provided procedure for 
registration of firms.
4. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 30(3) laid down the 
procedure for appeal against assessment.
5 . Income Tax Act, 1922, section 33(3)? provided for appeal 
against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
6. ’The Law of Income Tax in India* , V.S. Sundaram, 7th 
edition, 1954? p. 1086; The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, 
A.I.. Aiyaj? S.V. Aiyar and T.A. hajgopal, 7th ed., The 
Company Law Institute of India, Madras (1950), p.708.
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provisions applicable to every case of false verification
and of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The
impugned section differs from the earlier provision in
respect of punishment as well* For instance, section 277
provides for rigorous imprisonment up to two years with a
minimum of six months, whereas in the earlier corresponding
provisions punishment was limited to simple imprisonment
up to six months, or a fine up to Rs. 1,000 or with both.
The section reads as follows:
1 If a person makes a statement in any verification 
under this Act or under any rule made thereunder, or 
delivers an account or statement which is false, and 
which he either knows or believes to be false, or 
does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable 
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to two years:
Provided that, in the absence of special and adequate 
reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgement 
of the court, such imprisonment shall not be less than 
six months.
To support a prosecution for making a false 
statement in a declaration, two conditions must be satisfied, 
viz., that the statement must be false, and that the person 
making it should either know, or believe it to be false, or
o
does not believe it to be true . This raises the question 
what does 'false1 mean, what is the requisite degree of 
mens rea and what is the'standard of proof required for a
7. The words 'punishable with rigorous imprisonment...
not less than six months', were substituted for the words 
'punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend to 
six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand 
rupees, or with both', by the Finance Act, 1964, with 
effect from the 1st April, 1964*
8. Supra note 6, at p. 1086.
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conviction. As stated earlier, there is a dearth of cases 
on the point owing to a very limited number of prosecutions 
for tax crimes in India. However, some idea can be formed 
about the judicial trend from the few cases available on 
the subject.
An examination of the meaning of the word ’false1, 
as used in the section, reveals that the courts have adopted 
a dictionary meaning of the term, as implying something
designedly untrue, and deceitful, as meaning something more
q
than mere untruth . In other words, the section would
apply only to cases of wilful falsification of statements
and not to cases of genuine mistakes, misunderstanding,
10inadvertence or carelessness
A person will also not be liable under the section
for making a false return, if he expressly states that the
11return is incomplete . The fact that the return was false, 
that the defendant knew that it was false, and intended to 
evade his tax liability is normally inferred from the nature
9. Chambers’ Twentieth Century Dictionary, (1968), p. 384 > 
(Col.1); see Retina v. Re^err, (1967)3 Can. Cr. Case 
68, at p. 75 for meaning of the term ’false'.
10. Supra note 6, at p. 1086. The position is similar in the 
United States of America. As stated by Harry G-raham Balter 
in his book ’Tax Fraud and Bvasion: A G-uide to Civil and 
Criminal Principles and Practices Under Federal Law,3rd 
ed., ( 1963) > sec. 2.9j ’’The false act by itself is not 
fraud unless a fraudulent state of mind accompanies it; 
so the failure to pay the tax legally due, or the filing 
of a false return, is not enough, the evil state of mind 
which must accompany the act may be variously referred to 
as (1) bad faith, (2) intent to evade tax, (3) 
wilfulness, etc.”
11 .Uiiampalal Girdharilal v. Bmperor, A.I.R. 1933> Nag. 358 
at 359.
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1 2of the understatement , the assessee's experience in tax
and business affairs^, his signature on the return^ and
1 5other relevant facts connected therewith . Some of the
cases that throw light on the subject are mentioned below.
16In Gang a Sagar v. Emperor , the Allahabad High 
Gourt held that the necessary mens rea cou.ld be inferred 
from the circumstances of the case. The appellant was 
convicted of making false and deceptive statements in his 
tax return for the taxation year 1926-27, under section 177, 
Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with section 52 of the Income 
Tax Act, 1922, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000.
12. Ganga Sagar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1929 All 919; In Sivaro v. 
U.S.. (1967)(0»A.1.), 377 I1 (2d), 469, it was held that a 
tax return that omits material items necessary to the 
computation of income is not hrue and correct* within 
section 7206(a) of the I.R.C., 1954. In other words, it 
amounts to furnishing false tax returns and so the 
accused was liable under section 7206(a) for perjury; In 
Cooper v. U.S., 253 F (2d) 821 (8th Cir. 1956) it was held 
that the constant failure to report substantial sums of 
income was a strong and adequate evidence of fraud.
13- P.P. Patel v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1955 Rang. 292; Inspecting 
Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chotabhai 
Javerbhai, A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 941.
14. K.C.V. Reddy v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1950 Rang.201. The 
accused, who was prosecuted for making a false 
verification in return, contended that he signed it 
without looking at the figures and so he did not have the 
requisite degree of mens rea for conviction. The 
information which he furnished showed' that the business 
was running at a loss, whereas it was running at a profit. 
It was held that the accused was liable. Baguley J., said: 
"... A man who signs a document which is false and which 
he does not believe to be true is as liable as though he 
had made a deliberately false statement. This, when he
is bound by law to say the truth.” (At p.207 (para 5).
15. 'Penalties and Prosecutions for Evasion of the Federal
Income Tax' , Gerald L. V/all ace (194'6), 1 Tax haw Rev. 329 
at p. 355.
16. A.I.R. 1929 A H  919.
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The facts of the case are interesting and reveal 
how shrewd the taxpayer was. The appellant was a wealthy 
trader. He had numerous shares in a number of companies, 
paying handsome dividends each year. The Income Tax Officer 
issued a notice to the appellant under section 22(2 ) of the 
Act on April 2, 1 9 2 7 9 to make a return of his income for 
the year 1 9 2 6 - 2 7  by the 15th day of May, 1927. The appellant 
did not take any notice of it. It was only on 25th July, 
that the appellant appeared before the Income Tax Officer 
with his account books, which he placed before him and asked 
him to examine the records. Though it was none of the 
business of the Income Tax Officer, he examined the nakal 
bahi (account book) in which receipts of dividends had been 
shown. On a cursory examination of the records the Income 
Tax Officer calculated the income at Rs. 62,000. The 
appellant then hurriedly prepared a statement entering the 
amount noted by the Income Tax Officer as his dividends.
The unusual way in which the appellant behaved made 
the Income Tax Officer suspicious about his real income 
from dividends. He accordingly made inquiries about the 
appellant’s income from different sources and came.to the 
conclusion that the appellant had not disclosed a large sum 
of money (approximately Rs. three lakhs) received as 
dividends. The Income Tax Officer, therefore, started 
preliminary proceedings to recover the amount of tax. At
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this stage, afraid of being criminally prosecuted, the 
appellant submitted a revised return on November 7 , 1927, 
including the whole amount received as dividends.
It was held that the accused was liable for making
a false statement in a return under section 52 of the Act.
The Court rightly observed that the fact that the appellant
made a revised and correct statement might go in mitigation
of sentence but the offence once committed could not be
17erased by such rectification . it was further held that 
the section imposed a legal obligation to disclose every 
fact within one’s knowledge and its suppression amounted
to the commission of an offence under the impugned section.
18In Hazari Lai v. Emperor , the appellant submitted 
a return of his income, duly verified, showing an income of 
Rs. 896. The Income Tax Officer did not accept it as 
correct and examined the records and evidence produced by 
the appellant in support of his statement. The Income Tax 
Officer came to the conclusion that the accounts were false 
and eventually assessed his income at Rs. 8,000, and the
17. See Attorney General v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. (1944) 2 All.
E.R. 157. It was held that where a person conceals a 
part of his income in violation of the Act, he would be 
liable to conviction regardless of the fact that under the 
particular circumstances of the case, the assessment 
would have been the same, had the assessee disclosed his 
true income. Eor instance, the assessee might have been 
entitled to the relief claimed, had he made the correct 
statement in the return.
18. (1937) 5 I.T.R. 610 (Nagpur).
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1Q 20Assessee was prosecuted under sections 182 , 193 and
196^, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The appellant contended that there was no proof
that the statement of income submitted was in fact false,
and that all that had been proved was that there were
certain omissions in the account, which would not suffice a
conviction for giving false information under section 182,
Indian Penal Code. While rejecting the appellant's
contention, Pollock, J., said:
"...This statement of income was based on the account 
books, and as those account books have been found to 
be false it necessarily follows that the statement of 
income was false."
23In P.P. Patel v. Emperor , t*-e appellant, an 
advocate of the Rangoon High Court, was convicted under 
section 177 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with 
section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, for omission to 
include a sum of Rs. 15,000 (besides other small sums), 
received by way of commission for negotiating a loan, in 
his return for the year 1927-28.
19* Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 182 provides punishment 
for giving false information with intent to cause a public 
servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another.
20. Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 193 deals with 
prosecution for giving false evidence in any stage of 
judicial proceedings etc.
21. Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 196 provides 
punishment for using evidence known to be false.
22. (1937) 5 I.I.E. 610 at p. 613 (para 5).
23. A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 292.
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The appellant contended that the income was an 
isolated transaction of a casual and non-recurring nature,
p/
within section 4 (3)(vii) of the Act and in no way
connected with any business or adventure carried on and
that he honestly believed that it was not an item which
ought to have been included in his return. It was held
that the circumstances of the case would justify a
conviction; the necessary guilty intention could be- inferred
from the fact that the appellant, though a skilled lawyer
and well conversant with the provisions of lav/, did not
disclose the said amount in his return of income. Page, G.
J., rightly said:
"...The appellant is a barrister-at-law and an advocate 
of this Court, who must have had a working knowledge 
of the provisions'of the law relating to the fULing 
up of forms prescribed for returning income assessable 
under the Income Tax Act. Indeea, the very defence to 
the charges connotes that the appellant was familiar 
with the provisions relating to receipts of a "casual 
and non-recurring nature"... the appellant was fully 
aware that all these sums were income, that it was 
incumbent upon him to disclose in his return of income 
for the year 1927-28. '*25
In Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax
2 6v. Chotabhai Javerbhai and others "^ , the Madras High Court 
held that the revenue must prove its case beyond all
24. Income Tax: Act, 1922, section 4(3)(vii) provided that 
'casual and non-recurring 1 receipts were exempt from 
tax, provided they did not arise from business or the 
exercise of a profession, vocation or occupation.
25* A.I.R. 1933, Rangoon 292 at pp. 293, 294 (para 5).
26. A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 941.
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reasonable doubt for a conviction in a taxation case as 
in other criminal cases.
The assessees, five in number, were partners of a 
firm ’Chotabhai Javerbhai’, doing business in yarn and 
silver. The assessee firm’s agent, accused no. 6 , filed 
an income tax return on behalf of the firm showing 
Rs. 5,000 as its profit. On investigation the Income Tax 
Officer found that the firm had made profits of nearly 40,000, 
and that fraudulent entries had been made in the account 
books, with a view to defraud the Income Tax Department.
The Assessee and the agent were prosecuted on various 
charges under section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and 
sections 193 and 196 of tne Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The Court convicted the accused ho.6 on the ground
that he had authority both in law and in fact and that he
was aware of the concealment of income. Their Lordships said:
"... [l(t is difficult in the absence of some sort of 
explanation by accused 6, to understand how... an 
intelligent man of business should not be av/are that 
his business was making a substantial profit (Rs.40,000 
and more a year) and believe that his firm was doing 
so badly as to make only Rs. 5,000 a year."27
However, the accused ' 1 to 5 were acquitted on 
the ground that the prosecution did not prove that the
27. Ibid. at p. 943: Similarly, in U.S. v. Calderon, 548
U.S. 160, 167 (1954), the U.S. Court said that there 
could hardly be ’’more conclusive independent evidence 
of the crime" than proof of a deficiency in reported 
income of &50,000 over a four year period.
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28accused 1 to 5 knew beyond all reasonable doubt that
accused 6 was making a fraudulent return.
Section 278 of the Income fax Act, 1961, for the
first time made it an offence to abet or induce another
person to make a false return, statement or declaration
29
relating to income liable to tax. There was no such
provision in the earlier Acts, so the Income Tax Department
had to resort to the provisions relating to abetment
30contained in Chapter 5 of the Indian Penal Code . Section
278 of the Act of 1961 states:
28. The position is similar in the United Kingdom, United 
states of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
In Fottorrini Ltd. v. Inland Revenue, (1942) 1 All E.R. 
619~(K*l.), Lord Y/right said that the onus in penalty 
proceedings was not of an ambulatory or shifting 
character but the onus was finally on the Crown to prove 
its right to impose what was a severe penalty; see 
'Prosecution for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A 
Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid1, Steven Duke, 
11966) 76 Yale L.J. p.1 at pp. 7-33; U.S. v. MeCue (1962) 
301 P.(2d) 452; Federal Income Taxes and the Civil Fraud 
Penalties, Raymond Whiteaker 7 Vend L. Rev. 366 at p.368
(1954)Acme Slide Fastener Co. Ltd. v. Thomas Edward 
Knott (The Queen),(1962) 62 D.T.C. 1261, See chapter 8 , 
pp.471-84 for burden of proof.
29* Section 278 was incorporated in the Act of 1961 in 
pursuance of the recommendation of The Direct Taxes 
Administration Enquiry Committee, 1958-59* See para 7*72 
at p.174; see Report of the income Tax Investigation 
Commission 1945? para 241, p.107.
30. The Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), section 107 defines 
'abetment of a thing' in the following words:
"A person abets the doing of a thing, who- 
First.- Instigates any person to do that thing; or 
Secondly.- Fngages with one or more other person or 
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, 
if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance 
of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that 
thing; or
Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.!l
(Continued on next page)
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“If a person abets or induces in any manner another 
person to make and deliver an account, statement or 
declaration relating to any income chargeable to tax 
which is false and which he either knows to be false 
or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable 
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to two years:
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate 
reason to the contrary to be recorded in the judgement 
of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be less than 
six months.“31
The section appears to be wide enough to cover
inducement or abetment of any sort by any person, including
32professional men . Similar provisions are contained in the
33Income Tax Acts of the United Kingdom , the United States of
America'^, Australia"^, Canada^ and New Zealand^.
30. (Continued from previous page) Halkori Ram and others v. 
King Emperor, (1941) I.T.R. 209 (fatna). Charges were 
framed against the accused under section 109 of the 
Indian Penal Code for having abated the offence under 
section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, there being then 
no such provision in the Income Tax Act.
31. See supra note 7.
32. 1 The Law and Practice of Income Tax1, J.B. Kanga and
N.A. Palkhivala, 6th ed. Vol.I. (1969), p. 1047.
33* Taxes Management Act, 1970, section 99, provides
penalty for assistance in making incorrect returns, etc.
34* Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 7206(2).
35. See ’Gunn’s Commonwealth Income Tax Law and Practice,*
6th e&~. (Butterworth 1960), see 3421 at p. 1429. The
provisions relating to aiding and abetting contained in 
sec. 5 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914-1969 also 
apply in case of income tax offences.
36. Income Tax Act (RSC 1952, c 148) section 132 (1)(3).
37. Land and Income Tax Act (67 of 1954), section 228 (l)(e).
»
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Failure to Co-operate in Search and Seizure
*3 0
The Income Tax Act, 1961 , like the earlier Acts
of 1922^' , 1918^and 1886' 1 , has given various powers to
the Income Tax authorities to enable them to make the
assessment of tax in as reasonable and equitable a manner 
42as possible , and for catching the tax evader and
4.1establishing, beyond doubt the fact of concealment . The 
powers of search and seizure, to compel the production of 
a taxpayer’s record and to unearth the evidence which might 
not be available to an investigating agency , are among the
powers under the Act. But this power is to be exercised
v/ithin limits prescribed by the Act.This is neeessary to
ensure the fundamental right to privacy and freedom enshrined
58. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 125*126,127? 151 to 156.
59* Income Tax Act, 1922, sections 5(5)*5(6),5(7A), 57 to 59.
40. Income Tax,Act, 1918, sections 27 to 29*
41. Income Tax Act, 1886, sections 28 (dealt with the power
to summon witnesses.
42. Report of the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry 
Committee" (1958-59)V G-overnment of India, para 7.45*P*159*
45 Searches . Seizures and Self--Incrimination', Norman
Redlich (1955) 10 Tax L. Rev. 191. See ’Development of 
the Law of Search and Seizure’ , L.H. Leigh (1970) 11 ad•
._ . 268-280.
44. ’Power of Search and Seizure’, M.P.Jain (1969) 1 1 *
J.I.L.I. 535. See G-ianchana v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.
1962 S.C. 496. The Supreme Court has defined the 
expression 'seized1 appearing in Section 178A of the 
Sea Customs Act, 1878, as to ’take possession of 
contrary to the wishes of the owner of the property.’ 
at p. 499* para 7.
410
45in the Constitution , and to safeguard the affected
A £
personas reputation and business .
The power of search and seizure was for the first
time given to the Income Tax authorities by the insertion
of sub-section (2) of section 57^in the Income Tax Act,
1922, by the Finance Act, 1956, in pursuance of the
recommendation of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, 1958-
59^8* Section 152 in the Income Tax Act, 1961, is the
provision corresponding to sub-section (2) of section 57
of the Act of 1922 with slight modifications. Clauses (i)
to (v) of sub-section (1) of section 152^ of the Act of
1961 empower the specially authorized Income Tax authorities:
1 (i) to enter and search any building or place where 
he has reason to suspect that such books of account, 
other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other 
valuable article or thing are kept;
45* The Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(d) and (e)
provides fundamental right of residence, which includes
the right of privacy as well.
46. Surra note 44, p.535.
47. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 57(2) gave power of 
search and seizure to the Income Tax Officer specially 
authorized by the Commissioner in this behalf.
48. Supra note 42, para 7*43, at p. 159; Report of the 
Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54 * Vol.II, para 53 
at p. 201. The Income Tax (Amendment) Bill of 1938 
enacted a clause to give powers of search and seizure 
but it could not be enacted owing to opposition to it 
by the legislature.
49. The present section 152 of the Income Tax Act, 1961,
was substituted by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect
from the 1st April, 1964. See Board of Revenue,
Madras v. R.S. Jhaver, A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 59;
Sheonath Prasad v. State of Bihar A.I.R.,1968, S.C.15 17; 
State of Rajasthan v. Rehman. A.I.R. 1960, 5 S.C. 210.
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(ii) break open the lock of any door, box, locker, safe, 
almirah or other receptacle for exercising the powers 
conferred by clause (i) where the keys thereof are not 
available;
(iii) seize any such books of account, other documents, 
money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or 
thing found as a result of such search;
(iv) place marks of identification on any books of 
account or other documents or make or cause to be made 
extracts or copies thereof from;
(v) make a note or an inventory of any such money, 
bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing.”
In case it is not practicable to seize any such
books of accounts or documents, such officer may, under
sub-section (3) of section 132;
”... serve an order on the owner or the person, who 
is in immediate possession or control thereof, that he 
shall not remove, part with or otherwise deal with it, 
except with the previous permission of such officer...”
Section 275Aof the Act, which was inserted by the
Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1965» imposes criminal liability
on persons acting in violation of such order. Section
275A provides,
”Whoever contravenes any order referred to in sub­
section (3) of section 132 shall be punishable with 
rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years 
and shall also be liable to fine.”
Disclosure of Confidential Information
50The Income Tax statutes have invariably treated 
all documents filed or statements made or furnished to the 
Income Tax authorities as confidential in nature. The
50. See Income Tax Act, 1886, section 38(2) and (3);
Income Tax Act, 1918, section 42; Income Tax Act, 1922, 
Section 54; Income Tax Act, 1961, section 280.
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reason being, as stated by C.P. Sinha, J., in Srimati
Pandei v. Babulal Sah:
"...jTjhe assessees should feel that they can freely 
state the facts with regard to their income, which 
might involve confidential matters relating to their 
business without fear of the matter being disclosed.
It is with that end in view, to give absolute freedom 
to the income tax assessees to make statements of 
their income to the department, untrammelled by any 
fear of disclosure of those statements, that such 
restrictions have been imposed on the grant of copies 
and production of such documents. "51
Accordingly, it has been provided that, if any public
52servant^ is found guilty of a breach of confidence
reposed in him under the Act, he is liable to conviction
on prosecution before a court of law, with the previous
55approval of the appropriate authorities .
It is interesting to note that the Income Tax
statutus since the Act of 1922, have progressively relaxed
the rule of absolute prohibition of disclosure, laid down
in the Act of 1913, so as to bring the pressure of social
54calumny on tax dodgers' '. Section 42 of the Income Tax 
Act, 1913 stated:
51. A.I.R. 1958 Pat 257 at p. 258, (para 5); Emperor v.
Osman Chotani, (1942) I.T.R. 429 (Bombay); Promatha Nath 
v. Nirod Chandra Ghose (1959) I.T.R. 570,572; Shama Rao 
v. Motiram (1954) I.I.P. 456, 458, Report of the 
Taxation Enquiry Commission 1955-54» Government of 
India, Vo. II, p. 205 (para 40); Report of the Income 
Tax Investigation Commission, 1949» Government of India, 
para 244 at p. 108.
52. Income Tax authorities are 1 public servantsf under 
section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; supra note 42, 
para 7.67 at p. 171.
55* See infra pp.414-21 for provisions relating to sanctions.
54. Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1955-54, Vol. II 
Government of India, para 40, p. 205.
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"All particulars contained in any statement or return 
made or furnished under the provisions of this Act 
ahall be treated as confidential, and if a public 
servant discloses any particulars contained in any 
statement or return made or furnished under this Act, 
he shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may 
extend to six months, and shall also be liable to 
fine•”
Section 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, corresponding 
to section 42 of the Act of 1918, after stating that 
information furnished to the Income Tax authorities was 
confidential, enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) of sub­
clause (3)? a number of particulars, for disclosure of which 
the public servant was immune from prosecution. Similarly, 
section 137 (now deleted) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in 
sub-section (3), clauses (i) to (xxi), gave a list of 
various particulars, to the disclosure of which the 
prohibition did not apply, later it was realised that a 
threat of punishment for diclosure of information given 
to Income Tax authorities did not serve any useful purpose, 
when so many exceptions were recognized. Moreover, it 
was an encouragement to tax evaders to afford undue 
protection to statements furnished to the Income Tax 
authorities . Accordingly section 137 of the Act of 1961 
was deleted by section 32 of the Finance Act, (5 of 1964)? 
with effect from the 1st April, 1964. The result is that
55. See Report of the Income Tax Investigation Commission, 
(1949)> Government of India, paras 243> 244* p. 108.
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the prohibition against disclosure is now limited to the
documents specified in the orders issued by the Central
Government under sub-section (2) of section 138 of the Act
of 1961, Yrtiich states:
n...[T]he Central Government may,... direct that no 
information or document shall be furnished or 
produced by a public servant in respect of such 
matters relating to such class of assessees or except 
to such authorities as may be specified in the order.”
If a public servant acts in contravention of such
order, he is liable to conviction under section 280 of the
Act, whioh states:
1 (1)... [h] e shall be punishable with imprisonment 
which may extend to six months, and shall also be 
liable to fine.”
This provision appears to be similar to that
contained in section 38 of the Income Tax Act, 1886. The
relevant portion of which provided:
f1(l). The Governor-General in Council may make rules 
consistent with this Act... for preventing the 
disclosure of particulars contained in documents 
delivered or produced with respect to assessment... 
(2)...The Governor-General in Council may direct that 
a public servant committing a breach of the rule shall 
be deemed to have committed an offence under section 
166 of the Indian Penal Code.”56
Sanction for Prosecution
As the very idea of criminal prosecution brings
a feeling of horror to the mind of a respectable man, it
is not to be initiated as a matter of course. A case is
56. Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code punishes any public 
servant who knowingly disobeys any direction of law as 
to the way he is to perform his duty, knowing it to be 
likely that such disobedience will cause injury to any 
person.
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to be thoroughly prepared for investigation, scrutinized and
thrashed out before the machinery of the law is set in
motion. The decision to prosecute calls for a mature and
57and expert brain . Perhaps, with this end in view, and
58to ensure sufficient safeguards from taxpayers being
unduly harassed, the legislature in India has provided in
sub-section (1) of section 279 of the Act of 1961^, and
the corresponding sections of the Acts of 1922^, 1918^,
6 2and 1886 ", that criminal proceedings under sections 275A
to 278 should be instituted only at the instance of the
63Commissioner of Income Tax . And sub-section (2) of 
section 279 makes the tax offences compoundable^^"before or 
after the institution of such proceedings. The Courts 
appear to have been very rigid and have attached much 
significance to the technicalities of law in applying 
these provisions.
57. Supra note 72, sec.48.44 at pp. 457-9.
58. T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Ranga Chari, A.I.R 1969 S.C. 701.
59. Ibid., para 7 at p. 7067
60. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 53s Inspecting Assistant 
Commissioner.
61. Income Tax Act, 1918, section 41s Collector.
62. Income Tax Act, 1886, section 36: Collector.
63. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 279 (1A) provides that
no prosecution shall be instituted under section 277
if the penalty has been reduced or waived.
64. To constitute a valid compromise of an offence, there 
must be an agreement between the parties; and the parties 
must be fully aware of their rights and there must not be
any undue pressure or coercion or fraud by any one of the
parties. See the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 
1898), section 345; provisions relating to compromise are 
also found in the laws of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. See Tax Management Act, 1970, 
section 54 which provides for settling of appeals by 
agreement, and Internal Revenue Code, 1954? section 
7122: 1 Tax Fraud and Bvasion', Harry Craham Balter,
3rd ed. 11963)7 Chapter 7 for compromise procedure.
4 1 6
65In Bankat Lai v. Emperor as long ago as 1914, in 
a case under section 35 of the Act of 1886, it was held 
that, though the offices of Collector and District 
Magistrate were held by one man, the prosecution would be 
illegal, if the proceedings were instituted on a complaint 
signed by him as district Magistrate, not as collector.
However, there appears to haVQ been a change in the
attitude of the courts since 1914. The Supreme Court held
in T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, I.T.Q., Madras^0, that
a prosecution would not be illegal on the ground that it
was not instituted by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner
under section 53 of the Act of 1922, if the proceedings
were in fact launched at the instance of the proper
authority. The Court rightly said:
1 The clause ’at his instance' in Section 53 of the 
1922 Act only means ’on his authority' and it is 
therefore sufficient compliance Csic} with the 
statutory requirement if the complaint petition is 
filed by the respondent on being authorized by the 
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.”67
68In Hari Chanel v. Emperor the petitioner was
6Qconvicted under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code
65. (1914)12 All A.L.J.256; re Mohideen Pakkiri Marakkayer 
A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 50. A charge in respect of false 
statement in verification could be tried only by the court 
having jurisdiction over the place where the return was 
received ana not where it was filed, Jagdeo Sahu v. 
Emperor (1917) 15 All. L.J. 163.
66. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 701.
67. Tbid. at p. 766 (para 7).
68. A.I.R. 1934 Lah. 626.
69. Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code punishes 
furnishing false information by a person legally bound
to furnish information on any subject.
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read with section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, for 
malcing a false verification in a return. The return was 
submitted by the assessee, not in pursuance of a notice by 
the Income Tax Officer under section 22(2) of the Act of 
1922, but on his own accord. It was held that the 
conviction was illegal. The Court stated that the assessee 
was not bound to make a return, if he had not received a 
notice to do so and criminal liability would not accrue in
a case of a return filed suo motu.
70However, the decision does not hold good now , in
view of the fact that the Act of 1961 has imposed a
statutory liability on the part of every person under section 
71139(1) to file a return of his income to the Income Tax 
Officer each year without being served any notice to do so 
by the Income Tax Officer.
72In Champalal Girdharilal v. Emperor , Nagpur High 
Court adopted too a technical view and held that in a case 
of lack of proper sanction, the proceedings were illegal.
The appellant was convicted by a magistrate for an offence 
under section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, for making a 
false statement in his declaration attached to the income 
tax return. The prosecution was instituted, as required 
under section 55 of the Act of 1922, at the instance of 
70-* Supra note 52 at p. 1046 (f.n.1).
71. See Chapter 2, for section 159(1) of the Act^ , pp.47-9.
72. A.I.R. 1933, Nag. 358.
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the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On appeal, the
additional Sessions Judge found that the accused had not
committed an offence under section 52 but under section
51(1)(c) (for failure to file return in time) and therefore
altered the conviction to one under the latter section.
But it v/as held in revision that the offence under section
51(1 )(c) v/as of a different nature from that under section
52, and, as there was no sanction for a prosecution under
73the former, the conviction was illegal . The Court 
disagreed with the Sessions’ Judge’s view that, though the 
sanction of the Assistant Commissioner was only for 
prosecution under section 52, there v/as no bar to a 
prosecution under section 5 1 ( 1 ) ( c ) .
Admittedly>criminal provisions must be strictly 
construed but the Nagpur High Court's view appears to have 
been overruled by the Supreme Court in Shamrao Bhagwantrao 
Reshmukh v. Dominion of India^ .
Though the decision relates to compounding of
offences committed under section 52 of the Income Tax Act,
the decision appears to be relevant. P.D. Deshmukh, 
deceased, who was the manager of a Joint Hindu family at 
the relevant time, admitted on examination before the 
iippellate Assistant Commissioner that he had concealed a
73. In H. v. Barre Ltd. (1947), 88 Can. Crim. Cas. 397, a
Canadian case, it was held that the authority to
prosecute must refer to a specific offence.
74. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 249.
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sum amounting to Rs. 30,000 from the return submitted by 
the attorney having authority, for the year 1928-29. He 
v/as told that he would be prosecuted under section 52 of 
tne Act. As a result, Deshmukh paid the sum to the Income 
lax Department and the offence was compounded under section 
53(2) and the matter was closed.
In June, 19 3 4» the two cousins of P.D. Deshmukh, 
who were coparcerners, filed a suit against the State for 
the recovery of the sum so paid, on the ground that P.D. 
Deshmukh1s statement was incorrectly recorded, that the 
money v/as extorted from him under the threat of legal 
prosecution, that the omission v/as due to the mistake of 
the abent, and that he was not liable to be prosecuted 
under section 52 of the Act.
The Court rejected all these contentions and held
that there was no coercion and the offer of compromise was
made by P.D. Deshmukh voluntarily, to avert the disgrace and
ignominy of a prosecution. As regards the second contention,
Mahajan, C.J., said:
n... (e ) ven if it be assumed that P.D. Deshmukh v/as not 
liable to be prosecuted under section 52, because of 
the verification being made by his agent and not by 
himself, that there was no return by him under S.22, 
of the Income Tax Act, his liability under S.51(c) for 
failing without reasonable cause or excuse to furnish 
in due time any of the returns mentioned in S.22, sub-s, 
(2) would nevertheless remain unaffected.
Whether his liability arose under S.51 for failure to 
furnish the return, as required by S.51(c), or for 
making a false statement in the return as contemplated 
by S.52, it made no difference to the authority of 
the Assistant Commissioner to permit the composition 
of the offence under section 53- That section covers
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both offences under sections 51 and 52. There can 
be no doubt therefore that P.D. Deshmukh could be 
prosecuted either under S. 5 1(1)(c ) or S.52 and even 
if he had been prosecuted by the Income Tax authorities 
under S.52 only, there was nothing to prevent the 
Court from altering the charge to one under S.51(1)(c ), 
if it thought fit."75
It may be observed that the Department should
resort to prosecution in preference to compromise in
flagrant cases of concealment and fraud in view of the
7 6large scale evasion of taxes in the country' . This might
result in loss of revenue to the exchequer, but it will be
fruitful in the long run as it will deter tax-dodgers and
those who are like-minded. It will remove the deep-rooted
feeling in the public mind that justice can be purchased
with money and the sword of the law is for the poor and
not the rich. It may be noted that the Income Tax Act,
1886, had no provision for compromise of criminal
77prosecutions under the Act .
The provisions relating to compromise in criminal 
prosecutions contained in sub-section (2) of section 279 of 
the Act of 1961, should either be deleted, or at least 
amended to the extent that the compromise should be made
75. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 249 at pp. 251, 252; (para 5.).
Similarly in the United Kingdom a taxpayer is bound by 
the terms of the agreement to pay a sum in consideration 
of no proceedings for penalties being taken. Q.I.R. v. 
Kichards ( 1950) 53 T.G.I.; Attorney G-eneral v. Johstone 
(1924-26) 10 Tax Cases 753.
76. Report of the Working G-roup: Administrative Reforms 
Commission, (Government of India;, 1968, para 6.28, p.122.
ii. Income Tax Act? 1886, section 36.
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only with the leave of the Court before which the 
prosecution for the offence is pending as provided under
70
clause (2) of section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code
for the offences mentioned in the first two columns of
sub-section (1) of section 345 of the Code. This will
bring uniformity in criminal prosecutions under the law of
taxation and the general Criminal lav; of the country.
Penalties Outside the Income Tax Act.
Criminal prosecutions under the Indian Penal Code
may be instituted for violations of the revenue laws,
although the Income Tax Act provides most of the criminal 
30sanctions . The Courts have approved the use of the broad
penal sanctions contained in the Indian Penal Code, since
81the very inception of the Income Tax Acts , either in 
combination with oriminal provisions of the Income Tax Act
o p  O'?
or in preference to them . The Income Tax authorities
78. 1 Report of the Working Group on Central Direct Taxes
Administration (1968) para 6.28 at p.122; Report of the 
Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee 1958-59♦ 
has also suggested that a compromise in criminal 
prosecutions should be resorted only in exceptional cases, 
para 7.69. at p. 172.
79* See The Criminal Procedure Code (5 of 1898), section 345 
(1) and (2) for provisions relating to compromise in 
cases under the Indian Penal Code.
80. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 275A,276,276A, 276B,277 
and section 278.
81. R.v. Dayalji Ender.ji, (1871) 8 Bom. H.C.R. 2l(Cr.C.) In re 
Punamchand Maneklal (1914) 38 I.L.R. Bom. 642 (E.B.) In re 
Natara Ja Iyer, I.L.R. (1913) 36 Mad. 72; Gang a Sagar v. 
Emperor, A.I.R. 1919 All 919; Halkhori Ram v. Emperor,
(1941) I.T.R. 209; Inspecting Assistant Commissioner v. 
Chotabhai Javerbhai and others, A.I.R. 1941 Mad.941; P.D. 
Patel v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 292; K.C.V. Reddy v.
Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 201.
82. T.S. Baliah v. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 701.
83. See supra Chap 2, pp. 42-45 for various category of 
Income Tax authorities
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are ’public servants’ within the meaning of' section 21 of
the Indian Penal Code and income tax proceedings are
ft A
judicial in nature . As such an Income fax Officer may
institute a complaint before a criminal court for an offence
85committed before him
One may question the desirability of the use of 
general criminal sanctions in Income Tax cases, when the 
Income Tax Act itself provides punishment for infringement 
of its provisions. In fact, this issue v/as debated with 
much ingenuity and eloquence by the counsel for the 
appellant in T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, I.T.O., Madras0 ,^ 
before the Supreme Court of India.
The appellant was a cine-actor. Pour complaints 
were filed by the Income Tax authorities against the 
appellant before the Presidency Magistrate, Madras, in 
respect of income tax returns submitted for the assessment 
years 1958-59 1961-62. The first three complaints were
related to assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 
under section 52 of the Act of 1922, and under section 177, 
Indian Penal Code; the fourth was in respect of assessment 
year 1961-62 under section 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, 
and section 177, Indian Penal Code. In substance, the 
charge v/as that the appellant had been systematically filing
84. Income Tax Act, 1961, section 156.
85. Supra note 52 at p. 1046.
86. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 701.
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false returns of his income and had made false statements 
in verification, knowing them to be false and wilfully 
omitted and deliberately suppressed the inclusion of the 
receipt of certain sums of money in his income tax returns, 
with a view to evade lawful taxes due to the Government.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that 
the provisions of section 52 of the Act of 1922 being a 
special provision, he should be liable to prosecution under 
that provision only and not under section 177, Indian Penal 
Code. In respect of the matter covered by section 52 of the 
Act of 1922, the provisions of section 177 I.P.C. should 
be taken to have been repealed by implication, so that the 
prosecution of the appellant under section 177 v/as illegal.
The Court held that there being no repugnancy or
inconsistency between the tv/o enactments, they could
stand together and be treated as cumulative in effect.
Bamaswami, J., delivering the judgement of the Court said:
”... The provisions enacted in Section 52 of the 1922 
Act do not alter the nature or quality of the offence 
'enacted in Section 177, Indian Penal Code, but it 
merely provides a new course of procedure for what was 
already an offence. In a case of this description, 
the new statute is regarded not as superseding, nor 
repealing by implication the previous law, but as 
cumulative... In cases such as these, it is to be 
presumed that the legislature knew that the offence 
was punishable by indictment and that, as it did not 
in express terms abolish the common law proceeding, 
it intended that the two remedies should co-exist."87
87. Ibid. at p. 704 (para 4 )•
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The observation of Krishnaswami Reddi, J, of
Madras High Court, makes the point clearer where he says:
11.. • [f]he subject-matter of the offence under section 
177, I.P.O. is much wider and comprehensive than the 
subject-matter of the offence created under section 
52 of the Income Tax Act for the purposes of enforcing 
effectively the provisions of the said Act. The Indian 
Penal Code is a penal statute, whereas the Income Tax 
Act is fiscal and deals with revenue... The object and 
the purpose of the two enactments being different and 
the offence under the enactment being wider than the 
other,... it would not have been intended by the later 
enactment to repeal the earlier.
The Oourt further herld that there is no bar to 
the trial or conviction of the offender under section 177, Indian 
Penal Code, 1860, and’ section 52 of Income Tax Act, 1922, 
at the same time. The position under the Act of 1961 is 
the same.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom a person may be
89prosecuted for fraud at common law , or for offences under
90the Perjury Act, 1911 , or for conspiring to defraud the
91revenue.
92In R . v. Hudson" , a leading case on the point, the 
question was raised whether common law would apply in oases 
of revenue offences. The appellant v/as convicted on
88. T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 145 at 
149 (para 14*77™
89* R v. Hudson (1956) 2 Q.B. 252; ’Common Lav/ Prosecutions 
and Revenue Fraud (1956) B.T.R. 119.
90. R. v. Bradbury, R. v. Edlin, (1921) 1 K.B. 562; R.v.
R. v. Hood-Barrs, (1947) T k .B. 455.
91. Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 20, 3rd ed., (1957), 
at p. 720.
92. (1956) 2 Q.B. 252;(1956) 1 All E.R. 814.
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December 8, 1955 > of making false statements, with intent 
to defraud, in that he had sent to the Inland Revenue 
accounts,which falsely stated the profits of his business 
for the years 1945 to 1955 and also a certificate of 
disclosure, which he knew to be false.
On appeal against the conviction, the appellant
contended that the offence charged was unknown to the law,
i.e., not provided for by the Income Tax Act, 1952, or by
the Perjury Act, 1911. It was held that the appellant was
rightly convicted, since the offence charged disclosed the
offence of fraud on the Crown and the public, which v/as
indictable as a common law misdemeanour. Lord Goddard, C. J.,
delivering the judgement of the Court said:
”... (b / ecause the offence is not provided in any 
particular section of any particular Act, there is 
no reason why, if what is done is an offence at 
common law, it should not be prosecuted as such."
In the United States of America also criminal
penalties contained in the Federal Criminal Code are
94invoked in revenue cases . The most important criminal
93. ibid. at p. 815; Similar view was taken in R.v. J.(1963)
N.I. 73. *
94. 1 Tax Fraud and Evasion,* Harry Graham Balter (1963 9 
Chapter 11.2: U.S. v. Beacon Brass Company, Inc., and 
Maurice Feinberg, 344 U.S. 43 (1952). The Supreme Court 
held that prosecution for making false statements to 
representatives of the Treasury Department for the 
purpose of concealing unreported income is punishable 
under section 35A of the Criminal Code of 1901 (similar 
to section 1001 of the present code), even though the 
similar conduct had been specifically covered under 
section 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 
(section 7203 is the present section under I.R.C. 1954). 
Justice Minton said:
"... A single act or transaction may violate two or 
more criminal statutes... Being distinct, each of 
the statutes is to be enforced as it was written.”
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sanctions which are in vogue are (1) perjury (2)
96presenting false claims 01 making false statements J and
/ \ 97(3; conspiracy .
It may be noted in this connection that the Income
Tax Department in India does not take a serious view of
tax crimes. The Department rarely has to resort to the
criminal provisions available under the Income Tax Act and
98under the Indian Penal Code . The provisions are a dead 
letter. This detached view of the Department helps 
unscrupulous taxpayers in evading taxes. This might be 
because of the Department’s preference to realize money by 
imposing administrative penalties instead of seeking
criminal prosecution, and lack of proper facilities for
99preparing tax evasion cases , the difficulty in procuring 
evidence for criminal prosecutions because of the heavy 
burden of proof, the general reluctance of the Courts to 
convict a taxpayer for violation of tax laws, the lack of 
social consciousness and the involvement of influential 
people in general in such types of offences; But this is 
not going to help, if tax crimes are to be checked and 
minimized.
95. Title 18 of U.S.C., 1948 G. 1621; Cooper v. U . S . , 253 F, 
(2d) 821 (8th Gir 1956); (William C)Siravo v. U.S. 1967
(CA1), 377 P(2d) 469.
96. Title 18 U.S.G. 1948 , S. 1001, U.S. v. MeCue, (1962) 301, 
F (2d) 452.
97. Title 18. U.S.G. 1948, Section 371; Kerry V/. G-runewaid 
V. U^L. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
98. See supra Chapter 5> p. 229 for number of prosecutions 
99* See supra Chapter 5, pp. 215-61 for various causes of
tax evasion.
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It is high, time for the Department to maJce use 
of the penal provisions more frequently , because criminal
sanctions are one of the most effective deterrents against
2
tax evasion . The Income Tax Department appears to have 
ignored the recommendation of the Direct Taxes Administration 
hnauiry Committee, 1958-59? that the Department should 
have recourse of the penal provisions of the Indian Penal 
Code rather than those in the taxing statutes-', which 
would be a step in the direction of tax crime control, 
because the provisions of the Indian Penal Code are more 
stringent than those in the Income Tax Act. A clause 
similar to that of section 104^ of the British Taxes 
Management Act, 1970, might be added in the Income Tax Act, 
directing the Income Tax Department to take action under 
the Indian Penal Code in appropriate cases.
1. Supra note 88, para 6.28, at p. 122.
2. 1Report of the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry
Committee" 1958-59? para 7*66 at p. 171.
3. Ibid, para 7.65 at p. 170.
See ’The Crimes of Income Tax Fraud*: Its Present
Status and Foundation* , (1953) 52 Columbia L. Rev.,
4 7 £ , 4 7 8 .
4. Taxes Management Act, 1970 (9 of 1970), section 104 
states:
’’The provisions of the Taxes Acts shall not, save so 
far as is otherwise provided, affect any criminal
proceedings for any misdemeanour.”
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C H A P T E R  VIII
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Nature of Penalty Proceedings in India
In the preceding chapters a detailed study of
legislative measures to combat tax evasion has been made.
In this chapter an attempt is made to review the judicial
trend in some important areas of tax crimes. The judiciary
being the final arbiter of legislative action**, the success
of tax legislation, like that of any other enactments, depends
on how the courts view the intention of the planners, as
2manifested in legislative enactments •
*3
The Income Tax Act, 1961, as stated earlier , 
provides two types of penalty for defaults committed under 
the Act, i*e., one enforced by the Income Tax authorities 
and the other by the criminal courts. There seems to be no 
controversy as regards the latter type of penalty, which is 
criminal in nature. The very title to chapter 22, "Offences 
and Prosecution"1 is indicative of this fact. The real 
difficulty arises in relation to the former type of 
penalty. The question that has long puzzled those 
interested is the nature of penalties imposed extra-
judicially by the administrative authorities. The point
T7 'The Courts and the Legislature in India* » P.K. Irani,
(1965) 14* International and Comparative Law Quarterly,950.
2. 'Statutory Interpretation1 and the Welfare State', Sheldon
D. Elliot 11959-60) 2, J.I.L.I.,267, at p.258.
3. See Chapter 6, pr?£6 3 .
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has been agitated from time to time, but is still unresolved.
There seems no consensus amongst the judges^. Some of the
5
courts hold that the nature of such penalties is criminal , 
while others opine that it is civil, i.e., it is a mere
imposition of additional tax and otheife still would
7
categorize it quasi-criminal .
4. C.I.T., Calcutta v. A d A l i , A.I.R.1968 Cal. 345 at 
p.351. (para 17).
5. C.I.T., Ahmedabad v. Gokuldas Harivallabh Das A.I.R.1959 
Bom.96; Khemra.i Cheganlal v. G .I.T. A.I.R. 1960, Pat. 252; 
Bhagwandas Shyamsundar v. C .I.T. (1962) 45> I.T.R. 586
(Pat); Mohd. Atiq v. I.T.O" (7962) 46, I.T.R. 452 (All); 
P.K. Kalasami Nadar v. C.1.T. (1962) 46 I.T.R. 1056 
Mad.; Money and Co. v. C.I.T. (1963) 47 I.T.R. 434, 
(Ker.); Lakshmi Narain Shambhuram v. C.I.T. (1963) 49 
I.T.R. 35*5 (Pat) ; M. Hussaion Ali and Sons v. C. I.T.
(1965) 58 I.T.R. 787 CMad); Mohan Ram Ram Kumar v. C.I.T.
(1966) 59 I.T.R. 135 (All); S. Paramasiva Mudaliar and
Sons v. C.I.T. (1966) 60 I.T.R. 283 (Mad); Mangilal 
Karwa v. C.I.T. Misc. Civil Case No. 113 of 1962 Dated 
14.9*62 (M.P.); C.I.T., E.P.T."7 A. P . v. Hamaswami Che tty
(1967) 64 I.T.R. 388 (A.P.") : . C.I.T.. Gujarat v. L. H .
Vora, (1965) 56 I.T.R. 126 (GujTl P.3.S. Bommonna 
Chettiar v. C.I.T., Madras (1969) 73 I.T.R. 2 6  (Mad); 
C.I.T.. M.P.v. "Obiamp'al'al A.I.R. 1969 Mad. Pra. 72
6. lalchand Gopal Das v. C.I.T., U.P. and V. P . (1963) 48
I.T.R. 324 (All); Murlidhay Te.jpal v . C.I.T. , Patna
(1961) 42 I.T.R. 129 (pat); A.V. Thomas and Co. Ltd.
v. C.I.T., Madras, I.L.R. (1967) 1 Mad. 255.
7. C.I.T., Calcutta v. Anwar Ali_A.I.R. 1968 Cal 345> 352 
(para 27)"; Hindustan Steel "Ltd. v. State of Orissa 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 253. The case relates to Sales tax
law in which their Lordships stated such proceedings to be 
as quasi-criminal. Bha.juram Ganplat Ram v. C.I.T.
Bihar and Orissa A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 38, at p.40 (para5).
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The protagonists of the first view hold that the 
nature of the penal proceedings under the Act in general, and 
under section 271(1)(c) in particular, being criminal, the 
principles of criminal jurisprudence will apply in such 
proceedings* In other words, the following conditions must 
be satisfied before a person is penalized for defaults 
committed under the Act, viz.,
(i) the burden of proof that the assessee has concealed the 
particulars of income ,or has furnished inaccurate particulars 
of such income or failed to submit the return in time, or comply 
with notices or furnish necessary information under the Act, 
intentionally, or without reasonable cause, lies on the 
Income Tax Department;
(ii) it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that 
the assessee has committed such default, and
(iii) the finding in assessment proceedings that an assessee 
has concealed income is not sufficient for the purpose of . 
imposition of the penalty.
The majority of High Courts have approved of this view,
The Bombay High Court in C.I.T., Ahmedabad v. Gokul
Q
Das Harivallabh Das , dealt with the question of the nature 
of penal proceedings for the first time. Chagla C.J., in 
one of his classic pronouncements, said:
8. A.I.E. 1959 Bom. 96. See chapter 6P*303for facts of 
the case.
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"...The proceedings under S.28(l)(c) in their very 
nature are penal proceedings, and the elementary 
principles of criminal jurisprudence must apply to 
these proceedings, and nothing is more elementary... 
in criminal jurisprudence than the principle that the 
burden of proving that the accused is guilty is 
always upon the prosecution.
He further observed that the nature of such 
proceedings calls for a strict standard of proof. He 
stated:
"•..(is]aeh proceeding under the Income Tax Act is a 
self-contained proceeding and the findings in one 
proceeding do not become binding in respect of other 
proceedings,.. The assessment proceedings are taxing 
proceedings; the penalty proceedings are criminal 
proceedings in their very nature, and a decision given 
in an assessment proceeding cannot possibly be binding 
upon the authority who tries the assessee for an 
offence. ,!*l 0
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in one of its recent
11cases, C.I.T.,M.P. v. Champalal Sukhuram , held that a 
penalty proceeding is not a procedding for the imposition 
of additional tax. Accordingly, the quantam of evidence 
required for the levy of a penalty would not be the same as 
that required for the purpose of inclusion of an additional 
amount in the total income of the assessee for the purpose 
of assessment.
12In another case, C.I.T. .M.P. v. Pun.iabhai Shah , 
the Madhya Pradesh Court held that the penalty proceedings, 
being in their very nature penal proceedings, the degree 
and quantam of proof necessary for finding an assessee
9. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 96 at p.97 (para 3)«
10. Ibid at p. 98 (para 4).
11. A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 72.
12. A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 103.
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guilty is the same as in a criminal prosecution. The
facts were that the assesseefs total income for the
assessment year 1959-60 was estimated at Rs. 10,953.
However, the Income Tax Officer later found that the assessee
had purchased a motor vehicle for Rs. 31*250, regarding which
nothing was mentioned in the return.
The assessee*s explanation, that on 26th August, 1958
he had a cash balance of Rs. 14*168 and out of it he made
payments of Rs. 1000 and Rs. 9*000 on 26th August and 9th
September 1958, was rejected by the Income Tax authorities.
The Income Tax Officer found that there were no entries in
his accounts showing the withdrawal of Rs. 1,000. There
13were certain jottings in pencil in the Rokad ^and, if the 
payments had been actually made from the cash balance, then 
I these amounts would have appeared merged in the rokad entries 
themselves and not in the pencil jottings. The Income Tax 
Officer further discarded the assessee*s statement that
i
Rs. 21,250 was the depreciation allowance on his trucks for 
the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60, which had been 
utilized in purchasing the vehicle, as false. The Income 
Tax Officer, therefore, declared the sum of Rs. 32*250/- to 
be income from undisclosed sources in the assessment year 
1959-60 and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed a 
penalty of Rs. 5*000 under section 271 (1)(c ) of the Act of 
1961.
i
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 13. Rokad means 'account*.
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Rejecting the appellant’s claim to set aside the
penalty, the Court said:
”...The assessment proceedings and penalty proceedings 
are different in their nature. The findings given in 
assessment proceedings are no doubt relevant and 
admissible in penalty proceedings, but they do not 
operate as res judicata, so as to preclude the 
production of other evidence in penalty proceedings to 
show that the assessee concealed his income or to rebut 
this charge. Again, the bare fact that the explanation 
offered by the assessee in assessment proceedings was 
rejected and it was held in those proceedings that he 
had concealed his income or that the explanation was 
unsatisfactory by itself cannot be made the basis of 
the conclusion that he. has been guilty of deliberately 
concealing the particulars of his income."H
The Kerala High Oourt in Money and Co.. v. C.I.T..
Kerala, similarly said:
”... [l] he degree of proof is that of a criminal 
prosecution and that the mere preponderance of 
probability will not suffice as in the case of 
a civil action.”1^
The Madras High Court in Gnanmbika Mills Ltd. v. C.I.T.
Madras'^, M. Hussain Ali and Sons v. C.I.T., Madras1 ^ and
1R
P.K. Kalasami Nadar v. C.I.T.. Madras , expressed
concurrence with the views of the Bombay High Court in
19Gokuldas Harivallabhdas , regarding the nature of the penalty 
proceedings under the Act. The Court said that proceedings 
under section 28(1)(c) of the Act of 1922 (corresponding 
to section 27l(l)(c) of the Act of 1961) were in the nature
14. A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 103, at p. 106 (para 6).
15. (1963) 47, I.T.R. 434,436 = I.L.R. (1962) 1 Ker.95.
16. (1965) 58 I.T.R. 302.
17. (1965) 58 I.T.R. 787.
16. (1962) 46 I.T.R. 1056.
19. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 96.
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of penal proceedings, that the burden of proof was upon 
the Income Tax Department and that the burden was not discbaige^ 
by reason of the fact that the assessee gave a false 
explanation or plausible explanation in regard to the alleged 
concealed income or made a false statement in his return or
failed to comply with the statutory obligations under the Act,
20In M, Hussain Ali and Sons v. C♦ I,T,, Madras and
21Gnanmbika Mills Ltd, v. C,I,T,, Madras it was further
r
stated that the findings in assessment proceedings were not
conclusive in penalty proceedings. The assessment proceedings
might be relevant or prima facie evidence for the imposition
of penalty but the Department must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that there had been a concealment of income.
Similarly, the Patna High Court in the case of C.I.T.,
22Bihar and Orissa v. Mohan Mallah , Murlidhar Tejpal v.
2*5
C.I.T. , Patna and Messrs. Khemra.i Chagganlal v. C.I.T. ,
24
Bihar and Orissa , held that the proceedings under section 
28 of the Act of 1922 were penal proceedings and that the 
burden of proof lay upon the Income Tax Department that the 
assessee was guilty of concealment. It was further held that 
the unexplained increase in wealth and the plausible 
explanation of the source and nature of income do not mean
20. (1965) 58, I.T.R. 787.
21. (1965) 58, I.T.R. 802.
22. (1964) 54, I.T.R. 499 (Pat).
23. (1961) 42, I.T.R. 129 (Pat).
24. A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 252.
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that the explanation was false or that the assessee was 
guilty of deliberate suppression of the particulars of his 
inc ome•
The Gujarat High Court also expressed agreement with
25the Bombay High Court in C.I.T.. Gujarat v. L.H. Yora .
The Calcutta High Court in C.I.T., Calcutta v. Anwar
p c.
Ali held that proceedings under section 28(1)(c) were
criminal in nature* Basu J., delivering his judgement in
the case said:
”... T he ’additional tax’ imposed by Sec* 28(1) is 
nothing but a punishment for a statutory offence and 
that instead of judicial punishment, the section 
prescribes for a penalty being awarded by the revenue
authority.”27
Another line of argument is that there is no essential 
difference between ’tax* and ’penalty*, because the liability 
for payment of both is imposed as a part of the ’machinery 
of assessment* and the penalty is merely an additional tax 
imposed in certain circumstances for the defaults committed 
by the assessee.
The Allahabad High Court appears to be the champion 
for this proposition. The Court in Lai Chand Gopal Das v 
C.I.T.. U.P?8 , laid down the following principles:
25. (1965) 56, I.T.R* 126 (Guj.).
26. A.I.E. 1968 Cal. 345.
27. Ibid at p* 352 (para 25).
28. (1 9 65) 48 I.T.R. 524 (All), Lwarka Prasad Sheokaran Las 
v. C.I.T. (1953) 24 I.T.R. 410. see" also A.V.~ Thomas and 
V. CT.T7T., Madras I.L.R. (1967) 1 Mad. 255 at p. 267.
436
(i) A penalty proceeding under the Income Tax Act is 
not a criminal proceeding. Such proceedings are civil in 
nature ana so the normal rules as to pleadings in civil 
cases will apply.
(ii) The onus of proof of non-concealment of income 
lies on the assessee. The Income Tax authorities are not 
required to place evidence to ,prove any fact; what is required 
of them is that they must have materials to justify their 
finding of concealment or the particulars of income.
(iii) The findings in assessment proceedings that the 
assessee has concealed the particulars of income are 
sufficient to justify the finding of concealment for the 
purpose of imposition of penalty. Of course, the finding
I 29
in the assessment proceedings is not res judicata in the
penalty proceedings and fresh evidence may be given by the
assessee to show that he is not liable for penalty. The
justification for the above proposition that penalty is an
additional tax is found in certain observations of the
Supreme Court of India made in C.A. Abraham v. I.T.C.f 
*50Kottavam and C.I.T.. Andhra Pradesh v. Messrs. Dadabhai and 
Company^^.
29• Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Sheokaran Das« Kanpur v. C.I.T. «U.P.- 
A«I.R. 1954 All 125; Messrs. Kamlapat Motilal v. C.I.I*, 
U.P. A.I.R* 1950 All 249* The Code of Civil Procedure
(5 of 1908) Sec. 11 deals with res judicata. It means a
case or suit already decided.
50. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609.
51. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1265.
In C.A. Abraham v. I.T.O.. Kottavam.^2 the appellant 
and one M.P. Thomas were carrying on a business in food 
grains in partnership. M.P. Thomas died on October 11, 1949. 
The appellant submitted, as a partner, returns of the 
income of the firm, which was unregistered. The Income Tax 
Officer discovered, in the course of assessment proceedings, 
that the firm had carried on transactions under, different 
fictitious names and had not disclosed substantial sums of . 
money earned.
The Income Tax Officer, therefore, assessed the suppressced 
income of the firm and imposed a penalty of Rs. 29,000 upon 
the firm under section 28 read with section 44 of the Act 
of 1922. The appellant contended that section 44 referred 
merely to the assessment qf profits of tax and not to the levy 
of any penalty and that no order imposing a penalty could be 
imposed after the death of one of the partners^. The
■54.relevant portion of section 44 , as it stood at the
material time, ran as follows:
52. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609.
53. Mahakali Subbarao v„ C .I.T. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 113; In 
Veeraupan Chettiar v. C.I.T., Madras (1957) 52 I.T.R.,411, 
the Madras High Court held that section 44 (as it stood at 
the material time) referred merely to the assessment of 
profits to tax and not to the imposition of a penalty. The 
decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in C.A.
Abraham v . C.I.T. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609.
34. Income Tax Act, 1961, sections 177 and 189 reproduce the 
provisions of section 44 of the Act of 1922.
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"Where any business, profession or vacation carried 
on by a firm ... has been discontinued,... every person 
who was, at the time of such discontinuance or dissolution, 
a partner of such firm shall, in respect of the
income, profits and gains of the firm •«., be jointly 
and severally liable to assessment ••• under Chapter IV 
and for the amount of tax payable•.• and all the 
provisions of Chapter IV shall, so far as may be, apply 
to any such assessment."
The Court rejected the appellant!s contention and 
held that the legislature had expressly enacted that ’the 
provision of Chapter IV shall apply to the assessment of a 
business carried on by a firm even after discontinuance of 
its businessj and that the process of assessment included
■2 c
steps for imposition of penalty^ . The Court described
’penalty* as ’an additional tax* and observed:
"By S.28 ^corresponding to section 271 of the Act of 
1961] the liability to pay additional tax, which is 
designated ’penalty* is imposed in view of the dishonest 
or contumacious conduct bf the assessee."36
Their lordships refused to give a narrow meaning of 
the provisions of the impugned section and held that where 
the partners of the firm were guilty of conduct exposing 
them to penalty, by adopting the simple expedient of 
discontinuing the firm, the arms of the said section 44 were 
long enough to reach such cases and defeat such design. The 
Court declined to side with the assessee in his attempt to 
evade the penalty and said:
35. See C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa v. Messrs Kirkend Coal Co. 
A.I.E. 1969 S.C. 1352, at 1355 (para 9).
36. C.A. Abraham v. C.I.T. .TCnt-fag-yam A.I.E. 1961 S.C. 609 
at p. 612, (para 5). The Supreme Court approved of the 
decision of Mareddi Krishna Reddy v. C.I.T., Tenali, 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 368.
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"... W here, as in the present ease, by the use of 
the words capable of comprehensive import, provision is 
made for imposing liability for penalty upon the 
taxpayer guilty of fraud, gross negligence or 
contumacious conduct, an assumption that the words were 
used in a restricted sense, so as to defeat the avowed 
object of the legislature, quo a certain class, will not 
be lightly m a d e . ,!37
The other case is C.I.T., Andhra Pradesh v. Messrs* 
Bhika.ii Padabhai and Co.^« in which the Supreme Court 
expressed agreement with its previous decision in C.A*Abraham 
v. C.I.T., Kottayam , that a penalty is an additional tax, 
imposed in view of the assessee!s dishonest or contumacious 
conduct•
The assessee owned an oil mill in the former State of 
Hyderabad (now Andhra Pradesh)* He returned an income of 
Rs.50,384 for the assessment year 1947 (October 1, 1946, to 
September 30, 194^. The Income Tax Officer, on examination, 
found the books of account unreliable and assessed the total 
income of the firm at Rs. 1,63>131* The Income Tax 
authorities, thereafter imposed a penalty of Rs.42,000 
under section 40 of the Hyderabad Income Tax Act for 
concealment of income on October 31 > 1951*
The State of Hyderabad merged with the Indian Union 
during the pendency of the proceedings. In 1950, the 
Hyderabad Income Tax Act was repealed by sub-section (1) of 
section 13 of the Finance Act, 1950, which provided that:
37* Ibid* at p. 612 (para 6).
38. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1265 at p. 1267 (para 9).
39. A.I.E. 1961 S.C. 609.
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"If immediately before the 1st day of April,
1950, there is in force in any part B State... any 
law relating to income tax or super-tax... that law 
shall cease to have effect except for the purposes 
of the levy, assessment and collection of income-tax 
and super-tax in respect of any period not included 
in the previous year for the purposes of assessment 
under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922...."
The question was whether the power to impose a 
penalty in respect of the years,preceding the date of 
repeal was lost, because of the repeal of the Hyderabad 
Income Tax Act by the Finance Act, 1950. The assessee 
argued that the operation of the Hyderabad Act was saved 
only in respect of the levy, assessment and collection of 
income tax and super tax and not in respect of any ’penalty1.
The Court rejected the respondent’s contention and 
held that a penalty is an additional tax and accordingly the 
proceedings for the imposition of penalties were saved by 
Sec. 13(1) of the F.A. Act, 1950. Their Lordships expressed 
the view that the High Court was in error in holding that 
by saving the Hyderabad Income Tax for the purposes of levy, 
assessment and collection of tax, the entire procedure for 
imposing liability to tax and for collection of tax was 
saved, but money payable under the penalty sections, not 
being tax,the provisions relating to the imposition of and 
collection of a penalty, did not survive the repeal of the 
Act. It was held that the imposition of a penalty was a 
necessary concomitant or incident of the process of 
assessment, levy and collection of tax.
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An inference can also be drawn from the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Collector of Malabar v. Erimmal 
Ebrahim Ha.iee^that, the nature of income tax penalties is 
not criminal.
The respondent had been arrested on 1st June, 1954* 
in pursuance of a warrant issued by the Collector of Malabar 
under section 48 Madras Revenue Recovery Act (2 of 1864) for 
failure to pay income tax,( including interest and penalty ) 
as required under section 46 of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
The question for decision was whether the assessee 
was deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with a 
procedure established by law, or whether there had been a 
violation of the fundamental right in Article 21 of the 
Constitution.
It may be noted that the Income Tax Officer made 
independent inquiries which gave him reason to believe that 
the respondent was wilfully withholding payment of tax. 
Thereafter the Income Tax Officer issued a certificate under 
section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, to the Collector 
to recover the arrears of tax. On this certificate the 
Collector proceeded under section 48 of the Madras Revenue 
Act and the respondent was arrested.
Their Lordships, rejecting the respondent’s 
contention, held that, there was no deprivation of personal 
liberty such as to controvene Article 21 of the Constitution
40. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 688.
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in the case. The Court observed that:
"In the present case, the arrest was not in accordance 
with any allegation or accusation of any actual or 
suspected or apprehended commission of any offence of 
a criminal or quasi-criminal nature. It was really an 
srrest for a civil debt, in the process or the mode 
prescribed by law for recovery of arrears of land 
revenue. "4-1
The Court1s statement makes it abundantly clear that 
sums due under the Income Tax ay£ nothing but debts payable 
to the Government and so a penalty imposed is similar to the 
penalties imposed in civil cases.
It was thought, after the decision of the Supreme
Court in C.A. Abraham’s case, that the controversy in regard
to the nature of penal proceedings amongst the various High
Courts was dead and buried. But it proved otherwise. The
Supreme Court itself, in its latest case, C.I.T., West Bengal 
42v. Anwar Ali  ^ , showed a wavering attitude in regard to the 
nature of penal proceedings under the Income Tax Act. When 
the Court’s attention was drawn at its earlier decision of 
C.A. Abraham on the nature of penal proceedings, their 
Lordships side-tracked the issue and made conflicting 
statements. The Court on the one hand admitted that:
41. Ibid. at p. 691 (para 10); see Pur shot tarn Govind.ji Halai 
v. B.M. Desai. A.X.£*1956 S.C. 20. The assessee was 
arrested and detained in jail in execution of a warrant of 
arrest issued under section 13 of the Bombay City Land 
Revenue Act (1876). For recovery of the tax certified under 
section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. It was held 
that the provisions did not infringe the Fundamental 
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
and so the arrest was in accordance with the procedure 
established by law.
42. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1782.
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”...It is true that penalty proceedings under section 
28 are included in the expression ’assessment* and 
the true nature of penalty has been held to be 
additional tax.”45
Whereas on the other hand the Court said:
”...[l)n C.A. Abraham’s case ... the observations made, 
with regard to penalty being an additional tax, were 
made in a.different context and for a different 
purpose• ^
Their Lordships said that it was settled that the
45nature of penalties under the Sales Tax Law was quasi-criminal , 
but refrained from expressing any opinion on the nature of 
penal proceedings under the Income Tax Act. The Court merely 
said:
"...The section £28.) is penal in the sense that its 
consequences are intended to be an effective deterrent 
which will put a stop to practices, which the legislature 
considers to be against the public interest.”46
It may be noted that the imposition of ’interest* for 
non-performance of the statutory obligations under the Income 
Tax Act, is also ’penal*, in the sense that it is intended 
to put an effective check on the undesirable practice of the 
taxpayer. However, it is well recognized that,for the levy 
of ’interest’, the law does not require a criminal standard
45. Ibid. at p.1784 (para 4). The Supreme Court in Messrs. 
Jain Brothers v. Union of India A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 778,784 
Ipara 10), while upholding the constitutional validity of 
section 297(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, acknowledged 
that:
n...[Pj enalty has been regarded as an additional tax in a 
certain sense and for certain purposes under the Act...”
44. Ibid. at p. 1785. (para.4).
45. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 
255.
46. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1782 at pp. 1784 -1785.
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of proof and the burden of proof that the fault was due 
to ’reasonable cause1 lies on the taxpayer^.
In regard to the evidence necessary for the 
imposition of a penalty, it was held in H.H. Istifa Khan v. 
C.I.T. C.P. and U.P., by the Oudh High Court as long ago 
as 1942 that:
”... We see no reason why any distinction should be 
drawn between the quantum of evidence required to 
support the assessment and the quantum required to 
justify the imposition of a penalty.”48
The Income Tax Officer issued a notice under section 3 4  
of the Act of 1922 on the assessee in respect of the alleged 
concealment of interest on Rs. 4 lacs deposited in a bank in 
the joint names of himself and his minor son, Abdul Kasim.
The Income Tax Officer did not accept the appellant’s story 
that the money belonged to his five sons and not to himself.
The appellant’s contention that the money was given 
by his wife to her five sons in 1919 at the time of her 
death and that the sum was deposited in the joint names of 
Abdul Kasim and his father, as a matter of convenience, and 
that Istifa Khan did not himself own any portion of it, was 
considered false, as the assessee failed to adduce any 
reason why, if it was left by his wife to her sons, it was 
entered in the name of one son only. Apart from this, the 
appellant did not produce any evidence to show what happened
47. See infra pp471/&4for burden of proof; see Chapter VI, pp.
27#//9for nature of ’interest* imposed under the Act.
48. “(1942) 10 I.T.R. 435 at p. 439 (Oudh).
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to the money between 1919* the date of the lady’s death, and 
1933* when it was deposited in the bank; this casts doubt on 
the veracity of the statement of the assessee* Accordingly, 
the Income Tax Officer assessed the income under section 34 
and imposed a penalty of Rs.4,000 for concelament and 
deliberately furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, 
under section 28 of the Act*
The Court rejected the appellant's plea that for the 
purpose of proceedings under section 28 of the Income Tax 
Act, strong evidence should have been forthcoming* It was
r "
held that the Income Tax authorities^inference that 'Istifa
Khan had concealed the fact that this money and the interest
thereon belonged to him1^ was sufficient for imposition of
penalty under section 28 of the Act*
A third line of approach is that penalty proceedings
under the Income Tax Act are neither criminal nor civil in
nature but quasi-criminal. The support for this contention
is derived from the decision of the Calcutta High Court.in
C.I.T** West Bengal v. Anwar Ali^ *  the Orissa High Court
50in Bha.iuram Gann at Ram v. C.I.T.* Bihar and Orissa , and 
the very recent casein the Allahabad High Court, R* Prasad 
Mohonlal v • I.T.A* Tribunal^^•
Basu J., while delivering a separate judgement in
C.I.T** West Bengal v* Anwar Ali* said:
49. A.I.R. 1968 Cal. 345.
50. A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 38.
51. A.I.R. 1970 All 620, at p. 630 (para 27(iii) ). (P.B.).
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11 ... [T] lie proceeding for imposition of the penalty 
under sec. 28 (1) of the Income Tax Act cannot be 
regarded as a ’criminal proceeding1, £howeve£J there 
is no reason why it cannot be regarded by law aafquasi- 
criminal’ in the sense that it would partake of some 
of the characteristics of a criminal proceeding, even 
though the punishment is not going to be awarded by a 
criminal court after a trial, and that is what is meant 
by a ’penal proceeding*. That follows from the 
essential characteristics of a statutory penalty viz., 
that it is_0intended to be punishment for the violation 
of a law.”-^
The Orissa High Court in Bha.iuram Gann at ram v. C.I.T.,
Bihar and Orissa. allowing the appeal, said:
” ... 0  hese penalty proceedings,under the Income Tax 
Act, are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings 
and the onus is on the Department to establish the 
necessary ingredients under se ction 28(1)(c).”53
The Income Tax Officer, while making the assessment 
of a Hindu Undivided family (of which Ganpatram was the kart a) 
for the year 1953-54, added the sum of Rs. 20,000, which 
appeared in the cash book of the assessee.
The assessee’s contention, that the sum belonged to 
the four ladies of the family, was rejected, as the tippa 
book (cash book) produced in support of the statement was 
held to be unreliable. Thereafter, the Income Tax Officer 
started proceedings under section 28(5) of the Income Tax 
Act, 1922, and imposed a penalty under section 28(1)(c) of 
the Act for concealment of income, which was upheld by the 
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Tribunal.
52. A.I.R. 1968 Gal. 345, at p. 352 (para 27).
53. A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 38, at p. 40 (para 5).
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The question for decision was whether the penalty
could be imposed without further evidence to establish that
there was concealment of income or that the assessee
deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income.
The Court answered in the negative and said:
"...Doubtless the decision in the assessment proceeding 
can be taken into consideration in the penalty 
proceeding; but by itself it would not be enough to 
establish the necessary ingredients. Other evidence de 
hors the conclusion made in the assessment proceeding 
would be relevant and admissible.... In th6 assessment 
proceedings the assessee might have failed to prove his 
case that the questioned income is not his, but that 
will not prove the contrary, namely, that it has been 
established by the department that such income is 
concealed income. Different conclusions emerge, when 
the onus is placed either on the assessee or on the 
department to establish that the income had been 
concealed. Failure on the part of the assessee to 
prove his own case does not mean that the department 
succeeds in establishing its case that there was 
concealment of income.••"54
The Madras High Court in Gnanmbika Mills Ltd. v.
55C.I.T.. Madras . held that the degree of proof required 
for the imposition of a penalty is not that of criminal 
proceedings in the strict sense of the term. The appellant 
company, which was engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
yarn, sold certain bales of yarn at the prevailing market 
rate and earned a huge profit. However, the company showed 
less than the income earned in the return for the assessment 
year 1949-50.
54* Ibid. at p.40 (para 5).
55. I.I.R. (1966) 2 Mad. 491
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The company alleged that it had sold the yarn to its 
employees and certain villagers, at a considerably lower 
rate (i.e. at the rate fixed by the Mill Owners Association). 
The Company stated that it made this gesture, because its 
employees and villagers had been helpful to the management 
during the strike a few months earlier. The Income Tax 
Officer, while making the assessment,on investigation came 
to the conclusion on materials available, that the assesseds 
explanation was unacceptable. The alleged sale to employees 
and villagers was not proved; the sales were made directly 
to certain dealers at the market rate which was much higher 
than the rate stated. The Income Tax Officer instituted 
penalty proceedings under section 28(l)(c) of the Act and 
imposed a sum of Rs. 32,000 as penalty for concealment of 
particulars of income.
The assessee contended that the ground in the 
assessment proceedings for holding that the profits were 
greater than those stated by the assessee were not a 
sufficient basis for computing a penalty, but a higher 
degree of proof is required of concealment and that the 
concealment of the particulars of income should be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court rejected the appellant's claim and held 
that the Income Tax Officer was justified in finding that 
the sales to labourers, as alleged by the assessee, were 
make-believe, intended to circumvent the circular issued
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by the South Indian Mill Owner's Association, directing its
members to sell yarn at the association's rate, and to
secrete the surplus amount realised from the ultimate
purchasers, without bringing them into the books of account,
so that section 28 applied* As regards the burden of proof, .
the Court relied on the statement of Lord Denning in Miller
56v. Minister of Pensions , that 'proof beyond doubt' does
not mean 'proof beyond a shadow of doubt1. The Court said:
"... [pj roof beyond, reasonable doubt means that there 
must be a high degree of probability than what is 
implied in the discharge of the burden of an issue in 
a civil case... While in a civil case a reasonable 
degree of probability may support a decision, a higher 
degree of probability is required in a criminal case.57
Similarly, in P.K. Kalasami Nadar v. C.I.T..-Madras,
the learned judge of the Madras High Court stated:
"... Treating the penalty proceedings under the Indian 
Income Tax Act as being more in the nature of criminal 
proceedings than civil proceedings, we can say that the 
facts must establish a high degree of probability of the 
assessee being guilty of the charge against him and 
nothing more, and, of course, nothing less. Imaginary 
possibilities ought not to be assumed to weaken the
conclusion which is the result of a fair inference from
the materials on record. Any rigid standard of proof 
in these matters cannot be laid down and we are
hesitant to embark on such a venture."58
The supporters of this view further lean on the 
latest case of the Supreme Court, Hindustan Steel Ltd. v.
56. (1947) 2 All E.R. 372, 373.
57. I.I.E. (1966) 2 Mad. 491 at p. 495
58. (1962) 46 I.T.R. 1056, 1063.
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59State of Orissa , in which the Court held that penal
proceedings under the sales tax law are quasi-criminal in
nature. It is said that the Income Tax Act, being also
revenue legislation is akin to sale tax in nature.
It may be appropriate to examine in this connectiont
the nature of the penalty imposed by the RWehtie authorities
in some of the major Commonwealth countries, viz., the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in the
United States of America.
The Position in Other Countries
The position in the United Kingdom appears to be
well estabished that penal proceedings are civil in nature.
This is the logical inference of the following statement
made in the Halsburyfs Laws of England:
Proceedings for the recovery of penalties are not 
criminal proceedings^: nor it seems, are they 
proceedings in tort.f,t>*
The proposition that such penalties are civil in
nature has been approved by the Court of Appeal in C.I.R. v.
62Jackson . The action was to recover penalties under section 
232 of the Income Tax Act, 1952 (now repealed). The 
taxpayer failed to submit particulars of his income for
59. A.I.R. 19703) 253.256 (para 7).
60. R. v. Hausmann (1909)* 73 J.P. 516 (C.C.A.); Attorney- 
General v. James Casey (1930) I.R. 163; C.I.R. v.
Jackson (i960) 39 T.C. 357,358.
61. (1957), Simond’s Edition, Vol. 20, section 1447, at p. 719•
A.G. v. Canter. (1939) 1 K.B. 318.
62. 11960) 39 T.C. 357.
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certain years within a specified time, as required by a
notice issued by the Commissioner of Taxes. Thereupon the
63Commissioner levied the penalty under section 232  ^ of the 
Income Tax Act, 1952, for failure to submit the particulars 
without reasonable cause. The defendant denied the allegation 
and pleaddd not guilty.
The Court rejected the appellants contention that 
the proceedings, being ’criminal proceedings’, he could not 
be required to give the particulars of his income. It was 
held that, though the Commissioner’s claim was one for a 
penalty, it was not a 'criminal proceeding' and the normal 
rules aa to pleadings in a civil action would apply. Sellers, 
L.J., while delivering the judgement of the Court, said:
6 3. The British Income Tax Act, 1952 (c 10), section 232 
which dealt with the delivery of additional particulars 
for purposes of sur-tax, provided that:
”(1) The Special Commissioners may, ... require any 
individual who-
(a) has been required to make a return of his total 
income for the purposes of sur-tax; or
(b) being an individual liable to sur-tax, has been 
required to make a return of his income...,
to furnish to them within such time as they may 
prescribe, ... such particulars as to the several 
sources of his income and the amount arising from each 
source, and as to the nature and amount of any deductions 
claimed to be allowed therefrom, as they consider 
necessary.
(2) If any person without reasonable cause fails to 
furnish within the time prescribed any particulars 
required ..., he shall be liable to a penalty not 
exceeding fifty pounds, and, ... to a further penalty 
of the like amount for every day during which the 
failure continues.”
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,f ...One can simply take this case as a claim for 
penalties. It is not a criminal proceeding. The 
form of the pleading is of the usual kind and normal, 
so far as particulars are required, of the averments 
in the pleading.
The civil nature of penalties is further illustrated
by the fact that the penalty survives the taxpayer’s death.
65The Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. Canter , 
upheld the claim of the Revenue to realize penalties under 
section 30(l)(b) of the repealed Income Tax Act of 1918^ ,  
from the deceased's executrix, in respect of incorrect 
statements made by the deceased in his income tax returns 
for the year ending April 5, 1932 and April 5, 1933* No 
proceedings were taken against the taxpayer during his 
lifetime, but proceedings were commenced against his 
executrix on July 26, 1937*
64. (1960) 39 T.C. 357, at p. 358.
65. (1939) 1 All E.R. 13.
66. The British Income Tax Act, 1918 (CH 40), section 30 
(1)(b ), provided that:
ft3 0(l). A person who in making a claim gor or obtaining 
any exemption, abatement, or relief ... , or in 
obtaining any certification as aforesaid - 
• • •
(b) fraudulently conceals or untruly declares any 
income or any sums which he has charged against or 
deducted from, or was entitled to charge against or 
to deduct from another person;
• • •
shall forfeit the sum of twenty pounds and treble the 
tax chargeable in respect of all the sources of his 
inc ome.
The question was whether the * cause of action* in such
a case by virtue of the law Reform (miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 19349 section 1(1) would survive against the estate of
the deceased. The Act of 1934 was enacted **to amend the
law as to the effect of death in relation to causes of action
and as to awarding of interest in civil proceedings... * The
object of the Act is commonly said to be to abolish the
67doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona • Section
1(1) of the Act provided that:
**...[o\n the death of any person... all causes of 
action subsisting against or vested in him shall 
survive against, or, as the case may be, for the 
benefit of his estate. 11
The respondent argued that the Act of 1934 had no 
operation with regard to any penalty imposed by the Income 
Tax Acts, and, in particular under section 30, the reason
68being that such penalties were quasi-criminal in nature •
The Court repudiated the respondent*s claim and
gave a wider meaning of the expression * cause of action* in
section 1(1) of the Act so as to include cases in respect
67. Ross v. Ford (1937) 3 All E.R. 359 at p. 367.
6 8 . Huntington v. Attrill (1893) A.C. 150. Lord Watson 
pointed out in delivering the judgement of the Privy 
Council at p. 156, that:
*'...[T]he word * penal* may embrace penalties for 
infraction of the general law which do not constitute 
offences against the State; it may for many fsic]J legal 
purposes, be applied with perfect propriety to penalties 
created by contract, and it therefore, when taken by 
itself, fails to mark that distinction between civil 
rights and criminal wrongs...*’
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of penalties under the Income Tax Act, in particular in
section 30. It was held that the 1 cause of action*; although
belonging to the special class created by the Income Tax Act,
was within the scope of the expression *all causes of action*
in sub-section (1) of section (1) of the Act of 1934, and
survived against the estate of the deceased.
The situation in Canada is simlar to that in the
United Kingdom.
The Court of Exchequer in Alex Pashovitz v. Minister 
69of Rational Revenue , in an appeal from an assessment of
70penalties made by the Minister , held that the nature of
such penalties was a civil matter. The facts of the case
are as follows
The appellant, a farmer with little knowledge of 
accounting, made incorrect income tax returns for several 
taxation years. The Minister, following an investigation, 
came to the conclusion that the appellant had not reported 
certain income from the operations of a partnership with his 
father and disallowed certain expenses claimed as deductions. 
Thereafter the Minister assessed tax and penalties under 
section 51A of the Income Tax Act, which provided that:
69. (1961) Ex C.R. 365 (Canada). !.
70. The Income Tax Act, 1948> section 42' authorized the 
Minister to make assessment of penalties under certain 
circumstances. The present Income Tax Act of 1952 
contains similar provision in section 46.
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"Every person who has wilfully, in any manner, evaded 
or attempted to evade payment of the tax payable by 
him... for a taxation year or any part thereof is 
liable to a penalty, to be fined by the Minister, of 
not less than 25$ and not more than 50$ of the amount 
of the tax sought to be avoided."71
The Court repudiated the taxpayer’s claim that, as
penalties were criminal punishment, the burden of proof lay
upon the Minister. Thurlow, J., holding the taxpayer liable
as he failed to prove that the assessment of the penalty
was v/rong, said:
"The proceedings are, hov/ever, of a civil nature, and 
a preponderance of evidence is sufficient."72
In another case, Minister of National Revenue v.
73Maurice Taylor , the question arose as to the standard of 
proof required in case of penalties imposed by the Minister 
of Revenue for fraud or misrepresentation made by the taxpayer. 
The Minister appealed from a decision of the Tax Appeal Board, 
which allowed the respondent's appeal from reassessments 
made upon him for the taxation years 1948 and 1949.
The respondent was assessed to income tax in the 
usual way on his income for the years 1948 and 1949. The 
Minister of National Revenue found afterwards that the 
taxpayer had committed fraud in making his returns for the 
said years. The Minister discovered that the taxpayer had 
failed to report all his bond interest, had ommitted certain 
assets from the financial statement attached to the return and 
had made a gift of i11,000 to his wife in one of the years
71. Income Tax Act, 1952, section 56(1) is the corresponding 
section which is applicable now.
72. (1961) E.C.R. 365 at p. 372. (Canada).
73. (1961) 61 D.T.C. 1139 (Canada).
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under appeal and failed to mention it in the return. There­
upon the Minister made reassessments of the taxpayer's 
income, relying on section 55 of the Income Tax Act, 1917, 
and section 42(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1946, for the 
years 1948 and 1949 respectively.
The taxpayer objected to the reassessment on the
ground that the Minister had not established misrepresentation
or fraud beyond a reasonable doubt so as to justify the
reassessments. While repelling the respondent's contention,
the Court said:
",..[rjhe standard to be applied is not that applicable 
in criminal proceedings, namely, proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, but that applicable in civil 
proceedings, namely, the standard of balance of
74. Income War Tax Act, 1917 (Can. Ch.28), section 55 
provided that:
"Notwithstanding any prior assessment, or if no 
assessment has been made, the taxpayer shall continue 
to be liable for any tax and to be assessed thereof 
and the Minister may at any time assess any person for* 
i nterest and penalty and may
(a) at any time, if the taxpayer has made any 
misrepresentation or committed any fraud in making his 
return or supplying information under this Act,...
• • •
re-assess or make additiohal assessments upon any 
person for tax, interest and penalties."
75. Income Tax Act, 1948, Section 42(4) provided that:
"The Minister may at any time assess tax, interest or 
penalties and may
(a) at any time if the taxpayer or person filing the 
return has made any misrepresentation or committed any 
fraud in filing the return or supplying information ... 
• • •
reassess or make additional assessments."
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probability."^
In Australia, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada
the legislature has made it clear that the Income Tax
penalties are civil in nature. Section 257 of Part VII
of the Income Tax and Contribution Assessment Act, 1936-1970^,
which deals with penal provisions and prosecutions, expressly
provides that:
"Every taxation prosecution ••• may be commenced, 
prosecuted and proceeded with in accordance with#., 
the usual practice and procedure of the court in 
civil cases..."
This has practically left no scope for judicial
interpretation and the Courts have approved the legislative
scheme• For instance in Jackson (Federal Commissioner of
Taxation) v. Butterworth, Fullagar J., (while delivering
the judgement of the Supreme Court of Victoria), with regard
to the question whether taxation proceedings under Part VII,
of the Act was a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding,said:
”... [tJhe proceeding is civil and not criminal in 
character. The procedure is by action to recover 
a penalty, and the rules of civil procedure
76. (1961) 61 P.T.C. 1139 at p. 1141. The Court referred 
to various authorities on the subject, viz., Halsbury*s 
.Laws of England, Third Ed. Vol. 26, p. 845; Hornal v. 
Neuberger Products Ltd. (1956) 5 All E.R. 970; Amis v. 
Colls (1960) T.R. 213.
77. The Act provides provisions relating to imposition of 
penalties (i) for failure to furnish a return, (ii) for 
making false statements, (iii) fraudulent avoidance of 
tax and so on. See Grunn's Commonwealth Income Tax Law 
and Practice, 6th ed. (1960), (Butterworths), p. 1428.
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apply."78
Similarly, in regard to the degree of proof required
for a taxation proceeding, William J., in McGovern v. Hillman
Tobacco Company, after citing section 237 of the Act, said:
“The standard of proof is.*, the standard of proof 
required in civil cases.,179
Thus it becomes evident that the specially heavy 
burden imposed on the State in criminal cases is not borne 
by the Revenue in taxation proceedings. Of course^the Court 
must be well satisfied, after examining the evidence on the 
record before it arrived at the conclusion that the defendant
O  A
has committed a default which would attract a penalty .
New Zealand, like its neighbour Australia appears to
have thought it desirable to define the nature of penal tax,
instead of leaving it for the courts to guess it. The Land
and Income Tax Act, 1954, in section 232 states that;
"...£plenal tax shall for all purposes he deemed to be 
tax of the same nature as the deficient tax, and shall 
be deemed to be payable in and for the same year of 
assessment as the deficient tax.”
78. (1 9 49) 8 A.T.L. 214> at p. 216; Jackson v. flromann (1948) 
Y.L.R. 408, 411. In A.G. v. Freer 11822) 11 Price 183,
at p. 197, the Court expressed the view as long ago as 1822, 
that penalties were for many purposes civil in nature; 
Naismith v. McGovern (1953) 90 C.L.R.336; However in 
Malian v. Lee (1949)* 80 C.L.R. 198, the Full Court 
refrained from saying anything decisive on the point 
In Re Curtis (1951), 15 A.B.C. 172, a sales tax 
prosecution was held to be a civil proceeding;
79. (1949) 4 A.I.T.R. 272, at p. 275; R. and Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v. McStay (1945). 3 A.I.T.R. 209.
80. * Income Tax Law and Practice" (Commonwealth), Challoner 
and Greenwood, (1962 with Supplement 11969), 2nd.a£L at. p,1156 
(para 1625)#
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It is therefore obvious that the nature of penal 
proceedings is civil.
The Courts have not questioned its propriety; they 
have decided cases bearing this fact in mind. For instance, 
it was held by the Supreme Court at Wellington in Taylor v. .
O  A
Attorney-General that acquittal of a taxpayer on a charge
of wilfully making a false return of income under section
82228(l)(b) , does not stop the Commissioner of Inland
Revenue from imposing on the taxpayer a penal tax under
section 231 of the Land and Income Tax Act, 1954*
The taxpayer was charged under section 228(1)(b) of
the Act with having wilfully made false returns of income
for the years 1 9 5 4, 1955 and 1 9 5 6, but the taxpayer was
acquitted of the charge by the Magistrate. Thereupon, the
Commissioner of Inland Revenue imposed penal taxes to the
extent of £1 5 0, £50 and £100 respectively under section 231
in respect of each of such years. Section 231 states that:
11 If any taxpayer evades, or attempts to evade, or 
does any act with intent to evade, or makes default 
in the performance of any duty imposed ... with intent 
to evade, the assessment or payment of any sum... 
chargeable against him by way of tax ... he shall be
chargeable, by way of penalty for that offence, with
additional tax (hereinafter called penal tax) not 
exceeding an amount equal to treble the amount of the 
deficient tax . 11
81. (1963) N.Z.L.R. 261.
82. Land and Income Tax Act, 1954, section 228(1)(b) provides
that:
"Every person commits an offence against this Act who -
• • •
(b) Wilfully or negligently makes any false return, or 
gives any false information, or misleads, or attempts to 
mislea'd the Commissioner or any other Officer, in relation 
to any matter or thing affecting his own or any other 
person’s liability to taxation.’*.
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The taxpayer argued that the first judgement
operated res judicata, and that the acquittal of the first
charge bars an action on the secbnd charge of evading tax.
The Court repudiated the assessee's claim and held that it
did not operate as res .judicatat because the former charge
was in relation to a criminal offence while the latter with
regard to civil penalties and therefore the issues were
different. The Court said;
11 ...It is necessary for this submission to succeed that 
the issue of evasion, made a pre-requisite to enable 
charge of penal tax (s.2 3 1), be identical with the issue 
of wilfully making a false return (s.228(l)(b) in respect 
of which offence the plaintiff was a c q u i t t e d . "$3
Similarly, it was held in Maxwell v. Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue that the acquittal of a taxpayer on a charge 
of wilfully making a false return under section 228(1)(b ) did 
not bar the right of the Commissioner to form the opinion 
that the return so made was fraudulent or wilfully 
misleading and to make a reassessment of income under 
section 248  ^ of the Income Tax Act, 1954* As regards the
8 3 . Taylor v. Attorney General (1963) IT.Z.L.R. 261,262.
84. Cl962) N.Z.L.E. 683.
8 5. The Land and Income Tax Act, 1954* section 24, provides a 
period of limitation for amendment of an assessment. The 
section as stood at the relevant time reads as follows: 
"Where any person has made returns and has been assessed 
for land tax or income tax for any year, it shall not be 
lawful for the Commissioner to alter the assessment so as 
to increase the amount thereof after the expiration of 
four years from the end of the year in which the 
assessment was made ;or in any case where, in the opinion of 
the Commissioner, the returns so made are fraudulent or 
wilfully misleading or, in the case of returns of income 
omit all mention of income which is of a particular nature 
or was derived from a particular source and in respect of 
which a return is required to be made after the expiration 
of 10 years from the end of the year in which the 
assessment was made."
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appellant’s contention that an acquittal on a prosecution could
be relied upon as a ground of estoppel in subsequent
proceedings, the Court said that the issues in criminal and
civil proceedings being different the doctrine of estoppel
will not apply. North, J., of the Court of Appeal said:
“•♦.In the criminal proceedings, the Commissioner was 
required to prove that the appellant had made fraudulent 
returns. In the civil proceedings at best, all he 
would be averring was that he was still honestly of 
opinion that the returns were fraudulent.
In the United States of America there appears to be,
no controversy in regard to the nature of the additional .
87
tax imposed to discourage fraudulent attempts to evade tax..
The rival contentions of taxpayers that such penalties are 
criminal and of the Inland Revenue that they are civil in 
nature seems to have heen laid at rest by the Supreme Court 
in Cuy T. Helvering v. Charles E. Mitchell8 8 in favour of the 
latter. This is the logical implication of the Supreme Court's 
holding that the constitutional prohibition against double .. 
jeopardy did not preclude the imposition of a civil penalty 
for tax fraud despite acquittal of a taxpayer on a criminal 
charge8^.
8 6 . (1962) N.Z.L.R. 683, at p. 703.
87. The Internal Revenue Code, 1954, provides two types of 
sanction to combat tax evasion, viz., (1) Additions to 
the tax and (2 ) Criminal penalties. These are contained 
in Chapter 6 8: Additions to the tax, and Chapter 75s
Crimes, other Offences and Forfeiture.
8 8. (1937) 303 U.S. 391; Spies v. U.S.. G 942) 317 U.S. 492
89. ’Income-Tax Fraud - Basic Principles for The General 
Practitioner1. Francis J. Butler. (195*3) 37, Or. Ij.R. 199 
at p. 2 0 1.
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The respondent taxpayer submitted a return of his 
income for the year 1929. The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue found on investigation that the taxpayer had 
fraudulently deducted a substantial sum of money from his 
return of income, alleging a loss on a purported sale of 
shares and that he dishonestly failed to return a large sum 
of money and that these fraudulent acts were done with 
intent to evade tax. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
therefore, imposed an additional tax of 50 per cent under 
section 293(b)^ of the Code for fraudulent under-payment of 
tax and instituted criminal proceedings under section 46(b)^ 
of the Internal Revenue Code 1928 for fraudulent evasion of 
tax. The taxpayer, was, however, acquitted on the criminal 
charge.
The respondent contended thereafter that the claim 
for 50 per cent additional tax was barred by the doctrine 
of res .judicata, that the acquittal was a bar to further 
proceedings based on the same facts. It was further pleaded
90. Internal Revenue Code 1928, section 239(b) provided that: 
“If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with 
intent to evade tax, then 50 per centum of the total 
amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) 
shall be so assessed, collected and paid...”
91. Internal Revenue Code, 1928, section 46(b) provided that; . 
”Any person., who wilfully attempts in any manner to evade 
or defeat any tax imposed... or the payment thereof, shall, 
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty 
of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not 
more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than 5 
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.*
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on behalf of the taxpayer that, both the proceedings being
criminal, the second trial was against the doctrine of
92double jeopardy^ •
The Court upheld the Commissioner’s claim for
additional tax and rejected the respondent’s contentions.
It was held that the doctrine of estoppel by judgement would
not apply in the case, because the proceedings to determine
the amount of additional tax was different in nature from
the indictment of wilfully attempting to evade the tax. The
former were civil proceedings and the latter criminal
proceedings. The Court said:
"The difference in degree of the burden of proof in 
criminal and civil cases precludes application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was ’merely... 
an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to 
overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused’... That acquittal on a criminal charge is not 
a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in
its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the
criminal proceedings were based.••”94
As regards the respondent’s second contention, the
Court said that the provisions for imposition of additional
tax and criminal penalty in respect of the same act or
ommision did not violate the double jeopardy clause. The
double jeopardy clause merely prohibits punishing twice, or
92. See infra note 10 for double jeopardy. %
93* See ’Collateral Estoppel in Tax Fraud Proceedings, J.R. 
Mentz (1965) 51 Virginia L. Rev. 1360 to 1378: ’Collateral 
Estoppel by Judgement’, Austin Yfakeman Scott (1942) 5 6  
Harv. l.R. 1; ’Collateral Estoppel Applied to Civil Fraud 
Penalty’ , Buchwald, (1965) 19 U. Miami L.R. (>72.
94* (1937) 303 U.S. 391 at p. 297. Lewis v. Prick (1913) 233
U.S. p. 2 9 1, 302.
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!
I attempting to punish a second time criminally for the samei
I offence. The additional tax, being remedial in character,
is not a penalty in the criminal sense. The Court stated:
,f... The {additional taxes^ l are provided primarily as 
a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to 
reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of 
; investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s
fraud.”95
The civil nature of a penalty is also exemplified 
from the fact that fraud penalties can be realized from the
deceased’s estate.
i qg
In Francis P. Kirk v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue ,
the U.S. Court of Appeal, first circuit upheld the claim of
the revenue to charge a fraud penalty against a taxpayer’s
estate. The petitioner’s deOedent, who died on April 5,
1943, filed income tax returns for the years 1936 to 1942, in
which he had fraudulently under-estimated his income with
intent to evade the tax thereon. The Commissioner discovered
the fraud after the decedent’s death, and, in consequence,
determined the deficiences against his estate for the above
years and levied 50 per cent additional tax for each year
under section 293(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1928.
The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that
the fraud penalty was intended by the Congress as a personal
95* Ibid at p.401; Stone v. U.S. 1922 167 U.S. 178, 188;
Murphy v. U.S. (1926) 272 U.S. 630, 632. Hanby v. C.I.R.
(1954) 67 K2d) 12§.
96. (1951) 15 A.L.H. (2d) 1051 (C.A.I.).
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punishment for the taxpayers fraud on the revenue, which 
died with the assessee. The 'Court, referring to Hitchell*s^  
case, stated that a fraud penalty, being remedial in nature 
rather than punitive, is akin to compensation awarded in tort, 
so the modern rule, that a tort action survives against a 
decedent’s estate, would apply• The Court stated:
• [a] ctions to recompense or compensate a plaintiff 
for a harm inflicted upon him by a decedent do survive, 
for an estate can, and we think should, compensate for 
an injury to same extent as the decedent, had he lived.”
Thus the fraud penalty survives the taxpayer and 
could be realized from the estate of the deceased.^® In a 
number of cases the Courts have affirmed that fraud penalties 
are civil in nature and have decided issues accordingly.^ 
Penalty Proceedings: Civil in Nature.
Prom the foregoing discussions it becomes evident 
that in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States a distinction has been drawn in
97. (1937) 303 U.S. 591.
98. (1951) 15 A.l.R. (2d) 1051 at p. 1055 (C.A.I. See 'Tax 
Praud and Evasion'. H.G. Balter, 5rd ed., (1965)9 section
8 3-9.
99. Kann v. C.I.R. (1934) 210 P(2d) 247 (3rdC.A.). The 
Court held a wife responsible for penalties levied as 
a result of her husband's fraud. It was held that the 
fact that she had neither signed the return nor 
authorized her husband to sign it on her behalf will not 
exempt her from civil liabilities incurred under the 
Code. In Howell v. C.I.R. (1949) 175 P(2d) (C.C.A.6) 240. 
It Y/as held that the 50 per cent penalty assessed on a 
taxpayer for deficiences due to fraud with intent to 
evade income tax is a 'civil penalty', and may be 
imposed without regard to whether there had been a 
conviction on a criminal charge based thereon.
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regard to the nature of penalties levied by the Revenue 
authorities and the Criminal Courts* However, in India the 
position still appears to be uncertain* Neither the 
legislature nor the judiciary has given a clear decision on 
the issue. Nevertheless, the inference can be drawn from 
the following propositions that administrative penalties
i
are civil in nature and not criminal or quasi-criminal •
The very fact that the legislature has provided two
separate chapters, 21 and 22, one dealing with penalties and
other dealing with 1 offences and prosecution1 go. : to prove
that different standards of proof and evidence are
2
contemplated by the legislature . This is further confirmed 
by the Explanation clause added to section 271(1)(c) of the 
Act of 1961, which places the burden of proof in certain 
cases of concealment and furnishing of inaccurate particulars
3
on the assessee .
1. See 'The Struggle Against Tax Evasion; The Situation in 
Denmark1* S, Hirot Lorenzen (1953) 7, Bulletin for 
International Documents, p.8*The author has stated that 
'fiscal fraud, deliberate or by gross negligence, is a 
delict sui generis', which cannot be classified under or 
parallel to ordinary crimes. (p*14).
2. Satish Chandra J., while delivering minority judgement in E. 
Prasad Mohanlal v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal A.I.E. 1970 
AllT)2(1 at pp. 6359636 states:
"The authorities impose penalty if they are satisfied that 
a default has been committed. The revenue does not have 
to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. In 
prosecution under chapter XXII the Revenue will have to 
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt, because it 
is a fundamental principle prevailing in the criminal 
courts."
3. See Chapter 6, p.313 for the text of the Explanation 
clause•
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It has been clearly laid down by the Madras High
4
Court in Sivagamintha Moopanar and Sons v. L.T.O., Madurai 
that the two sets of penalties provided under the Income 
Tax Act are mutually exclusive in their nature and are
directed to different objectives. For instance, the
5
penalties provided under chapter 22^ are enacted to 
vindicate public justice and to punish the offender for the 
deliberate infraction of the law, whereas the penalties 
contained in chapter 21^ are enacted to render evasion 
unprofitable, and to secure for the State compensation for 
damages caused by attempted evasion.
The Rajasthan High Court appears to be more specific
in its views on the matter and states in Messrs. M.P. Indra
and Pompany v. Union of India that:
M... [pj enalties prescribed under the Income Tax Act for 
failure to submit returns of income in time are not in 
the nature of punishment imposed for conviction of an 
offence. Such penalties are more or less compensatory 
in character to make good the loss that may be caused 
to the State revenue on account of late submission of 
returns of income and in consequence late realization 
of the tax. Therefore, the provisions relating to 
imposition of penalties can be said to form integral
4. (1955) 28 I.T.R. 601 (Mad.); Ratnaprova Devi v. State of 
Orissa A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1195; Messrs M.P. Indra v. Union 
of India. A.l.R. 1965 Raj• 104* 106; Madula AppaJRao v.
I.T.Q. A.l.R. 1959 A.P. 391, 395.
5. See Chapter 7 for provisions relating to *0ffences and 
Prosecution*♦
6. See Chapter 6 for provisions relating to administrative 
penalties.
4 6 8
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parts of the proceedings relating to assessment."
In a recent case from Allahabad High Court R. Prasad
Mohanlal v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Satish Chandra J.
is more explicit on the point when he states:
"...[p] rosecutions under Chapter XXII are criminal 
proceedings, but penalty proceedings under Chapter 
XXI constitute a civil sanction.
It is perhaps because of all these considerations 
that the legislature provided in the Act of 1961 that both 
a penalty under Chapter 21 and a prosecution under Chapter
9
22 may be launched against an assessee on the same facts . This
will not violate the immunity granted to an accused against
10double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution.
T.r "A.I .£f. 1965 ka j. 104 at p. 107 (para 10).
A.l.R. 1970 All 620, p. 636 (Minority judgement). (F.B.).
9. There was no such provision in the earlier Acts; section 
28(4) of the I.T.A., 1922 prohibited Criminal and penal 
proceedings simultaneously.
10. !The Republic of India1, Alan Gledhill, (2nd. ed. Stevens
and Sons, London, 1964), p. 198; ’Constitutional Protection 
of Life and Liberty1 , Alan Grledhill. (Studies in Law:
Patna Law College Golden Jubilee Commemoration Volume,
1961) pp. 133,134. ’Life and Liberty in India*. Alan 
Gledhill (1959-60) 2 J.I.L.I. 241, 247-248. See ’Right 
of Federal Government to Appeal. Adverse Crimihal 
Decisions; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,(1970) Harv• L.R.
133. ’Double Jeopardy' is based on the ancient maxim: nemo 
debit bis vexari pro eadem causa, no person shall be' twice 
disturbed for the same cause. Tn other words no person 
can be punished and prosecuted for the same offence more 
than once. Protection is only given when there has 
previously been prosecution and punishment for the same 
offence before a Court of law. Thomas Dana v. State of 
Punjab, A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 375; ’A.l.R. Commentaries:
Criminal Procedure (5 of 1898), 5th ed., Vol. Ill, Sec.
403, Note 1, Halkori Ram v. King Emperor (1941) 9 I.T.R.
209 (Pat); Minister of National Revenue v. Durocher 
(1952) 101 Can. Cri. Cas.245C'Dx.CJ; T.S. Baliah v. T.S. 
Panachari, I.T.O., Madras A.l.R. 1969 S.C. 701,704; 
Helvering v. Mitchell (1937) 303 U.S. 3915 406; Spies v.
(continued on next page)
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It is an accepted principle of criminal law that
penalties being punitive in nature do not survive the
deceased, for the reason that a deceased person is beyond
punishment. But penalty levied under the Income Tax Act
can be recovered from the estate of the deceased. As in case
of torts, an action to compensate a plaintiff for harm done
to him by a deceased survives and damag® can be realized
from the deceased’s estate. It is on this assumption that
11the Act of 1961 has provided under section 159 that penalty
proceedings for a default committed by a deceased can be
started or continued against the legal representative in
respect of tax, interest or penalty.
The usual mode of punishment in the case of criminal
offences is imprisonment, or a fine with imprisonment in
default; but it is not so in the case of penalties imposed
by the administrative authorities.
The procedure for recovery of tax, interest and 
12penalty is different from that provided for the recovery 
of a penalty in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court 
in Collector of lialabar and another v . Erimmal Ebrahim
10. (continued from previous page) U.S. (1943) 317 U.S. 493>
500. San Simon v. C.I.E. (1958)(C.A.8) 248 P(2d), 869; R v. 
Smith (1959) 120 Can.Cr. Case 241 (Ontario H.C.); Winston 
M. Reynold v. U.S. (1961),(C.A.5) 28 F(2d), 78. ’Criminal 
Law; Former Jeopardy: Conviction for False Return of
of Income No Bar to Civil Action for Penalty1 (1934)» 47 Har, 
1458. Olshausen v. C.l.R.(1960)(U.S. C.A.9), 275 F(2d) 25;
N.A.LIalbari v. C.I.T. .Bombay,A. l.R. 1964 S.C. 1807; 
Chaturbhuj and Company v. C.I.T.(1939) 36 I.T.R. 386 All
11. ’The Law and Practice of Income Tax’, J.B. Kanga and 
N•A. Palkhiwala (1969)> 6th ed. Vol.1 at p.816.
12. See Chapter 2, pp. 47-49 for procedure for collection 
and recovery of taxes.
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13Ha.iee has described the procedure for recovery of penalty
under the Income Tax Act as the procedure for the recovery
14of a civil debt • This obviously means that such
proceedings are civil in nature*
The penalty does not carry with it the stigma
attached to a criminal case. Thus a taxpaye^who is
penalized for defaults committed under the Income Tax Act
is not subject to disabilities which an accused carries in
criminal cases.
Under the circumstances, to hold such penalties
punitive in nature would cast serious constitutional doubts
upon the administrative application of the penal provision
of the revenue.
However, the Judiciary has failed to lay down
authoritatively the distinction between the administrative
and criminal penalties. The legislature could make the
position clear in order to avoid undue complexity and
inconvenience. This can be simply done by adding a section
in Chapter 21, dealing with penalties, similar to that
contained in section 237 of the Australian Income Tax and
1S
the Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1969 • This will make
it clear that administrative penalties are civil in nature 
and forstall unnecessary controversy on the subject. A
13. A.I.E. 1957 S.C. 688.
14. Ibid. at p. 691 (para 10).
15. See supra p.457 for text of section 237.
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somewhat similar suggestion has been made by Shri S.
Bhoothalingham in his report on 'Rationalization and
Simplification of Tax Structure'. He said that penalties
should be dealt with by the Income Tax Authorities
simultaneously with tax assessment and not separately, as 
16at present . This obviously would mean that such penalties
would be treated as civil proceedings like the assessment
proceedings. But his recommendation that the penalties for
'concealment of income' in section 271(1)(c) should be dealt
with separately, because of the supposed requirement of mens
rea in such cases, needs further consideration. It is
submitted that there appears to be no justification for
differential treatment of such penalties, particularly as the
Legislature has progressively extended the principle of strict
liability to cases of concealment of income or furnishing
17inaccurate particulars of such income
Burden of Proof.
Burden of proof means the obligation to prove the
1 A
truth or falsehood of a fact ^or proposition, Proof however,
does not mean proof in the rigid, mathematical sense, because
19that is not possible . In a criminal case it means such
16. (1968), Government of India, pp.73,74. Mr* Bhoothalingham 
says: 11... A s far as possible penalties except for 
deliberate concealments, should be dealt with along with 
the assessments. If this is done numerous unnecessary 
delays leading to the same evidence being repeatedly gone 
into by different authorities can be avoided."
17. See Chapter 6 pp. 301-17 for discussion on the point.
1 8. Bhoormal Premchand v. Collector of Customs, Madras, A.l.R. 
1967 Mad. 39 at p.43.
19. 'The Law of Evidence', Ratanlal Ranchhoddas and Lhirajlal 
Keshavlal, (8th ed., 1939), p.8.
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evidence as would induce a reasonable man , in the
particular circumstances of the case in which the claim
21arises, to act upon the supposition that it exists
Generally the burden of proof rests upon the person who
substantially asserts the affirmative and not upon the
22person who denies it . The rule has its origin in the 
Roman maxim: Ei qui affirmat non ei aui negat incumbit
2*5
probatio . The maxim is based upon two considerations, viz., 
he who seeks the aid of the court should be the first to 
prove that he has a case and that in the nature of things it 
is more difficult to prove a negative than the affirmative.
The burden of proof may, however, be shifted by action of the 
parties and by statutory enactments2^. The standard or the
degree of proof also varies according to the nature of the
25proceedings . For instance, in case of civil proceedings
a mere preponderance of probability is sufficient, whereas
2 6in criminal proceedings proof beyond reasonable doubt
2 G. See Chap"te r 7 bP .3 1^/2 f or 1 a re as onab le man' test.
21. The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), section 103;’Fraud in 
Federal Income Tax1, Myron L. Goraen, (1948), 32 
Marquette L. Rev. 120, at p. 127.
22. 'Phipson an Evidence*, (11th ed. 1970), b 90.
23. Ibid. Digest on the Law of Evidence, Stephen., Article 
104; v Laly "of Evidence, S.C. Sarkar, 9th ed* (1953)* p.764.
24. Ibid.
25* 'Evidence', Rupert Cross, (3rd ed* 1967) > p.87)
26. Ibid., at p.88. See for meaning of 'proof beyond
reasonable doubt' Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947)
2 All. E.R* 372, at pp. 373*374, per Lord Denning: R v* 
Kritz (1950) 1 K*B. 82,90 and R. v* Summers (1952) 1 All 
E.R* 1059 per Lord Goddard, C*J.; See Standards of'Proof 
in the Divorce Court} Prof. Coutts (1951), 14, Mod. L.R.
411.
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is required for conviction. In brief, the rules of burden 
of proof may be summarized in the words of Stephen as follows:
"the burden of proof as to any particular fact 
lies on that person who wises the court to believe 
in its existence, unless it is provided by any law 
that the burden of proving the fact shall lie on any 
particular person; but the burden may in the course 
of a case be shifted from one side to the other, and 
in considering the amount of evidence necessary to 
shift the burden of proof the court has regard to the 
opportunities of knowledge with respect to the fact 
to be proved which may be possessed by the parties 
respectively."27
The burden of proof is used in two distinct senses,
viz., the burden of establishing a case and the duty to
28adduce evidence • The burden of proof in the former sense 
is fixed by law and always rests upon the person, whether
plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the
29affirmative of the case . On the other hand, the burden 
of proof in the latter sense is unstable and may shift from 
one side to the other during the course of the trial. The 
burden of proof in this sense lies on the person, who would 
fail if no evidence were given on either side. As stated 
by their Lordships in Abranath v. N.E. Railway;
27. A Digest of the Law of Evidence, Stephen 12th ed. (1836), 
Art. 104. The word ’Evidence’ is derived from Latin term 
’evidens evidera' - which means to show clearly, to make 
clear to the sight.
28. Supra note 22, p. 91; Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), 
Vol. 13> para 605*
29*’Law of Evidence’, S.C. Sarkar, (9th ed. 1953)> p.767;
Thaver has used ’burden of proof* in three ways, viz.,
"(i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward argument or 
evidence in support of a proposition at the begiining of 
the proceedings or later; (ll)to establish a proposition 
against all counter-argument or evidence; (iii) an 
indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the 
others. The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872). Sections 1C1 
to 114 lay down the rules of ’burden of proof'. Section 
101 prescribes the basic rule of ’burden of Proof'.
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"The burden of proof rests, before evidence is given, 
upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue; 
and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the 
party against whom the tribunal, at the time th£ question 
arises, would give judgement, if no further evidence 
were adduced."^u
The provisions relating to burden of proof in income 
tax: proceedings may be discussed in relation to assessment 
proceedings, best judgement assessment proceedings, additional 
assessment proceedings, penalty proceedings and prosecutions.
The Income Tax Act, 1961, like the Act of 1922 
imposes a general liability to tax on all income51. There 
is a legal obligation on the part of every person, whose 
total income in a particular year exceeds the maximum amount 
exempted from taxation, to pay tax. The Act, however, does 
not provide that whatever is received by a person must be 
regarded as income liable to tax. Only that income which 
comes within the taxing provisions is subject to tax. The 
primary onus probandi. as in other statutes, rests on the 
Income Tax authorities to show that income which they seek to 
tax is income liable to be taxed by the statute5^. However, 
the burden of proof in such cases is not as heavy as in 
criminal proceedings. The burden is even less than in 
ordinary civil proceedings and is discharged by merely
30. (1885) 11 Q.B* 440, at p. 456.
31• Income Tax Act, 1961, Sections 4 and 5; Paramisetti 
Seetharanamma v. C.I.T., Hyderabad A.l.R. 1965 S.C.
1905, at p. 1907.
22. Ibid. , Devadattam v. Dnion of India A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 880, 
885. ffiupra note 11, at p.11, khizar Mohamad v. C *I.T.
A.l.R. 1968 J. & K 53,55.
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showing that the assessee is in receipt of income^. The 
assessment carries with it a presumption of validity and 
legality and there is no burden on the Income Tax authorities 
to show by positive evidence that the accounts are unreliable 
or that the figure at which they assess it is correct. As 
stated by the Lahore High Court in Messrs G-anga Ram-Balmokand 
v. C.I.T.:
!tIt cannot be denied that there must be some material 
before the Income Tax Officer on which to base his 
estimate, but no hard and fast rule can be laid down 
by any Court to define what sort of material is required 
on which his estimate can be founded. The law nowhere 
contemplates that the Income Tax Officer is a party to 
the case in the sense in which an ordinary party to 
civil litigation is, and he cannot be expected to be in 
possession of such evidence as would be required from -, 
an ordinary litigant to refute the case of his adversary;"
The Income Tax Officer1s finding cannot be discharged,
35unless of course it is altogether capricious and injudicial . 
If an assessee receives a certain sum of money in the 
relevant accounting year or certain cash is found credited in 
his account, it is for him to explain from where he got the 
money. The burden lies on the assessee to explain to the 
Income Tax authorities the true nature and source of these 
receipts. The rationale for the rule that the burden of
33* C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa v. Visheswar Singh A.l.R. 1935 
Pat.342 p.343; G.I.T. and E.L.T., Madras v. South 
Indian Pictures Ltd., A.I.E. 1952 Mad. 231; see 'The 
Burden of Proof in Tax Disputes', Horst g. Wolf (1970)
18 Can. Tax Journal, p. 1. C.I.T. W.B. v. Messrs. Ukhara 
Estate A.l.R. 1971 Cal. 125.
34. A.l.R. 1937 Lah. 721 (Quoted from head note).
35. Lalchand Bhagat Amblica Ram v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa, 
1959 S.C. 1295.
proof should be on the assessee is that the taxpayer, alone, 
is the person best able to reveal the facts of his financial 
circumstances. And the taxpayer knows better than anyone 
else the amount of his taxable income.
The taxing authorities could not be expected to
render evidence about the facts, which are within the special
36knowledge of the taxpayer . If the assessee fails to give 
a satisfactory account of the source and nature of such 
receipt, the Income Tax Officer is entitled to draw the 
inference that the receipts are of an assessable nature^Ind 
can lawfully make an assessment accordingly.
The Courts appear to be unanimous in this regard.
For instance, Allahabad^, Patna^, Calcutta^, Lahore^,
36. The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), section 106 states 
that: 1 When any fact is specially within the knowledge 
of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon 
him.'1 See Messrs. G-anga Ram-Balmokund v. C.I.T. A.I.E.
1937 Lah. Lai Mohan Krishna Lai Paul v. C.I.T. , Bengal
A. l.R. 1945 Cal. 62; Harprasad Shiva Butt Rai v. C.I.T., 
U.P., A.l.R. 1957 All. 746.
37. G-ovinda.ra.iulu Mudaliar v. C.I.T., Hyderabad A.l.R.1959
S.C. 248; Sreelekha Baner.jee v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa 
A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 697. ~ ""  ......
38. Har Prasad Shiva Butt Rai v. C.I.T., U .P . A.l.R. 1957 
All 746>; Mithoolal Tek Chand v. C.I.T., U.P. A.l.R. 1953 
All 701; Kanhaiyalal Umrao Singh v . C.I.T. (1*941) 9 I.l.R. 
225 (Oudh); Gang a Prasad v. C.lTT., U.P. (1941) 9 I-^.R.
373 (All).
39* Manindranath Das v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa A.l.R. 1954 
Pat. 610. S.N. Ganguly v. C.I.T. A.l.R. 1954 Pat. 51.
40. Lai Mohan Krishna Lai Paul v. C.I.T. , Bengal A.l.R. 1945 
Cal. 6 2 9 J.A. Shellim v. C.I.T., Bengal A.l.R. 1947 Cal 338
41. Ganga Ram Balmokand v. C.I.T. A.l.R. 1937 Lah. 721.
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(now in Pakistan) Rangoon"^, (now in Burma) Madras^,
Bombay^, Punjab^, Ragpur^, the Privy Council^ and the
Supreme Court of India have said with one voice that the
burden of proof in such cases was upon the assessee^.
Hidayatullah, J., in a fairly recent case in the Supreme
Court Sreelekha Banerjee v. O.I.T. . Bihar, briefly
summarized the law on the point in the following words:
".. there is an entry in the account books of the 
assessee, which shows the receipt of a sum or conversion 
of high denomination notes tendered for conversion by 
the assessee himself, it is necessary for the assessee 
to establish, if asked, what the source of that money 
is and to prove that it does not bear the nature of 
income. The Department is not... required to prove 
anything... I f,... the explanation is unconvincing and 
one which deserves to be rejected, the Department can 
reject it and draw the inference that the amount 
represents income, either from the sources already 
disclosed by the assessee or from some undisclosed 
source. The Department does not then proceed on no 
evidence, because the fact that there was receipt of 
money, is itself evident;- against the assessee.... The 
very words 'an undisclosed source1 show that the 
disclosure must come from the assessee and not from 
the Department."49
42* C.I.T., Burma v. Dey Brothers A.l.R. 1936 Ran. 219*
43- Gr.M. Madoppo v. C.I.T. Madras A.l.R. 1949 Mad. 246.
44- Rora.yandas Kedarnath Ram v. C.I.T. Bomb ay A.l.R. 1952,
Bom.459*
45- Raghunath Singh v. C.I.T. , Simla, A.l.R. 1965 Pun. 436.
46. Raidu Cinema Exhibitor v. C.I.T.. Nagpur. A.l.R. 19§6•
Rap. 157.
47- C.I.T.. Bihar and Orissa v. Maharajadhira.ja of Ba.rbh.anga, 
1933 1, I.I.E. 94, 106, (P.cTT"^
48. Govindraora.julu Mudaliar v. C.I.T., Hyderabad, A.l.R.
1959 S.C. 248; Sreelekha Banerjee v. C.I.T., Bihar, A.l.R. 
1964 S.C. 697; Messrs. Mehta Pariah and Co. v. C.I.T., 
Bombay, A.l.R. 1956, S.C. 554.
49- A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 697, pp.701,702. Messrs. Lalchand
Bhagat Ambika Ram v. C.I.T. B. & 0. A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 1295*
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It may not be out of place to pinpoint an anomaly 
in the Supreme Court's view in this connection* Uhereas,
the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned cases of
50 51jGrovindrajulu Mudaliar and Sreelekha Banerjee have held
that the burden of proof lies on the assessee to show that
the income does not bear the character of income, it said
52in Parimisetti Seethar an amnia v* C.I.T., Hyderabad , that it
is for the Department to establish that receipts are
chargeable to tax*
The material facts of Parimisetti's case lie within
a narrow compass* The Income Tax Officer found a certain
sum of money, approximately Rs.5,20,000 notes in the
appellant's account for the years 1946-47, 1947-48, 1950-51
and 1951-52, which was not brought to taxation. The
appellant's contention that the sums were given to her out
of love and affection by the Maharani Sita Devi Gaekwad of
Baroda and so exempted from taxation under section 4(3)(vii)
53of the Act of 1922 , was rejected by the Income Tax Officer
because she failed to give satisfactory evidence about the
gift. The Income Tax Officer held that the sum was
50. A.l.R* 1959 S.C. 248.
51* A.l.R. 1964 S.C* 697.
52. A.l.R. 1965 S.C. 1905.
53. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 4(3)(vii) provided that: 
"Any income, profits or gains falling within the 
following classes shall not be included in the total 
income of the person receiving them:...
(vii) Any receipts ..., which are of a casual and non­
recurring nature or are not by way of addition to the 
remuneration of an employee.".
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remuneration for services rendered by the assessee as a 
maid-servant or secretary to the Princess and accordingly 
taxable. The amount was held to be income of the assessee 
liable to be taxed under section 34 of the Act of 1922.
The Tribunal and the High Court concurred with the
Income Tax Officer but the Supreme Court held that the
income would not be liable to tax by reason of the assessee*s
failure to prove that the income was a gift by way of natural
love and affection. Their lordships held that the taxpayer
was not liable to prove her case, accepted her statement
that the money was a gift and held the Department responsible
to establish that such income was taxable. The Court said:
"...In all cases in which a receipt is sought to be 
taxed as income, the burden lies upon the Department 
to prove that it is within the taxable provision." 54
The statement is in apparent conflict with that made
by the Supreme Court in Sreelekha Baner.iee1 s case, wherein
their lordships have stated that:
"... [fj t is plain that if there is a receipt of an 
amount in the accounting year, it is incumbent in the 
first instance upon the assessee to show that it does 
not bear the character of income. If he fails to do 
this the Income Tax Officer may hold that it represents 
income of the assessee either from the source he has 
disclosed or from some undisclosed source."55
\
It is submitted with respect that the Supreme Court 
unduly stretched the provisions in favour of the taxpayer. 
Could it be imagined, by any stretch of imagination, that 
anyone would give such a huge sum cfuJro^  natural love and
54. A.l.R. 1965 S.C. 1905, at 1907 (para 6).
55. A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 697 at p. 700 (para 8).
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affection, unless the donor and donee were intimately
related in some way or other. In fact,the assessee was not
related to Sita Devi and did not belong to the Royal family;
she belonged to a family of Basis (maid servants). Under the
circumstances, as noted by the High Court below:
"...fwjhere admittedly the assessee was in receipt of 
large sums of money as shown in the accounts submitted 
by her, that they were outside the rule of a taxable 
income was a matter which had to be stablished by the 
assessee herself... The bare allegation, unsupported by 
any evidence, in our opinion was not sufficient to 
discharge the burden which lay upon the assessee... the 
burden lay upon the assessee in this case to establish 
that the amounts received were voluntary payments made 
by the Princess out of love and aff ection. f,*6
In regard to the claim for exemption from taxation
there appears to be no controversy. The burden of proving
57that income received is exempt from taxation , or that a
56. Parimisetti Seetharanamma v. C.I.T. , Hyderabad, A.l.R. 
1965 S.C. 1905 at p. 1907 (para 6).
5 7. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa v. Ramarishna Deo (1959) 55,
I.T.R., 312,516-7 (S.C.); Keren Kayemethe le Jisroel Ltd. 
v. l.R. (1932) 17 T.C. 27 *58(H.L.); \Jdhavdas Kewalram v. 
C.I.T.. Bombay City (1967) 66 I.T.R. 462 (S.C.); Madras 
Provincial Corporation Bank Ltd. v . C.I.T. Madras A.I. 
1933 Mad. 489; Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh, v. ?.I .T . s 
Nagpur, I.L.R. 1947 Nag. 4^5*445; d.I.T., Madras v.
Madai Venkatasubbayya, A.l.R. 1951, Mad. 1007; C.I.T. v 
Venkataswami Naidu, A.l.R. 1956 S.C. 522. Smt Charusila 
Uassi,in r e , A.l.R. 1947 Cal. 148,151; Rani Amrit Kunwar 
v. C.I.T. , Pun.jab, 1946 I.T.R. 561 ,575; In the United 
States in a suit by a taxpayer against the Government for 
recovery of income taxes and penalties alleged to have 
been illegally and erroneously assessed and collected, 
it was held that the burden lay upon the assessee.
Wesley 0. Paddock v. U.S. (1960) (U.S.C.A.) 280P (2d)
565.
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88claim to any allowance or deduction should be allowed , or
59that losses in business should be set-off , lie on the
taxpayer who wants to take advantage of the relevant
statutory provisions.
This becomes evident from two cases of Supreme Court,
60viz., C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa v. Ramkrishna Deo and C.I.T.,
61^adras v. Venkataswamy Naidu . In these cases the taxpayers
claimed exemption from taxation under section 4(3)(viii) of
the Act of 1922, on the ground that the income earned was
agricultural income, exempt from taxes.
62In Ramkrishna Leo's case, the point for decision 
was whether income received by the respondent by the sale of 
trees growing in his forest was agricultural income, as
5 8. Copi Rath Vir Bhan v. C.I.T. , Punjab,,A .l.R., 1938,
Lah 530; C.I.T . , West iBengal v . Calcutta Agency Ltd. 
(1951) 19 I.T.R., f9l, 196 (3.Cj A.l.R. 1951 S.C. 108; 
United Steel Co. Ltd. v. Cullington (Inspector of Taxes) 
(194119 I.T.R. Suppl. 20,35 (H.L.); Hotz Simla Trust v.
C.I.T..E.P.(1952;, 21 I.T.R. 149* Lakshmiratan Cotton 
Mills Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T.,U.P. A.l.R. 1969 S.C. 917.
Amar Hath v. Hukam Chand-Nath Mai A.l.R. 1921 P.C. 35*
59. Radhakrishan Ramnarain v. C.I.T. 5 I.T.C. 366;
Jamna Las Rameshwar Las v. C.I.T., Delhi (1952) 21 I.T.R. 
109.
60. A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 259.
61. A.l.R. 1956 S.C. 522.
62. A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 239.
482
defined in section 2(1) of the Act of 1922^, and so exempt 
from taxation under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act. The 
Income Tax Officer, on respondent's failure to prove that 
there was a plantation of trees, held that the forest in 
question had not been proved to have been planted by the 
respondent, that the trees were of spontaneous growth, 
and that the income therefrom was not within the exemption 
under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act.
The Orissa High Court, allowing the respondent's appeal 
from the Tribunal, held that the burden of proof lay upon 
the Income Tax Department to show that the income earned 
from the forest was chargeable to tax and fell outside the 
scope of the exemption in section 4(3)(viii) of the Act; 
it did not rely on the assessee to prove that the income was 
exempt from taxation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court
63. Income Tax Act, 1922, in section 2(1) has defined
"agricultural income". The present Income Tax Act, 1961, 
has incorporated the same definition in section 2(1).
In Beohar Singh Raghubir v. C.I.T..U.P. & C.P. I 1947 
Nag. 425# The Court has very nicely defined the term 
"agriculture” in the following words at p. 425s 
"Agriculture is the art or science of cultivating the 
ground and requires the human skill and labour.
Forests of spontaneous growth which have come into being 
without the use of such skill do not fall within this 
definition." In this case the Court rejected the 
assessee's claim that income earned by the sale of 
forest produce was exempt from taxation under section 
4(3)(viii) of the Act of 1922, because the assessee 
failed to prove that the forest was 'cultivated' in the 
sense that its produce was due to the skill and labour 
which he had expended on it, as opposed to produce which 
would come naturally despite inaction on his part.
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rightly dissented from the High Court’s proposition and held
that the income was liable to taxation, as' the assessee
failed to prove that the income was exempt from taxation,
Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court, said:
11. •. The law is well settled that it is for a person 
who claims exemption to establish it, and there is no 
reason why it should be otherwise, when the exemption 
claimed is under the Income Tax Act... There is ample 
authority for the view that the principle that a person 
who claims the benefit of an exemption has to establish 
it, applies when the exemption claimed is under the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act.1 64
Similarly, Bhagwati, J., while delivering the
judgement of the Court in Ye nk at aswamy N ai duf s case said:
1 Iii order to claim an exemption from payment of income 
tax in respect of what the assessee considered 
agricultural income, the assessee had to put before the 
Income Tax authorities proper materials which would 
enable them to come to a conclusion that the income 
which was sought to be assessed was agricultural income. 
It was not for the Income Tax authorities to prove 
that it was not agricultural income.
In brief, the facts were that the assessee, a Hindu 
undivided family, owned 70 acres of agricultural land. It 
also maintained on the estate 65 cows and 10 pairs of bulls. 
The assessee sold milk for Rs.28,000 to the Co-operative Milk 
Supply Union during the financial year 1946-47. The assessee 
claimed that the profits from the sale of milk constituted 
agricultural income and, as such, were exempt from income tax. 
The Income Tax Officer rejected the: respondent!s claim as,
64. A.I.E. 1959 S.C. 259 at p. 241 (para 5).
65. A.I.E. 1956 S.C. 522, at p. 525 {para 8); A similar 
question was raised before the Nagpur High Court in 
Beohar Raghubir Singh v. C.I.T., U.P. & C.B., I.L.R.1947, 
Nag. 425. It was held that the burden lay upon the 
assessee who wanted to claim the benefit of the exemption.
484
he failed to produce any material to show that the income 
received by him from the sale of milk was agricultural income. 
He accordingly assessed the income to tax.
It was held that the Income Tax Officer was justified 
under the circumstances to treat the income as liable to tax, 
because the assessee failed to produce before the Income Tax 
Officer the materials to enable him to decide whether the 
income from the sale of the milk was agricultural income, as 
claimed by the respondent.
Assessment Proceedings
As has been noted earlier the Income Tax Officer can
C.C
make a best judgement assessment in certain cases, if the
assessee fails to comply with the requirements of the Act.
Such assessments will be deemed valid in law for all purposes.
If the assessee wants to get the assessment cancelled, it is
for him to show that he was prevented by ’sufficient and
reasonable cause’ from complying with the terms of the
notice issued by the Income Tax Officer. Similarly, the
onus is on the taxpayer to show that the assessment made by
68the Income Tax Officer is incorrect.
66. See Chapter 2, pp.5*1-54 for ’best judgement assessment*.
67. C.I.T., Bombay City v. Dhanmal Chellaram (1948) 16 I.T. B. 
319,322; Abdul Baree Choudhary v. C.I.T., 5 I.T.C.,352, 
358,359.
68. Commercial Hfttel Ltd. v. M.N.R.. (1948) Ex. C.B. 108; 3
D.T.O, 1119; Dezura v. M.N.R., (1948) 3 B.T.C. 1101; 
Jasperson v. M.N.R. (1954) Ex.C.B. 29, see ’Introduction 
to Income Tax Law; Canada, Francis Eugena La Brie, 1955, 
p.345. In U.S. also the burden lies on the taxpayer,
Cefalu v . C.I.R. (i960) C.A. 5. 276 F 2d p. 122.
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There appears to be conflict among, the High Courts 
in regard to the burden of proof in reassessment proceedings^ 
under section 147 of the Act of 1961 (corresponding to
section 34 of the Act of 1922). For instance, the Bombay^0,
71 72Calcutta , and Allahabad High Courts have held that the
burden of proving that the income escaping assessment was
taxable income of the assessee in the relevant year was
on the Income Tax authorities. For instance, Beaumont C.J.,
in C.I.T., Bombay v. Gopal Vaijinath, said:
".. . he burden of showing that income has escaped 
assessment or that it has been assessed at too low a 
rate, lies on the Commissioner.1
On the other hand, a special bench of the Rangoon High 
Court in C«I«T» ,Burma v. Bey Brothers^dissented from the 
Bombay High Court’s view. Page,C.J., who delivered the 
judgement for the Court, observed that the question ’whether’ 
the income has escaped or not’ was a question of fact to be 
decided by the Income Tax authorities and the Courts should 
not v interfere with their findings. A somewhat similar
69. See Chapter II,pp.64, 67for’Assessment of escaped income’
70. C.I.T. , Bombay v. G-opal Vaijnath, I.L.R. (1935; 59. Bom. 
626; C.I.T., Bombay v. C.V. Lianohar (1935) 3 I.T.R. 372;
71. Lai Mohan Krishna Lai v. C.I.T. , Bengal, A.I.R. 1945 Cal.
62.
72. Lal.iimal Girdhar Bas v. C.I.T., U.P. (1951) 19 I.T.R. 418 
(All); Radhey Lai Jawahar Lai v. C._X^T. , U . P . , Misc. Case 
no.3 of" 1949, B/ 16.1 .1952 (unreported) quoted from 
Mithoo Lai v. C.I.T., U.P., A.I.R. 1953 All 701; In re 
Ram Batta Sita Ram of Basti (1947) 15 I.T.R. (All") (F.B) .
73. I.L.R. (1935) 59 Bom. 626 at p. 631. A similar 
statement was made by Rangnekar, J., while delivering a 
judgement for himself at p.632.
74. A.I.R. 1936 Rang. 219.
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view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mahabir
75Prasad Munna Lai v. C.I.T., Qawnpore , the Patna High Court
76
in Manindranath hash v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa dealing
with a proceeding under section 54 of the Act of 1922 in
v/hich tax had been assessed on money received by cashing
certain high denomination notes during the assessment year
1946-47 as secret profit, held:
"... [fj f the assessee receives a certain amount in the 
course of the accounting year, the burden of proof is 
upon the assessee to show that the item of receipt is 
not of an income nature; and if the assessee fails to 
prove positively the source and nature of the amount 
of the receipt, the revenue authorities are entitled 
to draw an inference that the receipt is of an income 
nature. The burden of proof in such a case-is not upon 
the department but the burden of proof is upon the 
assessee to show by sufficient material that the item 
of receipt was not of an income character.1177
The Punjab High Court in Raghunath Singh v. C.I.T.,
78
Simla has expressed similar views in this regard.
The Supreme Court seems to have settled the
controversy on the point in favour of the latter view. In
79Sreelekha Baner.jee v. C.I.T.,Bihar and Orissa ,the Court was 
directly confronted with the question. Their Lordships rejected 
the appellant's contention that the case, being one under 
section 34 of the Act, a special burden was cast on the
75. A.I.R. 1947, All 414.
76. A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 610.
77. A.I.R. Pat. 610 at p. 611 (para 3).
78. A.I.R. 1965 Punjab 436.
79* A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 697. See Govindara.iulu Mudaliar v. C.I.T.,
Hyderabad A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 697 1959 S.C. 248; Mehta
Parikh and Co. v. c.i.'j.. Bombay. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 554;
Sovachand Baid v. C♦ I. ♦. 1959 S.C. 59; Lalchand Bhagat v.
C.I.T. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1295.
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Income Tax Department to show that the income had escaped
assessment earlier, and observed that:
"•..Inhere is no difference between an ordinary 
assessment and an additional assessment under S.34* and 
the same rule as to burden of proof governs the 
additional assessment.”^
Penalty Proceedings and Prosecutions*
O A
As discussed earlier the burden of proof in 
penalty proceedings depends on whether such proceedings are 
civil or criminal in nature • The Courts are divided on the 
issue- If the proceedings are accepted as civil in nature, 
the ordinary procedure applicable in case of assessment 
proceedings will apply. On the other hand, if such 
proceedings are to be treated as criminal in nature, the 
burden of proof will, obviously fall on the Income Tax 
authorities, particularly in cases where the penalty is
o p
levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act , on account of 
the assessee*s fraudulent conduct. In other cases, where 
the penalty is levied because of the assessee*s failure to 
comply with the statutory requirements under the Act without 
any reasonable cause^, it appears that the burden will lie 
on taxpayers to show, that there was sufficient justification 
for its non-fulfilment. In the absence of any case on the 
point, nothing can be said definitely as to how the courts
80. Ibid. p. 792 (para) 16); Baladin Ram v. C.I.T., U.P. A.I.R. 
1969 S.C. 351.
81. See Chapter 6, pp.300-17 ; and Chapter 7, pp. 1-19*
82. See Chapter 6, pp.285-7 - , ■ .
83. See Chapter 6, pp.317-39 ' for cases.
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R Awill interpret such cases .
There is no scope for controversy in such proceedings. 
The well accepted principle of criminal law that burden of 
proof lies on the prosecution will apply. The Income Tax
authorities are to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt
85before any conviction can be declared. A taxpayer can take
the plea of defences available to an accused in criminal 
86cases
Gonstitutionalit.y of Income Tax Legislation
Perhaps, the first case in which the constitutionality 
of an anti-avoidance measure was challenged in the Federal
84. There are two cases stating that if an assessee wants to 
get a best-judgement assessment order cancelled, he must 
show that the failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements, which led the Income Tax Officer to make an 
ex-parte judgement, was due to 'reasonable cause'. The 
cases are: C.I.T. v. Bhanmal Cheliaram, (1948) I.T.R. 319 
Abdul Baree Choudhary v. C.I.T.. 5 I.T.C. 352,358,359; In 
the United States under similar situations the burden of 
proof has been placed on the taxpayer. Breland V. U.S. 1964 
(C.A.5*) 323F (2d) 492, 497; William Estate of T. Mayer v. 
C.I.R. (1965) 351 P (2d) 617; see Joseph A. Cirilla and 
..ertha E. Cirilla v. O.I.R. (1963) (U.S.C.A.3) 314 F 2d 478
85. The law is similar in other countries. See Acme Slide 
Fastener Co. Ltd. v. The Queen (1962) 62.UT.C (2(d) (Canada) 
Cliford v. I.R.O. (H.Z.) (1966) 9 A.I.T.R. 35; U^S. v. 
Mardock 290 U.S. 389.
86. In HiS. v. Sheller (1966) (C.A.2) 369, F 2d 293. The 
plea of insanity was raised in connection with tax 
evasion crimes and upheld by the Appellate Court.
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Court of India is A.H. Wadia v. C.I.T.. Bombay8*^. This was 
an appeal on a certificate granted by the. High Court of 
Bombay against a decision in favour of the respondent.
The appellant was the agent of Gwaliar State,
outside British India. The State advanced a loan of Rs.50
lakhs to a company, a Provident Investment Co. ltd.
incorporated in British India. The money was paid in
Gwalior and. the interest was payable there. The money was
brought into British India and utilized in the Corporation's
business. The Income Tax Officer treated the transaction
of lending this money outside India and bringing it into
India as integral parts of one composite transaction as
contemplated by section 42(1) of the Act of 1922. He
accordingly, levied tax on the interest earned. The relevant
portion of section 42(1) provided that:
1 All income, profits or gains accruing or raising, 
whether directly or indirectly,... through or from 
any money lent at interest and brought into the 
taxable territories in cash or in kind... shall be 
deemed to be income accruing or arising within the 
taxable territories ... 1 •
It was contended by the appellant that the impugned 
section was ultra vires inasmuch as it was extra-territorial 
in operation. It was also contended that the provision was 
ultra vires the power of the Central legislature granted by
87* A.I.R. 1949 P«C. 19; in Messrs. Anwar Khan Mehboob v. 
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., (1970) 2 S.C.W.R.,770 
the Supreme Court held that the legislature was 
competent to enact laws on the principle of territorial 
nexus•
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item 54 in the Federal list of the 7th Schedule to the 
Government of India Act, 1935> "taxes on income other than 
agricultural income11.
The Court rejected the appellantfs contention and held
that the Indian legislature was competent to enact laws in
such a way that its revenue laws were not defeated by a
subterfuge. Section 99 of the Act empowered the Central
legislature to legislate for British India and without
prejudice to the generality of that provision, to make laws
with extra-territorial operation in certain cases not
relevant here. The Court applied the doctrine of territorial
nexus and held that there was sufficient connection between
British1.India and the interest payable to a foreigner
outside British India to bring the impugned provisions
within the legislative power. Mahajan J. rightly said:
Sl... A foreigner cannot escape liability to tax by 
resorting to a device or subterfuge, when, in effect, 
he is deriving income from a field of activity that is 
in India, or where a contract of loan, ostensibly made 
outside, is, in effect made in India. By changing the 
venue of the contracted loan, the jurisdiction of the 
legislature cannot be avoided, when the real purpose 
is to lend money in India.n88
After the Constitution of India came into force, the 
Supreme Court was faced with the question of the legality of 
certain important and crucial provisions enacted to combat 
tax evasion prevalent in the country during 1940-50. It
Ibid* at p#58 (para 59)• Patanjali Sastri J., gave a 
dissenting judgement and held that the provision was ultra 
vires because there was no sufficient territorial 
connection between the borrower and the bringing of money 
into India.
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was found that, during the last World War, large fortunes 
had been made by businessmen, while wartime controls were in 
force, by black marketering and hoarding essential goods.
The secret profits thus made were not brought to assessment 
and were not deposited in banks; they were used to purchase 
shares or real property, in the name of benamidars, 
(ostensible owners), to the purchase of gold, silver and 
jewellery. The machinery available to the Income Tax
authorities for assessment of income escaping assessment
89under section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 %  was 
considered inadequate to cope with the large number of 
complex cases of war profiteering. As a result in 1947, the 
Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (30 of 
1947), was passed by the Central legislature to deal with 
the cases of tax evasion arising out of profiteering from 
the beginning of the War on 1st June, 1939 to the 1st 
September, 1947. A Commission known as the Income Tax 
Investigation Commission was constituted "under section 3 
of the Act to investigate and report to the Government any 
case or matter referred to it by the Government under section 
5 of the Act.
Sub-sections (4) and (1) of section 5 of the Act 
were challenged in the Court for violation of the right 
to equality before the law, guaranteed by Article 14 of the 
Constitution, on the ground that the procedure applicable
89. See infra footnotes 93,96 for section 34 of the Act of 
1922* at pp. 493,499 respectively.
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in the cases of war-profiteers was less favourable to the
assessees than that applicable in other cases under section
34 of the Act of 1922. Three cases dealing with the point
ultimately resulted in the winding up of the Investigation
Commission. They are Sura.i Mall Mohta and Co. v. A.V.
90Visvanatha Sastri  ^ , Shree Meenakshi Mills v. Visvanatha
Sastriband M.Ct Ivluthiah v. C.I.T., Madras^ .
In the first case, Sura.i Mall Mohta, the Court held
that sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act (30 of 1947)
was repugnant to the equality clause in the Constitution.
The Central Government referred to the Income Tax
(Investigation Commission) the investigation of secret
profits made by the petitioner during the war period which
had not been disclosed and which had evaded payment of taxes.
The reference was made to the Commission in pursuance of its
request to the Government under sub-section (4) of S.5 of the
Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act 30 of
1947, which provided that:
"If in the course of investigation into any case or 
points in a case referred to it under sub-section (1), 
the Commission has reason to believe-
(a) that some person other than the person whose case 
is being investigated has evaded payment of taxation 
on income, or
(b) that some points other than those referred to it 
by the Central Government in respect of any case also 
require investigation, it may make a report to the
90. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 545.
91. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 13. Infra f.n. 93,96 for s. 34 of the Act 
of 1 922 at:pp. «593>,499 respectively.
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Central Government, stating its reason for such belief, 
and on receipt of such report, the Central Government 
shall, . •• refer to the Commission for investigation of 
the case of such other person or such additional 
points as may be indicated in that report.”
let 30 of 1947 provided a special procedure to be 
followed in such cases under sections 6, 7 and 8,which-was more 
comprehensive and drastic in nature than that contained in 
the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, inasmuch as the procedure 
prescribed by the Act for investigation under its provisions 
was of a summary nature. It constituted a departure from 
the ordinary law of procedure contained in the Income Tax 
Act.
The petitioner moved the Supreme Court under article 
32 of the Constitution for the issue of appropriate writs 
restraining the Commission from taking any action under the 
provisions of Act 30 of 1947 on the ground that sections 
5(4), 5(1), 6, 7 and 8 of the Act were discriminatory in 
character and offended against Article 14 of the Constitution.
Their Lordships upheld the petitioner’s contention 
and said that sub-section (4 ) of section 5 of the Act 30 of 
1947 gave arbitrary power to the Commission to pick and 
choose what matters it would enquire into, and was highly 
discriminatory in character in that an evasion, whether 
substantial or not, came within its ambit, as well as within 
the ambit of section 34^of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
93. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 34 had provided . 
provision for assessment of escaped income. The 
corresponding provisions are contained in S. 147 of 
Income Tax Act, 1961. See Qhapter 2, p.£5* See infra 
note 96.
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The Court held that the impugned sub-section was not 
limited in its application to those persons who made . 
extraordinary profits and to a substantial extent evaded 
payment of taxation on income but applied to all persons 
who might have evaded payment of taxation on income and 
whose cases fell within section 34 of the Act of 1922. There 
was no justification for discriminating against them by 
applying to them a procedure different from that provided 
by the Income Tax Act. The procedure prescribed under the 
impugned provisions of Act 30 of 1947 were obviously more 
prejudicial to the assessee than the procedure prescribed 
under the Income Tax Act, inasmuch as the former deprived 
the assessee of the rights of appeal, second appeal and 
revision and that investigation into concealed income was not 
limited to the period of eight years, laid down in the 
Income Tax Act. The Court accordingly, held sub-section (4 )
of section 5 of the Act 30 of 1947 void for repugnancy to ,
Article 14> as a discriminatory piece of legislation.
In the second case, Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v.
94A.V. Vishvanatha Sastri  ^ , the Supreme Court declared
sub-section (1) of section 5 of Act 30 of 1947
unconstitutional with effect from July, 17, 19549 after the 
introduction of sub-section (1-A) to (1—3D) in sedtion 34 
of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
94. A.I.R. 19S5 s;c. 13
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This was a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, challenging the validity of sub-section (1)
of Section 5 of Act 30 of 1947* under which the petitioners
cases were referred by the Government to the Income Tax
Investigation Commission for investigation of alleged
evasion of taxes. The impugned sub-section (1) provided that:
"The Central Government may at any time before the
first day of September 1948 refer to the Commission
for investigation and report any case or points in a
case in which the Central Government has 'prima facie’
reasons for believing that a person has to a
substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income...1
It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that sub­
section (l) of section 3 of the Act was repugnant to Article 
14 of the Constitution. Though a valid law must not 
discriminate between persons or things similarly situated, 
it is permissible to classify persons or things and treat 
them differently, provided there is a reasonable basis for 
the classification.
The Court held that the classification of cases to 
which Act 30 of 1947 applied was not valid. The word 
'substantial1 used in the section was vague and uncertain, 
having no fixed meaning; it could furnish no basis for any 
classification at all. It was further pointed out that 
Government was empowered by the clause to discriminate 
between persons in the same category, inasmuch as it could 
pick and choose the cases sent to the Commission for 
investigation and show favouritism toothexs by leaving them
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to be dealt with under the Income Tax Act,.though all might 
belong to the same class of persons, who had evaded payment 
of tax to a substantial extent.
By the time the petition came before the Court for
hearing, section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, had been
amended by the Income Tax Amendment Act (33 of 1954) and
sub-dection (1—A ) to (1-D) had been added* The relevant
portion of sub-section (1-A) provided that:
,!If in the case of an assessee, the Income Tax Officer - 
has reason to believe-
(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to income 
tax have escaped assessment for any year.*, beginning 
on the 1st day of September, 1939* and ending on the 
31st day of March, 1946; and
(ii) that the income, profits or gains which have so 
escaped assessment ••• amount,... to one lakh or rupees 
or more;
he may,... proceed to assess or reassess the income, 
profits or gains of the assessee...n
The Cpurt, as in Sura.i Mall Mohta1s case, did not 
express an opinion on the validity of S. 5(1) of the impugned 
Act, as being based on a valid classification and so safe 
from avoidance for repugnancy to Article 14 of the 
Constitution. However, on a comparison of the provisions 
of S. 5(1) of the Act with those of S. 34(1-A) of the 
Income Tax Act, 1922, their Lordships arrived at the 
conclusion that the new sub-section inserted in S.34 was 
intended to deal with the same class of persons aa were 
said to have been classified for special treatment by S.5(1) 
of the Act 30 of 1947. Of course, section 34(1-A) of the
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Income Tax Act, 1922, was an improvement on section 5(1) of 
the Act 30 of 1947, inasmuch as it did not use the word 
'substantial', which had been held to have no fixed meaning 
and was an unsatisfactory word for designating an 
asceirta-taable proportion of a whole, so that it brought 
about the avoidance of the provision in the Act of 1947. 
Section 34(1-A) of the Income Tax Act was free from the 
alledged defect. It was also made clear by the Act that 
no evasion of less than one lakh was subject to investigation 
and it was declared that the provisions would nol apply to 
income accruing between 1.9*1939 and 31*3*1946, tax on which 
had been evaded.
The Court accordingly held that the substantial 
tax-dodgers or war-profiteers, who were alleged to form a 
definite class under sub-section (1) of S.5 of Act 30 of 
1947 and whose cases needed special treatment at the hands 
of the Investigation Commission, now, after the insertion of 
section 34(1-A), fell within the ambit of S.34 of the:Income 
Tax Act. The result was that proceedings could no longer 
be continued under the provisionsof the impugned Act and 
sub-section (1) of section 5 was struck down as repugnant 
to the equality clause of the Constitution after section 
34(1-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, came into force.
In the third case, M.Ot. Muthiah v. C.I.T*, Madras, ^  
the Supreme Court struck down sub-section (1) of section
95* A.I.R. 1956, S.C. 269*
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5 of the Act 30 of 1947, after the coining into force of 
the Constitution in 1950, with effect from January 26, 1950, 
as the impugned section was reugnant to Article 14.
The Central Government, in exercise of its power 
under section 5(1) of Act 30 of 1947 referred the petitioner's 
case for investigation to the Investigation Commission for 
alleged evasion of income tax in the years 1940-4 1 , 19 41 -42  
and 1943-44 to 1948-49. The Commission, after holding an 
inquiry held that the petitioner had received an aggregate 
sum of Rs. 10,07,322, being undiclosed income for the period 
under investigation. The Commission gave its report to 
Government, which started reassessment proceedings. At this 
stage the petitioners moved the Supreme Court under Article 
32 of the Constitution, contending that the provisions of 
S. 5(1) of the Act 30 of 1947 was unconstitutional.
The grounds alleged were the same as contended in 
Sura j Mall Mohta and MeenajthhVs case, that S.5(1) of Act 30 
of 1947 wa€'disdriminatory, because it enabled the Central 
Government to discriminate between one person and another, 
inasmuch as they were authorized to pick and choose the 
persons who fell within the group of those who had 
substantially evaded taxation on income. The act of the 
Government in referring only some of the evaders to the 
Commission and leaving others to be dealt with under the 
Income Tax Act, 1922, was arbitrary and there was nothing
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to eliminate the possibility of favouritism or discrimination 
in.sending cases to the Commission between persons within 
the group of those who had evaded the payment of tax to a 
substantial extent. There was therefore, no justification 
for enacting a more drastic procedure (i.e., the summary 
procedure to be adopted in such cases by the Commission) in 
selected cases than the ordinary procedure prescribed under 
the Income Tax Act.
The Court while allowing the petition (Jaganadhadas J.
contra) held that the impugned section 5(1) was
discriminatory and offended against the right to equality
before the lav/ provided by Article 14 of the Constitution. 
________ It was held that section 34(l)^’as amended by the
96. Income Tax Act, 1922, section 34 (1) provided that:
”34(1) If-
(a) the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that by 
reason of i;he Omission or failure on the part of an 
assessee to make a return of his income... or to disclose 
fully and truly all material facts necessary for his 
assessment for that year, income, profits or gains 
chargeable to income tax which have escaped assessment for 
that year or have been underassessed, or assessed at too 
low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive 
relief... or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has 
been computed, or .
(b)... the Income Tair Officer has in consequence of 
information in his possession reason to believe that 
income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have 
escaped assessment...
He may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time 
within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b^ 
at any time within four years of the end of that year,.* 
proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or 
gains...and the provisions of this Act shall,... apply 
accordingly.. ♦11.
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Act (58 of 1948) v/ith effect from September 8, 1948, was 
wide enough to cover cases dealt with under section 5(1) of 
the impugned Act 30 of 1947. Their lordships repelled the 
respondent’s contention that the substantial tax evaders 
whose cases were referred by Government to the Commission 
before 1*9.1948 under section 5(1) of the impugned Act, 
formed a class by themselves and in leaving others, though 
belonging to the same class or category of substantial 
evaders of income tax, to be dealt with by the ordinary 
procedure prescribed in the Income Tax Act did not infringe 
the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the 
Constitution.
The Court held that the restriction of the operation 
of the impugned provision to a specified period did not 
create any special or rational nexus with the necessity for 
such a drastic procedure* Specifying the period was merely 
an accident and a measure of administrative convenience; it 
was not an element in the criteria of the particular class 
of substantial evaders of income tax.
It is submitted with respect that the majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court require reconsideration, 
inasmuch as their lordships erred in arriving at the 
conclusion that the impugned section 5(1) of the Act 30 of 
1947 became unconstitutional when Constitution came into 
force•
501
As stated by Jagannadhadas J., in his dissenting 
judgement, there was a clear cut distinction between the 
nature and the scope of section 5(1) of Act 30 of 1947 and 
section 34(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which justified 
differential treatment so that the former did not violate 
Article 14 of the Constitution. The establishment of the 
Investigation Commission was necessary, because the normal 
machinery available to the Income Tax Officer under section 
34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was inadequate for assessment 
of enormous sums of concealed income arising out of war 
profiteering. To overcame this lacuna Act 30 of 1947 was 
passed to enable an investigation of concealed income of 
war-profiteers to be made by a high-powered commission.
Section 5(1) of the impugned Act provided for an investigation 
of the:activities of the anti-social elements in India, who 
during-the war, had made substantial profits, had evaded 
payment of tax on those profits and whose cases were referred 
to the Commission before 1.9*1948. This constituted a well- 
defined class and the classification had a reasonable 
relation to the object sought to be achieved, viz., the 
catching up with black marketeers’ profits which had escaped 
assessment. The distinctive features of the impugned section 
5(1) and S. 34(1-^ would be apparent from the following points 
of difference:-
Section 5(1) was to be invoked only in those cases 
where the question related to evasion of a ’substantial sum*
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of money, while section 34(1) was applicable to every case 
of evasion, however small it might have been.
Section 5(1) required a greater degree of deliberation 
before setting in motion the machinery for assessment of 
concealed income, as compared with section 34(1) of the 
Income Tax Act. For instance, the former provision required 
a ’prima facie* belief on the part of the Government that a 
person had to a substantial extent evaded payment of 
taxation on income, whereas section 34(1) required only that 
the Income Tax Officer had ’reason to believe* before the 
machinery for re-assessment was set in motion*
A reference couid be made by the Government under 
section;5(1) only during a specified period, i.e., up to 
1.9.1948, whereas discovery under, section 34(1) any time up 
to eight years from the conclusion of the assessment year.
In fact, the Supreme Court itself in Sura.i Mall
Q7 QR
Liohta and Shree Meenakshi Llills  ^ impliedly upheld the
validity of section 5(1) of the Act 30 of 1947 and decided
these cases on that assumption.
And the Supreme Court in Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.
99M. Venkatachalam, upheld the constitutional validity of 
Section 5(1) of the Travancore Taxation on Income
97. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 545.
98. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 13
99. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246.
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(Investigation Commission) Act (14 of 1124 LI.E.), passed on 
7*3.1949> which was in identical terms with Section 5(1) of 
the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (30 
of 1947).
The impugned section 5(1) provided that Government
might refer to the Investigation Commission before 16.2.1950
for investigation and report any case in which it had prima
facie reason for belief that the assessee had, to a
substantial extent evaded income tax.
On 26.11. 1949 the Government referred the
petitioner’s case under section 5(1) of the Act for alleged
evasion of tax for the years 1942-1943. Before the
Commission could, however, make its report, the Constitution
of India came into force on 26.1.1950. Thereupon the
petitioner moved the Court for the issue of an appropriate
writ, restraining the Commissioner from proceedings in the
matter. It was contended that the impugned provisions were
void for repugnancy by Article 14> inasmuch as it was
discriminatory in the sense that the procedure provided
therein was more onerous as compared with that provided under 
•1
section 47 of the Travancore Income Tax Act (23 of 1121), when 
both dealt with the same class of persons.
Their Lordships rejected the petitioner’s contention 
and held that the two provisions were mutually exclusive 
and provided different treatment for cases different in their
nature and magnitude. It was held that section 5(1) of the
1.Section 47 of the Travancore Act was similar to that of 
Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, as it stood before
the amendment in 1948.
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impugned Act provided for investigation of only those
substantial evasions of income tax by persons who had made
huge profits during the war and whose dases required special
treatment by reason of the large scale evasions during that
period. Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court, rightly said:
"The object sought to be achieved by the impugned piece 
of legislation is quite definite and that is to catch 
substantial evaders of income tax out of those who have 
made huge profits duting the war period. They form a 
class by themselves and have to be specially treated 
under the procedure laid down in the Act. Being a class 
by themselves, the procedure to which they are subjected 
during the course of investigation of their cases by the 
Commission is not at all discriminatory, because such 
drastic procedure has a reasonable nexus with the object 
sought to be achieved by the Act and therefore such a 
classification is within the constitutional limitations?"
It may be noted that the Supreme Court*s attitude in
Thangal* s case was more realistic and helpful in grappling
with tax evasion. But the Supreme Court could not resist
the temptation of striking down a similar provision in
•5
Ivl.Ct. Muthiah v. Commissioner of Income Tax on the ground 
that it violates the right to equality. Despite their 
dedision in Thangal1s case, their lordships (by a majority) 
held that section 5(1) of the Act 30 of 1947 (which 
corresponded to section 5(1) of the Travancore Investigation 
Commission Act) became void when the Constitution came into 
force for repugnancy to Article 14*
2. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246 at p.267 (para 71)^ See1 Indian 
Constitutional Law*. M.P. Jain, (1862), pp. 365,366; LI.P. 
Jain, * Justice Bhagwati and the Indian Constitutional Law;1 
2, pp. 34,35 (1959).
3. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 269.
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This led to the winding up of one of the most 
important institutions designed to check evasion and caused 
a colossal loss of revenue to the exchequer.
However, it appears that the Supreme Court has 
abandoned its stiff attitude towards anti-avoidance 
legislation to some extent in its later decisions. For 
instance, the Supreme Court in Bala.ji v. I.T.O., Special 
Circle, Akola^ upheld the constitutional validity of section 
16(3)(a)(i) and (ii)^of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which 
provided that the shares in the profits of a firm received 
by the wife and the minor children of a partner in the firm 
should be included in the total income of such partner for 
the purposes of income tax, as being good legislation.
It was contended that S. I6(3)(a)(i) and (ii) was 
void for repugnancy to Article 14 of the Constitution, 
inasmuch as under the impugned sub-section, an individual 
was taxed on the income of his wife and children, if he 
carried on business in partnership with his wife or if he 
admitted his minor sons to the benefits of the partnership, 
whereas an individual, if he carried on business in 
partnership with a third party, whether a man or a woman, or 
even with his major children, or if his wife or children 
carried on business separately, would be liable only to pay
4. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 123.
5. See Chapter 4, p.!79for text of s. I6(3)(a)(i) and (ii).
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tax on the share of his partnership income. It was 
contended that this fact obviously placed an individual 
affected by the impugned sub-section in a more onerous slab, 
for the purposes of income tax, than the latter category of 
persons, because the husband or father had to pay tax at a 
higher rate on a higher income, than that he would have to 
pay, if the income of the wife or minor son was taxed 
separately, the tax being less on the lower slab.
The Court disagreed with the petitioner^ contention 
and held that the classification made by the legislature had 
a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, i.e., 
to prevent evasion of tax, so the provision was not 
unconstitutional for violation of the right to equal 
protection of the law under Article 14. The Court further 
stated that the impugned*sub-section did not violate the 
right to deal with property and carry on business in Article 
19(1 )(f) and (g)^ of the Constitution.
The husband contended that as he was made to pay tax 
on the income of his wife and children, who were in law 
distinct legal persons, he was deprived of his property by 
the State. Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court, stated:
6. Constitution of India, Article 19(l)(f) and (g) provide:
"19(1) All citizens shall have the right -
* ♦ •
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business."
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"...The scope of the provisions of S. 16(3) is limited 
only to a few of the intimate members of a family, who 
ordinarily are under the protection of the assessee and 
are dependents of him... This mode of taxation may be a 
little hard on a husband or a father in the case of a 
genuine partnership with a wife or minor children, but 
that is offset, to a large extent, by the beneficient 
results that flow therefrom to the public, namely, the 
prevention of evasion of income tax, and also by the 
fact that, by and large, the additional payment of tax 
made or the income of the wife or the minor children 
will ultimately be borne by them in the final accounting 
between them. In these circumstances, we cannot say 
that the provisions of S.16(3) of the Act impose an 
unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of 
the petitioner under Article 19(l)(f) and (g) of the 
Constitution."7
The Supreme Court, in one of its most recent
o
decisions, Messrs. Jain Brothers v. The Union of India , 
approved of section 297(2)(f) and (g) of the Income Tax Act, 
1961, which classified assessees in two groups for the 
purpose of the imposition of penalty dependant on whether 
the assessment proceedings were completed (a) before (b) on 
or after the 1st day of April, 1962 and held to be a valid 
piece of legislation.
Section 297(2)(f) and (g) of the Act of 1961
states:
"(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income 
Tax Act, 1922, •••....
7. Bala.ii v. I.T.O. A.I-.R.- 1962 S.C. 123,129, (para 15).
8. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 778. The Supreme Court has taken a 
similar stand in C.I.T., Delhi (Central) v. Messrs. Singh 
Engineering Work (P) Ltd. A.I.R. 1971 S.C• 95 >* (1970) 2 
S.C.W.R. 95; The Supreme Court in Babalal v. Collector of 
Customs A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 877, upheld the constitutionality 
of S. 178A, inserted in the Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878) by 
S.14 of the Amendment Act (21 of 1955)* It was held that
S. 178A of the Act, which places the burden of proof that 
the goods are not smuggled on the accused in whose possession 
guch ^go<^ are found does not violate Article 14 of the
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(f) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in
respect of any assessment completed before the 1st day
of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty 
may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed;
(g) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in
respect of any assessment for the year ending on the 
31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year, which is 
completed on or after the 1st day of April, 1962, may 
be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed under 
this Act*"
The cumulative effect of clause (f) and (g) is that 
the assessees whose assessment had been completed before 1st 
April, 1962, were to be dealt with for the purposes of 
imposition of penalty under the Act of 1922, while those 
whose assessment had been completed on or after April 1, 1962, 
were to be dealt with under the Act of 1961.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the 
impugned provision was violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution, inasmuch as it discriminated between two sets 
of assessees by reference to a date, which had no reasonable 
relation to the object of legislation, and it depended 
entirely on the sweet will of the Income Tax Officer whether 
the assessment was completed before the 1st day of April,
1962 in order to make the provisions of the Act of 1922 
applicable in regard to the imposition of penalty. It was 
further contended that as the penalty provisions contained 
in the Act of 1961 are more onerous to the assessee than the 
penalty provisions of the Act of 1922, so the application of 
the provisions of the new Act to a certain class of assessee 
while others were dealt with under the old Act, is ultra vires
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the Constitution, being discriminatory in nature.
The Court rejected the appellant*s contention and 
held that the classification based on a particular date, 
i.e., April 1, 1962, for the purposes of imposition of 
penalty in respect to pending assessment proceedings was 
not arbitrary or fanciful. It v;as necessary for the 
implementation of the Act of 1961 and the disposal of penalty 
proceedings, to fix a date ?/hen the new penalties would come 
into force and April 1 , 1962, was the appropriate date for 
this purpose, as it was the date on which the Act of 1961 
came into operation. Their Lordships approved of the view 
taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gopichand Sarjuprasad
9
v# Union of India and the Allahabad High Court in Income Tax
10Officer A-\7ard, Agra v. Birm Mad an Mohan Lamma Mai that no
discrimination was created by enacting S.297(2)(g) of the Act
of 1961. It was held that:
"...The classification made is based on intelligible 
differentia, having reasonable relation to the object 
intended to be achieved. The object essentially was 
to prevent the evasion of tax."''
It was further held that the mere possibility that
some Officers might intentionally delay the disposal of a
case could hardly be a ground for striking down clause (g) as
9. A.I.R. 1969 M .P • 220.
10. (1968)70 I.T.R. 293 (All).
11. Messrs. Jain Brothers v. The Union of India A.I.R. 1970,
S.C. 778 at p. 785 (para T T T
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discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The case is important from two points. Firstly,
1 2it has set at rest a controversy between the Bombay ,
<1 ■2 -i A -]£• -i /* * r-j
Gujarat , Calcutta , Assam ^ , Mysore and Allahabad '
High Courts on the one hand and the Madhya Pradesfi^Delhi^,
20 21 Rajasthan and an earlier case of the Allahabad High Court
in regard to the constitutionality of the impugned provision
by deciding in favour of the latter. Secondly, the Supreme
Court has taken a different attitude from its earlier
decisions in Shree Meenkashi Mills Ltd. v. A.V. Visyavantha
22 2^Sastri and M. Ct. Muthiah v. C.I.T. , wherein as stated
earlier, the Court held a classification based on time was
not valid.
12. Shakti Offset Works v. Inspecting Asst. Commissioner 
(1967) 64 I.'i'.R. 637.
13. C.I.T. v. Hira Lai Mohan Lai Shah, (1968) 69 I.T.R. 312; 
P.M. llansavi v. C . I . T . (1 L)69 ) 72 I.T.R. 17 (Suj).
14. Harendra Sharma v. I.T.O.unreported case. Case Ho 213. 
of 1966", D/- 5.3.19^9 (Cal.) Quoted from A.I.E. 1970,
All. 620 at p. 633 (para 39).
15. C .I .T . , Assam v. Tejpur Automobiles, A . I.E. 1969 Assam 
1 2 2 .
16. S.G. Magovi v. C.I.T., Mysore,(1967) 64 I.T.R. 409.
17. Messrs. Raghu Handan Prasad IVIohan Lai v. I.T.A. Tribunal,
  E. 1970 All. 620. ..
18. Kishan Lai v. C.l.T., M .P.t (1967) 64 I.T.R. 285 (M.P.);
C.I.T., M .P . v. Champalal Suldaram, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 7k;
19. Messrs Jain Brothers v. Union of India, Civil Misc. Writ 
1247 of 19^7, D/- 24.2.1969,(Delhi).
20. Messrs. M.P. Indra and Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1965 9 
Raj. 104.
21. I.T.O., A-Ward, Agra v. Firm Mad an Mohan Damma Mai (1968), 
70 I.T.R. 293.
22. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 13.
23. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 269.
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. C H A P T E R  IX 
CONCLUSION
The study made in the foregoing pages reveals 
that tax avoidance and tax evasion are widespread and 
rampant in India; they have retarded the economic 
development of the country in various ways. The 
consequences are grave, and far-reaching. They have 
reduced the yield of taxes, caused an unfair distribution 
of the burden of taxes and increased pro tanto the load 
of taxation on the good citizens, who do not resort to 
such anti-social and criminal activities. The problem 
is acute. It has not only retarded the industrial, 
agricultural and commercial progress of the nation, but 
has also, adversely affected social and moral values of 
society, creating disrespect for the law and the 
enforcement machinery leading ultimately to frustration 
among the honest taxpayers.
The study further discloses that no single factor 
can account for the spread of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
on such an alarming scale. Many factors are conjointly
1. See Chapter 3, pp. 79>80 and Chapter 5, pp. 204-206 and 
242 for extent of loss of revenue on account of tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and delay in payment and 
realization of taxes.
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responsible ior this nation—v/ide malady. Lack of a sound 
tax policy, frequent amendments of law, complexity of law, 
inefficient tax administration, lack of integrity in the 
Income fax Department, absence of deterrent punishment and 
prosecution of tax criminals, uneven treatment accorded 
to taxpayers, low public morale, non-co-operation of 
taxpayers and the lenient attitude of the judiciary in 
cases of tax avoidance and tax evasion, are some of the 
major factors responsible for the growth of tax crimes?
This indicates that the task of tax crime control 
is a hard one. It needs a constant and concerted effort 
from all sections of the community before real success can 
be achieved. There is no magic formula that will 
eradicate cririies.The problem has to be tackled on a 
number of fronts and many reforms are necessary, if 
substantial results are to be achieved. A programme of 
tax crime control requires a multiple approach in order 
to make it a success.
Preventive, deterrent and reformative measures 
must be planned and implemented in a sustained and co­
ordinated manner. These should include legal, 
administrative, economic and social measures, a nation-wide
2. For causes and effects of tax avoidance and tax evasion,see 
supra, Chapter 3> pp. 79 to 82 and Chapter 5, pp. 223 to 
2 6 1 .
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programme to educate the people in order to inculcate in 
them a sense of duty to pay their taxes to the State.
Besides this the judiciary should change its approach and 
outlook to tax crimes.
In the preceding chapters an elaborate study of 
the feasibility of such measures has been made,and appropriate 
schemes for their implementation have been suggested.
The Indian Income Tax legislation, as stated earlier, 
suffers from frequent additions, alterations and amendments. 
This is an undesirable feature of most modern taxation. It 
must be conceded that the law has to change to meet the 
needs of the time and changing circumstances, especially in 
a developing country like India and in particular in the 
case of Income Tax legislation, which has to take into 
consideration the interests of different classes of 
taxpayers. However, frequent changes should be avoided as 
far as possible, for they engender lack of confidence in 
the minds of taxpayers, suggest the absence of a sound 
policy on the part of the legislature and rob the law of that 
modicum of stability, which is essential to its healthy 
growth.
The lav/ should be so conceived and drafted as to be 
easily understood, even by the average taxpayer. Amendments 
should only be made after consulting experts and the 
interests concerned. They should not be made in a hurry;
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they should be well thought out.
An essential feature of tax crime control is a 
sound tax policy. Fiscal legislation is not an end in 
itself but a means to achieve an end. Taxes should be 
moderate, within the reach of taxpayer’s purses and not 
excessive. Taxation should not go beyond the saturation 
point; otherwise it will retard economic growth, lead to 
tax avoidance and tax evasion and discourage the investment 
in industries necessary for the development of the economy. 
The object of taxation should b e ; to create a harmonious 
relationship between the State's and the individual’s 
interests, to help the economy of the country to grow and 
to encourage industrial and economic development. Instead 
of imposing further exorbitant rates of taxes, attention 
should be directed to suppressing tax avoidance and tax 
evasion.
A word may be said for the imposition of income tax 
on ’agricultural income' and on ’receipts of a casual and 
non-recurring nature'.
In India, the main burden of income tax falls too 
heavily on a small segment of society, approximately 3 
million people,'' living in the urban and industrial sectors 
out of a total population of approximately 541 million.^
3. 'Report of the Y/orking Group on The Central Direct Taxes
Administration' (1968;, Administrative Reforms Commission,
para 2*3> P* 10.
4. This is the latest figure according to the 1971 census.
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The bulk of the population, nearly 80 per cent, live in 
villages and agriculture is their main source of livelihood. 
Land revenue and taxes on agricultural income are within 
the exclusive power of the States, being items 45 and 46 on 
List II in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The wide 
definition of ’agricultural income1 in the Income Tax Acts 
cannot be changed, except on the recommendation of the 
President, given under Art.270 of the Constitution.
Though the net proceeds of income tax collections are 
distributable between the Centre and the State,agricultural 
income tax dannot be levied under the Income Tax Act, 1961'. 
As most State Legislatures are controlled by agriculturists, 
it is notorious that the State Legislatures generally do 
not exercise their taxing powers so as to impose as heavy 
a burden on the agriculturists as Parliament imposes under 
the Income Tax Act, 1961
There appears to be no justification for the 
disparity between the burden borne by the agriculturist 
and the non-agriculturist, for it cannot be contended that 
either class has a heavier responsibility for the improvement
5. Some of the Indian States have imposed agricultural 
income tax on citizens in the higher income bracket.
These include Assam, Bengal,U.P.,Bihar, etc. M.L. Upadhya, 
Some Legal Aspects of Agrarian Reform in India (Ph.D. 
ThesisL unmve^'sTTy~of^ondon7~l^T^r^1~9-ER6’)~7~
6 . The earlier Income Tax Acts also exempted agricultural 
income from income tax, see Income Tax Act, 1922, s.4(5 ) 
(vii), I.T. Act, 1918, S.3(2)(x), I.T. Act, 1886, s.5(1 )
(a)(b).
5 1 6
of the national economy. If favour is to be shown, it 
should be to newly established industrial enterprises. As 
it is, a person employed in industry or commerce or following 
a profession and earning Rs. 5,000 a year is more heavily 
burdened than a person drawing Rs. 50,000 a year 
agricultural income, because even when agricultural income 
tan is imposed by the State, the rate is lower than that 
payable under the Income Tan Act.
The agriculturist lobby contends that the tiller of
the soil is too poor to be taxed and he must be exempted from
assessment to income tax to encourage agricultural
development. But the poorer citizens will derive the
greater benefit from economic development, so it is only
reasonable that they should contribute what they can to
finance such development. As has been pointed out by
Professor H.C.L. Merillat:
"It is an economist's commonplace that a developing 
country, in working its way towards a relatively 
self-sustaining posture of economic growth, must 
channel into savings and investment a large part of 
the gains in income resulting from current growth.
In other words, the siphoning off of savings (which must 
often take the form of taxation of current income) is 
a necessary element in the capital formation needed for 
economic development, whether agricultural or 
industrial, in conditions that avoid serious inflation. 
Accordingly, if the agricultural sector of the Indian 
Community is relatively undertaxed,not only will there 
be unjust disparities in comparison with the urban 
population and the industrial sector but also the total 
economic development of the country may be retarded."7
7. 'Land and the Constitution in India1, (1970), at p. 81;
See 'Tax Burden on Indian Agriculture', Ved P. Gandhi,
(Cambridge, Massachusse11s 1966), International
Programme in Taxation.
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It may be noted that 'agricultural income tax 1 
is levied in many parts of equally under-devoloped parts
o
in East Africa and Nigeria. In Japan as long ago as 
1870 the revenue from a tax on agriculture accounted for 
51.7 per cent of the total tax revenue^.
Besides causing disparity between the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors and deleteriously affecting 
the economy, the exemption encourages income tax avoidance 
and evasion. People invest unaccounted cash and concealed 
income in purchasing landed property and get exemption from 
taxation on the earnings of such property.
It i s ,therefore, high time for agricultural income
1 0to be brought within the purview of income tax. But it 
may be doubted whether the Central Government feels strong 
enough to take measures,which might induce the agricultural 
community to withdraw its support. As, at present, the 
Government enjoys the support of more than 2/3r&t> o f tne members
8 . 'Mr. Kaldor's Plan for the Reform of Indian Taxes', Ursula 
K . Hicks,(958) 6 8 , The Economic Journal, pp. 1 6 0,163-64.
9 * gupra note 7 at p. 82.
10• Ihe Income Tax Investigation Commission 1953-54 in V o l .3 
paras 10- 1 3, pp. 2 2 2, 2 2 3, made a suggestion for one 
uniform income tax levied by the Union of India and 
proceeds to be divided between the Centre and the States. 
But the suggestion was not implemented * The Administrative 
Reform Commission in its Report on Central Direct Taxes 
Administration (1969), para 7(h) at p. 22, suggested 
the inclusion of the agricultural income of a person 
for the purposes of calculating the rate of tax chargeable 
on his total income.
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of the Lok Sabha, it is in a position to sponsor 
legislature to amend the Constitution, but a proposal to 
make a change in any of the Lists in the 7th Schedule, such 
as transferring the power to levy income tax to the Central 
List, v,rould require, under Art. 568, proviso (2) of the 
Constitution, ratification by the Legislature of at least 
one half of the States.
The Centre has long been av;are of the unequal
fiscal demands made on the urban and rural taxpayers, and
has sought means of enforcing a greater contribution from
the agriculturists by inventing new taxes. One such was
the Wealth Tax, a levy on the capital value of capital
assets exceeding a lakh of rupees. As this applied to
11agricultural property, the agricultural lobby protested 
and succeeded in inducing the Government to raise the 
excluded capital to one and a half lakhs for owners of 
agricultural land. It is the well-to-do agricultural 
landlords who fight to maintain the status quo and, if 
income tax were levied on agricultural income, the main 
burden would fall on them. The poor cultivator who, they 
say, is too poor to be taxed, would not suffer, because his 
income would be too low to bring him within the mischief 
of the Income Tax Act.
1 1. Supra note 7 , pp. 99 to 101.
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Under the present scheme of taxation, receipts
which are of a 1 casual and non-recurring nature’ are
exempt from income tax under section 10(3) of the Act of
1961. This means that income, which is subject to or
produced by chance, or is an accidental gain and whose
occurrence is not of a regular nature, is not subject to
income tax. For example, a prize won in a lottery or a
bet on the race course is exempt from tax, being a receipt
of a casual and non-recurring nature.
There appears to be no rationale behind such an
exemption, though there are obvious difficulties in obtaining
information about some such receipts. It seems unjust that
a person who has earned by the sweat of his brow R s . 5 , 0 0 0
in a year is asked to pay tax on it whereas a person who
wins 5 lakhs in a lottery or a horse race is not required
to pay even a single paisa, on the ground that the gain is
a receipt of an accidental nature.
In addition to a substantial loss of revenue, this
exemption provides a fertile ground for concealing
unaccounted money and evading payment of taxes, as pointed
1 3
out earlier in Chapter five.  ^ A lot of the valuable time
12. Section 10(3) of the Act of 1961 provides three cases in 
which such receipts would be chargeable to income tax. 
These are:
(i) capital gains, chargeable under the provisions of 
section 4 5 ; or
(ii) receipts arising from business or the exercise of
a profession or occupation; or
(iii) receipts by way of addition to the remuneration 
of an employee.
13. See supra p. 203.
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of the Courts’, the Revenue authorities and the taxpayer is
wasted in finding out whether a receipt is of a casual and
non-recurring nature, exempt from taxes*
It may not be out of place to mention that the
earlier Income Tax Act of 1886 was more pragmatic in this
respect, inasmuch as it did not provide an exemption from
income tax in such cases. The Act of 1961 has no doubt
limited the scope of the blanket exemption provided in the
Act of 1922,^' but this is not enough.
It would be in the interest of the revenue and
taxpayers in general that this exemption, which has no ethical,
1 5social or legal justification should be withdrawn.
A large section of the community either does not
pay taxes or pays at a very low rate, though their income
16is much above the minimum taxable limit, and thereby 
evade paying a substantial amount of tax every year. They
14. See supra note 1 2. Similar provisions regarding
exemptions from taxation were contained in the Act of 
1922, in section 4 (3 )(vii) and in the Act of 1918 in Sec. 
3 (2 )(viii).
15* See ’A Plea for Tax on Casual Income’, R.N. Varma (1964) 
Tax Consultant Conference Souvenir (Jaipur) p.137,
149-50.
16 Supra notes 3, 6.11 at p. 11 2. This is evident from the 
fact that in the First Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, out of 
2,001 persons, 191 persons and in the Second Voluntary 
Disclosure Scheme out of 2,66,000 persons, 77,030 were 
those who had not been previously assessed. In India only
1 per cent of the income earning population pay income tax, 
whereas in Britain 70 per cent of (the income earners) pay 
taxes. See ’Indian Tax Reform’, Nicholas Kaldor 
(Government of India, 1956, p. 7.
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include persons belonging to such professions as contractors, 
accountants, doctors, lawyers and traders. Such persons 
generally do not keep any record or account of their income 
or they do business not recorded in their account books.
An extensive door to door survey is needed to bring 
to book such persons. Assistance of persons living in the 
locality may be of use in ascertaining the income, 
expenditure and the standard of living of such individuals 
in order to determine the actual income for the purposes 
of taxation.
Perhaps, it would be appropriate to establish a 
separate unit for the purpose in every Commissioner's 
division. The present staff is inadequate for the purpose 
and should not be trusted with this work. A team of 
enthusiastic and well trained staff is needed for the 
purpose.
A system of rewards to informers may be introduced, 
as in case of the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom. This system is enforced by the Indian Customs 
Department.
All persons doing business or following professions 
could be required by law to keep accounts of their income 
and expenditure and failure to do so should attract
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17penalty. To start with, this might be made compulsory in 
the case of persons having an income of Rs.25,000 per annum.
In the case of contractors and landlords (who earn 
a huge sum of money in rent from houses and other properties 
in cities), the tax could be deducted at source, as in the 
case of the salaried class of people and paid direct to 
the Government by the person making such payment.
In case of husband and wife, the income should be 
added for the purposes of taxation as is done in Britain.
This will close one of the areas of evasion, inasmuch as 
the husband will be restrained from misrepresenting part of 
his income as that of his wife and claim exemption from 
taxation.
The accounting year should be the same for 
every one for purposes of taxation. At present it is open 
to an individual taxpayer doing busihess to adopt any date, 
depending on his own convenience as the end of the previous 
year for the purposes of assessment of tax. This creates 
a lot of confusion and makes the procedure for assessment 
cumbersome and complicated so that much of the Departments 
time is wasted.
17. ®he Sales Tax statutes of various States make provision 
for keeping accounts and records. Failure to comply with 
the statutory provisions leads to statutory punishment. 
See The Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, S.24(0(e); Punjab 
General Sales Tax Act, 1949* S.23(l)(e); The Bihar 
Sales Tax Act, 1947. S. 16; The Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax 
Act, 1947, S. 24(e); Similar provisions are contained in 
the United States in U.S., Internal Revenue Code, 1954, 
section 60011 In New Zealand; The Land and Income Tax Act 
1954,^*239; In Canada, the Income Tax Act, 1952,
S. 151(2).
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The return forms meant for assessees with incomes
above Rs. 15,000 per annum and for companies, which runs
into 30 pages, should be simplified, as has been done in
the cases of other assessees. The form should be simple
and easy to understand. An instruction as to how one
should fill in the return form should be attached to the
form; this will help a taxpayer to understand the provisions
and make a correct return.
A word may be said regarding collection of taxes.
A substantial sum of Government money is lying in the hands
of taxpayers. To extract this requires a herculean effort
on the part of the Government and the Income Tax Department.
18
Special endeavours are required for the purpose.
Arrangements should be made in the Income Tax Department for 
the collection of taxes. Under the present system a 
taxpayer is required to deposit the amount of tax either in 
the State Bank or a Government Treasury, which stops 
collection after 2 p.m. on week days and 12 o’clock on 
Saturday. A.taxpayer is first required to go to the Income 
Tax Office and, after taking a chalan (voucher), he is 
required to deposit the sum in the State Bank of India or 
the Government treasury. This takes up a lot of the
18. See ’The Hew System of Collecting Income Tax, Property 
Tax and Company Tax in Indonesia’, D •R .S. Muhid Husni, 
(1969) 23, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation, pp. 151-9*
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assessees’ time and he is put to much inconvenience. It
would be better, if a provision were made for the collection
of taxes in the departmental office, which should remain
open until 5 p.m. This will facilitate the timely
collection and save the assessee’s time.
A rebate, 5 to 10 per cent of the tax due, as is
prevalent in the case of electricity charges should be given
to these taxpayers who deposit taxes within a prescribed
time and failure to do so should automatically forfeit the
amount of rebate. This would go a long way in accelerating
the system of collection of taxes. This system is working
very well in the case of the Electricity Department and
should be tried by the Income Tax Department.
The importance of educating the taxpayer cannot be
too heavily stressed in modern times, when almost every
one has to pay tax in one form or the otner. Such education
is necessary to create the proper psychological approach
19and inspire confidence in the average taxpayer.
Taxpayers should be properly informed and given
every assistance by the Income Tax Department. The
Department should send the necessary literature to
individual taxpayers along with the return forms.
Information should be issued on radio, television and in
the press; taxpayers -should be reminded of the dates for
19. See Articles on 'Tax Payer’s Education’, F.H. Vallibhoy,
B. Venkataratnam and Onlcar hath, ’Report on 3rd All India 
Conference of Tax Executives (1968), pp. 125-30, 131-36 
and 137-39 respectively.
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filing returns well in advance. Model returns should be 
prepared and explained to the taxpayers. Offices should 
be open during hours when taxpayers are not usually working, 
so that taxpayers can contact the officers and get their 
difficulties solved.
Taxpayers should be amde to feel that what they 
are paying in taxes is fair and just and that they are 
making a valuable contribution to the State. The taxpayers 
should be told that the act of defrauding the revenue is a 
mean and despicable offence against his fellow taxpayers 
and should not be done in any circumstances.
There is perhaps no other field of state and 
citizen relationship in which it is as necessary to have 
a cordial co-operative and smooth relationship and attitude 
as in the case of taxation. The Department should encourage 
the co-operation of the assessees and the assessees should 
reciprocate with the same spirit of cordiality, so as to 
pave the way for the harmonious relationship essential for 
a successful programme of taxation.
An important step in crime control is the infliction 
of deterrent punishments; this is necessary, not only to 
deter others from committing such crimes, but also to raise 
the standard of morale of the people. But unfortunately 
no attention is paid to this in India by the Income Tax 
Department. Generally a nominal monetary penalty is imposed
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or a half-hearted attempt is made to institute criminal 
prosecutions against tax evaders, which result in 
acquittal.^0
This has had a demoralizing effect on the taxpayers 
as a whole and gives an incentive to tax evasion. The 
department should change its lenient attitude and resort 
to more deterrent methods. Tax avoidance and tax evasion 
will stop only if the cost of avoidance or evasion is 
higher than the gain out of it.
A successful programme cf deterrent punishment 
should include provisions for automatic civil penalties, 
criminal prosecution, economic and social sanctions.
In cases where taxpayers fail to fulfil their
statutory obligations to file a return of income within a
prescribed time or pay taxes as required by the provisions
of the Act, without any reasonable cause or excuse, an
21automatic penalty should be added.
22The efficacy of a jail sentence is beyond question 
Such a sentence, "has had a most benign effect on those who
20. See Chapter 5, p. 229.
21. ’Report of the Seminar on Administration of Income Tax 
in African Countries, United Rations, (Llarch 25 to 5th 
April, 1968), p. 15.
22. In Israel a successful campaign of prosecution of tax 
evaders during a short period of three years 1961-64 
increased the amount of declared income by 150 to 200 
per cent as compared with returns filed before sentences 
were inflicted. See ’Memorandum: Criminal Proceedings 
lor Income Tax Offences’, Director of State Revenue, 
llarch 5> 1965, p. 7; ’The Crime of Income Tax Fraud:
Its Present Status and function’(1953) 53 * Col. L.rY 
476, 478...............
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23do not like to pay taxes." But in India provisions 
relating to penalties and prosecutions are more or less a
dead letter and rarely applied.
24As stated earlier, the prosecution machinery should
be strengthened; tax evaders should be prosecuted in large
numbers every year and publicity should be given to such
cases in the press. Compromise of cases of tax evasion
should be discouraged. It would be better to delete the
provisions relating to compromise contained in section
279(2) of the Act of 1961 .
The offence of making a false statement in a
25declaration under section 277 of the Act of 1961, should be 
made cognizable and non-bailable. This would have a great 
deterrent effect and people would think twice before making 
false and fraudulent statements in their returns of income.
Accountants, tax consultants and Officers of the 
Income Tax Department, who co-operate in tax avoidance and 
tax evasion, should also be prosecuted and punished adequately, 
This will have a positive and healthy effect both on the 
working of the Income Tax machinery and the taxpaying 
community in general.
23 • ’After Sentence - V.iiat?* James V. Bennett, (1954-55) 45, 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science,
North Western University School of Law, p. 537.
24. See Chapter 5, pp. 226-32.
25. See Chapter 7, Supra p. 339 for text of section 277.
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A person found guilty of evasion of taxes or non­
payment of taxes should be debarred from entering into 
Government contracts, obtaining foreign exchange, leaving 
the country, obtaining an import licence, seeking elections 
for Parliament, State legislatures and local bodies. Such 
persons should be made social outcast:* and Ministers and
Government officials should be restrained from attending
2 6parties given by such people, and associating with them.
A word of caution may be added here. While the 
severity of penalties and the likelihood of conviction are 
important factors in minimizing the incidence of tax 
evasion, the psychology of the average tax offender, the 
cost and convenience of administration, the amount of loss 
to the revenue, and the danger of harm to innocent persons 
should also be taken into account before launching a 
prosecution.
The magnitude of tax avoidance and tax evasion is
directly linked with the judicial attitude. If the Courts’
attitude is favourable to a taxpayer seeking to avoid and
evade the taxes, these activities will obviously flourish.
27In India, as noted earlier, the Courts’ attitude 
has always been encouraging to the reluctant taxpayers.
The Courts have approved of schemes and devices of a
26. Supra note , para 6.43 at p. 129.
27. See Chapter 4.
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taxpayer meant to defeat the object of the fiscal
legislation and escape from the impact of taxation, ignoring
the social and economic effect of the decisions. The Courts
in India, like British Courts, have applied the principle
of strict interpretation of statutes, when deciding cases
relating to tax avoidance, even when it has led to absurd
results and have expressed their inability to remedy any
28defect in the legislation.
It is submitted with respect, that the Courts’ view 
on the point needs modification in the light of changed 
circumstances and conditions. The Courts should not blindly 
follow and apply the literal rule of interpretation, or 
maintain ancient traditions, ignoring the social and
economic interests of the community. The Courts’ role, as
29stated by Lord Denning, M.R. , should not be to defeat the
object of legislation but to promote it by giving a liberal
interpretation of the provisions. This is particularly
necessary when interpreting the provisions of economic
legislation like an Income Tax Act, the object of which is
to promote the economy of the Country. The view expressed
3 0by Hedge J., in V»D. Dhanwatey v. C.I.T., M.P. (minority
28. See Chapter 4> p. 148 ; see ’Around the Courts’, G.
McGregor (1968) 16 Can. f.J. 262-280; Interpretation of 
Taxing Statutes: Thither Canada? G. McGregor (1968)
16 Can. T.J., pp. 122-136.
29. See Chapter 4, pp.
50. a .I.R. 1968 S.C. 683.
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judgement) in regard to the interpretation of ancient texts
equally applies in case of economic legislation. He states:
“Law is a social mechanism to be used for the 
advancement of the society. It should not be allowed 
to be a dead weight on the society. While 
interpreting ancient texts, the Courts must give them 
a liberal construction to further the interests of 
the society.“31
The Courts should interpret a taxing statute fairly
and equitably, in such a way as to give effect to the
intentions of the legislature and not to defeat it. The
Courts should also have due regard to the true nature and
effect of the transaction under consideration and take into
account its social, economic and legal effect. The role of
32Courts in India, like that of the Supreme Court of America , 
should be to accelerate the wheels of the legislature in 
its efforts to root out such anti-social acts and not to 
give encouragement to tax evaders.
Another important area in which the Courts’ role 
is significant in checking tax evasion is the application 
of the penal provisions contained in the Income Tax Act.
The Courts’ attitude, as elsewhere, has been 
discouraging from the point of view of the revenue. This 
is evident from the fact that, out of 31 prosecutions 
launched by the Income Tax Department for tax evasion during
31. Ibid. p. 696 (para 31)•
32. See Chapter 4, supra pp.193-98.
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the years 1961-62 to 1965-66, the Courts convicted in only 
two. ho doubt ,the Income Tax Department is responsible to 
a great extent for the acquittals. Nevertheless, the 
Courts’ attitude towards such criminals is material and 
important from the point of view of checking tax crimes in 
the Country. The lenient attitude of the judiciary towards 
economic offences is a direct inducement to potential 
violators and others to indulge in such crimes.
The mild attitude towards tax evaders is again 
discernable from the fact that the Courts, when dealing 
with administrative penalties, apply the Common law doctrine 
of mens re a, even in cases where the legislature has 
purported to do away with it.
Showing a soft or sympathetic attitude in cases of 
glaring tax evasion is inappropriate in a developing 
country like India.
It may be appropriate here to quote an extract from 
the judgement of the Court of appeal in R. v. raher, 
which illustrates the value of the infliction of deterrent 
punishment in economic offences. The Court upheld a 
sentence of three years imprisonment on a Lebanese student 
of nineteen, for illegal importation of cannabis.
The accused, previously of good character had been 
induced to become the "runner" of some Lebanese drug
33. oee Chapter 5, pp.228-9 and Chapter 8, pp. 428-50.
34. (1969) 53 Cr. App. hep. 490; see ’The Lnglish sentencing 
Oystem’, Rupert Cross (1971)5 p. 107.
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exporters by the promise of money and a short holiday visit
in .Britain. He was found to have £3 >500 worth of cannabis
on his arrival in Britain.
i'he Court refused to take a lenient attitude and
reduce the penalty to a suspended sentence of six months,
as in other cases, on the ground that:
”... If a young man such as the appellant is given a 
six months1 suspended sentence, back he goes from whence 
he came, and the news spreads like v/ildfire amongst 
all students. ’Well, this is not a bad way of trying to 
get money, because if it comes off, you have made a nice 
profit and had a good holiday, and if it does not come 
off you will just be sent home again.1 On the other 
hand, if it is known among potential runners in the 
Lebanon, and elsewhere, that if they are caught 
attempting to smuggle the drugs into this country they 
will be very severely dealt with, there may be a 
remarkable lack of enthusiasm for enterprises of this 
kind and great difficulties put in the way of people 
who run this horrible trade.,f
This attitude alone, can help in eradicating tax
evasion. The Courts should not hesitate in awarding long
term prison sentences for tax crime cases. The best way
to prevent tax fraud is to impose heavy terms of
imprisonment on delinquents. The taxpayers should be taught
by criminal prosecution that attempts at concealment of
income will not only fail but also land him in jail.
35. Ibid. at p. 492; see ’Criminal Sanctions in Economic Law’ 
J. Unger5 Published in British iegal Papers, (4th August- 
9th August, 1958), pp. 383-389; ’Nature of Criminal Law 
and Criminal Proceedings: Liens Rea and Economic Crimes, 
Latika Sarkor- and li#~V. Kelkar (1965) TT J. I • L. I. pp.
45.6-46 2: Mr. Justice G-ajendragadakar on Criminal Lav/, 
Grirsih Chandra (1966) 8 J.I.lVi ., p. 588,596.
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APPENDIX
ORGANIZATION CHART 
DEPARTMENT OP REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES 
MINISTRY OP FINANCE 
GOVERNMENT OP INDIA
HEAD QUARTERS
MINISTRY OP FINANCE
Departmentvof Revenue 
and Expenditures
Central Board of Indirect Central Board of
Taxes (includes Customs Direct Taxes,
and Excise). (5 members).
Directorate of 
Inspection
FIELD
Commissioner of Appellate Assistant
Income Tax Commissioner
i
i
Inspecting Assistant 
Commissioner
i
i
Income Tax Officer
i
Inspector of Income 
Tax
(Chart has been taken from the Report on Tax Administration in 
India - A Tax Assistance Survey, By Foreign Assistance Staff, 
United States Internal Revenue Service, (1964) at p.8.).
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